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
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
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THE

AMERICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

EDITED BY

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ART. I.—THE THEOLOGICAL SYSTEM OF EMMONS.

THE WORKS OF NATHANIEL EMMONS, D.D. *Edited by* JACOB IDE, D.D.
Boston: Congregational Board. 6 vols.

MEMOIR OF NATHANIEL EMMONS; *with Sketches of his Friends and Pupils.*
By EDWARDS A. PARK. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication.
1861. 8vo, pp. 468.

PROFESSOR STUART of Andover once wrote an essay in the *Biblical Repository* to show that Arminius was not an Arminian. And eminent divines are now busy with the inquiry whether Dr. Emmons was an Emmonsite. Did he really hold to those definite and peculiar views which are popularly associated with his venerable name? Or, are his sharp doctrinal statements to be taken in a feminine rather than a masculine sense? to be called metaphorical and not literal, popular and not exact, Biblical in contrast with scientific? Of course, all that is necessary to make out that Dr. Emmons was not an Emmonsite, is to interpret his definite formulas in an indefinite sense, for the essence of his system is in its definiteness. Keen logic and exegetical skill can do very much with such a flexi-

ble material as human speech. Words are susceptible of a great variety of significations. Interpret all the leading terms in a very general sense, and it can easily be shown, that the most extreme men, when rightly understood, really mean just about what common mortals are always saying. A trifling difference of phraseology is all that is left. And perhaps this is the way in which theological controversy is to come to an end, viz. by interpreting everybody indefinitely. If the whole region is levelled, no mountains are left. But whatever may be in store for us in the indefinite future, it is hard to overcome our prejudices as to the past, and still more difficult to reverse the verdict of history. There are, to be sure, some signal instances of a revision and reversal of contemporary judgments. We might admit, with Hegel, that Aristotle was a profounder metaphysician than Plato; with Müller, that Augustine held to human freedom in its profoundest sense; with Cousin, that Pascal was subject to the torture of doubt; Mohammed may not have been a mere impostor, nor Cromwell a fanatical rebel, nor Henry VIII. a cruel tyrant; but still we must confess that we find it difficult to believe, that the "Wise Teacher and Royal Preacher of New England" (as the Rev. Thomas Williams calls Emmons) did not hold certain very distinct and even peculiar views upon divine efficiency, human exercises, submission, justification, and the grounds of the rewards of Paradise. And in fact, it seems to us, that just so far as the peculiarities of his system are explained away, Emmons himself is explained away. Another personage takes the place of that simple, venerable, and rigid form. The three-cornered hat, small-clothes, and bright knee-buckles are replaced by a loose coat, flowing pantaloons, and a soft and easy hat of modern material and fabric. Just so far as he is thus modernised, he forfeits the special rank which has been ascribed to him in the development of New England theology. If his distinct and distinctive propositions are reduced to the terms of a less severe system, his reputation as a clear and logical thinker also suffers detriment. For this emasculating process has chief respect to the vital points of his theory, those upon which he thought and preached most

constantly and urgently. His "consistent Calvinism" is contained in them. Here he claimed to be Calvinistic, and not merely "Calvinistical" or "Calvinisticalish." It has been intimated, that if he had lived now, he would have expressed himself in the modified modes of his apologists; but the proper business of an expounder of Emmons, is with Emmons as he was, and not with Emmons as he might have been under the light of our "improved" ethics and theology.

We propose, then, in vindication and elucidation of his real system, to present its characteristic features, in comparison and contrast with the earlier and later forms of New England theology, and particularly to show the conditions under which alone it can be considered as a self-consistent scheme of divinity. Incidentally it may appear, that those cannot be considered as valid Emmonsites, who discard the radical features of his system; and that those who retain only his "exercise" scheme, and who deny his "divine efficiency" theory, deny that which alone made, or can make, the exercise scheme consistent with genuine Calvinism. It is reported that a distinguished preacher once said to the venerable recluse, "Well, Dr. E., you and I agree, that all sin and holiness consist in exercises." "Yes," was the quick and searching response, "but we differ as to where the exercises come from."

After the full account given by our valued contributor, Dr. Pond, in the last number of this REVIEW, we need add but a few words about Dr. Emmons's life and his most recent biography. The Memoir of Emmons, by Dr. Park, exhausts the subject, leaving nothing to be desired in the general portraiture of the man, his ways and surroundings. It is the most entertaining, ingenious and finished piece of ecclesiastical biography which New England has as yet sent forth in honor of her religious patriarchs. Minute divisions and subdivisions, sections and subsections, and even the aid of numbers and letters, give an almost mathematical accuracy to the arrangement of the book, as if it were written in the demonstrative method. The details are elaborated with nicety; the lights and shades are handled with consummate skill; the general as well as the particular relations of the theologian and his

theology are unfolded and set in their place. Careful logic and practised criticism watch over all the details, and fit each part of the narrative into its appointed place. If the object were to represent the Franklin divine, with needed explanations, as being upon the whole the best type of New England theology, polity, ethics, and practical divinity — that object could not have been more felicitously and acutely attempted. His chief biographer has certainly failed in his main purpose, if the reader is not convinced that Dr. Emmons is the Coryphæus of modern Congregationalism, as a system of independency in polity, and as a theory of exercises in ethics. The resources of English adjectives are put to a severe test in the contrasted descriptions, and varied encomiums, of his multiform traits of character. His idiosyncracies and his large humanity, his habits as a pastor and student, his peculiarities of dress, manner and conversation, his theological system in all its ramifications, and his style and method as a cogent preacher of divine truth, are set forth in such an attractive exposition, that even those who dissent most strongly from his prominent speculations must still reverence and admire and love the man. And even though it may not be made evident that he is a better and truer representative of the substantial orthodoxy of New England, than is Edwards, or Bellamy, or Smalley, or Dwight, or Hopkins, or Woods; all candid readers will confess, that in clearness of statement, consistency of logic, tenacity of phraseology, and especially in sharp and curt sayings, he is surpassed by none of his peers. He defined more sharply, and stuck to his definitions better, than any preceding New England divine. Though he wrote no formal body of divinity, but only sermons or essays in the homiletic form, he undoubtedly had a system thoroughly thought out, and carefully stated to obviate objections. Herein was his superiority; and it is of this very superiority that he is robbed, when he is interpreted as speaking more concisely than precisely, more intensely than plainly, more nervously than perspicuously, on the distinguishing features of his scheme. And to subject him to the metaphorical method of interpretation is peculiarly inapt, for he himself is the most

literal of our divines; his main positions are put as tight and tough, as clear and clean, as language can make them. He interprets every body else in the most literal and obvious sense; he never allegorizes. Scripture he explains with the simplicity of a child, and talks of the most supernatural themes as other people talk about men, and trees, and daily events. He holds to verbal inspiration, and literal interpretation, where others are staggered, or take refuge in a double sense. But he knew nothing about a double sense. He tried to say just what he meant; and if he had meant to say what his interpreters allege, he undoubtedly would and could have used the very words which they substitute for his strict formulas.

Dr. Emmons was the keenest of the old school divines of New England, and in some points the forerunner of its new school. He believed in the divinity of Christ, the Incarnation, and the Trinity—rejecting however, in opposition to Hopkins, the eternal generation of the Son, and even stigmatizing it as “eternal nonsense”. He carried divine sovereignty to its acme, while he maintained that man has natural ability to frustrate the divine decrees. He pressed the divine efficiency to an extreme which few Calvinists have dared to do, making it extend, as creative, to all events and all the acts of the creature, sin not excepted; and at the same time he held to the entire freedom and responsibility of the creature. So strictly did he believe that the glory of God is the great end of creation, that he also asserted that sin is necessary to the greatest good, and that a willingness to be lost is the chief test of regeneration. His ethical theory enforced an impartial and disinterested benevolence as the essence of true virtue,—a benevolence so comprehensive as to include all the good of all beings, and so disinterested that all self-love, if not repudiated, is merged in this universal good-will. Of the “five points” of the Calvinistic system, excepting that of a limited atonement, he was so constant an advocate, that they formed the staple of his Sunday afternoon inferences from his Sunday morning’s discourses. The decrees he declared to be the fundamental doctrine of “the *Gospel*”; he *proved*, that “it is absolutely necessary to approve of the doctrine of reprobation,

in order to be saved" (ii, 402). He held that depravity, in consequence of Adam's sin, is universal and total; that the Holy Ghost literally creates in the renewed a new heart and a right spirit; and that those thus renewed will persevere to the end, obtaining however the blessedness of heaven as a reward of their obedience, and not of Christ's. And thus does Emmons hold, as no one ever did either before or since, some of the extreme positions of both old school and new school. He is a supralapsarian Calvinist in all that concerns God, and the boldest of theorists in all that concerns human activity, carrying ethics and anthropology to the most startling results. He said of himself, at the age of ninety-three: "I go with the old school of New England divines half way, and then turn round and oppose them with all my might. I go with the new school half way, and then turn round and oppose them with all my might."

The essential points of his system are contained in three words — God, *efficiency*, *exercises*. The formula of his distinct and comprehensive scheme may perhaps be said to be this — *God by direct efficiency produces all events and exercises for his own glory*. Efficient and final causes are the metaphysical factors of his theory; the material and formal causes (as Aristotle would call them) he neglects or denies. On the one hand is an absolute decree, on the other hand are events and volitions; and the nexus between them is the immediate agency of God. And yet he says volitions are free, because God makes them free — it is their nature to be free; and man is responsible for them because they are his. Each volition is as distinct as an atom; it is, and must be, either wholly holy or wholly sinful; and as holy or sinful, it is inherently worthy of reward or penalty. The moral and personal being of every child of Adam, begins with these volitions — and, in fact, all that we know or can conceive about the soul, is that it is identical with its exercises. Some of the theological bearings and consequences of these extraordinary positions will come out in the sequel; but no one read in the history of theology can fail to recognise their peculiar character and scope. They indicate a mind of unusual keenness and penetra-

tion, subtle and scholastic, clear and consecutive. Emmons is, in fact, the schoolman of New England divinity; like the scholastics in logical acumen and fearless questionings; like them, too, in shrinking from no possible results of his logic; like them, in neglecting induction, and making deduction the royal road to truth; unlike them in his strong moral convictions and practical vigor of statement and appeal; and yet, again, like some of them—most resembling John Scotus Erigena, in the universality of his view of God's agency, bordering sometimes on consequences akin to pantheism—yet not pantheistic, for no theologian ever had a deeper sense of God's personal being and will, and of his entire distinction from the creature; no theologian ever pressed the idea of creation from nothing more sharply and even exclusively. Some of the recent attempts at elucidating his theology do not adequately emphasize these bolder and profounder aspects of his theory; his apologists seem anxious to smooth them over, to palliate them, to adapt them to the tastes of an enfeebled divinity, to a popular craving for the humanities and ethics—as if the substance of theology were to be found in moral philosophy, its adjuncts and inferences. But Emmons himself had no such weaknesses. He was every whit a theologian; and his moral philosophy and psychology (the latter rather barren at the best) were the handmaids and servitors of his lordly divinity. Such expounders hardly do full justice to the “grand old man”; they have not caught the inmost spirit and vital sense of his system.

The position of Dr. Emmons in the theological systems of New England is worthy of careful consideration. Isolated and peculiar* as he seems to be, his scheme is vitally interwoven with antecedent theories, and it has affected subsequent speculations. Intimate relations of affiliation or contrast con-

* The late Dr. Woods, of Andover, in his essay on the Theology of the Puritans (p. 13) says: “Dr. Emmons considered himself as an innovator on the settled theology of New England. He professedly dissented from several of the doctrines contained in the Catechism, and Confession of Faith, and in the writings of Edwards. He often mentioned the fact, that but a few, comparatively, embraced his peculiar views. He hoped it would not always be so”.

nect him with the older Calvinism, with the previous divines of the Edwardean school, and with the subsequent forms of New England divinity. He agreed with the school of Edwards in rejecting the direct imputation of Adam's sin, but he advanced beyond most of his predecessors in virtually resolving all imputation into an abstract divine constitution—a matter of sovereignty rather than a moral procedure. The "covenants" followed of course in the same line. He symbolized with the younger Edwards and Hopkins, and opposed the older Calvinism, as to the extent of the atonement—proclaiming it to be universal in its provisions, and recognising in it a satisfaction to the general justice of God; but he is far from resolving it into a means of moral impression—for he says that it was "necessary entirely on God's account"; and that "nothing can make atonement for man's sins, which does not express the *same* vindictive justice of God, which he expresses in the penalty of the law". In contrast, however, with both Edwards and Hopkins, he denied Christ's active obedience in relation to our justification, and identified justification with pardon. In opposition to the whole consensus of Calvinism, and to Edwards, Bellamy and Smalley, and following out sundry hints and speculations of Hopkins, Emmons denied the received doctrine of original sin, and reduced all sin to sinning—making, however, the first sin of each descendant of Adam to be coëval with the existence of his soul, and to be a consequence of the Adamic transgression. Taking up the hypotheses of Edwards and West as to identity and the divine causality, (viz., that the identity of any created existence consists merely in the fact that a divine constitution makes it to be the same at each successive moment)—he was led to the inference, that the divine power, by an immediate agency, actually brings into being every event and every exercise, each distinctly by itself—the most thorough-going atomism, extended to mind as well as matter, surpassing even the idealism of Berkeley*, to which it is near akin. In dis-

* Professor Park, in his *Memoir of Emmons*, "recalls" the statement he had previously made, that Emmons was a Berkeleyian, having since heard, that Emmons had said he thought he could refute Berkeley's arguments. Emmons, perhaps, did not hold, that ideas are all; but the fundamental character of his system is emi-

tion, too, from the older Calvinism, and in harmony with Edwards, the Franklin divine defined virtue as the love of being; following Hopkins, he called it a disinterested love; combining it with the doctrine of submission to the divine will, he drew the inference, which he supposed Paul enforced, when he declared himself willing to be accursed from Christ, for the sake of his brethren. No mediæval mystic, no French quietist, dared to make a willingness to suffer the tortures of the lost the condition of obtaining the bliss of the redeemed. And this profound mysticism was preached in the baldest prose, and proved by the keenest logic, and inculcated upon men and women in the church on Sunday, and in the conference meetings on other days of the week; and many, many a New England soul, through this torture has found its ecstasy. And this is the ethical theory which some Calvinists even now do not scruple to call—utilitarianism*! Yet, again, opposing the

nently Berkeleian—the same view of God as immediately producing all that is external—the same individualism—the same nominalism—the same denial of the possibility of finding or conceiving any essence or substance, besides and beyond the qualities and activities of objects, etc. In what the Germans would call their theory of the universe, both Emmons and Berkeley were of the same mind.

* No philosopher ever insisted more distinctly than Emmons upon the “essential and immutable distinction between right and wrong” (see his Sermon, thus entitled). “As virtue and vice, therefore, take their origin from the nature of things, so the difference between moral good and moral evil is as immutable as the nature of things, from which it results”. “The difference between virtue and vice does not depend upon the will of God, because his will cannot make nor destroy this immutable difference. And it is no more to the honor of God to suppose that he cannot, than that he can, perform impossibilities”. In another sermon on the “Moral Rectitude of God”, he presents the whole matter in a most felicitous style—“It is the *moral nature* of benevolence, that renders it *morally* excellent; and it is the *natural tendency* of benevolence to promote *happiness*, that renders it *naturally* excellent. It is the *moral nature* of selfishness that renders it *morally* evil. And it is its *natural tendency* to promote *misery*, that renders it *naturally* evil. The *nature* of benevolence is one thing, and its *tendency* is another. The *nature* of selfishness is one thing, and its *tendency* another. The *nature* of benevolence is *immutable*, and it cannot be altered by the Deity. The *nature* of selfishness is *immutable*, and cannot be altered by the Deity. But the *tendency* of benevolence, and the *tendency* of selfishness may be altered”. He even goes so far as to say, “If it were supposable that benevolence should have a *natural tendency* to promote *misery*, still it would be *morally* excellent in its *own nature*. Or if it were supposable, that *selfishness* should have a *natural tendency* to promote *happiness*, still it would be in its *own nature*, *morally* evil”.

older Calvinism, and in conjunction with the Hopkinsians, he preached natural ability and the necessity of immediate repentance, in deference to his exercise theory, sharpening the statements on both points; still, however, fighting the Arminian self-determination, and inculcating the strict irresistibility of divine grace. In the theodicy, Calvinism has generally been content with leaving the ultimate ground of the divine permission of sin an inscrutable mystery; but this did not satisfy the restless questionings of the school of Edwards, in their endeavors to fathom the ways of God. Dr. West, of Stockbridge, declared that sin was a necessary means of the greatest good. Dr. Hopkins wrote a treatise entitled, "Sin, through the Divine Interposition an Advantage to the Universe" (that is, as overruled, and not in its own nature). And Emmons, bolder than the rest, not only, with Hopkins, denied the palliative of "permission", to which most Calvinists clung, but also made God the efficient cause of sin, intrepidly asserting, "that there was the same *kind*, if not the same degree of necessity in the divine mind, to create sinful, as to create holy beings", viz., that he might display his justice and his grace. And thus he carried out to its sharpest extreme, in prosaic and logical terms, what even Augustine and Calvin veiled in the language of feeling and of faith:

"O felix culpa, quæ talem et tantum
Meruit habere Redemptorem!"

These general statements as to the historical relations of Emmons, make it evident that he gathered together, and sharpened out, several scattered theories of New England divines on special and important points, in which they somewhat deviated from the Calvinistic tradition, while, at the same time, he pressed certain fundamental articles of the Reformed theology, severed from their organic relations with the whole system, to logical results, from which even the strictest Presbyterians recoiled. He himself says that he early threw away his "crutches", and took to making "joints". The "crutches" were what he also calls the "wens and protuberances" of Calvinism—e. g. original sin, imputation, inabil-

ity, limited atonement, etc. The "joints" consisted in dovetailing what remained of Calvinism into the New England speculations about virtue, the will, ability, the atonement, etc. His Calvinism was concentrated into the doctrine of "divine efficiency"; the new elements were, for the most part, brought under the word "exercises". To "joint" this "efficiency" and these "exercises" was the problem. The solution was in the position that the divine efficiency creates the exercises. That is—the divine efficiency is the constructive idea, and the theory of exercises is the regulative factor of the distinctive theology of Emmons.

Before showing how the two were conjoined, it may be well to add a word upon the relation of Emmons to the older Calvinism; his relation to later theories will best come up by and bye. Calvinism, in its historical growth, has assumed a variety of forms; it has been prolific in systems. Running through them all is the theory of the divine sovereignty, or predestination, viz., that the will of God is the source and end of all things. The earlier Calvinism (and Luther, too) was penetrated with this idea. But it was soon modified by the theology of the covenants, which relieved the dogma of the absolute decree, and introduced historical transactions and elements. The plan of God (this is what the theory of the covenants, in substance, said) is not one of arbitrary will and sovereignty; it rather involves, in its essential idea, moral compacts on the basis of right and rights. The Confession and Catechisms of the Westminster Assembly contain both these elements—the sovereignty and the covenants. Emmons discarded the covenants, and constructed his system on the basis of the divine will. Hence he is called a hyper-Calvinist. The Calvinism, too, of this country and of Scotland, has been infralapsarian; Emmons was a supralapsarian—the most consistent form of the unrelieved doctrine of divine sovereignty. And so the Presbyterians, as a general rule, heartily opposed Emmons, both as a hyper-Calvinist and as an Arminian; the former in respect to sovereignty, the latter in respect to sin, ability, the atonement, and related points. No thorough-going Presbyterian was ever willing to say, that God creates

ainful exercises; that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good; that all sin and holiness consist in exercises; that man has the natural ability to frustrate the divine decrees; and that justification means only pardon. And, whether from a deficiency in logic or piety, or for some other reason, none of them were ever willing to be—“lost”, even for the glory of God.

The constructive idea of the system of Emmons is that of the Divine Efficiency. Predestination and decrees are his strong points. Professor Park, in his analytic survey of the “Formative Principles” of this theology, introduces the “Loveliness of God”, as the first characteristic of the system. But such is not the general and most obvious impression made by his writings. The “supremacy” of God, which his biographer states as the second characteristic, would be first suggested to most minds. We are also told, under another distinct head, that his system illustrates “the Duty of Union with God”, and that this is, in fact, “the *principium*” of his teachings; but this idea of union is quite incidental to the main scope of his theorisings, and not at all a capital characteristic. The absolute, supreme, irresistible, all-embracing, all-producing, all-sustaining energy of the divine will, making every event and act march to the music of the divine glory, is unquestionably the predominant idea of this most “consistent” of Calvinists. The emphasis is always upon power, and divine power; God orders all things after the counsel of his own will, for his own glory. And the peculiarity of his theory is in so far identifying the divine decrees and the divine agency, as to assert that what God decrees, he does. The divine agency is always and ever an immediate, productive, creative energy. Preservation is a continual creation. The agency of God, he says, consists “in nothing before his choice, nor after his choice, nor beside his choice. His willing or choosing a thing to exist is all that he does in causing it to exist” (Works, iv, 379). He is the “universal cause”. “It is his agency, and nothing but his agency, that makes men act and prevents them from acting” (iv, 272). “He exerts his agency in producing *all* the free and voluntary exercises of

every moral agent, *as constantly and fully as in preserving, and supporting his existence*" (iv, 388). All men's "motions, exercises or actions must proceed from a divine efficiency" (iv, 366). "Mind," he says, "cannot act any more than matter can move without a divine agency." In short, the divine agency is simply the divine creative energy, at work in all events and all actions. In harmony with this view, the divine providence and government are represented as only the immediate agency of God producing whatsoever He will for his own glory. God, he says, "governs the moral as well as the natural world, and both by a positive agency, and not a bare permission". Second causes have no efficiency in themselves.

This, now, is a very simple, and a very comprehensive theory. It is also a very mechanical and arbitrary hypothesis. It is taken from the sphere of the natural forces, and transferred without qualification to the sphere of providence. Efficient and final causes are the working factors; and the efficient produces the final cause. The fundamental conception is that of simple causative energy or force, universalized. It rests on the thesis, that the laws of nature (extended by Emmons to the moral world) are solely modes of the divine operation. How Emmons handles the matter is strikingly seen in a "familiar conversation", reported by his biographer: "'Do you believe', says Emmons, 'that God is the efficient cause of sin'? 'No'. 'Do you believe that sin takes place according to the usual laws of nature'? 'Yes'. 'What are the laws of nature, according to Newton'? 'They are the established modes of the divine operation'. 'Do you approve of that definition'? 'Yes'. 'Put those things together'". Now all this may be very ingenious; and there are only two objections to it. One objection is, that the laws of nature are *not* merely the established modes of the divine agency; and the other objection is, that sin cannot be said to take place simply according to "the usual laws of nature". If it did, sin would be as much a law of nature as is gravitation. The theory — supernatural and theological as it undoubtedly is, is strongly naturalistic in its prime postulate. And the progress of the natural sciences, recognising in nature living, organ-

ising principles, as well as mere dynamic agencies from without, has dissolved the spell of this Newtonian formula, once so highly prized. Even as a theory of nature it is imperfect.

The biographer of Emmons has another way of explaining the theory of efficiency. Conceding (p. 387), that Emmons says that "God is the only efficient cause"; and that he also says, that "man is not the efficient cause" of his own acts; he meets the difficulty by the assurance, that "efficiency" has an entirely different sense in the two cases. According to this explanation, it seems, that when this "exact" divine says that "God is the only efficient cause", he means by "efficient"—"*independent*"; and when he says, that "man is not the efficient cause" of his choices, he means by the same word, "efficient," something totally different, viz., "*producing a volition by previously choosing to produce it*".* We had no idea that the word 'efficient' had such a variety of significations; and the curiosity of the matter is, that in neither of these cases (the test cases of the system) does "efficient" mean anything like what it is usually supposed to mean. In the one case it means 'independent', but that does not necessarily involve the idea of power; in the other case it means—an absurdity, a merely fictitious power. This explanation is doubtless well meant; but, as the careful and precise Emmons would say, it is "clogged with gravelling difficulties"; and we do not wonder that the biographer felt compelled to add "that his language on this theme is more nervous than perspicuous, more compressed than precise"; though we are still unable to divine how such use of language is any more 'nervous' or 'compressed', than it is 'perspicuous' or 'precise'. And Emmons does not merely use the word efficient: he also employs a great variety of kindred terms. For example: "The Deity, therefore, is so far from *permitting* moral agents to act inde-

* "The objector asks: Does not Emmons affirm that man is not the efficient cause of his own choices? He does, sometimes: but *then* he means by efficient cause, that agent who produces a volition by previously choosing to produce it". "But, rejoins the critic: Does *not* Emmons affirm or imply that God is the only efficient cause in the universe? He does. But here he uses the word *efficient* as denoting *independent*". (Memoir, p. 387.)

pendently of himself, that, on the other hand, he puts forth a *positive influence* to make them act, in every instance of their conduct, just as he pleases". "Positive influence" here means the same as "efficient"; can it be translated by "independent"? He adds: "Such a dependent creature could no more produce his own volitions than his own existence". Man's dependence is described as "universal and absolute". In fact, in enforcing this favorite theme, our logical and metaphysical theologian uses all the exact and scientific terms and phrases applicable to the subject. By interpreting his most definite phrases in an indefinite sense, there is some danger of obscuring his otherwise luminous utterances.

Another way in which it is attempted to obviate the objections to this obnoxious doctrine is in the statement that Dr. Emmons did not mean to teach "the mode in which God secures the fulfilment of his decrees", but only the fact, that he does secure the fulfilment. But this reply (*Memoir*, pp. 417-419) seems to overlook the real point of the objection. Conversant as was Dr. Emmons with the decrees of the Most High, he would doubtless have shrunk back from the position, that he knew how God creates all events and volitions. But the real objection is, that he identifies the divine agency in respect to all events, and all actions, whether good or bad. *How* he acted we do not know; but Emmons says, that, whatever be the mode, "his agency was concerned in *precisely the same manner* in their [men's] wrong, as in their right actions"; and "that there was no possible mode in which he could dispose them to act right or wrong, but only by producing right or wrong volitions in their hearts". (We were about to underscore these last words, but, upon reflection, think that it is quite unnecessary). Now, though Dr. Emmons did not know just how God produces these volitions, yet one thing he did know, that he produces them by his direct efficiency, by immediate interposition, that in short He creates all sinful, as well as all holy volitions. But this leads us to the next topic in order—that is,

The agency of God in producing sin. His theory on this vital question is simply an application of his scheme of efficiency. The theodicy of this single-hearted and single-eyed

divine is as simple, straightforward, unambiguous, unshrinking as is his conception of the divine agency. Sin is necessary to the greatest good ; God, to manifest all his glory, must produce sin ; this he does by creating sinful volitions. If men "need any kind or degree of divine agency in doing good, they need precisely the same kind in doing evil" (ii, p. 441). "He wrought as effectually in the minds of Joseph's brethren, when they sold him, as when they repented and besought his mercy. He not only prepared these persons to act, but he made them act. He not only exhibited motives before their minds, but disposed their minds to comply with the motives" (ii, p. 441). In the case of Saul, we have a more definite analysis. After saying, that there was "a necessary and infallible connection between Saul's actions and motives", he adds, that "this certain connection could be owing to no other cause than a secret divine influence on his will, which gave energy and success to the motives which induced him to execute the designs of Providence".* In the same sermon it is said, that "on this theory it is as easy to account for the first offence of Adam as for any other sin," which is undoubtedly a fact. After disposing of all other possibilities as insufficient, he adds : "As these and all other methods to account for the fall of Adam *by the instrumentality of second causes*, are insufficient to remove the difficulty, it seems necessary to have recourse to the divine agency, and to suppose that God wrought in Adam both to will and to do in his first transgression". "Satan placed certain motives before his mind, which by a divine energy took hold of his heart and led him into sin". In the same way it is argued that we can "*easily* account for the moral depravity of Infants". After showing that depravity cannot be "hereditary", he finds the "easy" solution of the supposed difficulty in the statement, that "in consequence of Adam's transgression, God brings his posterity into the world in a state of moral depravity. But how? The answer is easy. When God forms the souls of infants he forms them with moral powers, and makes them men in miniature. And being men in miniature, he works in them both to will and to

* Sermon on Man's Activity and Dependence Illustrated and Reconciled.

do of his good pleasure; or produces those moral exercises in their hearts, in which moral depravity properly and essentially consists". (By the way, we should like to have a thorough-going Emmonsian, if such there be, tell us, whether such an infant, whose sin is coëval with his moral being, has the natural ability to resist this agency of God in producing his first sin? If not, does not the natural ability fail at the fatal and decisive juncture?) In short, his doctrine is that "there is but one true and satisfactory answer to be given to the question which has been agitated for ages, *Whence came evil?*—and that is, *It came from the First Cause of all things*" (ii, 683). And all these statements, which might be indefinitely multiplied, are reiterated in the most emphatic matter, and personally applied in the famous Pharaoh sermon,* leaving no doubt, one would think, as to the real sentiments of this plainest and simplest and most literal of preachers—or, as Emmons used the phrase,—of this "sentimental preacher", meaning a man who, like Paul, preached plainly and metaphysically at the same time. The amount of the matter is this—that he uniformly avoids making any distinctions as to the mode of the divine agency. He identifies that agency in the material and

* God, he says, "determined to operate on his [Pharaoh's] heart itself, and cause him to put forth certain evil exercises in the view of certain external motives. When Moses called upon him to let the people go, God stood by him and moved him to refuse. When Moses interceded for him, and procured him respite, God stood by him, and moved him to exult in his obstinacy. When the people departed from his kingdom, God stood by him, and moved him to pursue after them with increased malice and revenge. And what God did on such particular occasions, he did at all times. He continually hardened his heart, and governed all the exercises of his mind, from the day of his birth to the day of his death. This was absolutely necessary to prepare him for his final state. All other methods, without this, would have failed of fitting him for destruction." One of the most ingenious parts of the Memoir is the running commentary given by Dr. Park (pp. 409-411) to these hard sayings, transferring them *εἰς ἄλλο γένος*, interpreting them as Biblical and intense; illustrating one of his own criticisms, that such explanations are "at the expense of Emmons's immaculate reputation for perspicuity"; and also giving point to an anecdote which he repeats, about a preacher who took for his text, 'God hardened Pharaoh's heart,' and announced as the proposition of his discourse, that the Lord did not harden Pharaoh's heart; and on leaving the church was asked, "Which his hearers must believe, his sermon or his text?"

moral world; he identifies it in respect to both sin and holiness. He makes no distinctions upon the points where the theologians of all ages have been most perplexed and most careful, viz., the different modes of the divine operations. God in his view always acts as a sheer creative energy. Sin is the product of the divine efficiency.

But yet we are informed, on venerable authority, that the views of this straightforward divine, who wrote "plain sermons for plain people", have been, on this point, extensively misunderstood and misrepresented. His general doctrine of divine efficiency, and the natural interpretation of his language, as above cited, undoubtedly favor the current misapprehension. Logic demanded of him to make just these statements; and he made them. But we are told, that he said God "created evil", because the "Bible" used this phraseology. Is it not rather to be said, that he used the Biblical phrase, because it is so pertinent and exact? He says "texts ought not to be adduced to explain *first principles*, but first principles are to be adduced to explain and establish the sense of every text of Scripture"; and the first of all his first principles was undoubtedly that of the divine agency. And why, too, did he not lay equal stress on other words and phrases of the Bible, which suggest an entirely different view of God's agency in respect to sin? Manifestly, because these phrases were not so congruous with his radical theory. And, yet again, Emmons on this point does not merely quote the language of Scripture; quite as frequently he uses the most precise scientific and metaphysical phraseology—"cause", "produce", "make", "efficient cause", "positive influence", "immediate interposition", "without the instrumentality of second causes", and the like. The philosophical vocabulary of his age has hardly a word or phrase, denoting direct causal agency, which he does not apply to the case of God's relation to sin.

We are also assured (Memoir, p. 405), that when this 'ardent' and 'intense' logician tells us "it is extremely difficult to conceive how he [Adam] should be led into sin without the *immediate interposition* of the Deity", that by 'interposition' is here meant only "an interposition of

new influences, or a *change* of the former influences". But "immediate interposition" is surely more than "influence"; it is the direct agency of God, which Emmons *defines* "as the willing or choosing a thing to exist" (iv, 379). And so, too, when this "perspicuous" theologian affirms that Adam's sin cannot be accounted for "by the instrumentality of second causes", we are told (p. 405), that "he means the mere *influence of motives, etc., without any attendant and governing agency of God*". How much the slight "*etc.*", so carelessly thrown in, may be meant to mean, we cannot of course conjecture; but if it does not mean a great deal more than all the rest of the passage, this interpretation reduces "second causes" to a very insignificant affair. Did not Emmons mean to include the will, as well as motives, in these second causes? He himself says, "there is no *possible* way in which God could dispose men to act right or wrong, but only by producing right or wrong volition in their hearts". Which shall we believe, the definite dogma or the indefinite interpretation? Such explanations dint and blunt the edge of our acutest divine's sharpest sayings.

Another attempt is made to obviate this fatal difficulty in the scheme of this most "consistent Calvinist", by resolving his theory of divine agency into the more general doctrines of decrees and providence (Memoir, p. 407). Thus, when Emmons says that God makes Adam's posterity sinners "*by directly operating on the hearts of children, when they first become moral agents*" (ii, p. 263), this is interpreted as meaning, that "the divine *agency* keeps pace with the divine *determination*; that the *providence* of God embraces the same *principles*, and has the *same extent*, with the decrees of God; that there is no more objection to the doctrine of divine *efficiency* securing the *occurrence* of all things than to the doctrine of divine *purposes* securing the *certainty* of all things". This seems plausible, until we reflect that it does not touch the point of the difficulty. The difficulty is—that God is said to make men sinners; the reply here suggested is, that there is no more objection to his making them so, than to his decreeing to make them so; which of course is true. There is the same difficulty about

his decreeing to make them sinners as about his making them sinners. The real question is, whether God does decree to *make* them sinners by his own act? Is God's providence simply and solely God's direct agency? In short, if 'providence' and 'certainty,' in this explanation, mean the same with 'agency' and 'efficiency,' the difficulty is not answered, but only re-affirmed; and if 'providence' and 'certainty' mean any thing more extensive than 'efficiency,' then the explanation is inconsistent with Emmons's fundamental doctrine.* The turning-point about his system is in this very question, whether providence is to be resolved into efficiency, or efficiency into providence. He says the former, and this apology interprets him as meaning the latter. But, "to vouch this is no proof, without more certain and more overt test."

One of the tests of the way in which a system is really held, is the mode in which objections to it are met and answered. The same objections were made to the theory of Emmons, while he yet lived, as are now strongly felt and urged. Did he reply to them as his present defenders reply? If so, he held the system as they defend it; if not, not. Thus we are assured that he "neither used nor tolerated the phrase" that God is "the author of sin".† Though this denial is not con-

* "None can have a full and just idea of the universality and perfection of divine providence, without considering God as governing all moral agents in all their moral conduct, by a powerful and irresistible influence. It is a *gross absurdity* to suppose that the providence of God is more extensive than his agency, or that he ever governs men without exerting a positive influence over them." (Emmons's Works, iv, 372.)

† A venerable and distinguished Massachusetts divine, after reading the article of Dr. Pond in our last number, sent us a communication on this point, from which we make a few extracts, omitting some of the quotations from Emmons, which we have already made. "Dr. Pond says: 'Dr. Emmons is charged with holding that God is, in the strictest and most proper sense of the term, the *author of sin*. But this is an unfounded allegation. That the providence of God is somehow concerned in the existence of evil, he certainly did hold. But he believed, that every man is the responsible *auctor* or *actor* of his own sin; and the phrase, *God the author of sin*, he never used.' But the English term *actor* is not derived from the Latin word *auctor*, though here very shrewdly used as synonymous with it: *author* is derived from *auctor*. Let it be, then, that God is not the *actor* of man's sin; yet in the opinion of Dr. F. he is the *auctor*, the *author*. For what is the meaning of *author* 'in the strictest and most proper sense of the term'? Dr. Webster in his

tained in any of his published writings, yet we can readily accept it, because the word "author" is ambiguous; and he uses only unambiguous phrases. Thus he certainly was wont to defend outright, without qualification, the position that "God is the efficient cause of sin"; and the only difference of the two phrases is that the latter expresses his real idea more definitely. On page 454 of the Memoir is a reported conversation of Dr. Emmons on this very topic; and the amount of it is, that instead of retracting or modifying his statements, he reiterates his position in various forms; as, e. g. "God's will is creative"; "he has only to put forth a volition, and the event takes place"; his "will was creative" when he

Dictionary defines author as 'one who produces, creates, or brings into being'; also 'the beginner, former, or first mover of anything; hence the *efficient cause* of a thing'. Now what is the language of Dr. Emmons in respect to the cause of sin? Is it not in its plain, obvious meaning the same, as if he had said, 'God is the *author* of sin'? The following are his words: 'Moral agents can never act, but only as they are acted upon by a divine operation'. (Works, iv, 357, ed. 1842.) 'Adam's first sin was a *free, voluntary exercise, produced* by a divine operation in the view of motives'. He represents God as the *efficient cause* of all the wicked actions of men; for he says, 'Whether men have a good or *bad* intention in acting, God has always a good design in *causing* them to act as they do' (iv, 373). 'The Deity is so far from permitting moral agents to act independently of himself, that he puts forth a *positive influence* to *make* them act, in every instance of their conduct, just as he pleases' (iv, 361). There can be no mistake of his meaning, that God *causes* the actions of all men, the most wicked as well as the good, for he said just previously that God must necessarily determine beforehand 'how he will *work* in us both to will and to do', and 'how we shall will and do through every period of our existence.' Thus, too, he asserts, that 'the criminality of men does not consist in the *cause* of their evil desires, affections, designs, and volitions, but in their evil desires, affections, designs, and volitions themselves, (iv, 374.) After reading this plain language of Dr. Emmons, and much more in the same strain, as to God's being 'the cause' of all the wicked actions of men and of the devil and his angels too, for his words as quoted include 'all moral agents' in the universe as being '*made to act*' in every instance 'just as God pleases'; and after reading also his sermon 'on the Scriptural Account of the Devil', I feel constrained to remark, that he has written a very good sermon on the devil, but a very bad sermon concerning God; for he well maintains from the Scriptures the personality and agency of the devil; but he ascribes to the agency and efficiency of God the *production* of the sin of the devil and of all the sin in the world, whereas God himself warns us by his Apostle James, 'let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God', and teaches us by his Apostle John, 'he that committeth sin is of the devil, for the devil sinneth from the beginning.' "

"willed sin to exist". And then, explicitly: "My theory is that *God causes moral evil in the act of willing it*". Here are certainly no "ambages or circumgyrations"; he marches right up to the mark, and does not qualify by even an "immediate interposition" of "influences", and "motives", and other psychological and providential phenomena. So, too, when pressed by the objection, that if "God produces our moral exercises, then they must be his", he responds, that "there is no foundation for this conclusion, since our moral exercises are *productions* of the divine *power*, and not *emanations* of the *divine nature*"; that is, all that he excludes is pantheism (Sermon on Man's Activity, etc.); he allows that God's power produces them, but says that they are not of the same nature with God—and this is his chief defence. He likewise asserts, that "it is as consistent with the moral rectitude of the Deity to produce sinful, as holy exercises in the minds of men. His operations and their voluntary exercises are totally *distinct*". Undoubtedly; but still he holds that the "exercises", though distinct, are produced by God's "operations". In another passage he meets a kindred difficulty by suggesting that "God's secret will respects one thing, but his revealed will respects another"; his secret will, whereby he ordains and produces the sin, respects "the taking place of things"; his revealed will, in which sin is prohibited and condemned, has respect "to the moral quality of things". "Sin is one thing, and the taking place of sin is another" (iv, 292). And he therefore concludes, that God, with entire consistency, can both produce and punish sin. Now, it is indeed true that a distinction can be made between the "nature of sin" and the "taking place of sin"; but no distinction can be made between the act of sin and the taking place of sin—especially on Emmons's theory, which makes all sin consist in act. And, he expressly asserts, that each act of sin is produced by God, and that each act of sin is in its own nature sinful. "Put these two things together". And even though it be alleged, that it is produced by God for his own glory—this only makes the matter still worse. For the glory of God is in his holiness; sin is the opposite of holiness; the opposite of holiness is then necessary to holiness.

The distinction at the basis of his argument is illusory. But such argumentation shows what a terrible power there may be in logic to blind the minds of even the best men in respect to the most awful and vital themes. The sharp logician is tempted to mistake an abstract distinction for a real difference. But our object here is not so much to debate this point as to show how Emmons defends his system, in contrast with the mode adopted by some of his advocates. His defence uniformly presupposes that divine efficiency is ultimate and absolute; his modern defenders suppose that this efficiency is to be explained away. They say that by efficient he means independent, but he says that efficiency is a productive energy; they say his phrases are Biblical, and he defends them as exact; they resolve his efficiency into providence, he resolves providence into efficiency; they suggest a double sense from which his simple common sense would have instinctively recoiled; they interpret his most definite propositions as "forceful rhetorical turns"; and the turns are "forceful", and they are "rhetorical", but they are also strictly logical. Emmons, in short, rests ultimately upon a theological basis, and his advocates upon certain assumed ethical maxims.

And yet it is claimed, that he held to "Exercises" as well as "efficiency". "The Exercise Scheme" says Dr. Ide, "is by common consent his". And this leads us to the next point in discussion—the other half of the system. While he brings his Calvinism under the term Efficiency, he defends under the name of Exercises those views in mental and moral philosophy, which the pressure of some New England speculations had led him to adopt. And here are several of his most startling positions; those in which he is at war with the Calvinistic tradition. He is as strenuous, logical, and dogmatic on this side as he is on the other. He counts his postulates to be axiomatic. He fully believes them to be not only consistent with, but deductions from his stern Calvinism. He does not think that he is holding two schemes, but only one. And our general position here is this—that whoever adopts his Exercise Scheme must, if logical, also adopt his main inferences from it; and that his exercise scheme is made Calvinistic only by his theory

of Divine Efficiency. In all this, the Franklin divine is by far the most logical and consistent theologian that New England has produced. In relation, too, to tendencies current in his times, his positions were carefully and consistently taken. He wanted to defend Calvinism equally against Antinomianism, Arminianism, and Universalism. His exercise scheme was to extirpate the Antinomians; while the divine efficiency, in combination with the exercises, was to root out all Arminians and Universalists.

What now are these Exercises on which so much depends? "Exercise" is the generic word, by which Emmons denotes all mental and moral states, or rather acts; for he does not recognize a spiritual state, which is not an activity. Some interpret him as implying, that the soul itself is only these exercises. Each exercise, he says, is simple and single, produced, of course, by the divine agency. The moral exercises, those of the heart or will (which Emmons does not sunder),* are termed Volitions. These Volitions, and volitions alone, have a moral character; each one of them is either perfectly holy or perfectly sinful.† There is no character in anything preceding these volitions (in any antecedent taste, bias, principle, or disposition), for the cogent reason, that there is no such taste or bias, about which we can know or affirm anything. Each of these volitions, still further, is created perfectly free; and a man that has them can do as he has a mind to. Volitions, and volitions alone, are the subjects of moral approbation or disapprobation, of reward or punishment. God's moral government knows nothing about anything else.

Such being the character of these voluntary acts—several "interesting" conclusions follow. (1) There is no original sin, in the sense of hereditary depravity. Adam committed the only strictly original sin that this world ever knew. That is, the only mere man, who, according to the doctrine of the church, had no original sin, is, according to Emmons, the only

* The Taste men first made the articulate distinction between the heart and the will. See Burton's *Essays* (a book too little known), pp. 19, 53, 84, *et passim*.

† Hopkins also said (*System*, i, 129): "Every moral action is either perfectly holy or perfectly sinful".

one who ever had any. "All sin is sinning". (2) There was original righteousness, in the strictest sense, in Adam. God created him holy. "It is agreeable to the nature of virtue, or holiness to be created". (See his Sermon on the Primitive Rectitude of Adam.) He adds, that holiness is "something which has a real and positive existence, and which not only *may*, but *must* be created". "Adam could not be the efficient cause of his own volition". "God not only *might*, but *must* have created Adam either holy or unholy". (3) There is, and can be, no imputation, either of sin or of righteousness. Each man, or rather, each volition, stands or falls for itself alone. Men are indeed "constituted" sinners in consequence of Adam's sin; but solely in virtue of a divine, sovereign "constitution", and not at all as a moral, still less as a legal procedure; for all that is moral is in single volitions, and not in any generic constitution.* So, too, by the strictest parity of reasoning, there cannot be any imputation of Christ's righteousness—for all holiness is in the individual volitions, and in nothing else. (4) It equally follows, in the way of logic, that justification is simply forgiveness or pardon, and does not include or involve any title to eternal life. (5) The theory itself expressly declares that each volition must be perfectly holy or perfectly sinful. This, to be sure, is against all consciousness, and could never be proved, either from Scripture, or by induction. But the logic demands it—and if the facts do not correspond, so much the worse for such very illogical facts. Some other "entertaining sentiments", as Hopkins would call them, might be deduced from this same theory; but these are enough to exhibit the character and bearings of the speculation, and to warrant a more particular inquiry into its grounds and reasons.

Materialists hold that the mind is a modification of matter

* In his own singular phraseology: "By constituting Adam the public head of his posterity, God suspended their holiness and sinfulness upon his conduct. So that his holiness would *constitutionally* render them holy, and his sinfulness would *constitutionally* render them unholy". *Constitutional* here means a sovereign constitution or plan of God. In modern Hopkinsianism constitution is used for what is human, in old Hopkinsianism for a divine arrangement.

—matter acting in certain modes—the substance, however, being distinct and distinguishable from its activities. Almost all ancient and modern spiritual psychologists agree in the positions, that the mind or soul is a simple essence, having its proper qualities or faculties, and that its activities or exercises are the manifestations of this essence and these properties. That is, both materialists and spiritualists make a distinction between the substance and its qualities, and between both of these and their activities or exercises; and this seems agreeable to common sense and the nature of things. Almost all, too, carry this distinction out in such a way, that they say of any beings or substances, existing in time, that the essence is or may be before the manifestation; that the activity is the product of, and of course is possibly subsequent to, the essence, attributes or tendencies. Distinguishable in thought, they may also be in the order of time—so far forth as they are finite. The peculiarity, now, of Emmons's metaphysics and psychology on this point is, that he refuses to recognise, or at least to apply, these fundamental distinctions. He identifies the soul with its energies; tendencies with activities; taste or principle with exercises; the heart with the will; the will with volitions; and, in the last analysis, essence with phenomena. The popular and bungling phrase about his theory is, that he maintained that the soul is a chain or series of exercises.* Professor Park (Mem. 412) attempts to shield him on this point from the felicitous and well-aimed shaft of the New Haven professors (cited, *ibid.* p. 420); but all that his quotations prove is—that nobody could use the English language and be consistent with such a theory. And in fact, the theory is demanded by the whole spirit of Emmons's theology. If there was anything which he hated with a pure theological odium, it was Armin-

* Dr. Dwight, it is well known, wrote an able sermon on this theme. It is generally supposed that Emmons was meant; but we recollect seeing some years since, a statement that the President of Yale had in mind some body nearer New Haven—the younger Edwards. If this be so, it shows that in the Exercise Scheme, as well as on the Atonement, and the happiness theory of ethics, and the position that man has physical ability to overcome his moral inability, the younger Edwards, unlike his father, was a forerunner of much modern Edwardeanism.

ianism ; if there was anything which he loved with an intense theological affection (next to his moral love for God and his neighbor) it was Efficiency and Exercises—efficiency in behalf of God, and exercises in view of man. Now if he could only contrive to make this love and this hatred work into one system, he might well say, speaking theologically, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith, henceforth, etc. Such an accomplishment was worthy of a strenuous theory, even if a point were strained in making it. The main difficulty was in reconciling his love for Exercises, with his hatred to Arminianism ; and this on two points. Arminians held, with him, that all sin and holiness are in exercises ; they also held, being seduced thereto by common sense, that there is a soul with all its power and tendencies, before the exercises ; and, since there is no sin except in exercises, they concluded—being heretics, that such a soul, before it acted, was in an innocent or neutral state. Now it would never do for a strict Calvinist to grant this—and yet, says Emmons, all sin is sinning, and all holiness is active love. Here is the emergency, and “the giant” (as Professor Park calls him) showed himself equal to the task. He just said—God creates volitions—and the thing was done : Gioberti’s formula, *Deus creat existentias*, is not more keen. That is—no tendencies before acts, for if there were, those tendencies must be neutral,* which leads to Arminianism ; but, if there may be a soul, before an act, then there may be tendencies before activities—consequently, no soul before an act ; but, there must be a soul before an act, if the category of essence and attributes be rational and ultimate—consequently, this category must be ignored.† And in all this, Emmons is eminently “consistent”. To be sure, a funda-

* Hopkins preceded Emmons in the attempt to explain what came before the exercises as a “neutral” ground ; but he at last seemed inclined to resolve it into a mere divine constitution. Emmons saw that this was the only consistent course.

† “We are conscious”, says Emmons, “of having perception, reason, conscience, memory, and volition. These are the essential properties of the soul, and in these properties the essence of the soul consists ; we can form no conception of the soul as distinct from these properties, or as the foundation of them”. “All we know about body are its properties ; and all we know about mind are its properties”.

mental idea of the human mind is set aside, and one application of the law of causality is slurred over—but what is that, compared with the rout of the Arminians, and the triumph of supralapsarian Calvinism, combined with a steadfast adherence to the Exercise scheme? His theory is, that God creates the soul in creating its exercises; that he brings every descendant of Adam into being a sinner, in consequence of Adam's sin. Man's personal and moral being, and his sinning, are simultaneous. "It is impossible," he says, "to conceive of a corrupt and sinful nature, *prior to*, and *distinct from*, corrupt and sinful exercises". Why not? Not merely, as is now held, because all sin must consist in act; but for the profounder reason, that the very soul consists of activities. He saw, that he could not, as a good metaphysician and logician, defend the former position without advancing the latter. Here was his strategic point.

In other words, though Emmons denied original sin, yet he did it in an entirely different sense from that of modern Hopkinsianism. He did it on the basis of a wholly different metaphysic and psychology. Holding that there was no soul except in volitions, he could afford to say, there is no original sin, for the conclusive reason that his theory does not recognise any moral and personal being, of whom such original sin could be predicated. (What might possibly become of the foetus, if it died before it got a soul, is here the unanswered question.) He could very well say, and did say, that as soon as there is a real human being, it is sinful, because it is created in the act of sinning—the soul is caught in the very act. And thus his theory enables him to be very strenuous about the connection between Adam's sin and ours. But the whole state of the case was entirely altered, when Berkeleianism was supplanted by the Scotch philosophy, and the distinctions between the soul and its exercises, between tendencies and voluntary acts, between the heart and the will, were reinstated in their rational right. The Exercise scheme became another scheme, in its sense, its bearings, and its results. It was cut loose from its Calvinistic moorings; it was divorced from the divine efficiency. The divine element was eliminated, and the human

will, in the construction of the system, took the place of the divine will. Modern Emmonism is thus as different from the old scheme as democracy from imperialism, or Congregationism from the papacy, or psychology from metaphysics, or ethics from divinity, or the human will from the divine. The same phrases may be used, but there is another sense; there may be, to outward seeming, the same eye-ball, but another soul looks out; the hands feel like the hands of Jacob, but the voice is the voice of Esau.

This same point is also illustrated by Emmons's theory of Natural Ability. He undoubtedly made very sweeping statements about ability. He must do so, if any room was to be left for human freedom and responsibility in face of the divine efficiency. If men would only accept the efficiency he could afford to talk strongly about their exercises. He emphasized the abstract possibility of a different volition from the one actually created. Thus there was a seeming freedom left. He exaggerated ability in phrases, just as he exaggerated efficiency in fact. But it is after all a shadowy realm. And his attempts at reconciliation are equally ingenious and unsatisfactory. His "joints" are the nice juxtaposition of atoms, rather than the junction of an organism by vital nerves and living bands. Here, too, his formulas are simple and comprehensive: God creates volitions; volitions are in their very nature free. "The Deity by working in men both to will and to do lays them under an absolute necessity of acting freely" (iv, 351). God's "acting on men's hearts and producing all their free voluntary moral exercises, necessarily makes them moral agents" (iv, 385). The first volition of every created agent must have had a cause altogether involuntary"; it "not only may but must be created". Adam, for example, "could no more produce his own volitions than his own existence. A self-determining power, is an independent power, which never was, and never could be given to Adam". To objectors he replies thus: "I teach that God creates within us free moral exercises. Can they say, that exercises which are *created free* are not free? One of my opposers once said in a sermon, that an exercise which is not self-originated can-

not be voluntary, and if it is made free, it is not free. But this man was by birth an Irishman". Does not the divine who thus replies to the "Irishman" seem to imply, that if *he* says they were "created free", that that settles the matter, and the difficulty? His statements in respect to ability, too, are equally emphatic with those about the freedom of volition. "Every sinner is as *able* to embrace the Gospel, as a *thirsty* man is to drink water". They "are *as able* to do *right* as to do *wrong*". "Men always have natural power to frustrate those divine decrees which they are appointed to fulfil" (iv, 304). And this he conceives to be consistent with the position, that men "cannot originate a single thought, affection, or volition independently of a divine influence upon their minds" (iv, 397).

How, now, are these resolute statements about dependence and freedom, ability and inability, to be understood? Does Emmons mean to teach the current doctrine of self-determination, of self-originated choices? He expressly repudiates it, as Arminian. Does he mean to teach, that man, before action, has a faculty of will, which is the cause of volition, so that volition is its proper effect? This he expressly denies under two aspects. He, in the first place, identifies will and volition: will, he says, "never properly means a principle, or power, or faculty of the mind; but *only choice, action, or volition*". And, in the second place, he denies the position, that free agency consists in a power to originate voluntary exercises: "many imagine that their free agency consists in a power to cause or originate their own voluntary exercises; but this would imply that they are independent of God" . . . who "is the primary cause of every free voluntary exercise in every human heart". And then he adds,—which shows us just how the whole thing stood in his mind: "But this is consistent with man's *having* [not, producing] free voluntary exercises, which is *the essence of free agency*". That is, if we only *have* them, not matter how we come by them, they are still free. He sharpens this position: "A power to act without choosing to act would be of no advantage to them, if they possessed it. But they do not possess such a power, neither does God possess such a power". The possession of this power

is the emphatic point in the modern theories of the will, where it is represented as essential to praise and blame, to holiness and sin. But the metaphysics and psychology of Emmons, as well as his efficiency scheme, are irreconcilable with this view. Freedom with him is simply an attribute of a given volition; given a volition, it is free, whatever be its cause.* His view of freedom is so low, that he even says, that *animals are free agents*: "*The animal creation are free agents because they act of choice*" (iv, 380). That is, free agency is found as really in the natural, as in the spiritual sphere. Hence all that is necessary to freedom, is to have a volition produced—no matter how. Hence, too, he could, and did, say, that God's producing these volitions lays man "under *an absolute necessity of acting freely*". He also said, that volitions "are virtuous or vicious in their own nature, without the least regard to the cause by which they are produced" (see his whole argument on Adam's Primitive Rectitude, Works, iv, 447 sq.): but some of his disciples say just the opposite, viz. that unless we produce them, with full power to the contrary, they cannot be praiseworthy or blameworthy.

His theory of "physical" or natural ability (not of "power to the contrary") runs back of course into this theory of freedom. He generally uses the word ability in an external sense, as meaning the power of doing as one pleases. Sometimes, however, it denotes with him the abstract possibility of a different choice. But choice itself, he distinctly says, is dependent on something else besides this natural power: "Two things are absolutely necessary in order to men's acting; one is to be able, and the other is to be willing. By being able is meant a natural power to act; and by being willing a moral power to act" (iv, 305). And this "moral power" is what God confers in "producing" the exercises. If both are "absolutely

* Hopkins held the same view. "Herein consists man's freedom, that his choice is a choice, or his will a will. Although he be not the cause, original mover, or efficient agent of the choice, yet it is his being produced in him" (System, I, ch. iv). What do modern Hopkinsians say to his position, that persons "may be moral agents, and sin, without knowing what the law of God is, or of what nature their exercises are, and while they have no consciousness that they are wrong"? (I, 339).

necessary", then the natural power without the moral would seem to be insufficient. But he is not always faithful to this view. He sometimes talks as if the natural power alone were sufficient, or as if the natural ability could produce the moral power.* He presses this point verbally so as to demand the advanced position, taken by some of his followers. His natural ability had in fact no hold, or substance, no background to support it; a possible volition without a real will and a real soul, was a mere abstraction. But as soon as a soul with all its powers and capacities was brought in, the whole aspect and bearings of the theory were altered. The divine efficiency was driven back. Though Emmons's own doctrines of philosophical necessity and divine efficiency kept him from affirming a self-determining power of the will; yet he so exalted natural power, in theory, that it became proud and boastful, broke loose from the divine efficiency, and set up for itself. In breaking loose from divine efficiency it also broke loose from Emmons. In hypostatizing a real faculty of will, in affirming self-determination, in asserting that natural ability of itself is enough (as simple power) to account for the volition, the new scheme is unfaithful to the real spirit of Emmons; it retains his phraseology and alters its sense; it keeps the exercises and denies the efficiency that produces them. The modern theory demands a pause, as it were, between the divine agency and man's act, so that man may have a chance to choose; while Emmons says, the divine agency makes the volition. The human will, instead of the divine, is the constructive idea of the new system. And yet, it is pretended that the systems are the same on the essential points. Just as if Emmons, and men of his stamp, spent their days in exalting the human will! The difficulty with him was in reconciling human freedom with his main dogma of divine efficiency: the difficulty with the moderns is to reconcile even decrees and

* One sentence strikingly illustrates the curious results to which his novel phraseology sometimes led. "If they [men] were willing as well as able to defeat his [God's] purposes, they certainly would defeat them" (iv, 305). It is usually thought that wicked men are quite willing to, but cannot; Emmons says, they can, but are not willing. What sort of an "ability" is that?

providence with their dogma of the power to the contrary. God was the soul of the one system; man is the measure of the other.—And as to Emmons's mode of reconciling dependence and free agency, to which two of his most noted sermons are devoted—the process consists in stating clearly and sharply both points, God's universal agency, and the freedom of volitions, and then saying, that the divine efficiency creates the volitions free. In one passage, he also says, that the two truths cannot clash, because they fall under the cognizance of different faculties—the dependence under "reason", and the freedom under "common sense". But this is a merely external remark. The chief solution is in the simple doctrine of efficiency. This is no solution, it is simply assertion. We cannot accept it, even though he also asserts, that the denial of it is "either open infidelity or impious blasphemy" (iv, 386).

The most startling, yet logical, application of the Exercise scheme is, however, to the doctrine of Justification, in relation to the rewards of a future life. The atonement of Christ, it says, directly procured only the forgiveness of sins. Justification consists in this forgiveness. Emmons held indeed to the Protestant doctrine that justification is "the gift of the giver", and not "the reward of the worker"; but he held this just because he limited justification to pardon. Hopkins retained both the active and passive obedience of Christ*; Emmons not only denied the active obedience, but he also denied that justification confers a title to eternal life. He shrunk from no conclusions, which his exercise theory imposed. Dr.

* Hopkins says: "The law could not be fulfilled by Jesus Christ, without his suffering the penalty of it, and obeying it perfectly". "Atonement consists in fulfilling the *penal* part of the law by *suffering*, to provide the way for *pardon* only; while *meritorious obedience* is such conformity to the preceptive part of the law as procures *positive righteousness*". The remission of sins, he asserts, would be "a very partial redemption"; it was therefore necessary that Christ should obey the precepts of the law for man, and in his stead, that by his perfect and meritorious obedience he might honor the law in the preceptive parts of it, and obtain all the positive favors and benefits which were needed". "When a sinner is justified he is *pardoned* on account of the *atonement*, and *accepted* as a just one, on account of the *meritorious obedience* of his substitute" (System, i, pp. 468, 198–9, etc.). Emmons, on the contrary, was averse to the phrase—"the merits of Christ."

Spring, of Newburyport, and most of the older New England divines here parted company with him* ; but he stuck to his thesis (the title of one of his sermons)—*Holy Obedience the Only Title to Eternal Life*—not because obedience “merits” life, for the creature cannot merit anything of the Creator, but because it makes us “worthy of approbation”; it is a “reward of grace”. There is an “essential difference”, he says, “between the ground of God’s justifying [pardoning] men, and the ground on which he rewards with eternal life”. “He forgives them solely on the ground of Christ’s atonement, but he rewards them solely on the ground of their good works”. The contrary opinion is “not only an error, but a palpable absurdity”. And, on his exercise theory, it is so. For, if all that is moral, all that is the subject of moral judgments, praise or blame, reward or penalty, is in individual volitions, and in these alone, then it is a “palpable absurdity” to say that Christ’s merits can confer on other beings “a title to eternal life”. In logic, “holy obedience is the only title to eternal life”. He is right in saying that “there is no propriety in using the term *merits of Christ*”. This, to be sure, cuts deep into the Christian system ; but it is the inevitable and inexorable logic of the theory. The same definitions that define away original sin are also incompatible with the proper doctrine of justification. Adam and Christ stand together. If Adam’s sin is only the “occasion” of our sin, then is Christ’s righteousness only the “occasion” of our righteousness. If there is no moral nexus in the one case, there can be none in the other—on the “consistent” exercise theory. Though

* In connection with this matter, a good anecdote is told in the Memoir (p. 456) of the following “laconic, magisterial and patronizing” epistle, sent to Dr. Emmons “May 1st. My dear brother, I have read your sermon on the Atonement, and have wept over it. Yours affectionately, A. B. C.” To which he at once replied : “May 3d. Dear sir, I have read your letter, and laughed at it. Yours, Nath’l Emmons.” The divine who wrote this epistle is understood to be Dr. Griffin. We are assured, on direct authority, that there must be some mistake about this anecdote ; that Dr. Emmons, on being questioned about it, said, that though he received from Dr. Griffin a letter on this subject, he did not reply to it. He also said that the amount of the letter was that the doctrine of his (Emmons’s) sermon on the Atonement “robbed the believer of half his Saviour”.

Emmons sometimes concedes that Christ's death is the "occasion" of God's granting innumerable favors to mankind, yet, speaking strictly, he says: "God grants regenerating grace to whom he pleases, as an act of mere sovereignty, without any particular respect to the death or atonement of Christ". Such a statement as this, in connection with his view about our "being rewarded solely on the ground of good works", is a sad illustration of the power of an unbending logic, when based upon a partial theory. It emphatically indicates, that Christ has not that central and comprehensive position in this theorectic scheme, which he has in the Scriptures, and in the experience of believers. We say, in the *theoretic scheme*, because we would not for an instant imply that Emmons did not fully believe all that the Scriptures assert about Christ. But his theory obliged him to assign to Christ only the position of removing the obstacle to forgiveness, and then to let a mere moral system (the exercises, as containing all that is moral) run on its own course—having indeed respect to Christ, as, in the divine decree, the occasion of blessings, but not as their meritorious source and ground. The matter lay in his mind thus: the sinner must first get through with the decree of election, and then he may trust in Christ. Thus in his compendious statement of his own views, we read (Memoir, p. 428): "That sinners must exercise unconditional submission to God *before* they can exercise faith in Christ". Love and repentance both come before faith in Christ (Memoir, pp. 366-7). In his dread of Antinomianism, he ran into the counter extreme. As his exercises lacked a psychology, so was his theology deficient in its Christology.

The two other points that characterize the system of Emmons, he shares with the body of the old Hopkinsians, as they are usually interpreted, viz. that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good; and that unconditional submission, in the form of a willingness to be lost (damned), is the fitting test of regeneration. As the divine agency is the efficient cause of all events and acts, so is the divine glory the final cause or end of the system; and the ultimate reason for the existence of sin is, that it is necessary to manifest the

full declarative glory of the Most High : sin is in this sense the necessary means of the greatest good. And if that divine glory demands our everlasting condemnation, we must be submissive to it : if need be, we ought to be willing to be condemned forever. And thus Emmons did not falter or waver in his logic. He was thoroughly consistent with his fundamental assumptions in all their deductions. In apology for his position about sin as the necessary "means" of the greatest good, it is suggested, that by "means" he only means "occasion" (Memoir, p. 403). But the word "occasion" seems too indefinite to express his accurate meaning. Though he did not assert that sin is the direct means of good, in its own nature (it could not be this, since it is essentially evil), yet he certainly did maintain that it is necessary to the full manifestation of the glory of God—so necessary, that God created it for this end. His plain position is, "that there is the same kind—if not the same degree of necessity in the divine mind, to create sinful, as to create holy beings"; that "all the goodness of God in all its branches could not have been displayed, if natural and *moral* evil had not existed"; and again, "if God meant to display all his goodness in creation, he was obliged to bring into being objects upon which he might display both his justice and mercy" (iv, 254). Does the indefinite word "occasion" express the sum of these statements? Nor is this all, for he even goes so far in his inferences as to say (iv, 374), that though men are bound to repent of their own criminality, yet, "since all their sinful conduct may be ascribed to God, who ordained it for his own glory, and whose agency was concerned in it, *they have no reason to be sorry that any evil action or event took place*". He illustrates it by the case of Joseph's brethren, who, when they saw the good accomplished by the selling of their brother, "could not have been sorry for this, without being sorry for God's conduct", etc. This is surely sufficiently explicit, and it shows that he could hardly have used the term "occasion" to express his own position in its real sense. So, too, as to the "willingness to be damned", as the phrase runs. He did not, we are told, really mean, or

say, "damned"; he only said, "lost"—a milder word, of the same import. This theory is also resolved by his defenders into the general duty of submission (the caption under which the Memoir discussed it, is, "Harmony of Disinterested Submission to with Love to Self"). Very true—it is submission; but it is submission, not in a general, but in a very definite and peculiar form—at war with the primary instinct of self-love, as well as with the benevolence and grace of the Gospel. God never demanded of any creature to be willing to be lost. And no ingenuity of deduction can warrant such a terrible questioning and torture of the soul. It is a logical rack, and not a scriptural test. The most ingenious explanation of the theory is that of Emmons himself in his reply to Stuart (Memoir, pp. 397-400); and his argument shows, that he included in this test, not only the willingness to suffer pain, but also the willingness to be in a "*future*" state of "disobedience and rebellion". And this settles the matter as far as Christian consciousness and the Bible are concerned. It is a self-subversive and revolting test of a regenerate condition. The test includes a bribe; for, if we are willing to be lost, we never shall be. And this fearful test is the inexorable logic of the combined efficiency and exercise schemes.

And this rigid and consistent scheme was not confined to the closet of the student, and the discussions of a theological class, but it was enforced as the measure and standard of religious experience; it was made the touch-stone of the new life. Emmons himself, we are told, "adopted the new theology and experienced the new birth at one and the same time" (Memoir, p. 37); and the disciples were as the master. In this too he was a faithful exponent of some New England tendencies; the most abstruse and metaphysical dogmas have there been worked into the heart and life, as no where else in the world. The abstractions of theological systems have been the turning-point in the renewal of the soul. No other people ever passed through such a process. And not more than one generation, even of New England men and women, could bear the scrutiny of the searching dogmas of Emmons. They were too much even for regenerate human nature, as yet sanc-

tified only in part. And if too bitter for saints—what must they have been to sinners, inclined by nature to Arminianism and, by unenlightened common sense, to Unitarianism? There were in those days other sharp men in New England besides the orthodox. Orthodoxy in their view became identified with the dogmas, that God is the author of sin, that men should be willing to be cast off for ever, and the like hyperboles of hyper-Calvinism. Not only so, Emmons also gave into their hands some of the strongest arguments against the older Calvinism. They took his exercises and discarded the all-controlling efficiency; they adopted his ethical maxims, divorced from his rigid supernaturalism. He averred that all that is moral is in exercises, so did they. He denied imputation and the covenants, inability and limited atonement, and they were agreed. He said the rewards of heaven are for our personal obedience, and they thought this very natural. They chimed in with his abstractions, about its being as easy to repent as to walk or eat. He made the essence of virtue to consist in impartial love; and on this point Channing also followed Hopkins. His theory made this love to be the essence of the new birth, and heterodox men said they had this love, and of course were born again. Emmons brought every thing about Christ in his relation to us, excepting pardon alone, under the head of sovereignty, and “liberal” thinkers brought pardon, too, under the same category. He subordinated the exercises to the efficiency, and they subordinated the efficiency to the exercises. He believed in the Trinity, the Incarnation, the decrees; but they said, if they could only have holy love (the essence of the new life) without these hard doctrines, that they hardly thought them essential to salvation. No Emmonsian reasoned in this way, but there were many in New England, who were repelled from orthodoxy by the logical consequences of the efficiency theory, and who were confirmed in heterodoxy by the logical inferences from the exercise scheme—each of course being taken, unfairly to Emmons, by itself alone. But heretics cannot be expected to be comprehensive; heresy, in its etymology, is something “taken”—a part taken,—and the whole left.

The truth is—as our whole exposition shows, there were in Emmons two systems, both held in the most extreme and logical form. Sir Emerson Tennant, in his work on Ceylon, says, that in the chameleon there is an imperfect sympathy between the two lobes of the brain and the two sets of nerves which permeate the opposite sides of its frame. One side may be fast asleep, while the other side is wide awake; and the poor creature cannot make them act together. There is a like imperfect sympathy between the efficiency scheme, and the exercise theory, of Emmons. They are not organically unified. They are not really harmonized, but held together, not by a rational idea, but by the force of will—his own will (subjectively), and the will of God (objectively). *Stat pro ratione voluntas*. His conception of the created universe is that of a series of perfectly distinct events and exercises, produced at every instant by an immediate, divine energy. It is an atomic naturalism engrafted upon an extreme and arbitrary supernaturalism. The conception of anything akin to a real organism, or a proper development, is entirely wanting. The unity of the race is not a real historic continuity, but an arbitrary divine constitution. And then, in constructing the system, all events and exercises are, in effect, parcelled out, doctrinally, under the two rubrics of divine and creature agency. One set of doctrines sets forth the divine agency; another set of doctrines sets forth the human activity. And both cover, where they concur, the same subject matter, which is at one time viewed as all divine, and at another time viewed as all human. And the only union between the two, which Emmons knows, is found in the divine efficiency itself. He did all that a man of the greatest keenness could do, in his attempts at mediation on this basis. But his mediations are unreal, formal, and abstract. Thus, as we have seen, sovereignty and free agency are reconciled, by saying, that God creates the volitions free; God is defended from the charge of being the author of sin, chiefly on the ground, that “sin is one thing”, and “the taking place of sin” quite another thing; though God’s sovereignty and his moral government are said to cover equally all acts, yet so sharp a distinction is made

between them, that it is claimed, God as a sovereign can create a moral act, which, as a moral governor, he is bound to punish. By asserting, that the same act is, in one aspect, "wholly the product of divine energy", and, in another aspect, "wholly the act of the creature" (being made his), Emmons seems to think, that he has solved the problem of dependence and free agency—"a seeming difficulty which runs through the whole Bible" (iv, 371). But this is simply statement and distinction, not solution or reconciliation. He confounds clear, abstract distinctions with the truth itself. A definite, intelligible proposition is his ideal—and also the reality. As if theology, like mathematics, were a science of definitions and deductions! But in such a system, so clear and paradoxical, one of the antagonistic elements must get the upper hand, and the other be subjected with a strong arm; one must be the reality, and the other an illusion. And there can be no question, that in the logical results of this theory, the reality is in the divine agency, and that the alleged freedom and power of the creature is an unreal and vanishing factor in the victorious and irresistible march of the divine decree. Freedom and responsibility could only be saved by a revolt against his hyper-Calvinistic necessarianism; by a psychology, which should give a real human substratum to the volitions. In his theory the volition was made perfectly free, natural ability was strained to the utmost so as to endure the pressure of the divine agency; and the tension between the efficiency and the exercises became so intense, that the two snapt asunder and parted company. His dogma of divine efficiency was left with himself, and his ethical and voluntary exercises went on their way rejoicing, under other auspices. And he himself stands alone in New England theology, to show us what a great man can do and say, when he attempts impossibilities—that is, when he attempts to make both the divine agency and human freedom absolute. If the feat could be performed, it was in the way he attempted it. If any body wishes to hold the essence of Calvinism, that is, that the will of God is all in all, together with the essence of Arminianism, that is, that the will of man is absolutely contin

gent, it can only be by exaggerating Calvinism into the position, that the divine will creates the human exercises. Calvinism must be exalted into hyper-Calvinism, or else the exercises will land us in an entirely different system.

This would be made still more evident, if we could follow out the system of Emmons, in its influence on subsequent speculations. Our discussion has already been so protracted, that we must here confine ourselves to general and brief statements.

As we have seen, in deference to his ethics and exercises, he parted company with certain traditional dogmas, inwrought into the Calvinistic bodies of divinity—viz., imputation, the covenants, original sin and hereditary depravity (including the organic and moral unity of the race), and justification under the relation of conferring a title to eternal life. Now, it might easily be shown, that these doctrines, thus excluded (shearing them off as “fag-ends”), are for the most part the very doctrines by which historical Calvinism has endeavored to mitigate or avoid the pressure and logical conclusions from the strictest theory of divine sovereignty—so that the procedures of God in respect to sin and salvation should not seem to be the acts of arbitrary sovereignty, but the regulated and ordered course of a moral system, intended for the whole race. These doctrines are the ones by which the awe-inspiring decree (horribile decretum—in Calvin’s sense, not “horrible” but fearful) was relieved from the stigma, that it made God the author of sin, and, in an equally arbitrary way, of redemption. But Emmons’s “exercises” compelled him to reject all imputations and covenants. Strictly taken, they left no place for any other than a merely moral or legal system—unless the divine sovereignty were enforced with redoubled emphasis. Being a Calvinist, he chose the latter course; and hence, of all Calvinists he is most strenuous about predestination, election, reprobation, and the affiliated doctrines. In short, he made his exercises Calvinistic only by the violent process of representing them as the product of the direct agency of the Most High. He retained of Calvinism chiefly that doctrine which is most easily perverted, and represented

it in the form most liable to perversion. Such was his position in relation to the old Calvinism.

But this "giant, with a hundred athletes in his train", as the Memoir strikingly describes him, also produced a decided effect upon the old Hopkinsian school; he rent it in twain, into the men of Taste, and the men of Exercises (all mighty men); and this provincial phraseology denotes an important distinction. The larger part of the Hopkinsians were not ready to sanction the position, that all that is moral is in Exercises, in Emmons's sense, that is, in Volitions (volition with him including the affections, and being equivalent to heart). They distinguished between heart and will, feeling and action, the ground or source of the exercises, and the exercises themselves. They held, with Edwards, that there is a 'principle' or 'foundation' for the exercises or volitions, and that this 'taste' or 'principle' is the real seat of moral character. They had a better psychology than Emmons. Here stood Burton, to whom we have already referred.* And this too was the ground of the venerated Dr. Woods of Andover, who receded from the peculiar phrases of the school, in proportion to the enlargement of his experience as a teacher of theology. It was a kind providence for the New England churches, that when the violent abstractions of 'efficiency' and 'exercises' were waging such warfare, and leading to such results, a man like Dr. Woods was called to the chair of theology in the seminary at Andover. He is emphatically the 'judicious' divine of the later New England theology. He educated a generation of preachers, who had neither crotchets nor airy whims. And Moses Stuart, too, with all his versatility, became a rich blessing to the churches, by training their preachers in the more

* One of the ablest of these Taste men was Judge Nathaniel Niles of Vermont, who, it is said, was the rival of Dr. Burton in the honor of being the founder of the Taste school. How strongly the men of this stamp were opposed to the peculiarities of the Emmons school is seen in an acute pamphlet, now little known, entitled: "A Letter to a Friend, who received his Theological Education under the Instruction of Dr. Emmons, concerning the Doctrine which teaches that Impenitent Sinners have Natural Power to make themselves New Hearts. By Nathaniel Niles, A.M." Windsor, 1809. It is one of the most valuable relics of this controversy.

thorough study of the whole truth, as revealed with open face in the inspired Word.

But the extreme positions which Emmons deduced from both his Efficiency and Exercise schemes led to a more radical dissent and reaction. As we have seen, his "consistent Calvinism" emerged in the three dogmas—that sin is the product of the divine efficiency, that it is necessary to the full manifestation of the divine glory, and that, for the sake of this glory, men should be willing to be "lost". On the other hand, his exercise scheme led to the inferences, that all that is moral is in volitions (excluding original sin), and that man has natural ability to repent, etc. But this natural ability, as we have stated, still needed to be backed up by a soul—and these volitions cried out for a real human nature as a substratum. The peculiarity of the reaction that ensued (chiefly in the New Haven school) consisted, in the first place, in the introduction of such a psychology, giving to the exercises a living source and centre—and, then, in arraying the exercise scheme against the doctrine of the divine efficiency. The Connecticut divines as a whole never favored the tendency represented by Emmons; Bellamy, Smalley, and Dwight opposed it, and Dr. Taylor brought the discussion, in the sharpest way, to direct issues. He adopted the exercise scheme, so far as it asserted that all that is moral is in acts of the will, defined natural ability as implying full "power to the contrary", and made self-love to be the germinant principle of ethics. He not only reinstated the human soul in its native rights (reuniting the dispersed exercises, the *diaspora*, in a living, personal centre), but he also affirmed, with the Taste men, the existence of susceptibilities, tendencies, dispositions, antecedent to voluntary action. But as he also held that all that is moral is in voluntary action, he of course said, that these tendencies and dispositions have no moral character; and here he left the Taste men. This changed the whole aspect of the old exercise scheme. He could, and must, now say what the old Hopkinsians never did, or could, say—that a complete human nature exists for a time, be it more or less, in the descendants of Adam, in a neutral moral state. This was the very posi-

tion which the old Hopkinsians, Emmons included, were always striving to avoid, as utterly inconsistent with the Biblical representation of the effects of the Adamic transgression. So, too, he brought his theory of the will, as essentially the power of contrary choice, to bear against the dogma, that God creates free volitions. His Scotch psychology demanded a pause, as it were, in the direct divine agency, so as to give the faculties of the soul a chance to work out the volition—intellect, feelings, and will preceding the first moral choice. The volition no longer came through the will of God alone, but also through the agency of the human powers coming to the point of decision. And as he made self-love the spring of all voluntary action, and happiness its end, so too he mightily opposed the inculcation of a willingness to be damned; for in his view this implied the annulling of the primary instinct of human nature. Nor could he consistently hold to the Hopkinsian theodicy, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good; he levelled against it, not only the precepts of the divine law and the prescriptions of the moral sense, but also, and chiefly, the doctrine of natural ability, transformed into the power to the contrary. He formally denied the old theory, and affirmed, that sin is not necessary, but incidental to the best system; and that it is incidental, because a free agent, having the power of contrary choice, may sin, in spite of Omnipotence. Thus skilfully did this acute theologian bring the exercises of the Emmonsian theology to bear against its dogma of efficiency; he used its left hand to disable its right hand. He took the attitude of fair and square antagonism to the three main positions of the older theory. The dogma of divine efficiency he confronted with the theory of human efficiency; disinterested benevolence in the form of a willingness to be damned he opposed by making self-love the root of moral action; and, so far was he from asserting that sin is necessary to the greatest good, that he affirmed that it was better accounted for by saying, that even omnipotence may not be able to prevent all sin in a moral system. Thus while the divine will is the constructive idea of whatever is peculiar in the one system, the human will, moved by self-love, is the constructive idea of all that

is peculiar in the other system. The antagonism is sharp and complete on all the main points. The attempt in each scheme is to frame a system on the idea of will—the difference being, that in the old school an omnipotent divine will, and in the new school a contingent human will, is the prime factor. And the result of the whole controversy was to show the inadequacy of each to the proposed task. Each system led to conclusions at war with the Scriptures and Christian experience, and this, too, on just the points most characteristic of the respective theories. The one could not free God from the charge of being the cause of sin, made sin necessary to the declarative glory of the Holy One, and exacted of man an impossible test of regeneration, at once unreal and full of torture to the soul. The other system so exalted the power of the human will, that it became, in the power to the contrary, an unreal abstraction; it denied the “categorical imperative” of duty, by resolving right into happiness; and it defended the divine permission of sin by limiting the divine omnipotence. Each was strong in refuting, neither in building up. Each shows very clearly that the peculiar views of the other cannot be maintained.

Dr. Taylor, in this controversy, took the only consistent course, and did not aim at any unreal compromise. He never thought of representing his system as identical with the one he was opposing, bating a difference of phraseology or emphasis. He knew perfectly well that he could find some of the germs of his own theory in the minor key of the old school; but he did not intimate that they habitually sung their tunes on this key. He knew, too, that the way in which antagonistic systems are developed is almost always just this—that what is subordinate in the one become supreme in its opposite. The change of relative position is indeed all; but then, too, it is quite enough. It is the only logical attitude which related thoughts, that suggest each other, can assume even in opposite systems. The contest is always for supremacy and not for annihilation.

Hence, too, it is possible for modern Hopkinsians to quote many a passage from the old divines, which seems to favor

their views, while it is still true that the systems are entirely different in their spirit, methods, results, and sympathies. What an old-fashioned Emmonsism made supreme in the scheme is now made subordinate; and what he made subordinate is now made supreme. That is all. The impression made by the Memoir of Emmons is, that he held to exercises definitely, and to the divine efficiency indefinitely; the impression made by a volume of Emmons's sermons is, that he held to both definitely, and subjected the exercises to the efficiency. His propositions about God bear the stamp of inherent life and reality; if there is anything essentially unreal in his system, it is in his propositions about man. He did indeed uphold the three radicals (now so-called) of the New England theology, viz. that all that is moral is in exercises, that ability is equal to, and limits, obligation; he held them, but he held them in check. He spent his toilsome and thoughtful life in elaborating a system to show, that though God's agency is always creative, yet man may still be free; he had no idea of a system which says, that because man is free, God cannot be the immediate efficient cause of human volitions. The old system affirmed, that God creates all events and acts; that he created Adam holy; that he creates sinful acts; that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good; that we must be willing to be lost in order to be saved; it also affirms that there is no soul (conceivable) before the exercises; that the exercises are either wholly holy or wholly sinful; and that holy exercises are the only title to eternal life. Modern Hopkinsianism denies that God creates sin; it denies that he creates holiness; it denies that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good; it denies that we must be willing to be lost in order to be saved; and it also affirms, that there must be a soul and tendencies before volition; that this soul is in a neutral moral state; and that it is not luminous to say, that Paradise is the reward of our works. And yet, it is insinuated that the systems are the same, because both equally hold, that all that is moral is in exercises, and that ability is equal to obligation. But to discard all the former positions is to discard Emmonsism; and to affirm the

latter, is to affirm, not the essence, but the accidents, of the old Hopkinsian theology. The resemblance is verbal, the difference is radical.

The theological system of Dr. Emmons is undoubtedly one of the most original and instructive in the history of theological science in this country. His biographer has led us to love and honor more than ever that simple, noble, acute, and consistent man. He spent his days and his nights in the unwearied search for divine wisdom. He failed in constructing a complete system of truth, because, with his data and factors, it was a sheer impossibility. With Dr. Pond, we may say: "Read Emmons; by all means read Emmons"; but so read him as to see, that neither in the divine efficiency, nor in human exercises, neither in mere sovereignty, nor in mere ethics, can we find the formative or central principle of Christian theology as a science. For the one leads to an arbitrary determinism on the divine side; the other must ascribe an equally arbitrary self-determining power to man. But no such abstractions, on the one side or the other, however clearly stated, and no definitions based on them, can satisfy the demand for a system of theology, at once Scriptural, rational, and conformed to Christian experience. Neither is theology to be sacrificed to anthropology, nor anthropology to theology. The centre of Christian divinity is not in God, nor in man, but in the Godman. Christian theology is essentially a Christology, centering in facts, not deduced from metaphysical or ethical abstractions. Neither God's agency, nor man's will, can give us the whole system; but, as Calvin says, "Christ is the mirror in whom we may without deception contemplate our own election". Above the strife of the schools rises in serene and untroubled majesty the radiant form of the Son of God, the embodiment and reconciliation of divinity and humanity.

ART II.—THE ANTE-NICENE TRINITARIANISM.

By Prof. ROSWELL D. HITCHCOCK.

THE CHURCH OF THE FIRST THREE CENTURIES; or, *Notices of the Lives and Opinions of some of the Early Fathers, with Special Reference to the Doctrine of the Trinity; illustrating its Late Origin and Gradual Formation.* By ALVAN LAMSON, D.D. Boston: Walker, Wise & Co., No. 245 Washington street. 1860. 8vo. Pp. 352.

[Concluded from Vol. III, page 526.]

THUS far we have met with nothing which can properly be called speculation on the subject of the Trinity. The Trinitarianism of the Apostolic Fathers, although distinctly enough pronounced, is certainly not that of scientific theologians, but rather, and only, that of simple-minded disciples, accepting and transmitting without question the traditional belief. The Trinitarianism of Irenæus and Hippolytus is essentially of the same type; differing by no spontaneous impulse, by no infusion of Platonism, but only as the antagonism of Ebionistic, Gnostic, and Patripassian heresies compelled it to differ. Speculation on this subject, as likewise on that of human depravity, began with the Greek Apologists whose place, chronologically, is between the two groups, whose opinions we have been considering. This position of the earliest speculative Trinitarians, thus preceded at once and followed by plain, practical believers in the absolute Divinity of Christ, shows conclusively that there was a catholic faith on this subject, independent entirely of the Platonic speculation, existing before it, and therefore able to survive it. Speculation, instead of originating the doctrine of the Trinity, labored only to define it. Hence the development of this doctrine, partly in simple obedience to the scientific instinct of learned believers, partly in opposition to divers heresies on the one side

and on the other, between which the steadily maturing confession of the Church steered its triumphant course. The steps taken in this development, from the earliest speculations of the Greek Apologists in regard to the Logos, till the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father was affirmed at Nice, we are now to trace.

We begin, of course, with Justin Martyr, the first alike in order of time, and in importance, of the Greek Apologists whose writings have come down to us. We know but little of his history. The dates assigned, by conjecture, for his birth, range from 89 to 118 A.D. The better opinion is, that he was born not far from the year 100, about the time when the last of the Apostles died. Though born in Palestine, at Flavia Neapolis, the ancient Samaritan Shechem or Sychar, he was of Greek extraction, and underwent the literary training of a Greek. While yet a Pagan, he thirsted for a deeper and better knowledge of God; and, to assuage this thirst, betook himself to one school after another in philosophy, seeking instruction first of the Stoics, then of the Peripatetics, then of the Pythagoreans and last of all, of the Platonists. Here he rested, till one day he fell in with a stranger of venerable aspect, whose conversation led him to reflections which resulted in his becoming a Christian. His conversion is supposed to have occurred when he was a little more than thirty years of age. After this he appears to have travelled extensively as a sort of unordained evangelist and champion of the new religion, although residing usually at Rome, where he suffered martyrdom in the year of our Lord 166. Of the writings which bear his name, the most important are the three about whose genuineness there is no dispute. These are: The First, or larger, Apology, presented in 138 or 139 A.D.; the Dialogue with Trypho, published some years later, perhaps about 146 A.D.; and the Second, or shorter, Apology, which has been referred to the period between 161 and 166 A.D. Unfortunately, a work of his *Against all Heresies*, which he himself makes mention of in his First Apology (§ 26), is no longer extant. This, with another lost work *Against Marcion*, would probably

have furnished a more exact and satisfactory, because an interior, exposition of his doctrinal opinions. The doctrine of the Trinity, especially, might in that case have stood forth in somewhat bolder outline than was consistent with the strictly apologetic purpose of the extant treatises. With the materials now in our possession, we have to take account of Justin's theology as it stands opposed to Paganism in the two Apologies, as it stands opposed to Judaism in the Dialogue with Trypho. How he handled the Trinity as a Christian amongst Christians, we do not know; we only know how he handled it in the face of a Pagan Polytheism on one side, of a bald Jewish Monotheism on the other.

The two leading allegations of the Unitarians in regard to Justin are: First, that his Trinitarianism, such as it was, was a novelty, at variance with the current faith; and second, that it differs "essentially" from the Nicene Trinitarianism. In fine, the assertion is, that we have in Justin Martyr the crude beginning of a doctrine, which, in the progress of its development, became essentially different from what it was at the start.

The first of these allegations has already been refuted, quite sufficiently perhaps, by the passages adduced from the writings of the Apostolic Fathers. If these men, whose writings "still shine with the evening red of the Apostolic day", were not Trinitarians, then it would be difficult, as we have said before, to find Trinitarians anywhere in history. But what is the testimony of Justin in regard to the theological opinions prevalent in his day? That Humanitarianism was not the faith of the Church, is distinctly affirmed in the *Dialogue with Trypho*, § 48, where we read: "There are *some* of our race * (that is, Christians) who acknowledge him to be Christ; yet maintain that he was a man born of human parents: with whom I do not agree; nor should I, even if the majority (*πλειστοι*) of those who think as I do (that is, are Christians) should say so." Here we have not only a decisive repudiation of Ebionism, but also an intimation that Justin's opinion of

* In spite of the proposed emendation of Bishop Bull, *ἡμετέρον γένους* is retained by Otto and others, the best critics of our day, as the correct reading.

Christ, whatever that may have been, was not his own merely, but the general opinion of the Church in his time. Other passages of kindred import might be cited, but it is not necessary. The truth is, Justin took special pains to have it understood that his opinions were not those of himself alone, nor of a select few, but of the mass of Christians.* What those opinions were we shall presently see.

The other allegation of crudity has more to be said in justification of it. Crudity, certainly, there was. It is idle to pretend that the Trinitarianism of Justin Martyr was as scientifically mature and well defined as that of Athanasius. We hazard no such assertion. On the contrary, we admit, nay, we insist upon it as indispensable to a right understanding of the whole matter, that, in the sphere of science, there was a development of the doctrine of the Trinity steadily in progress, from the time the Platonic Fathers first began to speculate upon the subject, till the final statement was reached at Nice, Constantinople, Ephesus, and Chalcedon. But while thus admitting the crudity of Justin's statement of the doctrine in question, as compared with the statement of Athanasius, we must deny the alleged *essential* difference between them. Radically, there was one and the same faith, seeking utterance in scientific forms which differ, it is true, but only as the sapling differs from the full-grown tree. The change accomplished was not an innovation, but a growth.

That Justin Martyr was a believer in the essential Divinity of Christ, is rendered doubly clear by what we know of the circumstances which conditioned the expression of his sentiments. It was one of the offensive singularities charged upon Christians in Justin's day, that they worshipped a crucified man. As early as 110 or 111 A.D., the Roman Governor of Bithynia, the younger Pliny, in his famous letter to Trajan, describing the new religionists then numerous in the Province, speaks of them as singing hymns responsively to Christ as God.† Not that he had ever been present in their assemblies,

* See the Bishop of Lincoln's *Justin Martyr*, p. 50.

† "Carmenque Christo, quasi Deo, dicere secum invicem". *Plinii*, Lib. X, Epist. 96 (97).

but this, amongst other things, had been reported to him by Christians themselves. It does not avail to say, as has been said even by Münter,* that Pliny was a heathen, and consequently entertained only vague and low notions of worship. It is evident that he was given to understand that worship, such as is rendered only to God, was rendered to Christ. Nor were the Bithynian Christians alone in this worship. Eusebius (*Hist.* v, 28) tells us that, "Whatever psalms and hymns were written by the brethren from the beginning, celebrate Christ the Word of God by asserting his Divinity". Here certainly we have not mere heathen impression or inference, but direct Christian testimony. Thus, from the beginning, there was the highest authority for the heathen understanding of the matter, that Divine honors were paid to Christ. And this continued to be the heathen understanding of the matter, as we learn from the writings of Justin. He admits the worship rendered to Christ, worship in no qualified but in the strictest sense, and instead of condemning, justifies it, on the only sufficient ground that Christ was more than a man. "With reason", he says, "is Christ worshipped, because he is the Son of the very God".† And again: "It was not the Father, who spake to Moses and the other Prophets, as the Jews supposed, but the Son, who, because he is the Word, and the First-born of God, is also God".‡ It matters not that Justin, as we shall see farther on, was a Subordinationist, assigning to the Son a second and lower place than he assigned to the Father. The subordination of which he conceived, however falsely, was at any rate not that of the creature to the Creator. According to the passages just cited, Christ was the Son of God, and God, in that high sense which warrants the rendering of the highest Divine worship. There is no suggestion of anything lower than the very loftiest adoration. This fact

* Münter's *Dogmengeschichte*, Göttingen, 1802, vol. i, pp. 368-9.

† *ὁ υἱὸς αἰσθὼ τοῦ θεοῦ* θεοῦ, *Apol.* 1, § 13. See also *Apol.* 1, § 22, where Christ is said to be the Son of God in a sense altogether peculiar (*ἰδίως*); *Apol.* 2, § 6, where it is said that he alone is properly (*κρίως*) called God's Son; and *Dial. cum Tryphone*, § 36, where Christ is called God, the King of glory, and the Lord of hosts.

‡ *Apol.* 1, § 63.

of Divine worship rendered to Christ rests firmly upon a basis of its own, and is not to be invalidated by any theory of subordination, which Justin may be found to have entertained. The worship thus rendered may be pronounced logically inconsistent with such a theory, but the worship itself must not on that account be denied.

Justin also teaches with equal explicitness, that Christ is one of *Three* Divine Persons. That he conceived of these Three Persons as eternally Persons, immanent in the Godhead, we do not affirm. Nor need it be affirmed in order to make out his Trinitarianism. Whatever may have been, in Justin's opinion, the date of the hypostatical development, whether in eternity or only in time, if only the Second and Third Persons had an eternal preëxistence as attributes or powers of God, and, when developed as hypostases, were the Second and Third Persons in the Trinity, entitled to worship because separated by an immeasurable distance from all mere creatures of God, then Justin was a Trinitarian. This economic Trinity, developed, so far at least as the Second Person is concerned, just before and in order to creation, is none the less a real Trinity, to be Divinely adored. It may be conceded that an immanent Trinity, such as was subsequently affirmed, is logically required as a basis for the economic Trinity, but it by no means follows that the recognition of this logical antecedent is indispensable to a genuine worship of God as Triune. If Father, Son, and Spirit are from eternity, even though the Son and Spirit were at first only attributes of God, there is still a real Trinity, and the man who holds to it must be accounted a Trinitarian. Such a Trinitarian was Justin Martyr. In the *First Apology*, § 61, he speaks of the Trinitarian Formula as employed in Baptism; in § 65, as employed in the celebration of the Eucharist; and in § 67, as employed by Christians at their ordinary meals. In three other places in the same *Apology*, §§ 6, 13, and 60, rebutting the heathen charge of Atheism, he enumerates the objects of Christian worship: Father, Son, and Spirit. In §§ 13 and 60, it is true, the Son and Spirit are spoken of as subordinate to the Father, hold-

ing the second and third place;* and in § 6, the Angelic Host are also mentioned along with the Father and his Son and the Prophetic Spirit. But as to §§ 13 and 60, this idea of subordination, it is evident, did not hinder Justin from thinking himself a Trinitarian. Nor should it have that effect upon us, since the subordination, as already suggested, and as we propose to show more fully in the sequel, was so manifestly not that of the creature to the Creator. The mention of the Angelic Host in § 6, presents a more serious difficulty, and has given rise to not a little discussion. An attempt has been made to amend the reading, substituting *στρατηγόν* for *στρατόν*, so that the sense of the passage shall be: "Him the Father, and his Son, Leader of the Angels, and the Prophetic Spirit, we worship and adore". This failing of acceptance, different renderings of the passage have been proposed; one, making Christ the teacher of men and angels; another, favored by Bishop Bull,† making angels one of the subjects in regard to which Christ had instructed men. Bellarmin and the Roman Catholics generally,‡ are of course tenacious both of the old reading and the old rendering, by which Justin is made to teach the worship of angels; while Protestants generally have been equally strenuous in resisting this interpretation.§ But several eminent Protestant critics of recent date, such as Neander, Semisch, and Otto, have sided with Bellarmin, admitting that Justin does really teach the worship of angels.|| In the Oxford Translation, lately issued, the passage is rendered: "Both Him, and his Son who came from Him, and taught us these truths, and the host of the other good angels who follow and imitate Him, and the Spirit of Prophecy, we reverence and worship". So be it. The Trinitarianism of Justin is not thereby impeached. No one pretends that Justin entertained any idea of a Quaternity of Persons, while in so many other passages, not thus disfigured by his Angelology, there is the clearest recognition of the tra-

* For the subordination of the Logos, see also *Apol.* 2, § 13.

† *Defensio Fid. Nic.* 2 : 4 : 8. ‡ Möhler is an exception. § As, quite recently, the Bishop of Lincoln, and Chevallier. || Or, at least, as Semisch admits, a certain homage paid to them.

ditional Christian Trinity. Nor does it militate in the least against the orthodoxy of Justin, that in §§ 65, 68, and 93 of the *Dialogue with Trypho* he mentions only God and Christ as objects of worship. In controverting the bald Jewish Monotheism of Trypho, it was quite sufficient for his purpose to vindicate the Divinity of Christ, without calling attention, as in the *First Apology*, to the Third Person in the Godhead. The question at issue was, whether the word God could properly be applied, in its highest sense of course, to any other than the Jehovah of the Old Testament. An affirmative answer to this question, brought to its trial in discussing the essential Divinity of Christ, would necessarily lead in the end to an acknowledgment of the Christian Trinity as proclaimed in the *First Apology*.*

But in order to a full understanding of Justin, it remains to be noticed, that the Trinity, for which he thus witnessed, was the Trinity, not of immanence, but only of economy. The Second and Third Persons had no eternal existence as Persons, but only as attributes, becoming Persons in order to the administration of the Divine economy of creation and redemption. Such a Trinity is of course not permanently tenable. Either it must be relinquished in the progress of theological science, or be underlaid and supported by the deeper view of Three Persons eternally immanent in the Godhead. The economic Trinity must either drop from the tree as withered fruit, or draw its nourishment from the immanent Trinity. Which of these two issues Justin would have reached, had he been pushed to an issue, cannot well be doubted. The whole spirit of his system favors the assumption, that he would have moved along, as the Church herself did, to the doctrine of the eternal generation as propounded by Origen, and to the doctrine of the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, as affirmed at Nice, not to say also to the doctrine of the consubstantiality of both the Son and the Spirit with

* See *Dial. c. Try.* § 62, where it is said that Gen. iii, 22, "The man is become as one of us", proves that there were at least *Two* Persons in the conference. This point must first be carried.

the Father, as affirmed at Constantinople. While the philosophy of a Christian doctrine is undergoing discussion, a man's orthodoxy is to be determined, not merely by knowing the precise point at which he is found, but also by observing which way his face is turned, and in what direction his feet are moving. Justin Martyr was certainly orthodox in that he worshipped Christ as God, and believed in God as Triune. In the simplicity of his faith as a Christian, he was as much of a Trinitarian as Athanasius himself. It is only in his philosophy of the Trinity that we find him falling short of the standard subsequently set up. For this deficiency, so easily explained, let him neither be chided by the riper orthodoxy of our day, nor claimed by Anti-Trinitarians as a brother heretic. He was neither more nor less than a converted Platonist, seeking to give proper philosophic expression to the universal Christian belief. The worship rendered to Christ by his Church from the beginning, attested of course his Divinity. But if Divine in such a sense as to be properly worshipped, then he must have been eternally with the Father. How? Justin's answer was, he must have been with the Father as his Reason, or Logos. A distinct personal existence with the Father, had not entered Justin's thoughts. It was only as an attribute of God, that he could, from his philosophical stand-point, predicate eternity of the worshipped Christ. This is clearly expressed in many places: as, for example, in *Apol.* 2, § 6, addressed to the heathen, and in the *Dialogue with Trypho*, § 62, addressed to a Jew, where the participle and verb *συνών* and *συνῆν* are employed to set forth this impersonal connection. But the impersonal was destined to become personal; the attribute, an hypostasis. This took place before and in order to creation. He that had always been with the Father as an attribute (*συνών*), was then begotten (*γεννώμενος*) as a Son.* The eternally immanent Reason was then *prolated* (*προβληθέν*), or brought forth; and it is with him that the Father converses (*προσομιεῖ*).† That this prolation, or begetting, by which the immanent Reason became transitive, did not put the Second

* *Apol.* 2, § 6. † *Dial. c. Try.* § 62.

Person of Justin's economic Trinity down upon the level of the creatures of God, is evident from the assertion so often repeated, that this begetting was *before* the work of creation.* This begetting was not of necessity, else it had been eternal; but, as Justin taught, by the will of the Father.† The Logos thus begotten was distinct from the Father; another in number, though not in will, for he never did or said anything which the Father did not wish him to do or say.‡ Nor does the Father suffer any loss by this sending forth of his Logos. As in us, reason utters itself in speech without suffering diminution, as fire kindles fire without being lessened, so God utters and emits his Reason without ceasing to be rational.§ It was this uttered intelligence, this transitive Logos of God, that created the world, appeared to the Patriarchs and Moses, and finally was miraculously born of the Virgin Mary as the man Christ Jesus.¶ This Logos economy was for all men, even the heathen participating in its benefits. Christ is the First-born of God, the Word, of whom the whole human race are partakers; such men as Socrates, Heraclitus, and Musonius, who lived according to reason, having been Christians. In such men, however, the Logos was present only as a seed (*σπέρμα τοῦ λόγου*), while Christ is the whole Logos.¶ While Socrates, amongst the Greeks, was instructed by reason (*ὑπὸ λόγου*, without the article), amongst the Barbarians (the Jews) the Reason himself took form, and became man, and was called Jesus Christ.** Christ was therefore the Son of God, not merely because of his miraculous conception as a man, but also and more especially, because of his antemundane prolation as the

* As in *Dial. c. Try.* § 129, *πρὸ πάντων ἀπλῶς τῶν κτισμάτων.*

† *Dial. c. Try.* § 61. ‡ *Dial. c. Try.* §§ 56 and 129.

§ *Dial. c. Try.* §§ 61 and 128. These two ideas of reason and discourse, the immanent and the transitive, which in Latin require the two words *ratio* and *oratio*, or *sermo*, are expressed in the Greek by the single word *λόγος*.

¶ These representations were made both to heathens and Jews. See *Apol. 1.* §§ 5, 59, and 64; and *Dial. c. Try.* §§ 59, 75, 127, and 128. Sometimes the Logos is represented as the Creator, sometimes God through the Logos.

¶ *Apol. 1.* § 46; and *Apol. 2.* § 8, where we find Justin's doctrine of the *Spermatic Logos*.

** *Apol. 1.* § 5.

transitive Logos. This prolation was altogether peculiar. What Justin says of Mercury as the word-messenger of God * in the heathen mythology, is simply an *argumentum ad hominem*. The title "Son of God", he argues, should be no scandal to a Greek who believes in Hermes as a son of Zeus. The lofty sense put upon this title as employed by Justin in application to Christ, is everywhere apparent. Even as a man, this Son of God was born as no other man ever had been. As the transitive Logos, he not only preceded, but himself created, all creatures. As an attribute of God, he was as eternal as God himself. Eternal Sonship is not, indeed, affirmed, but eternal existence is. And therefore, according to Justin, is Christ legitimately worshipped. He is not merely the Son of God, he is God.† Not God in the Sabellian sense of being merely a manifestation of God, for this view, which some had begun to entertain, is expressly rejected in the *Dialogue with Trypho* (§ 128). The hypostatic Logos, Justin says again and again, is other than the Father, distinct, and holding the second place; so distinct, that the illustration taken from the sun and its beams must be discarded, on the ground that the beams have no separate existence of their own, but vanish with the disappearance of the sun. But not distinct and second in the Arian sense, since the Son is not a creature of God; while as an attribute, there was never a time when he was not. As to the Humanitarian heresy, so far was Justin from it, that he fell over rather into the Apollinarian extreme of denying to Christ a rational human soul. Such at least is the apparent sense of a passage in the *Second Apology* (§ 10), where the Person of Christ is made to consist of body, Logos, and animal soul.‡ Very much less is said of the Third than of the Second Person in this economic Trinity, and less clearly said. In passages already referred to, § the distinct Personal-

* *Apol.* 1, § 22, λόγον τὸν παρὰ θεοῦ ἀγγελτικόν.

† Θεὸς θεοῦ υἱὸς ὑπάρχων, *Diul. c. Try.* § 128.

‡ καὶ σῶμα καὶ λόγον καὶ ψυχὴν. Neander in his *History* (Torrey's ed. vol. i, p. 635), expresses some doubt in regard to the genuineness of the passage; but in his *Dogmengeschichte*, posthumously published, the doubt appears to be lessened. Otto and Semisch consider the passage genuine.

§ *Apol.* 1, §§ 6, 13, and 60.

ity of the Spirit is taught with sufficient clearness; nor is it just to say, that there are any other passages, in which, if fairly interpreted, the Logos and the Pneuma are confounded.* But *when* the Spirit became a Person, we are not distinctly informed; nor are we informed, whether this *personizing* of the Spirit was immediately by the Father, or mediately through the Logos. It is, however, a curious feature of Justin's system, that the office exercised by the Spirit has relation chiefly to the Prophets; the Divine power represented as working in believers being that of the Logos rather than that of the Pneuma. Hence the frequent use of the term Prophetic (as "Prophetic Spirit", "Holy Prophetic Spirit", and "Divine Holy Prophetic Spirit"), especially in the *First Apology*; "Holy Spirit being the title most commonly employed in the *Dialogue with Trypho*.† That Justin honored the Spirit even as he honored the Father and the Son, is evident. And equally evident is it, that his doctrine of the Spirit had not undergone the speculative development, which his doctrine of the Logos underwent. The time for such a development had not then come. Christianity had first to vindicate its Divine origin and authority, by vindicating the Divinity of its founder. This Justin did, proclaiming, indeed, his faith in the Trinity, but leaving for those who should come after him the three-fold task of asserting the eternal Sonship, as well as the eternal existence, of the Logos, the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, and, finally, the consubstantiality of the Spirit with both the Father and the Son.

In close connection with Justin Martyr stands Tatian, an Assyrian by birth, if not in blood. Originally a teacher of rhetoric, perhaps also of philosophy, which, at any rate, he appears to have studied eagerly, after travelling over many countries, engaged in a variety of pursuits, he came at last to Rome, where, by the reading of the Old Testament Scriptures,

* Their offices are sometimes confounded, but not their Persons.

† According to Semisch, the title, "Holy Spirit" occurs 32 times; "Prophetic Spirit", 27; "Holy Prophetic Spirit", 4; "Spirit of God", 4; "Divine Spirit", 3; "Prophetic Spirit of God", once; and "Divine Holy Prophetic Spirit", once.

he was led to Christ. He became also a pupil of Justin Martyr, but whether before or after his conversion, is not known. After the martyrdom of Justin in 166 A.D., he returned to the East, and fell eventually into Gnostic heresies. Jerome, who died in 420 A.D., in his *De Viris Illustribus*, § 29, says he "wrote innumerable volumes" (*infinita scripsit volumina*), only one of which, however, appears even at that early date to have been extant. This was his *Address to the Greeks* (*Ἀδύος πρὸς Ἑλλήνας*), which is still extant, written, probably, shortly after the martyrdom of his teacher, for the purpose of showing the superiority of Christianity, which he calls "the philosophy of the Barbarians", over the Greek mythology and philosophy. In this treatise, the Logos doctrine is the same as that of Justin, with only some slight variations in the phraseology. God, Tatian teaches, is without beginning in time, and is the beginning of all things. God is a Spirit, not pervading the universe as its soul, but presiding over it as its Creator.* From eternity he existed alone, but had his Logos with him (*σὺν αὐτῷ ὑπέστηκε*, instead of the *συνῆν* of Justin), and in him, as a rational power. By his will the Logos is projected, or "springs before" him (*προπηδῶ* instead of the *προβληθὲν* of Justin), in order to create the world. This begetting of the Logos was not by separation (*κατὰ ἀποκοπήν*), but by participation (*κατὰ μερισμὸν*), as fire kindles fire without diminution, as in man reason utters itself in speech without loss of reason.† The Logos made man immortal, having previously created the Angels. Prophecy is by inspiration of the Logos.‡ And finally it is said that God was born in the form of man.§ Tatian says nothing of the Holy Spirit as the Third Person in the Trinity. That, notwithstanding this silence, he was a Trinitarian, is hardly to be questioned. Copying Justin so closely in his development of the Dyad, we have no reason whatever for supposing that he did not accept also the Triad of his master.

* *Oratio ad Græcos*, § 4.

† *Oratio ad Græcos*, § 5. In § 7, Tatian speaks of the Logos as proceeding from the rational power, *ἐκ τῆς λογικῆς δυνάμεως*.

‡ *Ibid.* § 7. § *Ibid.* § 21.

Athenagoras, the converted Athenian philosopher, in his *Apology*, Πρεσβεία περὶ Χριστιανῶν, composed about 177 A.D., is a strong assertor of the Trinity. In § 10, he repels the charge of Atheism, and says that Christians believe in God the Father, and God the Son, and the Holy Spirit, who are one in "power", or Divinity, but distinct in rank, or position (ἐν τῇ τάξει): which is equivalent to saying that they are One in essence, and Three in economy. This idea is repeated in § 24, with the additional statement, that the Son is the mind (νοῦς λόγος σοφία) of the Father, and the Spirit his effluence (ἀπόρροια), flowing from him as light from a fire (φῶς ἀπὸ πυρὸς).* In § 6, it is said to have been through the Logos that all things were created, and by his Spirit that they are held together (συνέχεται). In § 10, the Son is called the First-begotten (πρῶτον γέννημα) of God, the distinction between begetting and creating being carefully drawn.† The word employed to express the going forth of the Logos to realize the Divine idea in creation, is προελθόν. But the Divine Unity is asserted with special energy. The Father is declared to be in the Son, and the Son in the Father, because there is one Divine nature in both. The λόγος is the νοῦς revealed. The Son of God is the Word of the Father in idea and operation (ἐν ἰδέᾳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ). Indeed, the peculiarity of Athenagoras, as compared with the other Greek Apologists, is the emphasis he puts upon the Unity of God; an emphasis so strong in some of his statements, as to seem almost to do away the distinct Personality of the Son and Spirit. In the sphere of speculation, no doubt the idea of a proper Trinity is endangered by these statements; but that Athenagoras thought himself a Trinitarian, is as clear as that he thought himself a Christian.

The fourth and last of the Greek Apologists is Theophilus, for some thirteen years Bishop of Antioch, where he died about 181 A.D. His only extant work is the *Ad Autolycum*, in three

* Justin's illustration was of fire from fire, objection being made to that of light from the sun, which agrees better with the Sabellian theory.

† The Son, he says, is a γέννημα, not a γενόμενον.

books, an Apology addressed to a learned heathen friend, and written near the close of the author's life. In spite of its exegetical blemishes, abounding as it does in allegorical interpretations of the Old Testament Scriptures, this treatise gives proof of much learning, and is written with a good deal of rhetorical vivacity. The Trinitarianism of Theophilus is unmistakable. It is he who first employed the terms ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικὸς, (corresponding with the συνὼν and γεννώμενος of Justin), to set forth the relation subsisting between God and the Logos.* In the *Ad Autolycum* 2 : 10, he says, God in the beginning existed alone, but had his Logos with him, immanent or "innate" in his breast (ἐνδιάθετον ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις σπλάγχνοις),† and begat (ἐγέννησεν) him with his Wisdom, before the worlds were made. This Logos he had as his servant or helper (ὑπουργόν) in the work of creation. In 2 : 22, the immanent Logos is represented as God's counsellor, but when God wished to create the universe, he begat him transitive (τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐγέννησε προφορικόν), not emptying himself of the Logos, but begetting; and with this Logos he always converses. So far Justin had gone. But Theophilus went farther; for in 1 : 7, God is said to have made the world by his Word and his Wisdom. So too in 2 : 18, we are told that when God said, "Let us make man in our image", he said it to his Word and his Wisdom. Theophilus appears to have been the first thus to represent Three Persons as taking part in the work of creation.‡ He was also the first to employ the term "Trinity". It occurs in 2 : 15, where, after speaking in his fanciful way of the sun as a type of God, and of the moon in its waxing and waning as a type of man, Theophilus adds, that the three days which preceded the creation of the great luminaries, are a type of the Trinity (τῆς Τριάδος): of

* Philo had previously employed them in describing the relation of thought to speech in man. See Baur's *Dreieinigkeit*, vol. i, p. 167. They were also employed by Plutarch. See Passow.

† In 2 : 22, the phrase is ἐν καρδίᾳ Θεοῦ.

‡ The spurious *Epistle of Barnabas* (107-120 A.D.) chap. 5, refers Gen. 1 : 26 to the Father and Son. So also Justin Martyr, *Dial. c. Try.* § 62. Irenæus, like Theophilus, refers it to the Three.

God, of his Word (*λογου*), and of his Wisdom (*σοφίας*). Much account has been made by Unitarian writers of the fact, that the Third Person in this Trinity of Theophilus is Wisdom, and not the Holy Spirit. That he meant the Spirit, we think is certain. Maranus, the Benedictine editor of the Greek Apologists, refers to three passages in Irenæus (who wrote about the same time), in which the same usage obtains.* In one of these passages, mention is made of the Word and Wisdom. In another, it is the Son and the Holy Spirit, the Word and Wisdom. And in the third, it is the Word and Wisdom, the Son and Spirit. These passages would seem to be decisive of the fact, that the Fathers of that age employed the names Wisdom and Spirit interchangeably. Theophilus himself makes use of both titles. In 2:10 (where the Word is said to have spoken through Moses in his account of the creation), as well as in 2:15, the Third Person in the Trinity is Wisdom; while in 2:9 and 2:30 it is said that Moses and the other Prophets were inspired by the Holy Spirit.

So much for the Greek Apologists. They were certainly Trinitarians. And their Trinity was that of Father, Son and Spirit, or Father, Word and Wisdom. But their Trinity was not that of Persons eternally immanent in the Godhead. The Son and the Spirit, or the Word and Wisdom, were originally and immanently only attributes or powers of God, becoming transitive as Persons just before and in order to the work of creation. Such at least was the theory as we find it completed in Theophilus; Justin, as it will be remembered, not undertaking to say when the Spirit became hypostatized. The inadequateness of the theory, is one thing; the honesty of these men in thinking themselves Trinitarians, and striving to compass a satisfactory philosophical statement of the traditional belief of the Christian Church, is quite another thing.

From the Orient we turn now to the Occident, from the Greek Apologists to the Latin Fathers, Tertullian, Novatian and Cyprian; not in the expectation of finding the speculative

* *Adversus Hæreses*, 3:24:2. 4:7:4. 4:20:1.

development of the Trinity materially advanced, but to see how the prevalent Christian belief expressed itself in another quarter of the world, and in another language. The change is great in several respects. First of all, there is an acknowledged inferiority in the instrument employed; the Latin language, for strictly scientific purposes, holding much the same relation to the Greek as the modern English does to the German. In the men themselves we recognise a much feebler spontaneous impulse towards philosophical speculation; Novatian alone of the three appearing before his conversion to have been attached to any particular philosophical school, the other two having probably been rhetoricians and advocates. And furthermore, we find their doctrinal statements conditioned by a new antagonism. This antagonistic heretical development, conditioning their statements, is known by the generic title of Monarchianism, which is made to include two species of heresy hardly deserving to be classed together. These were: Humanitarianism, which sought to conserve the Divine Unity by denying the Divinity of Christ; and Patripassianism, a far nobler heresy, which sought to conserve the Unity by making the Trinity a Trinity only of Divine manifestations. The former heresy, which was slightly in advance of the old Ebionism, in that it admitted the supernatural conception of Christ, and dated the descent of the Spirit upon him from his birth instead of his baptism, found utterance in Theodotus, a tanner of Byzantium, who, coming to Rome, was excommunicated by Victor, 190?–202 A.D.*; in Artemon of Rome, who was excommunicated by Zephyrinus, 202–218 A.D.; and in Paul of Samosata, deposed from the Bishopric of Antioch in 269 A.D. The contemporary Patripassian heresy found utterance in Praxeas of Asia Minor, who figured at Rome, gaining over to his side the Bishop Victor; in Noëtus of Smyrna, who flourished about 200 A.D.; in Callistus, Bishop of Rome from 218 to 223 A.D.; in Beryllus of Bostra in Arabia, convinced of his error by Origen at a Council held in 244 A.D.; and in Sabellius, the ablest of them all, born probably

* Cave in his *Historia Literaria*, vol. i, p. 87, says about 194 A.D.

in Egypt, and excommunicated by Dionysius of Alexandria in 261 A.D. This prompt condemnation of the Humanitarian heresy wherever it appeared, indicates the strong sense entertained by the Church of the Divinity of Christ. The longer and severer struggle with Patripassianism, only indicates how difficult it was to fix upon a statement, which should reconcile the two ideas of Trinity and Unity, neither of which was lightly held to.

Few men of the Ante-Nicene period are better known to us intellectually and spiritually than Tertullian of Carthage, although we know but little of his personal history.* He was a heathen of Roman descent, and is supposed to have been born about 160 A.D., to have been converted about 197, to have fallen off into the Montanistic heresy and schism not far from 204, and to have died at an advanced age about 240.† That he considered himself a Trinitarian, is sufficiently set forth by the well-known fact, that the Latin language is indebted to him for the term *Trinitas*, answering to the *Τριάς* of Theophilus.‡ That his Trinitarianism was of no mere philosophical parentage, might be argued from the scorn with which he uniformly speaks of philosophers and their speculations. In his *Apology*, addressed to the heathen, he denounces their philosophers as mockers and despisers of the truth, who lust only after fame and eloquence.§ In other treatises, he calls philosophers the ancestors of the heretics.|| His strong dislike of speculation, in spite of his own indulgence in it, is frequently expressed. In the handling of Christian doctrine, he commonly appeals to Apostolic tradition as embodied in the *Regula Fidei*. This Rule of Faith, as given in the *De Virginibus Velandis*, § 1, resembles in brevity and theological

* Of his writings, thirty-seven treatises are extant, fifteen of them produced before, and twenty-two of them after he became a Montanist.

† The dates as recently given by Huber in his *Philosophie der Kirchenväter*, p. 103.

‡ "Trinitas unius divinitatis, pater et filius et spiritus sanctus", *De Pudicitia*, § 21. See also *Adversus Praxean*, § 2.

§ *Apologeticum*, §§ 46 and 47.

|| "Hæreticorum patriarchæ philosophi", *Adv. Hermogenem*, § 8. See also *De Anima*, § 3.

simplicity the so-called Apostles' Creed ; but in the *De Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, § 13, as well as in the *Adversus Praxæan*, § 2, it is expanded so as to teach the eternity of God's Word (*verbum* in one treatise and *sermo* in the other), " emitted " to be his Son,* by whom all things were created, who was revealed to the Patriarchs, and by the Spirit of the Father was incarnated in Jesus Christ. The Humanitarians, Theodotus and Artemon, are nowhere noticed in the writings of Tertullian. The heresy they taught had probably gained no such foothold in Carthage as to require assault. In opposition, however, to the Patripassian heresy as taught by Praxeas, Tertullian composed a treatise, the *Adversus Praxæan*, in which his view of the Trinity is elaborately developed. Tertullian's theory of the Trinity, which antedates his Montanism and was never essentially modified by it, is almost precisely the same as that of the Greek Apologists, possibly a little in advance of it. Before all things, he says, God existed alone, in that there was nothing in existence outside of him ; but not alone, since he had within himself his Reason, *ratio*, which the Greeks call *λόγος*, and which the Latins, not quite accurately, commonly render *sermo*. This Reason which utters itself in Speech, even in man is other than the man himself ; how much more then in God, in whose image man was created. And yet the two terms, Reason and Word, *ratio* and *sermo*, may be used indifferently, since, as we know from our own experience, thought is a kind of internal conversation. In this distinction between *ratio* and *sermo*, we find at least a hint of the eternal *Personality*, as well as the eternal existence, of the Logos.† From God, says Tertullian, proceeded, *processerit*, his Word, by whom all things were created. And again, God sent forth, *protulit*, his Word, as the root the trunk, the fountain the stream, the sun the ray.‡ This prolated Word is

* Editors are not agreed whether the reading should be *emissum*, " sent forth ", or *demissum*, " sent down. "

† In general, the Eternal Word appears not to be called *Son* till prolated just before and in order to the work of creation ; as in *Adv. Marcionem*, 2 : 27, where we read : " *Sermonem ejus, quem ex semetipso proferendo filium fecit* ".

‡ It is also said that the Father " begets ", *generat*, and the Son " is begotten ", *generatur*.

the Son of God, second to the Father, yet one with him, as root and trunk, fountain and stream, sun and ray, are both two and one. But there is also a third, and this third is the Spirit, derived from the Father through the Son, the *tertius gradus* in the Trinity, and yet partaking of the *una substantia*, as the fruit is from the root through the trunk, the brook from the fountain through the stream, and the point of light from the sun through the ray. These are one as well as three. The Trinity is thus consistent with Unity. Subordination is constantly and clearly taught by Tertullian, as by the Greek Apologists before him. God the Father is the Divine substance, of which the Son and Spirit partake by derivation, as trunk and fruit of the root. But the subordination is not so conceived of as to rob the Second and Third Persons in the Trinity of their proper Divinity. The Son, though in some sense inferior to the Father ("*non statu sed gradu*"), is yet absolutely Divine. In the Scriptures when God the Father and the Son are mentioned together, the Father alone is called God, and the Son Lord; but when the Son is mentioned alone, he also is called God. And although God the Father is commonly designated as the Almighty, the Son is likewise declared to be equally almighty. When the Patripassians objected that this made two Gods, the reply was, that they might say so if they would, since in the 45th Psalm, and in other Scriptures, the term God is applied to the Son as well as to the Father. So too of the Spirit. Although inferior to the Son, as the Son is to the Father, the Spirit is also called God, as well as the Father and the Son. The Three are equally Divine because of the one substance which is in them all; "one substance", as Tertullian expresses it, "in three connected existences".* In thus stoutly affirming, and then attempting to reconcile, the two ideas of Trinity and Unity, Tertullian is clearly in advance of the Greek Apologists. The only point open to doubt, is in regard to the date of the proper *hypothetical* development of the Logos. That Tertullian regarded the Son and the Spirit as equally Divine with the Father, is open to no doubt whatever.

* "*Unam substantiam in tribus coherentibus*". *Adv. Praxeas*, § 12.

The personal history of Novatian is even more obscure than that of Tertullian. He has been confounded with Novatus of Carthage, and the two treatises of his now extant, the *De Trinitate* and the *De Cibus Judaicis*, were for centuries ascribed to other writers. Neither the time nor the place of his birth can now be determined. Probably he was not a Phrygian, as stated by Philostorgius.* There is better authority for believing that before his conversion he was a Stoic philosopher, and that after his conversion, though baptized clinically, he was, on account of his genius, eloquence and piety, made a Presbyter of the Church in Rome, in spite of the clinic baptism which was commonly a bar to such promotion. In the year 251, in consequence of a dispute in regard to the discipline of the lapsed, whom he thought too tenderly dealt with by Cornelius, he was ordained as a rival, schismatic Bishop. According to Socrates, he died a martyr during the persecution under Valerian, which lasted from 257 to 260.† His principal treatise, the *De Trinitate*, was written not far from the middle of the third century; but whether before the schism in 251, or as late at least as 256, critics are not agreed.‡ This treatise is not, as sometimes described, a mere epitome and echo of Tertullian. Not only is it more polished and eloquent in diction, but it covers more ground, controverting heretical opinions not noticed by the author of the *Adversus Praxean*. Of the thirty-one chapters, of which the treatise consists, the first eight are devoted to the doctrine of God, who may be described but not defined, being absolutely ineffable, and whose spirituality is carefully vindicated in the face of the anthropopathic and anthropomorphic representations, which, in condescension to human infirmity, are employed in the Old Testament. In the ninth chapter, Jesus Christ, "our Lord God", is declared to be the Son of God the Creator,§ foretold by the Hebrew Prophets, whose predictions are recited. In the tenth chapter, it is maintained that Christ was

* Philostorgius, *Hist. Ec.* 8: 15. † Socrates, *Hist. Ec.* 4: 28.

‡ Jackson, to whom we are indebted for the best edition of Novatian (London, 1728), says the former; Möhler in his *Patrologie*, the latter.

§ Which was denied by the Gnostics.

truly a man, in opposition to the Docetists, some of whom taught that his body was only a phantasm, others that it was composed not of earthly but of ethereal or sidereal elements. In chapters 11-22, it is argued at great length out of both Testaments, that Christ was not only a man but also God, wielding all the attributes of God, with whom God the Father took counsel in the work of creation, the Son and Word of God, yet one with God, the revealer of the unrevealed, the visible of the invisible. Humanitarianism being thus disposed of, the writer next proceeds, in chapters 23-28, to answer those, who, overborne by the Scripture testimony in support of Christ's Divinity, go too far, as it is said, and teach that Christ is not only God, but God the Father, or, as others say, only God, and not both God and man. In the attempt to distinguish between the two Persons of the Father and the Son, Novatian is clearly a Subordinationist, referring the passage, "My Father is greater than I", to the Divine nature of Christ. But this subordination of the Begotten to the Begetter, is evidently not supposed to impair the proper Divinity of Christ, which is constantly asserted with great energy and in every possible form. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit is very briefly handled in the twenty-ninth chapter, attention being called not so much to his Person as to his office, as the inspirer of Prophets and Apostles, and the sanctifier of believers. In the concluding chapters, 30 and 31, there is a summing up of the whole discussion. Great stress is laid upon the Divine Unity, which, it is contended, is not to be conserved either by saying that Christ is only a man, nor on the other hand by saying that he is God the Father. God indeed is One, and Christ is God, but God the Son, and not God the Father. Before all time Christ was in the Father as his Word, and by the will of the Father was begotten to be his Son.* The emphasis so steadily put upon the inferiority of the Son to the Father, is doubtless offensive to modern orthodoxy, but occasioned, as it manifestly was, by the Sabellianism, against which Novatian struggled, it gives us no concern. At all

* "Ex quo, quando ipse voluit, sermo filius natus est", ch. 31.

events it is perfectly clear, that Novatian was not pushed over into the opposite extreme of Arianism. The inferiority affirmed was certainly not that of the creature to the Creator. It is not a man, nor an angel, nor any other created being, it is God who thus proceeds from God, constituting the Second Person in the Trinity.*

While Novatian was thus contending for the faith in Rome, Cyprian, the strong-handed Bishop, sat ruling the Church in Carthage. Born probably about the year 200, converted in 246 in the midst of a prosperous career as an advocate, made a Presbyter the year following, and advanced in 248 to the Episcopate, which he held for ten laborious and troubled years till he died a martyr, Cyprian was not so much a theologian as a churchman. His energies were devoted almost exclusively to urgent questions of polity and discipline. The maintenance of the unity of the Church in the face of schisms within and cruel persecutions without, was the one great end of his endeavors. Theological discussion accorded neither with his natural gifts, nor with his education, nor with the circumstances of his lot. If he indulged in any speculations on the subject of the Trinity, there remains now no trace of them, and they are only to be inferred from his well-known admiration of the writings of Tertullian.† We have accordingly in Cyprian the best possible representative of the traditional and current faith of the Church in his time. That he was a Trinitarian in the midst of Trinitarians, is no more to be doubted than that he was a Christian in the midst of Christians. In a goodly number of passages, scattered throughout his writings, we have both the elements of the doctrine, and the doctrine itself of the Trinity, set forth in precisely that manner which best witnesses for the doctrine as an accepted tradition of the Church Catholic. In one of the earliest of Cyprian's treatises, the *De Idolorum Vanitate*, written before he became a Bishop, Christ is called the "Reason", the

* "Deus utique procedens ex Deo, secundam personam efficiens", ch. 31.

† "*Da Magistrum*", he is reported to have said daily to his secretary. Jerome, *De Vir. Ill.* § 53.

"Word", and the "Son" of God, is also called "God", and being born of the Virgin is said to be both God and man in one.* So likewise in the *Testimonia adversus Judæos*, which is also of an early date, Christ is called the "First-begotten", the "Wisdom", the "Word", the "Hand and Arm" of God, and "God" himself, many texts being cited out of both Testaments in support of these declarations. The filiation of Christ is represented as twofold; the first "from the beginning", a *principio* (probably of time), the second, in the incarnation.† In the *De Bono Patientia*, written several year later, Christ is set forth as an object of worship on the authority of Philipians ii, 9, 10, and Revelation xxii, 9. The distinct Personality of the Spirit is also taught. He is said to have appeared often in fire. The description of the appearance of Jehovah on Sinai, Exodus xix, 18, and of the Angel of Jehovah in the burning bush, Exodus iii, 2, are both of them referred to the Holy Spirit.‡ Finally, the doctrine of the Trinity, though not discussed, is repeatedly referred to as a well understood article of faith; as in the *De Oratione Dominica*, § 84 (Goldhorn's ed.), where the three hours of prayer, the third, the sixth, and the ninth, observed by the three children with Daniel, are spoken of as sacramentally denoting the Trinity, which was to be revealed in the latter days; as also in Epistles 73, 74 and 76 (Benedictine ed.), where the doctrine of the Trinity is brought to view in connection with the Formula of Baptism. An equal emphasis is put upon the Divine Unity,§ but without any attempt to reconcile the two ideas of Unity and Trinity. It is clear that both ideas were entertained, and entertained because a churchman like Cyprian could do no otherwise than accept the traditional and current theology of his time.

It now remained for the theology of the Church to advance from the doctrine of Christ's eternal existence to the doctrine

* "Deus cum homine miscetur". *De Id. Van.* § 11, Goldhorn's ed. Leipzig. 1839.

† *Testimontiorum*, Lib. 2, §§ 1-8. ‡ *Testimontiorum*, Lib. 3, § 101.

§ *De Unitate Ecclesie*, § 6: "Et hi tres unum sunt", 1 John v, 7, which Cyprian appears to have regarded as genuine. See also Ep. 73.

of his eternal Sonship. This was accomplished in the speculative Orient, at Alexandria. The problem was, to get rid of the idea of *time* in connection with the hypostatizing of the Logos. Clement commenced the solution of this problem, and Origen completed it.

Clement is supposed to have been born about the year 160 ; but whether in Alexandria or in Athens, is not known. He was at the head of the theological school in Alexandria from about 191 to 202, when he was driven into exile, from which, however, he is believed to have returned to Alexandria, where he died not far from 220. His extant writings are a *Hortatory Address to the Greeks*, apologetic in its character ; the *Pedagogue* in three books, designed to instruct the new convert in the regulation of his conduct ; the *Stromata* (or Miscellanies) in eight books, for the instruction of the mature disciple ; and the *Quis Dives Salvetur*, addressed, to the rich in view of the temptations to which they are particularly exposed. Of the Trinitarianism of Clement, so abundant are the proofs it would be tedious to recite them. The title *God* is repeatedly given to Christ.* As to the three Persons in the Godhead, not only does he hold to this doctrine as a Christian relying upon the Scriptures, but he even finds it in one of the epistles of Plato.† In each of the four treatises already mentioned, there is a distinct recognition of the Trinity. In the *Address to the Greeks* p. 74,‡ it is said : "The Word of God shall govern you, and the Holy Spirit shall lead you to the gate of heaven". In the first book of the *Pedagogue*, p. 102, we read : "O mystical wonder ! The Father of the universe is one, the Word of the universe is also one, and the Holy Spirit is one, and this same Spirit is everywhere". In the third book of the *Pedagogue*, p. 266, we are called upon to "praise one Father and Son, Son and Father, instructor and teacher Son, together with the Holy Spirit". In the fifth

* See Bishop of Lincoln's work on Clement, p. 332 n. 1, where some twenty instances are cited.

† The 2d Ep., now thought to be spurious. Ast, vol. 9, p. 516.

‡ Our references are to the Ed. of Sylburgius, Cologne, 1688, unless otherwise indicated.

Stroma, p. 598, is the mention of Plato's Trinity already alluded to. In the *Quis Dives Salvetur*, p. 954 (Potter's ed.), it is written: "Not knowing how great a treasure we have in an earthly vessel, walled about by the power of God the Father, by the blood of God the Son, and by the dew of the Holy Spirit". That there are some passages, such as in the seventh *Stroma*, p. 702, which savor of subordination, is not to be concealed, and need not surprise us, since even Origen, who taught so clearly the eternal generation, was a Subordinationist. Nor is it to be denied that there is a degree of vagueness about many of Clement's doctrinal statements, resulting from the fervent and declamatory style in which he writes. And yet he must have the credit of taking the first step towards representing the prolation of the Logos as an eternal act. In the seventh *Stroma*, p. 700, he speaks of the Son as "the timeless and beginningless beginning of all existences".*

Origen, the most learned, gifted and genial of all the Ante-Nicene Fathers, deserves a more extended notice than our present limits permit. He was born at Alexandria, in the year 185, was a pupil of Clement, whom he succeeded in 203, as Principal of the Alexandrian School, which office he held till 232, when he was banished, and after enduring various hardships, died at Tyre in 254. Of his manifold and brilliant achievements in almost every department of sacred learning, we need not now attempt an enumeration. Our present concern is solely with his speculations in regard to the Trinity. That in these speculations he was logically consistent with himself, is more than can justly be claimed. With as little reason can he be called an Arian. That in quite a number of passages he makes the Son inferior to the Father, and the Holy Spirit inferior to both the Father and the Son, is not indeed to be denied.† But this idea of subordination is certainly not the central and formative idea of his system. It

* τὴν ἀρχονον καὶ ἀναρχον ἀρχὴν τε καὶ ἀπαρχὴν τῶν ὄντων, τὸν υἱόν.

† As when he calls the Son θεός, but the Father ὁ θεός, or αὐτόθεος; and as when he calls the Father "the fountain and root of the Divinity".

came in by reason of his solicitude to maintain intact the Unity of the Divine essence. Manifestly it did not hinder him from making statements concerning the Second and Third Persons in the Trinity radically at variance with the idea of subordination, and destined eventually to drive that idea entirely out of the theological system of which it was then a part. Following on in the path opened by Clement, he succeeded in expelling from the development of the Trinity the element of time. From the economic Trinity connected with creation and redemption, he made his way boldly to the essential Trinity eternally immanent in the Godhead. Not that his statements are always logically consistent with this conception; for he would rather speak of the Son as proceeding from the will, than as proceeding from the essence of the Father, fearing lest the latter form of statement might imply, as Neander suggests, a partition of the Divine essence. But whether proceeding from the will, or from the essence of the Father, it is evident that in his opinion this act of proceeding was absolutely an eternal act; at once before all time, and still ever going on. The "*this day* have I begotten thee", of Ps. ii, 7, is *always*. "It is", he says, "an eternal and perpetual generation, as radiance is begotten of light".* Time has nothing to do with it.† Christ is "by nature" the Son of God, and therefore the only begotten. In support of this view he quotes Col. i, 15, Heb. i, 3, and the apocryphal Wisdom vii, 25.‡ The term "prolation" is objected to as too sensuous. It cannot be said that there was ever a time when the Son was not. Father and Son are no more to be separated than light and radiance. If it be objected that Origen teaches also an eternal creation of worlds, we have it from his own lips that the eternity predicated of Father, Son and Spirit, is wholly different from the eternity predicated of creation.§ Thus, in spite of his subordinationism, Origen rendered a most

* "Est namque ita æterna ac sempiterna generatio, sicut splendor generatur ex luce". *De Principiis*, 1: 2: 4.

† "Quia subsistentia Filii ab ipso Patre descendit, sed non temporaliter, neque ab ullo alio initio, nisi, ut diximus, ab ipso Deo". *De Princip.* 1: 2: 11.

‡ *De Princip.* 1: 2: 5. § *De Princip.* 4: 28.

important service to theology in emphasizing the Personality of the Son and Spirit, and making their Personality eternal. Theology is also indebted to him for the term God-man.*

The element of time in connection with the Trinity having thus been got rid of by Origen's doctrine of the eternal generation, it only remained for the Church to harmonize the two ideas of Unity and Trinity. Origen, instead of contributing to this result, only widened the breach between them by his subordinationism. Though not himself an Arian, many expressions of his were subsequently made use of to encourage Arians. The inferiority which he predicated of the Son and the Spirit in relation to the Father, in order to bring out the distinction of Persons, paved the way for Arius to pronounce the Son and Spirit mere creatures of God. On the other hand, the Unity of God had its champions, some of whom, the Humanitarians, did not scruple to deny the Divinity of Christ and the Personality of the Spirit; but others of whom, the Patripassians, moved by deeper religious impulses, so far from denying the Divinity of Christ, made Father, Son and Spirit only different manifestations of the same Divine Person. Between these two extremes of Arianism and Sabellianism, the theology of the Church for a long time swung back and forth, till it finally rested in the decision pronounced at Nice in 325. To reach this decision, the Church, as is well known, had to steer her way between the two extremes just named. The final struggle, however, was with Arianism. And the one word in dispute at last was *ὁμοούσιος*. It matters not that a previous orthodox Council had condemned the use of this term. It matters not that the sense now put upon it is not quite the same as at first. It is enough that we know why it was insisted upon at Nice. It was understood to teach not only that Christ is God, but God *in no inferior sense*. A similar decision in regard to the Spirit followed soon after amongst the theologians, though not affirmed by the Church

* Θεῶνθρωπος, *Hom. on Ex.* 3 : 3. Θεὸν ἀληθῶς ἐνανθρωπήσαντα, *De Princp.* 4 : 1 : 2.

in a formal manner till the Second Œcumenical Council met at Constantinople in 381.

One of the best possible proofs of the perfectly legitimate and normal character of this Nicene decision, is furnished by the fragment which has come down to us from the pen of Dionysius, Bishop of Rome from 259 to 269. This fragment may be found in Routh's *Reliquiæ Sacræ* (2d ed.), vol. iii, pp. 373-377, and is assigned by Jaffé to the year 260. In this remarkable production, antedating by more than sixty years the Council of Nice, Dionysius first condemns both the Sabellians and those who in reaction against Sabellianism ran into Tritheism, and then with equal clearness and energy condemns the Arians. No wonder Athanasius, in his defence of the Nicene Creed, contended that the Council, in which he bore so conspicuous a part, "laid down nothing new".

ART. III.—MEMORIAL VOLUME OF THE AMERICAN BOARD.

By SAMUEL M. WORRESTER, D.D., Salem, Massachusetts.

MEMORIAL VOLUME OF THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS OF THE AMERICAN BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS. Boston: Published by the Board. Missionary House, No. 38 Pemberton Square. 1861. 8vo, pp. 462.

THE moral dignity of the missionary enterprise has a noble monument in this Memorial Volume. Since we hailed the "Great Commission," from the graphic pen of Dr. Harris, eighteen years ago, we have seen no work in this "line of things", which has such claims to the attention and gratitude of the Christian public. We anticipated an honorable success for Dr. Anderson, when first informed of his design to prepare this volume. We are not disappointed.

It would be too much to say, that no other man could have produced a work of equal merit, on the same subject. But we are quite sure that there are manifold paragraphs and

pages in this Memorial, together with numerous brief notices, allusions, or suggestions, which in a historic or didactic view are of no common interest and importance; and which would never have been given to the world—certainly not more opportunely and satisfactorily—if the much respected senior Secretary of the Board had ceased from his labors previous to the Jubilee Meeting.

There is at times a seeming necessity for some one to undertake the execution of a standard work of literature or science. Authors could be named who have secured an enviable celebrity, although their actual qualifications for the service performed were by no means preëminent. Their success was mainly in their seizing the opportunity, which their superiors neglected. They did well, and to good acceptance, what others might have done better.

But when, as in the case of this memorial volume, the right man comes to the right subject at the right time, there is such a rare felicity of conjunction, as indisputably entitles all his friends to express their most cordial congratulations. And these are the more fitting in the present instance, because from family bereavements and his own early and “often infirmities”, it was so probable, more than a generation since, that he would go to his grave and to heavenly rest, at least a score of years before any of his more vigorous coëvals would reach the usual beginning of a “good old age”.

The work before us we do not propose to review by copying its title only, “as the manner of some is”. Neither shall we essay a full abstract, or even a systematic synopsis of its contents. We may presume that it is already, or will soon be, in the hands of most of our readers, for at least one careful perusal, and will afterwards be kept as a missionary classic for frequent reference. On this presumption, we shall willingly omit what we should otherwise deem it necessary or expedient to say.

“The reader”, it is remarked, in the Preface, “will naturally turn first to the Historical Discourse, by the President of the Board, which contributed so largely to the interest of the Jubilee Meeting. A considerable part of the volume will be found

more or less illustrative of that discourse. Those well informed in religious biography, will at once perceive the hand of the Rev. Dr. Sprague, of Albany, in the comprehensive and truthful sketches of the Founders of the Board, forming one of the chapters; and this generous contribution to the work is very gratefully acknowledged. For the admirable analysis and philosophical views of the literature of the Board and of its Missions, forming one of the chapters in the second series, the volume is indebted to the Rev. Joseph Tracy, D.D., author of the History of the Board in its first thirty years".

Beside these and other contributions of which the author does not speak too highly, the work is enriched by instructive and stirring passages from different sources. He evidently sought to make the volume as valuable as he could, within the limits which his best judgment had prescribed. He has wholly foreborne to exhibit himself, even when in the very midst of the *quorum magna pars fuit*. "Should many of the facts here embodied strike the reader as not new", the Preface modestly suggests, "he will at least see them for the first time in their natural combinations". And this we consider one of the cardinal excellences of the volume, the most of which is necessarily of the nature of compilation, but of that kind which demands such a union and measure of toil and skill, that, when well executed, it deserves a meed of praise, not a whit inferior to what is usually accorded to the happiest inventions and demonstrations by purely original efforts.

A brief notice of the Jubilee Meeting precedes the Discourse by Dr. Hopkins, now first published. It would have been relevant somewhere, to have referred to the previous commemorative services at Bradford, on the twenty-ninth of June, the very day when the half-century from the time of the institution of the Board was completed. Bradford was *the* place of all others, where the Jubilee should have been celebrated, if there had been convenient accommodations for the immense assemblage. The services there in June were entirely commemorative, and were more impressive as such, than those of the Jubilee Meeting, at Boston, in the October following.

At this last, the subject of missionary expenditure was

introduced somewhat before its time, and occupied, as we think, a disproportionate part of three sessions. It "gave rise", Dr. Anderson says, "to a protracted, earnest, and very profitable discussion. It was (as it is still) a topic for the times, and every body seemed interested. It had such an obvious bearing on the vital interests of the great cause, and also upon the personal duty of every Christian, that it did not perceptibly interfere with the spirituality of the meeting. In view of the unexpected and very grave national agitations which have since arisen, and of their depressing influence on the commercial and religious interests of the country, it was, perhaps, well that the main current of the meeting took this direction. That, and the disenthralment of the treasury, may be thankfully regarded as a providential preparation for passing through the national judgments so soon to follow". Still, much more of a strictly commemorative character was desired at the meeting. The want which was then so deeply felt by many, is well supplied by the Memorial Volume.

A single session, or but a little more, might have sufficed for the subject of finances, at least in the opinion of those, and they were not few, who, in anticipation of the festival, and especially its last great day, had for months been "panting, as the hart panteth for the water-brooks".

In those dense gatherings at the Tremont Temple, there was an unwonted preparation of glowing thoughts and grateful memories, of the good hand of God upon the Board and the Missions, from the beginning hitherto. And there were the tenderest recollections of one, and another, and another, of the worthy "company of those that published" salvation,—the devoted and faithful men and women sent forth by the Board;—now shining as "stars in glory";—who, for their indebtedness to the Lord of all, freely gave talents, genius, learning, labor, self-denial, yea, life itself, and whose sacred ashes, "our Father's care", are reposing in the soil of every quarter and every climate of the globe:—to say little, or even nothing, of those five deceased Secretaries, Worcester, Evarts, Cornelius, Wisner, Armstrong,—whose influence on the world's evangelization is immeasurable, and whose character for purity

and beneficence is a mine of "durable riches", transcending far the price of all gold and silver, with all diamonds and pearls.

A grander occasion for a commemorative discourse, no man ever had, unless it was Daniel Webster, at Plymouth, in December, 1820, at the bi-centennial celebration of the Landing of the Pilgrims. But as was said by that great man, at Bunker Hill, on the seventeenth of June, 1843, as he pointed to the "plain shaft" of granite, — "it is itself the orator of this occasion", — so there was no orator at the Jubilee Meeting so powerful as the inaudible Jubilee itself.

Too much, unquestionably, was expected from the President of the Board, in that place and hour, which he or any one else might justly have declined attempting to fill, unless conscious of a power to "play the man" "for the cities of our God", not only as of David's "thirty and seven", but of his "first three". Dr. Hopkins's discourse is worthy of his well-deserved reputation, though it is less distinctively commemorative than the affluent, brilliant, and energetic sermon by Dr. Fisher, on the evening previous. In the view which he takes of the origin of the Board* and American Foreign Missions, it is not all that we could wish. But it will bear a searching inspection, as a masterly analysis and statement of the objects, which

* Our own views of the "origin of American Foreign Missions" are given at some length, in Vol. II, of this REVIEW, pp. 687-724. Dr. Hopkins says, that the secret society of those at Williams College, who, in 1808, pledged themselves to go on a mission to the heathen, was "the first Foreign Missionary Society on this continent". A similar society was soon formed at Andover, by Mills, and those who went with him, and from that the proposition was made that resulted in the formation of the American Board". (Mem. Vol. p. 17.) But the first chapter of the Memorial says, — "This society was transferred, with its constitution and records, to the Seminary at Andover, in the year 1809, or early in 1810, and has continued to the present time". And Mr. Nott, the only survivor of the first missionary company, — and who was a member both of the secret society and of the "Society of Inquiry", — testifies of the former, that "after he joined it, it never acted as a society, and that the paper presented to the General Association at Bradford, had no direct connection with it. Neither", he says, "did the Society of Inquiry authorize the paper, which was merely individual action". — Dr. Hopkins had forgotten, or had never heard of the Foreign Missionary Society at Newport, R. I., as early as 1773, etc.

the Board has ever aimed to accomplish;—its elementary principles and constitutional modes of procedure;—the signal and stupendous results as a whole of its world-wide operations;—with the deductive and enduring lessons from the enterprises, experiments, and experience of its first fifty years. But the solid, sterling excellence of the discourse, a cursory reading is not likely to discover and appreciate.

Excepting the introductory historical sketches, there is a perfect coincidence and congruity between this discourse and the other parts of the Memorial Volume; not very unlike the agreement between a theorem and its demonstration. The coincidence is the more striking, because, as we have reason to believe, wholly undesigned. Dr. Anderson's plan, as well as his style of execution, is independently his own. He had no precedent as a model, either to guide or perplex him; for his work, as he apprises the reader, "is the first of its kind".

With the mass of materials germane to the subject, it must have been no easy achievement in the art of methodising, to originate a plan which would alike secure unity and completeness, clearness and brevity, comprehensiveness and fulness. We have all matters distributed under the general heads of "The Board" and "The Missions". These are each illustrated in a series of chapters, sufficiently logical in arrangement and exhaustive in treatment. Each chapter also has a competent degree of substance, freshness, and vigor; while a multitude of facts appear in high-relief, without disturbing the easy progress of narrative or discussion, or leaving any reasonable demands of good taste and a sprightly humor unsatisfied.

We have thus a beautiful and truly readable volume, for all classes of friends of the missionary cause, as well as for the most intelligent members and patrons of the Board. If we do not much mistake, and may be indulged in the suggestion, it is decidedly more interesting than the average of the most able publications, which have emanated from the Missionary House, during the last twenty and more years. The official documents of the Prudential Committee, annual and special, have ever been distinguished for clearness, definiteness, accu-

racy, and argumentative force ; but for attractiveness or adaptability to the majority of those who are the readers, or who should be, they have been too severely chaste and temperate in illustration and expression. There has been, as we think, and we are not alone in this judgment, too palpable a preponderance of the intellectual over the imaginative and emotional. And with such exalted and exhaustless themes, that more of brilliancy and fervency should be a desideratum, is no strange thing, when our geographies, major and minor, and even our library editions of dictionaries are all pictorial, our first-class histories are magnificent orations, in all but name, and form, and space, while annals or chronicles are as seldom seen as the skeletons of anatomy, and are by many scarcely known to have ever been written, since the days of the patriarchs and prophets.

But the desideratum of which we speak is not altogether a novelty, or a peculiarity of our times. The first Secretary of the Board well understood the Christian and the popular mind of his day. Without any enthusiasm, as Isaac Taylor defines the term, he had a great degree of sensibility, over which he had an almost perfect mastery. His head and his heart were inseparable in all circumstances. Whatever he wrote or spoke for conviction, was intended also for persuasion. His powerful logic never neutralized either his pleasantry or his pathos. Responding with all his soul to "the grace that bringeth salvation", he cherished all the graces, mental, moral, or social, by which his personal and public life could be made the most effectually to "adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour". This was the secret, we humbly conceive, of his unsurpassed influence, through the missionary papers of the first ten years of the Board. And his solicitude to secure the highest and the happiest effect in all his writings, not only continued, but increased, until he laid down his pen at Mayhew, to resume it no more. His last letter, that to his own family, is, as was said by the late Dr. James W. Alexander, "transcendent".

Some fifteen years before his death, he happened to be present, at an association of ministers, of which he was not a member. But being asked to remark upon a sermon, which

had just been preached, and we may as well add, by a preacher of "the straitest sect", — "the most straitest", King James's translators would say, — of Hopkinsians, — he gravely answered: "There were very many bones; and lo! they were *very dry*". The unexpected critique, — so kindly and truly uttered, — exhilarated the "good company", and could not at all be withstood by the preacher, who, as the nautical dialect has it, was at once "taken all-aback". Whether or not it was further said, it might have been, that "many" and "dry" as were the "bones", which Ezekiel saw "in the open valley", the narrative of the vision is *not* "dry". It is as if there was a fire in the prophet's own bones; and all his words, according to an inspired exemplar of eloquence, are "like apples of gold in pictures of silver".

And if the discourses of Him who spake as never man spake, may not be legitimately presented as a model for imitation, there is still an abundance for the purpose, in both prophets and apostles. The greatest of the apostles did indeed disclaim "excellency of speech", as forming any part of his manner or means of "declaring the testimony of God", to the self-conceited and hypercritical people of Corinth. But whatever was the particular point of antagonism in the expression, and whatever may have been true of his *preaching*, which, by the way, whether in his vernacular Hebrew or his adopted Greek, was not powerless, Hebrews and Greeks themselves being witnesses, — it is not a little notable, that in no one of his epistles is there more, if as much, of beauty and grandeur, of fervid and impassioned energy and earnestness, as in those to the Corinthians; the very style, we fully believe, which, even in the refined judgment of Longinus, could claim for Saul of Tarsus, an honored remembrance among the carefully selected examples of the highest order of writers and orators.

It would be too much to require of the Secretaries of the Board, that they should always prepare the Annual Reports of the Prudential Committee, in the style of elevated, and, if we may so use the term, *oratorical* composition, like, for instance, the last report by either of the first two Secretaries. Of the "conclusion" of that by Mr. Evarts, whose habitual style of

writing was a happy combination of superior qualities, Dr. Anderson says, — it is “one of the most eloquent productions that have resulted from the modern missionary enterprise”. But we may refer to the universal praise awarded to those Reports in particular, as ample proof, that the more there can be of “eloquent productions” from the pens or the tongues of the administrative officers and subordinate agents of the Board, the greater will be the satisfaction of their most candid and cordial friends and coadjutors. In this sentiment, these estimable brethren, we know, will entirely concur.

Like all other volumes, which deal largely in facts, incidents, names, and dates, the memorial is open to emendations, as one edition succeeds another. The latest issues are evidence of this, and of the author’s intention to secure the utmost completeness and correctness. “The work has been performed”, he says, — “under a deep sense of responsibility for the accuracy of every statement. Very little has been taken on trust”.

The work could never have been what it is, but for the care of Dr. Anderson, during his long term of office, to note systematically every event, occurrence, proceeding or transaction, which might be of use in the future operations and deliberations of the Board; — and to classify and place on file, or in bound volumes, all letters and other papers belonging to his own department, — the same system being carried forward simultaneously in the other departments at the Missionary House. He has also had a great advantage in preparing his work, from the able discussions of the most important subjects in the weekly meetings of the Prudential Committee, or on missionary ground, as when with very peculiar responsibilities he visited the missions in India.

The “Reports and Letters, bound up with the Report of the Deputation to the Board, and that of the Special Committee on their case, make a considerable octavo volume”. Of this volume, Dr. Joseph Mullens, “one of the London Society’s missionaries in Calcutta, to whom missions in India and all missionary bodies are under great obligation”, was pleased to say, at the Liverpool Conference, in 1860, — “that no volume of equal size, published during the era of our modern mis-

sions, contains so much valuable information on all the details of missionary experience, on several most important fields of labor, as that volume of missionary papers. It might be published with great advantage to the friends of all missionary Societies, etc”.

This testimony must be peculiarly gratifying to Dr. Anderson, who from an imperfect acquaintance with the facts in the case, or for other reasons, was virtually “arraigned” at the meeting of the Board in Utica, in 1855, on account of his alleged unauthorized and untoward proceedings in India, as the leading member of the Deputation in 1854-5. As he was then absent from the country, he of course could not answer for himself. But he had the opportunity, at the Special Meeting of the Board, in Albany, in March, 1856. His vindication, although at first received with considerable hesitancy or misgiving, by many, and among them some very warm personal friends, was a great success, and may now be regarded from subsequent developments, as a complete and signal triumph.

At Albany, he seemed to be far more anxious for great principles and permanent benefits to the cause, than for his own reputation. To this, however, he has no right to be indifferent, because it is so vitally important to the prosperity of the Board, that the Secretaries should have the confidence and the approving sympathy of all, who are expected to sustain its measures by their prayers and their substance. No one is more sensible of this, we judge, than is the present Senior Secretary. And who, we confidently ask, ever sought information of him, or explanation by letter or by an interview, and was not responded to, or received, with the kindness and urbanity of a true Christian gentleman? If any have different impressions concerning him, let them seek his acquaintance. In any event, let them not take counsel of envy or jealousy.

Not the least among the important objects accomplished by the preparation of this volume, will be found the saving of labor and trouble to many thousands, who need more knowledge on different points of constantly recurring inquiry. By the specifications connected with the subject of each chapter,

or by the copious Index, any person may soon determine whether the volume will give him the desired instruction. As to the constitution of the Board, and the elements of its efficiency as a working instrument; the circumstances in which it was incorporated, and the reasons for its being “a *close* corporation”, to which exceptions, not very justly, nor always, perhaps, very kindly, have been so often taken; the relations and privileges of honorary members, and the method by which the Board’s identity, stability, and pecuniary integrity are maintained, while it enjoys all the material advantages of a strictly voluntary association, and avoids some of the most embarrassing liabilities; its relations also to churches, to ecclesiastical organizations, and to governments, and whatever pertains to the meetings of the Board, the Prudential Committee, the missions and the missionaries, the correspondence, the finances, or the agencies for the collection of funds, and the diffusion of missionary intelligence and influence;—all these and other associated matters are so distinctly and comprehensively exhibited, that difficulties, which heretofore naturally and honestly, or captiously and morbidly, have been agitated, may have an explanation, or an effectual solution; and much anxious, or otherwise uncomfortable feeling, may be greatly relieved, if not entirely removed. In this view alone, we regard Dr. Anderson’s elaborate digest of the history of the Board and its Missions, as both seasonable and invaluable.

On the relations of the Board to slavery, there is but little said. We may presume, from the experience of the past, that the volume, in this respect, will be unsatisfactory to many; and we should have been pleased if there had been more fullness and explicitness on this subject. But we do hope that we have heard the last of it, at the meetings of the Board.

The most original, and perhaps most remarkable chapter in the Memorial volume, is that on “The Literature of the Board and its Missions”. The writer is duly recognised in the preface—the evangelical and philosophical “Rev. Joseph Tracy, D.D., author of the History of the Board in its first thirty years.” This very suggestive contribution is in its proper

place, before the concluding chapter, in which we have a review of the "Field and work at the close of the half-century".

From the Rev. Dr. Bacon's elaborate and characteristic article in the *New Englander*, for August, 1860, in which he learnedly and vividly portrays the aspects of Christendom and the world in 1810; and from a stirring speech of Rev. Dr. Mullens, at the Liverpool Missionary Conference, already referred to, free extracts are very justly introduced for an instructive and impressive presentation of some portions of the contrast between the present and "fifty years ago". This chapter, like others preceding, will richly repay a very careful study.

Possibly there may be more of the pecuniary and statistical, and less of the moving and melting, than some would expect to find in the last pages. But the chapter, as a whole, is a truly dignified and animating conclusion of the work, which the author "regards as among the closing labors of his somewhat protracted official life", and in respect to which his "prayer is, that it may be accepted by the Head of the Church, and blessed to the extension of his kingdom". May his great usefulness yet be prolonged, and his prayer be answered, "exceeding abundantly".

Here we should be glad to close our review of this volume, and turn our thoughts to some of the subjects suggested by it, which have an immediate bearing upon our present and prospective duty in respect to the work of missions. But we are reluctantly constrained to take a frank and explicit issue upon statements in the chapter on the "Founders" of the Board, worthy of all praise, as it certainly is, for a group of biographic sketches, which are like a gallery of the choicest portraits; and also upon a statement, in a previous chapter, by which this is foreshadowed. The issue is of such a nature, that we wish first to disclose our stand-point.

A few years since, we were at great pains to procure as correct and exact a sketch as possible, for an engraving of the scene of the laying on of hands at the ordination of the first American foreign missionaries, in the old Tabernacle, in Salem, February 6, 1812. To our astonishment the picture came

forth, with such a fashion of pews, such places, positions, postures, and costumes of ladies and gentlemen in attendance, as completely metamorphosed the reality of that morally sublime spectacle. When we protested against this engraving, which, as a work of art, is reputed to be very successful, we were apologetically informed that, there was much competition among New York artists, and that no one of the first class would be willing to engrave such a scene without adding embellishments, which would ensure a fine artistic effect. We had to content ourselves as best we could. But we shall probably never look upon the frontispiece of the American Missionary Memorial, without thinking of the "Miracles and Moralities" of the mediæval drama, in which, for example, the poor Lazarus, of the sick man's gate, rides out a knight errant, with a pack of hounds, and the humble and grateful Mary Magdalene comes abroad for new conquests as a blushing coquette.

In "Paradise Lost," for ought we have to object, it may be no offence to nature, if our first father's Eve is "the fairest of her daughters", and thus the loving mother of herself. And we should not shed a single tear of regret if our eyes could behold the painting, by which a Dutch clock keeps time on the walls of the Temple of Solomon. But in history or biography we can tolerate no fiction, no romance, though it may "lend enchantment" to the truth of fact, like the magic creations of the genius of Waverley.

We believe, with Dr. Lingard, that what has been called the philosophy of history, would be more properly denominated the philosophy of romance. We have had too much of observation, not to be thoroughly persuaded, that very intelligent and conscientious men do not always discriminate between fancies and facts. And we are sure that unintentional and unsuspected errors or mistakes, from wrong information, inference, or impression, especially when sanctioned by "a good name", and in harmony with one's personal or partisan wishes, or foregone conclusions, may be repeated from mouth to mouth, or copied again and again for publication, until it is next to impossible to correct them. They are thus liable to be more injurious, and are more to be deprecated, because less likely

to be exposed, or to be disbelieved, than flagrant misstatements are, and unmitigated falsifications; or what in a retributive review of the works of some mendacious British travelers, forty years ago, Edward Everett more mildly defined as that "species of fiction in which gentleman of veracity are not accustomed to indulge".*

It has long been our conviction, therefore, that those who have the opportunity and the power of attempting the correction of such errors, as uncorrected will inevitably become a part of accredited history, should not shrink from the duty, which, according to the GOLDEN RULE, they imperatively owe to the generations of the future. And such is the design of this Memorial Volume, such the acknowledged importance of accuracy in every statement, such will be the estimation in which it will be held, as an authority for citation or reference, that it would be incomparably better to expunge, or re-write whole pages and whole chapters, than that any material misconception and misrepresentation of a single fact in the history of the American Board, should be circulated through the world, and transmitted to posterity, under the full sanction seemingly of its own consecrated seal.

"As every great enterprise," says our friend Dr. Sprague, who has made such princely and unparalleled contributions to our American biography, "takes its complexion more or less from the character of its originators, so the almost unexampled prosperity that has attended the American Board, no doubt

* In Mr. Everett's Life of General Stark, (Sparks's American Biography,) there is a capital example of the danger of writing history by inference. The General had said, in his despatch to General Gates, after the battle of Bennington: "I lost my horse, bridle, and saddle in the action." Inferring that the horse must have been killed, Mr. Everett wrote: "The General's horse was killed in the action". But the truth is, that the horse was *stolen*, and very probably by some one, who by "running away", might "live to fight another day". In a file of the *Connecticut Courant*, for 1777, there may be seen an offer of \$25 reward for the detection of the thief, or the recovery of a horse, which was stolen, during the Bennington fight, from the subscriber, John Stark. When Mr. Sparks was informed of the mistake of Mr. Everett, he very courteously acknowledged it to the gentleman who had made the discovery of the advertisement; and among other remarks observed, that such errors are to be regretted, because they shake confidence in other statements.

had its seminal principle in the eminently enlightened, comprehensive, and evangelical views of its founders; that is, the twenty-six corporate members of whom it was constituted in 1813, when it assumed its national character. These men were all among the lights of their generation; and one noticeable circumstance in connection with the body is, that it had in it a representation of the nobility, not only from several different Christian communions, but from different States, professions, and walks of honorable usefulness; as if to stamp its very beginning with the most exalted type of both wisdom and liberality. It is fitting that due honor should be rendered to these illustrious men. . . . We find here presidents of colleges and professors in theological seminaries, other distinguished ministers of the Gospel, and eminent civilians, occupying various stations of public usefulness."

Dr. Anderson's own view of the Board and its membership, in Chapter IV, corresponds with this statement. "These twenty-six persons", he says, "may be regarded as the founders of the Board, viewed in its broad national character".

Why, then, was the Jubilee meeting not postponed to 1863, if in 1813, "the Board assumed its national character"; and if those twenty-six corporate members were really the "founders", the "originators" of the Board", and "stamped its very beginning with the most exalted type of both wisdom and liberality"? And how long is it since the discovery was made, that there was, as would seem to be implied, an essential change in its organic structure and endowments, in 1813; and that it was not in fact the *American* Board, when, having been instituted at Bradford, in June, 1810, it was in the September following, duly organized and formed, at Farmington, Ct., by the adoption of its constitution and the choice of its officers?

What says the first article of the constitution? "The Board shall be known by the name and style of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions". Why was it called "*American*", if it neither had, nor was designed to be understood to have, a "*national character*"?

Although at the beginning the members were chosen only

from Massachusetts and Connecticut, they were *Commissioners* to whom might be entrusted the care and expenditure of all moneys, which might be contributed in any part of the country, for the purpose of sending the Gospel to the heathen. At the very time of their organization, there was in eastern Massachusetts a "Board of Commissioners of the Society in Scotland for promoting Christian Knowledge". This Board was chiefly or entirely composed of residents in Boston and vicinity. But it acted not only for the Society in Scotland, but for all persons in any part of the land, who might commit donations or legacies to its trust. From this Board, as we believe, our American Board took its name, and was so constituted, that it could act for the friends of foreign missions in all the States of the Union, as well as for those in Massachusetts and Connecticut.

At their first meeting, the Commissioners prepared an address, "soliciting the serious and liberal attention of the Christian public". And they say in conclusion :

"The Commissioners hold themselves sacredly bound to use their best endeavors for promoting the great design for which they have been appointed ; and solemnly pledge themselves to the Christian public, faithfully to appropriate, according to their best discretion, all moneys which shall be contributed and committed to their disposal, for aiding the propagation of the Gospel, in unevangelized lands."

They took missionary candidates under their charge, and made other preparations for their great work. And when early in 1812, it was made known, that a mission was about to be commenced, contributions were forwarded to the Treasurer, as if indeed, according to the second annual report of the Prudential Committee— "The Lord made it to be remembered, that *the silver and the gold are his*. The hearts of the people were wonderfully opened ; money flowed in from all quarters ; and by the time that the Caravan sailed, the Committee were able to meet all the expenses of fitting out the missionaries, and to advance for each of them a whole year's salary. The Treasurer's accounts for the year 1812, acknowledge donations from Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Mas-

sachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. In February of that year, the city of Philadelphia was far in advance of all other cities and towns, in liberal contributions to the cause.

The unexpected and highly encouraging development of missionary interest, during the first half of the year 1812, very naturally led to a special addition of new members, at the annual meeting of the Board in September. Thirteen were at this time chosen — two from New Hampshire; one from Vermont; from Massachusetts and Rhode Island, one each; from New York, four; from New Jersey, two; and from Pennsylvania, two. These additions being made in 1812, can of course all be accounted for, without affirming, that in 1813, "the Board assumed its national character".

In 1826, the Board was enlarged by the addition of twenty-seven. The reason is given in the Minutes: "The contemplated union between this Board and the United Foreign Missionary Society having been consummated within a few months past, it was judged expedient to make a large addition to the members of the Board". If it has been inferred that the Board "assumed its national character" in 1813, because of appointing eight members out of New England, much more might the Board be said to "assume" this "character", in 1826, when twenty-three were chosen from States out of New England, namely, nine from New York, two from New Jersey, three from Pennsylvania, one from the District of Columbia, two from Virginia, two from Georgia, and one each from South Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Ohio.

In 1811, "the ever-to-be-remembered Mrs. Mary Norris", of Salem, Mass., deceased, bequeathed to the Board the munificent legacy of \$80,000. Her will being contested, the Board could not appear as one of the defendants in the case, unless it had a legal standing. It was this pecuniary exigency, and *this alone*, which moved the Board, *the American Board*, to apply to the Massachusetts Legislature for the necessary Act of Incorporation. A narrative of the proceedings in the case constitutes one of the most interesting chapters in the Memorial Volume.

After much resistance, the Act was passed. It received the cordial signature of the venerated Caleb Strong, Governor, on the 20th of June, 1812. The Preamble recognizes William Bartlet and others, as "having been associated under the name of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, for the purpose of propagating the Gospel in heathen lands" . . . , and as having "prayed to be incorporated in order more effectually to promote the laudable object of their association".

The Board was "incorporated and made a body politic" by the very name precisely, which it gave to itself in its constitution, nearly two years previous. Not a line or word of its charter implies, that it had been otherwise than *American* and "national", from the beginning of its organized existence. And if it were not already national, it is difficult to see how it could be made so, by an Act of a State Legislature.

We are thus particular, and we have only begun to say what we might, because there is no fact in the history of the Board more memorable, than that Drs. Spring and Worcester, the two men who were its real founders or originators, and the three others who were among their earliest associates, and present with them at the first meeting, framed a constitution at the "very beginning" in 1810, which, without any essential revision or modification, has been perfectly adapted to all the changes in church or state, throughout the country or the world. And if ever great and good men, since the days of inspiration, have been favored with special Divine guidance, those were who fashioned and framed this extraordinarily wise constitution.

It may have been a valid plea for the poet Archias, in the Roman forum, that if he were not a Roman citizen, he ought to be, or might be so considered, because he had sung the praises of the people. But were a lawyer in our courts, to try the effect of such a plea in any similar or analogous case, it might be a grand Ciceronian flourish; but it would not require a Rufus Choate to quash it on the instant, by simply calling for the certificate of naturalization. So now it is in vain to assume or to argue the claims of those "twenty-six persons", who were corporate members in 1813, to be "regarded" as

founders of the Board, on any ground whatever, unless they were among the "originators". Such they were, or such they were not. If they were such, let us have the legitimate and decisive evidence. But if they were not, it is quite too late, now that they have been so long dead, to make them for this world, what they never were, when they were alive.

Eight only of these "twenty-six founders" so called, were original members by appointment at Bradford, in 1810. One was added, in 1811. Two became members, by being named in the Act of Incorporation, in June, 1812. Thirteen were elected by the Board, in Sept. 1812, as already noticed; and the two others, in Sept. 1813. — After the Act of Incorporation, the members were called "corporate", but their membership dated at the time of appointment, whether before or after the Act.

One of the nine original members was Dea. Samuel H. Walley, the first Treasurer of the Board. He is not named among the "twenty-six"; because perhaps, he had resigned his office and his membership. But he was appointed the Auditor of the Board, in Sept. 1812. He had an eminent social position, and is gratefully remembered by many hundreds, as a truly good man, of whom it could be said emphatically, as it was of Ezekiel Rogers, the first minister of Rowley, Mass., — "he was a tree of knowledge, laden with fruit, which children could reach". But of late years he seems to have been entirely forgotten, at the Missionary House. For the first time, he is placed in 1860, at the head of the list of the Massachusetts corporate members, deceased or resigned. We think, that he would have made a very respectable appearance, in the group of the "twenty-six".

And how shall we explain the absence of the Rev. Dr. ALEXANDER PROUDFIT, of New York, from that same group or collection of portraits? We well remember him, as a distinguished clergyman, whom a younger brother, the late Dr. Spencer, then of Northampton, Mass., was "*proud*" to introduce to a meeting, as a delegate from the American Bible Society. The Senior Secretary of the Board must have repeatedly seen him at the annual meetings; for he attended as

many as ten of these, in the period from 1816 to 1836. He was appointed a member, in 1813, at the same time with Gen. Henry Sewall and Rev. Dr. Jesse Appleton, both of whom are commemorated as "founders". And besides, his name in small capitals is the first in the record of the appointment of the three. How then did it happen, that he has no place either in the list prepared at Albany, or that at Boston?

And further, we have to say, that *six* of the "twenty-six" were not present at any one meeting of the Board, during the next fifteen years after their appointment; some were never present but once or twice, and *four* never at all. Yet they are alike commemorated as "founders". And as the Memorial Volume now is, they will go down to posterity as if all of them were entitled to honor, as the "originators" of the Board,— "a representation of the nobility, not only from several different Christian communions, but from different States, professions, and walks of honorable usefulness; as if to stamp its very beginning with the most exalted type of both wisdom and liberality".

There is an old maxim, of which we often have occasion to think. "A thing is what it is". The truth applies to all things and all beings. If, therefore, those corporate members in 1813, were "originators" of the Board, they *were* founders, whether or not they have ever been, or ever shall be, so "regarded". If they were not, they ought not to be so "regarded"; for any cause, reason, or purpose.

Si quid novisti rectius istis,
Candidus imperti. Si non, his utere mecum.

Instead of "Founders", the title of Chapter II should be — Founders and early Corporate Members. Some sentences would of course need to be expunged, and new sentences to be substituted in the same, and also in Chapter IV. And if Chapter VI should be open for enlargement, as well as amendment, then we would propose for consideration twenty-six other names, beside those of Mr. Walley and Rev. Dr. Proudfit. Twenty are names of voting members of the General Association of Massachusetts, in June, 1810; and six are

names of those who had "an honorary sitting" in the Association, — among them Edward D. Griffin and Moses Stuart, — whose voice and influence contributed powerfully to the adoption of the resolution, by which the Board was instituted.

If some of these names would not shine or dazzle, as belonging to the high places of colleges or theological seminaries; or have never been numbered with those of "eminent clergymen", or "eminent laymen", we are yet by no means certain, that they are written in characters any less bright or illustrious, in the Lamb's Book of Life. And in that same unerring record will be found, we rejoice to believe, many hundreds of names "of honorable women, and of men not a few", without whom, and the like of whom, though now uncelebrated in history, eloquence, or song, — the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions would itself have never had but a name to live. HONOR TO WHOM HONOR.

ART. IV.—THE TWO SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY.

By TAYLER LEWIS, LL.D., Schenectady, N. Y.

IN that fascinating book, *The Bible in Spain*, Borrow gives us an interesting account of an interview he once had with a very old Gipsy. He was past the age of one hundred; books had been to him a sealed world; his own individual experience during the course of his long, roving life, the "common-sense" of his wild tribe, had been his only schooling in philosophy. Yet this old Gipsy was a Berkeleian of the purest kind. He asked Borrow, who well understood his native language, if he had never thought that the outer world, or the things that *appear* to be around us, had no real existence out of our own minds, and that each man, in fact, made his own world. Such a dream, he said, had haunted his long life. This man was a philosopher without knowing it. In Borrow, too, he found one whose mental temperament was attuned like

his own. How he could think, with the old dreaming Gipsy, is shown by a passage in another work of his, *Lavengro*, or irregular memoranda of his own rather remarkable life :

"Would that I had never been born, I said to myself; and the thought would intrude: But, was I ever born? Is not all that I see a lie—a deceitful phantom? Berkeley's doctrine—Spinoza's doctrine! Dear reader, I had, at that time, never read either Berkeley or Spinoza. I have still never read them. Who are they? Men of yesterday. 'All is a lie, a deceitful phantom,' are old cries. This doubting is almost coëval with the human race. 'All is a phantom,' was said when the world was yet young, when the great tortoise yet crawled about. All is a phantom, was the doctrine of Buddh, and Buddh lived many centuries before the wise king of Jerusalem, who sat in his arbors, beside his sunny fish-pools, saying many fine things, and among others: 'There is nothing new under the sun'".

But such thinking is not peculiar to the eccentric Borrow, or to the old Gipsy. It belongs to the common mind of the race; it has the best claim to be regarded as the real "common-sense", or common feeling, we might say, if the term had not been so much abused. What is now called the "common-sense" philosophy, is one of the latest things in the world. The Gipsy train of thought has been *semper, ubique*. The lowliest minds have had it and wondered; the highest minds have been occupied in working out its true place in philosophy. That man has never thought at all, who has not sometimes held with himself some such soliloquy. Childhood is oftentimes thoughtful, introverted, yea, metaphysical, to an extent the false "common-sense" school would hardly admit. It thinks more than we can well believe when the time-worn, sense-worn spirit has forgotten its earliest exercises, its youthful tendency to idealism. The musing boy hath said thus to himself: Perhaps there is nothing in the world but myself and the Great Soul from which my thinking comes; how know I that there is any thing else, or that what I seem to see, and hear, and know, is aught but my own thoughts—visions created by that power within, which sometimes dreams, I know, and may be ever dreaming. We appeal to a wide experience. It is enough for the present use we make of the thought, that it has not been confined to the writings of affected transcend-

ental philosophers delighting themselves in paradoxes, or to the wild fancies of dreamy mystics, but has manifested itself in the least cultured, as in the most highly educated minds.

But what does all this prove, says our more rational, or rather more *sensible*, philosopher, who claims to be wide awake? Shall Gipsy dreams, or the dyspeptic reveries of eccentric souls, stand up against the strong "common-sense" of mankind, or cast a doubt upon the unerring decisions of immediate consciousness? Away with Buddh and Berkeley. There is an external world of hard, resisting matter, real matter, wherein force and power, into which some would resolve it, are but secondary, and, otherwise, inconceivable properties. There is such a *hard* outside world. We know it; we are *conscious* of it. We know it from the "immediate testimony of sense". We see, and hear, and touch, and taste, and smell, the very "things themselves". To this we say, the psychological experiences to which we have referred, neither prove nor disprove a real outwardness. Neither is one or the other view essential to the highest truth. We may dream in a hard, material world; there may be, on the other hand, an intense reality, of highest moral and intellectual value, all perfectly conceivable without it. Men may be extreme idealists, and yet consistent theists, pure, religious, holy, having as real a moral world, as strict a moral accountability, as could be conceived on any other basis.

In this respect, then, these idealising tendencies, or idealising *experiences*, as we may justly call them, may be said to prove nothing. They do show, however, that there is a fallacy in this superficial taking for granted of the "common-sense" school, that they, more than all others, represent that oldest and most universal thinking of mankind to which they so confidently appeal. It shows that this seeking, or this tendency to seek truth in the ideal, this missing it in the phenomenal and the material, is not to be disposed of by a sneer at the idealist for not "running his head against a post", or by such stale anecdotes as that related of Dr. Johnson, who is said to have refuted a Berkeleian by kicking a stone: "You ask, What is matter? There, sir, that is matter; you can tell im-

mediately, if you will try your foot upon it". It may have been a rebuke, on the part of Johnson, to some philosophical pedantry by which he was annoyed, for he was altogether too profound a man not to see that there was something more in such a question than was met by such an answer. He was a giant indeed, and ever engaged in a *gigantomachia*, but not one of those whom Plato so admirably describes in the *Sophista* and *Theætetus* — *σκληροὶ καὶ ἀντίτυποι*, "hard and repellent ones, who, in their battle with the gods, draw down every thing from the celestial and invisible region, affirming vehemently that, that alone truly *is* which has touch and resistance".*

But be that as it may; aside from the sneer of the satirist, or the confident appeal of the dogmatist, the facts in human history to which we have alluded do show that no truly philosophical mind can ever treat lightly a mode of thinking so ancient, so universal, so deeply seated in the human soul, that if not the "common-sense", it would almost seem to be something like the *common reason*. Let us cite a specimen of this kind of common-sense refutation from one of our *ἀντίτυποι ἄνδρες* although a very orthodox and religious one. Those who hold that "we have no immediate consciousness of any thing but our own thoughts and our own sensations", and that, therefore, the questions respecting an external world, the manner of our knowing it, and the methods of proving it, are really great matters in philosophy; these men, and especially one of the ablest among them, are thus disposed of in what was intended for wit, but which, in connection with such a subject, is unworthy of the grave writer, and of the learned and highly respectable Review in which it finds a place. But here it is. See what fools these idealists are, and how it shows them up.

"We may not trust our senses that a cane is a cane. But here comes a man with a book, — we beg pardon; if our senses cannot truly inform us of the cane, how can they truly inform us of a man and a book? By the very conditions of the 'Rational Psychology', we are not yet allowed to say it is a man. Here comes a *phenomenon* with a phenomenal book. We

* *Sophista*, 246, A. *Theætetus*, 156, A.

beg pardon again; the 'Rational Psychology' demands proof that a phenomenon is a phenomenon, and not a modification of our own minds. But let us grant the phenomenon. Here comes a phenomenon with a phenomenal book, offering to prove by a system of 'Rational Psychology', that a cane is a cane. The phenomenon, indeed, appears to our senses as Dr. H.; so does a cane appear a cane. Our consciousness may be utterly mistaken. We will not make the assumption which the phenomenal Dr. H. forbids. We find it quite as difficult to cognize a man and a book, as to cognize a cane. It may not be Dr. H. It may not be even a phenomenon; for Dr. H. finds it necessary to 'give an ontological demonstration of the valid existence of the phenomenal'. So far as we are able to determine, at present, the phenomenon may not be Dr. H. For aught that sense or consciousness can tell, he may be a steamboat, the book an earthquake, and the argument a volcano. He may be Nichts, the German nothing. If it be Dr. H., he requires us to receive him on the testimony of consciousness; while, if the inevitable witness of the consciousness of all mankind be not utter falsehood, the 'Rational Psychology' is wholly unnecessary. We cannot rationally believe it to be Dr. H.; he would not so belie his own philosophy. What is it that comes to us with a seeming book and a seeming argument? We are, as yet, unable to determine. It ought to be anything else rather than Dr. H. But whatever it be, we call upon it to stop. We shall make no dogmatical assumptions. Stop, Dr. H.; or stop, steamboat; or stop, Nichts. Prove to us that you are Dr. H. Prove to us that you are even a phenomenon."

And so he goes on. We do assure our readers that the above extract is actually made from pages 580, 581 of the October number of the *Princeton Review*. We affirm it thus strongly, because the well known and deservedly high character of that Review is such that some might be inclined to doubt it. There is a great deal more of the same sort. The writer is a clergyman, generally supposed to be occupied with the gravest matters. He is a teacher of theology. He sits in a chair, such as was once occupied by idealists, theologians, and scholars like Augustine, Anselm, Wickliffe, Cudworth, Howe, and yet he can go on in this kind of style, gravely attempting to treat as nonsense questions in which these grandest thinkers, and most devout Christians, found something not only of profoundest interest in itself, but having an intimate relation, as they thought, to all that is most spiritual in Christianity.

In the general comprehending of those thinkers at whom

this poor attempt at ridicule is directed, there may be mentioned three varieties, if not more. There are those who have gone to the extreme, like the saintly Berkeley, doubting, or thinking there was ground for a doubt, whether there really was an external world of matter, at least such as matter is commonly conceived to be,—besides the question, whether this external world, if there is such, is at all, *in itself*, what it appears to be to the sense. There are others who maintain that we *know* it, although not *conscious* of it. We know it, we are sufficiently sure of it; we believe it, but it is by an ultimate law of belief in the mind, which law of belief, as we cannot resolve it into consciousness on the one hand, so neither can we make it matter of rational proof on the other. There are, thirdly, those who, whilst they deny that we know, or can know, the external world or any thing out of our own mental exercises, by direct consciousness, yet affirm that it can be proved by a higher faculty than the sense, which faculty they call the “comprehending reason”. Our sense gives us a world of each man for himself, and which we can never truly separate, in this way, from ourselves, for the reason that there is no *common-sense*, and can be no common-sense shared in by many sentients. Our reason which, though we call it ours, is truly a common reason, a communion beyond the human, even with the universal reason—this lifts us into a higher sphere of mind, puts us upon an elevation where we look over, *comprehend*, and see the truth which lies beyond the horizon of the sense. Dr. H. may be said to belong to this class; but the great absurdity in Dr. H., according to our “laughing philosophers”, is that he should attempt to prove it at all, that he should even think of making any question about it. “Dr. H.”, says Democritus, “finds it necessary to give an ontological demonstration of the valid existence of the phenomenal”. Absurd man! he is so crazed with metaphysics as to doubt whether consciousness gives us, at once, the evidence of an outside reality! he would gravely undertake to prove that we are not always dreaming, that though we often see what others see not, and sometimes hear a voice they cannot hear, yet there is a way of getting at the truth. In doing this, how-

ever, he greatly lacks humility. He ventures to maintain that above this shadowy region of the phenomenal there is a higher, an *unseen* world, and that man has a faculty by which he can penetrate it. By this overlooking, comprehending power, he may be assured that all is not delusion, that there is an objective reality, a true outer world, — of inferior importance, indeed, in itself, and mediate to our inner life, yet still real — real *per se*, real in its relation to a higher reality. Dr. H. is charged with attempting to “give a proof of the valid existence of the phenomenal”. This is the thing which is so laughable. He would give an “ontological” proof, too. He would ground it on something more certain than my dream, or *your* dream, on my *feeling*, or your feeling, or any man’s individual feeling, which may never be the same with that of another, even when it has the same external cause; he would, in other words, give an ontological proof, an *a priori* proof, connected with the very necessities of being, and which no rational mind can doubt without doubting all other truth along with it. A very proud, as well as very stupid attempt, this “ontological” proof, as viewed from the critic’s stand-point. Ontological forsooth! Could any thing be more supremely ridiculous, more worthy of that exposure which he has so unsparingly given it?

We have not time here to discuss this question of immediate consciousness to any extent on its merits. Nor need we do so. It is sufficient to show what kind of thought it is which this common-sense school so ignorantly affect to dispose of by an obsolete laugh. When we say the sense school, we only use the single term that is most characteristic, without intending at all to disparage the acute minds, the truly hard antagonists, that have belonged to its ranks. From the earliest times there have ever been two sides to these questions, two hard and well-debated sides—two schools of thinking which have divided in their treatment of them. There are two such schools now; there probably will be until the end of earthly time. There have been great minds in each, and they have known how to treat each other as such, though contending oft-times earnestly and angrily. From Plato to Coleridge, from

Aristotle to Mill, there have been the keenest thinkers on both sides. They have ranged themselves according to intellectual temperament, according to their scientific or other pursuits giving more of a physical or metaphysical tendency to their speculations, or which have made them look mainly at this or that aspect of the prime standing question, What is the chief reality, the ground reality? Is the phenomenal the valid basis of all truth, from which we mount to what is higher, or seemingly higher, in its classifications and generalizations, or must we seek in something else, in some ontological demonstration, that is, some *a priori* argument drawn from the *rationaly perceived* necessities of being, a proof of the *valid* existence of the phenomenal—that is, its existence for anything out of itself? Men may attempt to show that this ontological argument contains fallacies; they may succeed in so doing with many minds; they may present, from their side of the great question, many views which the *a priori* reasoners will find it no easy work to answer; but if they are thinking men, they cannot help treating the question with the respect demanded by its gravity and the deep ground it seems to have in our mysterious human nature. They cannot help seeing that it taxes their highest powers to grapple with it on its merits. They cannot think of laughing without knowing that, by such a course, they lower their own positions instead of harming those of their opponents.

Men who write otherwise, see no meaning in that inquiry which has so perplexed the thoughtful of all ages, whether among the philosophical or the devout—the great question, not so much, Is there an external world? as our spiritual relations to it, and our manner of knowing it? May we not expect to find the rudiments of it in the Scriptures? Not in its philosophical form, perhaps; and yet there is a similar language in the Bible which cannot be resolved into a merely pious discontent with the things that now *appear* around us, as compared with other and better *appearances* when we shall be in a more substantial, that is, a happier world. The strange Bible expressions, whether as we find them in Paul's Greek, or David's Hebrew, go deeper than this. If they cannot be

strained into the philosophical, they are, certainly, something more than a mere sentimental religionism. True it is that the purest philosophy and the deepest devotion meet in this thought of the unsubstantiality of the phenomenal, the reality, the *ὑπόστασις*, of the "things unseen". "Man walketh in a vain show"—בצלם ירחיך—"He flitteth about in an image," *tselem*,—*in imagine pertransit homo*." "We see in a mirror shadowly"—we see, but the reflections of things. The essence of things, the real being of things, are the *μη βλεπόμενα* (2 Cor. iv, 18. Heb. xi, 1, 3), not *unseen* in the sense of now absent, but as above the world of sense for evermore. They belong to the *dōpara*; they are cognized only by the reason, or by faith. Such has ever been the language of the musing mind, whether called out by a contrast between the present and some future condition of the soul, or between the two worlds of matter and thought, of sense and reason, of phenomena and ideas, in which may even now be said to lie our strangely compounded being.

But all this, say some of our common-sense men, is not only a Platonizing perversion of Scripture, but in itself a cloudy, unmeaning mysticism. Why deny, or even in the faintest degree distrust, the senses that God has given us? Why not credit them for all the intelligence they bring, or seem to bring? That is the very question—What intelligence do they bring? Let us not overrate it for fear of some inevitable conclusions which, though perfectly in harmony with our philosophy, may shock our religious education. Others, not so well trained in this respect, have followed it out. Allowing of nothing *a priori*, they have proved that matter alone was substance, mind a blank consciousness, and truth their shadowy offspring, having no being aside from this blank knowing power, and the material things which it knows only as they are seen.

"We see the very things themselves", we are "conscious of outward material objects". Waiving any remarks on the apparent absurdity of this use of the word consciousness in connection with the outward, let us examine the fact in the light of experience itself. *I hear the bell*; every one must admit

that the senses are all alike in this respect, or in their bearings on this question of a direct immediate consciousness of things without. In sight, the transition from the outer cause to the inner effect is so rapid, that we sooner lose the thought of a real distinction between them ; we sooner come to have some kind of habitual feeling (seen, however, to be false, the moment we think steadily upon it) that we see not the *images* of things, as we hear the sounds of things (*imago vocis*), but the very things themselves. The hearing is slower, and therefore, presents the best subject for examination. I hear the bell. But is it, now, the bell I hear, the very bell itself that I am conscious of, or is it the primal vibration commenced in the metallic medium ? There is something still nearer to me, the undulations of the atmosphere, produced and continued after the remoter cause, or "thing itself", has ceased. It is nearer still—the agitation in that thin and most sensitive membrane on which the outer messenger knocks before admission into the material sensorium. Nearer still, it is some motion *in* this material sensorium itself. Nearer still, it is an *effect*, call it a motion or anything else, an affection in the spiritual sensorium, and terminating at last in the thinking, transmuting, mind, which takes this far-writing, this telegraphic signal, and translates it into that language which is known only to the soul. Now, of what is there consciousness ? Clearly only of this last stage, or action of the spirit itself—inferring, it may be, a cause without, connecting it, it may be, with similar affections, apparently from the same source through other media, and thus, not through immediate sense, but by a reasoning as rapid as sense, by what would seem an instantaneous flash of the intellect, getting the habitual thought of the reality of such outward causation. We infer it in every case, even as we infer distance in space, and remoteness in time, so rapidly that this distance and this remoteness seem a part of the very sense, although we know they cannot be such. And so must it be with all the other senses in a Rational Psychology. They have all the same psychological conditions. They are all feelings. They are all roads of transmission through time and space, through rarer or denser mediums, through slower or quicker stages ; they all

fall under one fundamental law in their estimates of quantity and quality, of more and less in space and degree. They all perform the same ultimate function of awaking in the mind the thought of form, extension, dimension, distance, resistance, motion in space and time. Some of them do this very imperfectly, but only in relation to others. The lowest sense, with a reason to receive and shape its messages, would gather, at last, although with difficulty and slowness, the knowledge we now receive so much more speedily from the highest.

With this view, which the reason takes of the sense, how absurd must appear the attempt to refute it which we find made by the same critic. Dr. H. maintains that the reason is competent to tell us, how a sense, any sense, or sense in general, can give us the phenomena of space, distance, succession, degree, more or less in the extent and intensity of the affection; thus awaking in the mind of a rational being all the prime numerical, mathematical, and dynamical ideas. In this they are all essentially alike, whether it be the dull touch, the narrow taste and smell, the wider and more space-filling ear, or the rapid and almost instantaneous sight. They may differ as the slow mail-coach, floundering through the mire and forest of sluggish material hindrances, or the telegraphic signal that requires the keenest time-micrometer to measure its lightning leap; but in this more interior estimate, where they all lay off the robe of the flesh, and stand in the presence of the spirit, and in the transforming light of the spirit—in other words, in those ultimate conditions of the sense, of every sense, which are demanded by a rational psychology—they are all alike, we say, they may all be treated as one great medium of intelligence, the same in itself, but made higher or lower by the transmutations it undergoes from the higher or lower intellectual vision that receives it. What trifling now to array against this “Voltaire’s Micromegas from the Dog-Star with his thousand senses”, or “an inhabitant of Saturn with his seventy-two senses”! What an absurd misapprehension of the whole field of thought, when the critic gravely asks, imitating the language of Dr. H.: “What is the content in the sensory of each one of these? How does the sensation reach the

mind? Unless Dr. H. can tell us this, he is utterly incompetent to give us the subjective idea of *all* intelligence". The critic italicises the word *all*, and thereby shows us how totally he fails to see the real point in the reasoning. All intelligence with him is not the ultimate knowledge of space and time which reaches the soul, but all the conceivable modes or media through which it may get there,—these being as many as any foolish Voltaire, or jesting theologian, may imagine them to be. It is the same knowledge they bring, so far as they are concerned, or the same elements of knowledge, but it differs immensely according to that which stands waiting to receive it. There is a truth in the old Greek notion, that there is a spiritual *δψις*, a light of the soul that goes forth in every sense perception. The same knowledge (as far as sense is concerned), coming through the dullest medium, may be far higher than that of the keenest and most perfect organ, according as the former is transmitted to a higher, and the latter to an inferior, the former to a rational and the latter to a mere animal intelligence. The slow, dull touch of the blind and deaf Laura Bridgman tells her imprisoned soul more even of the outer world, than the eye of the eagle, infinitely more than that splendid castle of optical lenses with which God has so strangely adorned some of the lowest varieties of his creatures that crawl on the earth, or lie motionless in the deep caves of the sea.

Whether we call consciousness a *power*, or a *light* of the soul, it must be present to that of which it is conscious, or that must be present to it. If to hear the bell (using the common elliptical phrase) is to be immediately conscious of the bell, then consciousness is in the whole process of transmission if it goes a single step back of the last spiritual motion, it is away off in the remote metallic vibration. And why should we stop here? It is in all the causality connected with that metallic vibration, or that luminous undulation; it is throughout nature, as far as matter, force, and motion go. In other words, this doctrine of immediate "consciousness of the things themselves", is inevitable materialism. There is no separation between such consciousness and matter, between spirit and

nature. There is no interval from first to last, no line, however narrow, on one side of which we can say consciousness is, and on the other side, it is not. That isolation which is the very dignity of spirit, and through which alone a pure doctrine of spiritualism can be preserved, is gone. There is no *holy separateness*, where we dwell apart. For this there must be, somewhere, a bounding shore, beyond which all is nature, a mysterious passage, across which the physical and material may send their transformed *representatives*, but can never come themselves, or in their own material and physical forms. We are compelled to use figurative language here, and talk of a locus and its boundaries; but however difficult the *conception*, the *idea* must not be given up. Abandon this thought of isolation, and there is no possibility of answering the materialist; there is no spiritualism purely. There is no *Ego*, no personality, no true kingdom of the soul.

What we see and hear is neither the material things themselves, nor are they strictly *like* the "things themselves", if by the term we mean likeness in some fixed outer form, or shape, or absolute extension, or in any properties strictly physical. We have designedly used the term *representative* as excluding these. It may be called an *image*, even as the Latins use *imago* for representative,—as when they said *imago vocis*, the image of a voice. But whether like it or not, in any sense resemblance, it is sufficient for our present argument to say, that the immediate spiritual object, as it stands in the spiritual sensorium (after having made its last stage from the adjacent material sensorium), *represents* the outward cause as fixing its identity, that is, as something ever invariably denoted by the same unchanging sign or signs. We may compare them to telegraphic signals. We may suppose an analogy between them and the *arrangements* of the carpet weaving apparatus, or to go still farther back, the previous ratios and numbers on which such arrangements are grounded. These *exactly represent* the figures brought out in the weaving—represent them without the loss of a hue, or shade, or stripe, or point essential to their perfection—but they are not like them in any visual sense. There is no optical resemblance to

a carpet in that mass of machinery, whether working or quiescent, but the beautiful figures are ever coming out from the intelligence it brings, even as the soul constructs from the dull knowledge of the sense far higher forms of thought and beauty than were ever in the "things themselves", could they be seen by us in the formless poverty of their material nakedness. Our comparison may be said to have an inverted aspect, but it comes to the same thing whether we say the representative, the image of a thought in the one case, or the thought of an image as presented in its converse.

But this is not essential to our present argument. It is enough, as we have said, that the inward spiritual object so represents the outward cause as to fix its outward identity in distinction from other outward things, and that too for different sentient; for although no man can say, from consciousness, that his sensations are the same with another man's, or even like them, yet it may be seen, from invariable concomitants, that they represent the same outward cause. Could we get into each other's souls, it might be found that the sensible impression I have from green is very different in many respects—in quantity, in intensity, in other things that belong to sensation alone—from that produced in another sensorial organism. So the affection from a certain size or magnitude, in one soul, may vary much from that which comes from the same outward cause to another, yet both alike *represent* something as invariable to the same sentient, and as one in outward identity with both; and this is enough to resolve into nonsense the objection as commonly urged, and especially as we find it thus presented in a paragraph which assumes to demolish Dr. H., and make the matter perfectly plain indeed to the most common understanding.

"This abstract question will be better comprehended by an example. I hold in my hand a cane; so it seems; but perhaps my senses deceive me. It may be an elephant, it may be a whale. How do I know that it is really a thing outside of myself? If it be a thing, how do I know that it is a cane?"

With all respect for the writer we cannot help thinking of Polonius in Hamlet. This talk of the cane and the

elephant is "very like a weasel, very like a whale," only that the common-sense Dane makes no pretence of philosophy, no learned assumption of bringing down things to the level of plainer people's intellects.

The intelligence brought by the sense is not a sense likeness, but an exact *representative* of the outward cause. Any one will see that this is the meaning of Aristotle who will carefully study the second book of his treatise *De Anima* (περὶ ψυχῆς) and especially chapter twelfth. It is sufficient to give his famous definition; ἡ μὲν αἰσθησίς ἐστι τὸ ΔΕΚΤΙΚΟΝ τῶν Αἰσθητῶν Εἰδῶν ἀνευ τῆς ὑλῆς, "Sense is that which is *receptive* of the *sensible forms* without the matter, or as separate from the material". It is this phrase, "the sensible forms", that has been the stumbling block ever since the common-sense school made nonsense of it by confounding εἶδος and ἰδέα with εἰδῶλον, or the knowable in a thing, that which the mind cognizes in a thing (and without which it would remain unknowable), with that mere phantom of the sense which never, of itself, amounts to knowledge. Εἶδος may sometimes mean the outside image, but its metaphysical sense, like that of the scholastic word *form*, is that inner invisible thing or cause, which makes the outside form to be what it is. In a visual object it is the mathematical idea, the elements of which the sensation brings along; not in a figure ready made, but in its points, lines, distances, and ratios, out of which the mind *constructs* the mathematical figure, more or less obscurely perceived as such by all rational intellects, and, in this way, a very different thing from that which the same sensation would present to the animal or irrational nature. The Schoolmen's term was *species*. Both Aristotle, and these his followers, regarded the εἶδος as *representative*, neither the thing itself (with any of the matter or material properties of matter such as extension, magnitude, etc.) nor, visually, *like* the thing itself, but that which mind takes from sense, and on which it impresses its own image, giving it an "intelligible form", in distinction from its blind sense form, if we may connect their word with sense at all. The phrase, "sensible forms", was like the "spiritual body", and the "carnal mind". It did not denote

sense ideas, which is nonsense, but ideas from sense, the intelligible which the mind finds in it. "*Form*", in the scholastic language, meant the same with *εἶδος* and *species*, but by later usage it has become a thing almost wholly of sense. For this we are, in a great measure, indebted to Reid, and especially to his interpreter Dugald Stewart, who was the great authority in most of our colleges not many years ago. The writer well remembers when he had to get for a lesson so many pages of this author, and how terribly his common-sense was perplexed with these "sensible forms" or phantoms, and the use made of them by the foolish Schoolmen, as they were described by Stewart and Reid. What a puzzle it was to understand, for example, how the square *form*, or square *idea*, with all its sharp points and angles and clumsy squareness, could travel smoothly along the optical medium from the object to the eye (this difficulty being greatly enhanced by the straight line conical ray theory of light then universally held); how it could enter the *round* pupil of the visual organ; how it found its way among its fluid lenses, and, most marvellous of all, how it could travel down the narrow thread of the optic nerve, until, at last, this troublesome materiality, or the square ghost of it, found rest in the mind itself. Another mystery; how "they were sent forth from their object", as Stewart says, or how these scaly forms, thus continually thrown off, as the serpent casts her skin, could move through space at all, or how any mind could possibly hold to things so difficult of rational conception. We have since become convinced that the Schoolmen were not such fools as this would make them. Certainly Aristotle was not. With them, *εἶδος*, or *species*, was not a *shape* in space, but a *representative* energy which the mind read and recognised, and from it made its own more perfect *form*, a reality far more glorious, we may say, than that remote cause from which it came. It was like the letters of a book, which bring along with them, not the actual thinking of the author, much less its remote outward objects, but that from which the mind reconstructs the thought, better it may be, higher and clearer, it may be, than the original itself;

and hence it was that the wise Greeks actually called reading *ἀναγινώσκειν*, a *re-knowing*, or knowing again.

That the "sensible species" was regarded thus as a representative, is evident in that quotation from Des Cartes which Stewart so wholly misunderstood from not being able to comprehend how Des Cartes could reject the flying images, which he calls a "vulgar notion", and yet hold to the ancient doctrine of the "idea as alone the immediate object of perception". They were not a likeness but a sign, says Des Cartes, *ut, exempli gratia, verba et signa nullo modo similia iis quæ significant*. See Des Cartes as quoted by Stewart. Aristotle has, to be sure, his figure of "the wax and the ring", but no one who reads closely all he says, can think that he meant anything else than a mere comparison of effects, or had in view any actual space likeness.

"We fully admit", says the Reviewer of Dr. H., "that man is rational. He is able to discern, in objects of sense, more than sense reveals". Does the writer fully understand the extent of his admission? There is then not only a spiritual eye, but a spiritual light higher than those of sense. *E nihilo nihil*: Nothing can come from nothing; more cannot come from less. This whole apparatus of higher vision, that which is seen, the *seeing* itself, must have come from some other and higher sphere. As the sense is only the occasion for bringing them out, they must have been born with man. There is no other conceivable source except some subsequent divine inspiration; and why not as well conceive this to have been the case at the birth of humanity, when God "breathed into man a *nephesh hayya*", but of a higher kind than that of the animal,—when he "created man in his own" uncreated and eternal "image", when "the inspiration of the Almighty gave him understanding". "He is able to discern in sense more than sense reveals". We know that after using such language there is a way of getting down from it, and talking of a power, a *faculty*, a potentiality, a possibility, which may as well be predicated of anything else as man. The merest animal may have connected with him such a possibility of becoming ra-

tional as far as we know. There may be in God's wide kingdom of means a potency for almost any purpose; but no man can tell what he means by such a blank unfurnished power, unless he comes back, as Locke does expressly, and the common-sense school virtually, and makes it, after all, but a reflection of the sense, instead of a distinct and higher revealing. A power—a faculty—to do what? What it knows not? If it be a power without something that may be called an innate knowledge of its own, as well talk of an eye seeing, or a power of seeing, without light or anything to be seen. A *faculty* of seeing cannot make the object of sight. A mere power or potentiality of knowing? What is it without something in the organisation of the faculty to determine it to the knowing of one thing more than another? But the moment we bring anything of this kind into this blank power, we have a primal furnishing of the soul; we have something like ideas; we have a varied, *a priori* knowledge which knows the moment the sense, or anything else, brings before it the truth to be known. In such a view we see the reason of those new revelations, those new "discernings", when the dark and dull notions of the sense are brought within the circle of its light. *Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu*. There is no possibility of getting away from this, unless we give to the soul itself something we may call a knowledge. Locke's *faculty* of reflection is only a reflex attempt to get something new out of the sense and the memory, which, after all, he makes but the child of the sense. Primary laws of belief can do no better. They are but blanks unless there is some *a priori* knowledge to determine them to believe one thing rather than another. The Reviewer, after making this wonderful admission that man is a rational being, having something by which "he discerns more than the sense reveals," flounders on for some time, with the same kind of language, but as he can make nothing of it, concludes, at last, by saying—"we have not space to argue these things". A blank faculty he seems to see is not enough, and yet the moment we attempt to fill up this blank with any thing that would make it a power for one

thing more than another, we admit something which we cannot distinguish from diversities of cognitions in the original birth-furnishing of the soul,—something, in short, which we must call a knowledge, an *a priori* knowledge, or a knowing wholly independent of sense, and which the soul brings with it, more or less, to its first and every judgment of the things of sense. And thus the maxim is reversed—*nihil in sensu quod non prius in intellectu*; there is nothing in the human sense that is not, somehow, modified, or made different by the human intellect. In its first numberings of sensible things the soul brings with it its innate knowledge of numbers, elementary indeed, but all there, even to the highest heights of the mathematics. In its first judgments it has its ideas of difference and identity. In its first space measurements it has its ideas of ratio, of equality, of equivalence, whether as belonging to the relative spatial or the absolute angular dimension, although it hath not yet learned the mathematical names. The things to which it applies these measuring ideas are but its diagrams; it never got its ideas from them. They lie in the soul ready for use when demanded. The first straight, or seemingly straight, line the spirit recognises, it immediately employs its innate canon or rule of straightness. It never learned it from the diagram, for the diagram is never perfect, and its imperfection is brought to be judged by the spiritual or ideal standard. The negative idea would be never known, were not the positive already in the soul. In its first æsthetic emotion, however faint and obscure, it has its idea of beauty, or all the mere feeling of the sense, whether of pleasure or pain, whether of smoothness or difficulty, would fail of producing it. It is because it sees its own idea there that the soul rejoices with a joy surpassing sense. And so we might go through all its ideal knowledge of space and time, its *here* and *there*, its idea of motion, its *now* and *then*, its innate thought, of succession, of past-ness, presence, and futurity, all ready the first moment they are wanted, and forming the spirit's calendar by which are measured the otherwise dark and timeless notices of the sense. All this knowledge, containing within itself a world of other knowledge, it has, not from experience, but as essential to a rational experience. All these

ideas come with it from that supernatural preëxistent sphere, in which the human spirit, so far as it is rational, had its supernal origin. Though physically, sentiently, individually, born in time, it shares in the universal reason, and breathes the higher life of the eternal uncreated world.

Now this is absolutely shocking, our Reviewer would say. This is giving man a divine knowledge. Why not, if God himself had previously given it to him? And then to attempt, by this daring, *a priori* reason to "argue the ways of God"! But why is this more presumptuous, more irreverent, as an *a priori* than as an *a posteriori* claim? We have a thought of God, one of the divine ideas; it has come to us through a gift bestowed in the creation of humanity, or it comes to us afterwards through a sense medium (on the supposition that it ever could come in that way alone) or it reaches us through a written revelation; in either way we have a divine thought. Why is it more irreverent in the one case than in the other? How does it make man more or less divine in the one way than in the other? To know God at all, implies a divine faculty in the human, — the animal cannot know him, — to receive the thoughts from revelation, and know them as such thoughts of God, this also implies the same; although the necessity and the mercy of this latter medium should make us humbly feel how deeply we had fallen, how much we had animalised ourselves in spite of reason, and lost, or misused, the "light that lighteth every man coming into the world". We believe the *a priori* men have, in general, as much humility as their condemners. A right view of their doctrine should give them more. The extremes of philosophy go astray in both directions. Unchecked by grace, the one becomes a vain, boasting, gaseous spiritualism, the other a grovelling, earthly materialism. But this foolish charge of irreverence has no more application to serious thinkers on the one side than on the other. The Church has never held within its bosom Christians more humble, penitent, sin-loathing, — more self-abhorring, more deeply conscious of the degradation of the fall, than men who, along with all this, have felt that this doctrine of the "spirit's worthiness", its original divine, and hence its divine

relationship, was the chief ground of all religion, and was intimately connected with all right views of man's salvation.

But Dr. H. is guilty of "world-making"; and so there must be brought to bear upon him that old battery of misapplied texts which has been so often employed by men utterly unconscious of their own irreverence in so doing. They have themselves determined what God is, and what he is not, and what he does, and *why* he does it, and then, if a man pursues such inquiries in a different way, be it in a style unsurpassed for philosophic dignity and religious calmness, straightway are heard from these defenders of Deity, the old exclamations, as though they were their exclusive property—"Oh! the depths, etc."—Oh! the presumption of the man who would thus attempt to fathom the divine ways! "For who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been his counsellor"? May we be forgiven, if we even seem to use these texts profanely by placing them in this connection, but we think we are only rescuing them from an abuse which is sometimes little less than blasphemy.

Especially is the Reviewer shocked at the boldness of the man who would hold that there are any *a priori* ideas as a necessary part of the divine mind,—“any eternal and *unmade* principles”, by which the Deity worked,—“principles conditioned by no power but which must themselves condition all power”. This takes away from God, the critic thinks, his “power of choice”. Under such a necessity of acting wisely, Deity is not free. “He cannot choose”, he says, “he is conditioned”. It is a limitation upon him if he cannot sometimes choose irrationally, if it pleases him. It would be going by a knowledge and a reason independent of the divine will, above the divine will,—which the will itself had not made what it willed them to be, even as it makes things. Now what is this but making mere will, having no knowledge, no ideas, no principles, no right, no eternal law, no *unmade*, immutable truth,—for all these would be conditioning—making such a blank *power*, we may say (for *will* in such a case is a misnomer), our sole conception of the Eternal God! And this they would call reverence! To believe in an uncreated world of

truth wherein God dwells for evermore, to maintain an eternal knowledge of such truth as something which cannot be otherwise than as it is known, to hold, in short, to "eternal principles", this is placing something above Deity, that is, conditioning the Absolute Power. "The laws of the universe", says this very humble and reverent Reviewer, "stand in no eternal necessity, but depend on the *free choice*, design, and *wisdom* of God, who may ordain and establish them as he chooses, in *endless variety of choice*". The writer, for a certain purpose, gets under the wing of Princeton; but his vocabulary makes it easy to determine his schooling and his theological origin. Here is that much-talked of "power of contrary choice," not a new school doctrine, yet so keenly discussed in certain quarters, in respect to man, who may, in some sense, be said to have a power of choosing wrong; but the wonder here is its application to the *unerring* God. It is curious, however, to see how the writer mixes up things. We have italicised a few words in the above quotation which are wholly inconsistent with each other. The word wisdom has no proper place there. It could only have come from a misgiving. For wisdom is conditioning; wisdom is unmade; it "was in the beginning"; and all that belongs to wisdom, knowledge, truth, ideas, "eternal principles" are all equally ancient, alike uncreated and eternal. They all condition; unless this "*free choice*", this "endless variety of choice", mean surely that God may sometimes, if he "chooses", act unwisely, and against the *eternal principles*, or make others in their place. And so one of this school, a mathematician, has lately said. There is no necessity in mathematical truth, nothing which God could not unmake and make otherwise. It shocked him, he said, that any one should affirm the contrary. What is God, then, in this view? He is a power and a will, a blank, conceptionless, idealess being, living in a blank eternity of duration,—no determining knowledge until things are made out of which there could arise a *knowledge of things*, no conceivable thought, except, perhaps, a blank forecasting, a future memory, we might call it, of what he would do in ages to come,—a solitary potency, dwelling in no present world of eternal

ideas, having no present *ἀγαθὸν*, no *καλὸν*, no immutable Good, no eternal Beauty, no *Νοῦς*, no Love, no "Wisdom ever rejoicing before him". Relief from this may be sought from conceptions that come through the doctrine of the Trinity, but this modern theology mainly rejects those notions of the Trinity, so common in Patristic times, and which gave an ante-mundane diversity to the divine hypostases, making one the Wisdom, and another the Love, of the Father. These are called metaphysical fantasies, Platonising conceits, a "Trinity of notions", instead of that better conception of three blank persons which now claims to be the only Orthodox view. And yet the more ancient is the only one on which a true trinitarianism can be long maintained. It was the view which led the most thoughtful minds of antiquity, even without revelation, to something closely resembling, to say the least, the Christian Trinity, and to some such thought of the divine persons as may be derived from Prov. viii, 22, John i, 1, and Col. ii, 23. No doubt the metaphysical notion of the Trinity, as it has been called, has been carried to excess, resulting in the loss of the personal distinctions; without doubt, too, have modern speculations, in the other extreme, so made the personal the only distinction, as to merge the relationship, the subordination, of the hypostases into a blank tritheism, easy of conception numerically, but far more difficult for the reason.

The will of Deity is conditioned by his knowledge and his wisdom as something higher, if not more ancient. It is the contrary doctrine which is irreverent, — awfully irreverent, if any one should dare to follow it out to its inevitable consequences. Most absurd, too; for if God only knows what he wills to know, that is, if he makes his knowledge just what he wills to make it, with a power to make it otherwise, then he wills to know without knowing what he wills to know, otherwise the knowledge is before the will, conditioning the will, and so our circle brings us round again to that same irreverent position this hyperpietism so struggles to avoid.

This is all still worse, if possible, in respect to another awful question intimately allied to the preceding. God *must* do

right, said Abraham of old, and Dr. H. follows him in this. God is "conditioned" by his righteousness. We have no objection to the word. It means just what was meant in the Patriarch's exclamation. But some are greatly shocked at it; for this, too, is putting something above and back of Deity. It is awfully irreverent to hold that his will cannot make *right*, even as it makes *things*—cannot make right, even as it makes truth and knowledge. It is this divine will alone, without any connection with a divine wisdom and an eternal morality, that makes right. It is not the divine reason *seeing* a thing to be right, but God's command must be right *because* he commands it, and this, not as an evidence *to us* of some conformity to the absolute eternal rectitude which our finite vision cannot see, and we therefore submissively take the believed command as such, thus using the word *because* in one of its true logical acceptations as denoting a reason for us,—not on this account, we say, but the command makes right *per se*, makes right what would otherwise, or if commanded otherwise, be wrong. This, too, must be carried out, not only to acts, whose reasons we cannot see, but to ultimate states of soul which *seem* to have their moral reason intuitively in themselves, and to be right or wrong *per se*. If God should command us to hate one another, then malevolence would be right instead of love, deceit would be holy instead of truth. Otherwise we are putting something above Deity, something which directs the action of this *free choice*, something which conditions this fearful will, the only thing truly divine,—and this would be shocking irreverence.

We find it difficult to understand what the reviewer means by the "wisdom of God," when he happens to use the term in such connection. Sometimes he seems to think that he has turned the tables on Dr. H. In his *a priori* doctrine he says, he (Dr. H.) "leaves to the Lord no room for wisdom, save only on the question whether to put his act into counteraction," that is, to adopt his own instead of Dr. H.'s phraseology, whether he will commence to make a world or not. If he does make one, Dr. H. would say, he must make it on some eternal, unmade principles, some reasons, determining to this or that,

both in the artistic making, and in the purposes for which it was made. The irreverent Platonists would say, the Great Architect follows some idea, paradigm, or pattern. Now the Reviewer maintains that this would be at war with what is believed respecting the present "astronomical arrangements" which are commonly thought "to manifest in a wonderful manner the wisdom and goodness of God". If any meaning can be got out of such an argument at all, it would seem to be this. If God, in *making* the planetary worlds, worked according to any *unmade* eternal principles, whether mathematical or moral, or according to any plan or idea, then he did not work after his own wisdom, but another and a foreign wisdom, and this is "to take away his choice or wisdom" (the writer puts these words together with an *or* as though they were about the same thing) save only on the question, whether he would commence the work at all.

A great deal of this pious nonsense may be disposed of in a single paragraph. Dr. H. nowhere undertakes to "teach the Lord" *what* he must create, or *when*, or *where*, or how much, or how long, or for what purpose, moral or artistic. There is not a sentence or a syllable in his works that can be tortured into any such meaning. He might say with all reverence, that even here, there are reasons lying in the very being of the eternal, immutable truth, conditioning the divine action, but the human mind has no knowledge, *a priori*, or *a posteriori* about them. It has no means from nature, and the very dimmest from revelation of forming any judgment of what they are. On this field of the divine moral reasons, though it is one so often and so confidently traversed by the dogmatist who is ever talking about his humility, the Rational Cosmology does not presume to venture. It would require not only an *a priori* knowledge of principles and axioms, and first truths which the mind, even the human mind, can reverently reason about, because God, from his own eternal fountain, has given it some light for so doing—but also a universe of infinitely varied facts, which man has no means of knowing, because they are not *a priori*, and, should he undertake to reason from induction, as the natural theologian does, his sense, which God has so limited,

takes in but an infinitesimal portion of them. But the other, as attempted in the Rational Cosmology, is a very different field of study, and it is the blind overlooking the distinction, or the unjust refusal to make it, that has arrayed a great deal of false as well as shallow criticism against this work.

God makes worlds when, and where, and for such purposes, we will not say, as "he chooses", or as it pleases him, but as his own high and inscrutable *reasons* demand. They may be moral; we cannot say that they are always so. They may be artistic, having solely, as their end, the artistic excellence of the workmanship, or the manifestation of some scientific idea, or of some intellectual glory. There is nothing so irreverent in this, we think, as in the dogmatic assumption that all the worlds we see, or can imagine, were made for the one unvaried purpose of producing in each, and in the whole, the greatest amount of happiness, or pleasing sensations, in sentient beings high or low. Or they may be for ends, some of them, which are to us utterly inconceivable.

But let us come down to a lower plane. If Deity does make worlds for any reason, then, says Dr. H., whether he makes one world or many, whether he makes them large or small, he proceeds on some fixed eternal principles in their construction; and these the human mind may, to some extent, attempt to ascertain. Whether this is done by an *a priori* or an *a posteriori* method would seem to make no difference on the score of reverence; it being a question, too, whether men do not cheat themselves, and lose sight of the mysterious duality of their own minds, when they think that they are *humbly* pursuing the latter alone, without continually finding their way by a light borrowed from the higher path. In one department, certainly, we mean the mathematical, none but those lowest inductionists to whom we have referred, would think of finding irreverence. If God makes worlds to move, it can be deemed no blasphemy to say that there is something in us which affirms, *a priori*, that they would be much more likely to move in circles, or ellipses, than in trapezia, or polygons, and that, too, not only for moral and artistic, but for mathematical reasons. God has power to force

a planet, or a comet, into a zigzag polygonal path; but it may be doubted, whether reverence requires us to say that this could be done by a single law unfolding a constant idea, or without a forced change of the law at every abrupt angle in the passage. For God can no more act unmathematically than he can be unwise or unjust. It is not simply a spurious reverence; it is irreverence itself to affirm the contrary.

Again, we may advance to a more confident position. Not only is it more likely, *a priori*, that bodies would move in circles and ellipses than in trapezia, but if God actually designs that they shall thus move in circles and ellipses, then we say, not as a thing which is *likely*, but as absolutely *certain*, that those circles and ellipses must have the unmade, uncreated, and eternal properties that belong to those mathematical figures, and that bodies moving in them must conform to such mathematical laws. This single example covers the whole field. In a universe at rest (which is perfectly conceivable), so as to be without motions or *sensible* force, all natural philosophy would be resolved into mathematics. Matter would be unknown except as figure. Time would disappear except as measured by thoughts. It would be a real universe, but filled with space-figures, their numbers undetermined and undeterminable, but every one of them having those necessary, immutable, mathematical properties which the human mind can determine to a great extent *actually*, and in elements which it knows, *a priori*, must *virtually* contain the whole. And why should it be so confident? Because these mathematical ideas are the ideas of God, and the human mind sees them by that supersensual light, that universal reason in which it shares, that divine reason (we must retain the word, though many may pervert it, and others cry blasphemy against all who use it)—that divine reason which God gave us, from himself, when he created humanity.

So far our way is clear. And yet the man who says that there are mathematical ideas according to which the Great Geometrician constructed, and *must* have constructed, the universe, is equally exposed to all this mindless charge of "dictating to God", and interfering with the divine prerogative. He

may equally be met with the exclamations, "O the depths! etc.": "Who hath known the mind of the Lord, and who hath been his counsellor"?

Dr. H., it may be said, has gone a little farther than this; but it is only seemingly so. The most scientific find it extremely difficult to draw exactly the line between the mathematical and the dynamical. May there not be axioms in the latter as well as in the former,—necessary truths, hypothetical of course, as all mathematical truths are, but still necessary when the conditions of the hypothesis are given? Now God need not make worlds, we say again,—or we do not know *why* he should,—but if he does make them, he cannot make them, so far as they are figures in space, except according to the mathematical ideas. Let us repeat the formula with another application. God need not make worlds, but if he does make them, and introduce into them forces and motions, either as world-constituting, or as superinduced, then he cannot make them, so far as they are figures in space having force and motion, except according to certain dynamical ideas. The only question is, Are there any such necessary dynamical ideas inseparable from any and every hypothesis of force and motion? Or have force and motion their necessary laws as well as figures? Certainly, beginning with the prime elements of these, there would seem to be axioms in them, necessities in them, as well as in the others. If God makes figures in space, it is not irreverent—certainly not for a rational mind—to say that these must all be mathematical figures, every one of them; and then, if it does not shock us to say that he could not make a circle whose tangent should be in less than a right angle to its radius, or an asymptote that would, anywhere within infinity, meet the hyperbole to which it belonged, though ever approaching it,—neither should it make us shudder to hear one say that Deity could not construct a system of forces so as to make action and reaction unequal, or a single force, unmodified by any other, to produce motion in any other than a straight line, or that he could make two equally balanced and energetically opposing forces equal to nihility, instead of a

maximum of resistance.* Here are axioms of dynamics and statics which the reason seems to affirm as strongly as any in the mathematics strictly. There are more of them perhaps. It is certainly worth our study, and we see nothing irreverent in such study. It ought not to shock us, as very wicked, should one attempt to prove that if bodies are drawn together, there is a necessity that such drawing should be in the inverse ratio of the *squares* rather than of the cubes of the distances. Even should we fail to discover this law, the universality of the appearance should not only lead to the conclusion that it *is* so in all cases, which is induction, but also awake the soul's *a priori* divining faculty to infer that it *must* be so, that is, that there is not only a universal *fact* in this case, but also a *must*, an *a priori* necessity, a *reason*, although we may not be able to bring it out from the deep place where it lies buried in our own minds.

Again, the very being of matter may be force, and that primal force may have its law as one of the eternal ideas of

* In the Rational Cosmology two forces in exact counteraction are regarded as the germ of matter. Laying aside any peculiar phraseology, it is hard to think matter (not think of it) as a thing for the mind at all, except in some such way. It is a *doing something*, as Plato defines all substance to be. (*Sophista*, 248, C. *ὅπως τοῦ ὄντος τὸ ὀπᾶν*, to be is to do.) It is resistance, action, and reaction. But be this doctrine of counteraction true or not, as making matter, it is curious to see how Dr. H. has been assailed for it. It has been ridiculed on the ground that two opposing forces make *nothing*. This is the grand idea of a long article of the *Princeton Review* for April, 1859. It was written by one, who, in such a position, shows the mere mathematician more than the philosopher. Mathematics can only express forces by having motion (or the *outward* sign of what the force is doing) one of the factors in the product. Whenever, therefore, motion *ceases* by two forces exactly equal meeting in counteraction, then that which is, dynamically, a maximum, becomes, mathematically, a nihility. As far as motion is concerned, it is $x - x = 0$. The true representation dynamically would be $x \leftarrow \longrightarrow x$ denoting the maximum of energy, or *doing*. *Rest*, which the critic confounds with *inertia*, is *resistance*, as the etymology implies. Motion is ever the letting out, or the spending of force. *Rest* is its highest state. A universe of forces at rest, or brought to a rest, would be an expression for the highest physical strength of God, as exhibited in space. There is a power in a few grains of quiescent dust that will rend the rock and might burst worlds in sunder. There lies sleeping in a small quantity of water a giant force, which, when unchained, that is, released by fire from its equilibrium, swiftly draws the railroad-car with its thousand tons. The power was all the time in the water and in the dust.

God which is to have its outward manifestation whenever the thing we call matter is to be created. Here, too, is something worth our study, and which we may study without irreverence. Dr. H. has given his mind to it; and whoever will examine, in a manner worthy of it, this great idea as it is developed in the Rational Cosmology, will learn much that will increase his admiration for the author, and give him a profound sense of what he has achieved in this department of thought. Scientific errors, if they exist in a too enthusiastic carrying out of the great principle of the work, need not detract from its real value, and no senseless outcry about "annihilating matter", or "usurping the prerogatives of Deity", no stale alarm of Germanism and pantheism, should prevent us paying the just tribute due to one who so reverently serves God by seeking to explain what he conceives to be one of his divine thoughts. Even if there are mistakes of science, or defects of reasoning, there is no profanity in them. This is all on the side of those who would limit Deity, and the study of Deity, by their own narrow dogmatism. Even error itself may sometimes be better than truth pursued in such a temper.

We ask the reader's indulgence for appending a few more remarks on the subject of perception. They were intended as a note to another part of the article, but the intimate connection of this doctrine with all the matters of which we have been treating, makes it well adapted to the close. Aware of its importance as presenting the prime distinction between the two schools, as they are denominated, the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*, we have labored to obtain the utmost accuracy of expression.

We do not *see* distance. It is always a reasoning, an almost instantaneous deduction from an assumed size and a certain angle of vision;—this angle of vision, so far as it exists in the sensorium alone, being but the more or less in the intensity of the sensation. I look out of my window; I see a light which appears to be as large as the side of the chamber. I look again; it has dwindled to the lamp across the street. I had assumed a certain distance; the angle of vision, or this intensity of sensation, denotes a large object for that distance; and so a large object I see. Again, the distance is corrected,

and immediately the vision changes ; the largeness *disappears*. There is no absolute *quantity* in sense but that of intensity ; visual space magnitude is ever relative, the creation of a mental comparison. Aristotle well expressed this long ago : οὐδ' ἡ αἰσθησις μεγεθός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ λόγος τις καὶ δύναμις ; "sense is not magnitude, but a *reason* and *potency* of it"—that is, it gives a force, or power, from which the mind makes a ratio : *De Anima*, II, 12, 2. And so conversely ; distance is an inference from an assumed size ; size is an inference from an assumed distance. Neither of these do we, strictly, see ; neither is in the sense, both are supplied by the stereoscopic mind. It is a reasoning process, swift as the lightning, yea, swift as thought, yet purely mathematical. Figure, too, falls under the same categories ; for it is the product of distance, angularity, and ratio,—a true perspective, of the mind's own drawing. So far as sense is concerned, we never see things *as* they are, nor *when* they are, nor *where* they are. There is ever a correcting, a locating, a solidifying, a throwing out of things in the three dimensions demanded by the idea of space, or, as we have called it, a *stereoscopic* process from the supersensual. It is a pure statement in geometrical proportion, the same, essentially, in the most untaught soul as in that of the most scientific engineer. It has no names ; it knows nothing yet of sines, and tangents, and base lines, but it works by as unerring a trigonometry as the astronomer employs in measuring the distances of the heavenly bodies. It is a supersensual action of the intelligence, dimly, if at all, connected with the consciousness, or too quick for the consciousness, and yet a true reasoning from ratios, numbers, "eternal principles" arithmetical and geometrical, which the soul has as parts of its original birth-furnishing. It does not send out its thoughts in conceptual diagrams, as something to be looked at or read on the outside of us ; that is, it does not yet know itself knowing, or know the knowing, but the thoughts are there. The spirit actually reasons thus ; the process goes on as truly as any outward calculus. It is as regular as breathing, or any bodily function. It begins in earliest life, it continues ever after. When we stop and think of our thinking, whether such effort comes from some discovery from within, or is prompted by outward instruction—when we analyse the process, and see

what the soul was doing in her secret chamber,—in other words, when we project it objectively as something different from the *sciens*, then we call it *scientia*, mathematical science, but it all comes from the soul itself; it is only a learning of what takes place in that wondrous inner world having depths of the unknown exceeding far, perhaps, any that are yet to be explored in nature, or the world without.

So with the hearing. The rational soul alone perceives music. The sense only *feels*, and what it feels is only *noise*, a roaring in the ears, until the intelligence sees (we were going to say) *hears* its own ideas, its own harmonies, represented in the motions, the forces, the numbers and the ratios which it brings. Without this it is only *quantity*; more or less of loudness. I have a sensation. It is in itself nothing more than the mingling of two sounds, two vibratory motions, either simultaneously, or in immediate succession. I experience an exquisite emotion of pleasure. It is not a sense pleasure, though sense has furnished the materials for it. It is an intellectual joy. There is again this supersensual process going forth to meet the sense. It is the recognition of its own ratios, its reasons, its ideas. When my attention is called to the outward prompting causes, it is then that I perceive, outwardly, it may be said, the outward reason of this strange delight, and thus not only know, but know myself knowing, which, in this case, again, is called musical science. I find that the strings, and the vibrations they produce, are in certain ratios. I could have said so *a priori*. I could have divined that it would have been a *rational* (as it is scientifically called), rather than a *surd*, or incommensurable ratio; that it would have been one rational ratio rather than another; more likely some of the fundamental ratios, such as $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{2}{3}$, rather than such insolvable ones as $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}$ or $\frac{1}{\sqrt{5}}$. And so outward science afterwards informs me; but the supersensual perception from which came that joyous emotion, was no less perfect in its intelligence. It is even more perfect, as being the ideal, the inward rule or canon, by which I measure the outward ratio, and judge of the degree of its accordance or discordance. It was, in fact, this inward vaticination that led me to seek the relations in the strings with a good hope of finding something that would satisfy the search. This is what the intelligence hears, and

which, when heard, it claims as its own. It is soul recognising soul, the prime elemental fact in all perception of beauty, whether it be of figure or of motion, whether of the eye or ear.

And this suggests the thought that the same ultimate spiritual perception may come through different senses. I see the beauty of figure; I hear the harmony of sounds; the Greeks called them both *ἀρμονία*. The *seeing* and the *hearing* both unite in the supersensual region. It is said that the perceptions are *similar* or analogous, but, so far as the soul is concerned, they are the very same; it is one and the same idea of the intelligence awakened to cognition and spiritual emotion through different media.

Akin to this, if not identical with it (at least, so far as it is intellectual), is the perception of moral *rectitude*. This, too, is beauty, proportion, *ἀναλογία*, equality of ratios, *ῥοῦς*, *justitia*,—in a word, a heavenly harmony. The best philosophy approves the thought, the most expressive etymologies favor it; the Bible seems to give it countenance. What is the music of the heavens? Is it a figure, or something more than a figure, that the extatic emotions of the redeemed in the contemplation of the everlasting righteousness, are expressed by "harpers harping on their harps", "singing a new song" never heard by mortal ears, gazing on architectural beauties such as were never seen in any earthly temple?

But none of these things are in the sense. Go down to the very bottom of it, and we find only a difference of *more* and *less*—different degrees of intensity—either in different media, or in the varying *forces* of the same medium. They are varying quantities of motion and force, and nothing more. But the soul is rich; and when these poor materials are brought into the light of its ideas, it immediately commences its spiritual architecture, constructing from them distances, extensions, intensities of light, or colors, latitude and longitude, figure, ratio, intelligible relation, beauty, harmony, all supersensual,—in fact, its ideal world, so far surpassing sense that could we see the outward "things themselves", as some insist, *and nothing more*, we should find it but an unwrought chaos, in comparison with that more glorious reality which the spirit makes from this dark and amorphous material.

ART. V.—GARDINER SPRING, D.D., AND THE BRICK CHURCH.

Brick Church Memorial. New York. M. W. Dodd, 1861. 8vo, pp. 248. *Works of* GARDINER SPRING, D.D. 10 Vols. M. W. Dodd.

THE Brick Church Memorial is issued in a style worthy of the church and pastor it is designed to commemorate. Besides engravings of the exterior and interior of both the old and the new church, and a striking likeness of Dr. Spring, it contains the discourses of the latter at the closing of the Beekman street church, and at the opening of the Murray Hill edifice; his discourse on the fiftieth anniversary of his ordination as pastor of the Brick Church; the proceedings of the Memorial Meeting; and Dr. Spring's affectionate tribute to the memory of his revered wife. The whole volume is of no ordinary value. It has a deep interest for all the members of the Brick Church, many of whom fill places of honor and trust not only in the city of New York, but in other parts of our land, and in other lands. It gives the history of a church which has always been conspicuous in works of faith and charity. It narrates the story of one of the most honorable and successful pastorates in this country, extending through more than half a century. And thus it offers high themes of profitable reflection, ranging far beyond the circle for which it was directly intended, and bearing upon the widest interests of the kingdom of Christ. It discloses the secrets of the vigorous, prolonged and healthful influence of an efficient church, and an able and eloquent pastor, devoted with single heart to the one great object of the ministry.

The corner stone of the First Brick Church in Beekman street was laid in 1766; its members came from the old church

in Wall street. Dr. Rodgers, whom Dr. Spring calls "the father of Presbyterianism in New York", was its first pastor. Daniel Lord in his eloquent address (pp. 150-162) says, that it "contained the Democratic part of the larger Presbyterian church"; "it was the patriotic in opposition to the conservative and Tory party of the Presbyterian body in this city. The Scotch and Irish elements were vastly conservative; the American element, the New England element, settled itself in that edifice of which we, as the successors, are worshippers". The recent noble stand of Dr. Spring in the General Assembly and in this city, in behalf of our government in its present arduous struggle, seems to indicate that this traditional patriotic fire is still burning as lustrous as ever. The church was made a hospital by the British during the revolutionary war, and defaced and left in ruins; but it was repaired and reopened for public service in 1784. Dr. Spring became the colleague of Dr. Rodgers in 1810, having in hand at the same time a call from the Park street church in Boston, and one from a church in New Haven. He was chosen with entire unanimity, after preaching two sermons, of which he says (p. 13), that he has "often been filled with wonder that these two jejune and puerile discourses should have decided the question in which so many interests depended for time and eternity". We rather think, that nobody but Dr. Spring himself would venture to connect any such adjectives with any of his discourses. He addressed himself at once to his great work in the right spirit. The people expected "popular" discourses; and he preached a sermon from the text: "Speak unto us smooth things", enforcing the position, that the preacher's business is to declare God's truth. No minister has been more faithful in this respect. His discourses are eloquent, realising one of the best descriptions of a sacred orator—*Vir bonus dicendi peritus*. But they are instinct, from first to last, chiefly with the majestic eloquence of truth. His appeals are forcible, often well nigh irresistible; but they are thus cogent, because inspired by divine wisdom, drawn from the sacred oracles. "Dr. Spring", we once heard a distinguished critic say, "has preached more good sermons than any minister in the country"; and one

reason of this is, that he has preached, not single sermons alone, but "series of discussions", demanding severe study on his part, and elevating the whole tone and spirit of his intelligent congregation. One of these series, for example, he says, "comprised a whole system of theology and consisted of more than one hundred discourses. It was the great effort of my life". Several of these series are comprised in his published works. One of the first of these was the "Discriminating Traits of Christian Character", 1813, preached to counteract "a hybrid theology, half Arminian, and half Antinomian — tinctured with the views of 'Marshal on Sanctification' on the one hand, and the ritualism of High Church Episcopacy on the other"; "in the main it was evangelical and Calvinistic, but it was hyper-Calvinism, and not that *kind* of Calvinism, which is taught in the Bible". This work was greatly blessed, and has a permanent place in our best religious literature. It maintained the theological positions which its distinguished author has consistently held in the midst of all the collisions and modifications of both Old School and New School divinity.

Dr. Spring was trained in the Old School of New England theology. His father was a distinguished representative of some of the peculiarities of Dr. Emmons; but the son did not adopt either the positions or deductions by which Dr. Emmons was separated from the body of the old Hopkinsians. He has never favored the exercise scheme in its Emmonsite type, but has been faithful to the real spirit of the Edwardean theology. On the three points of a limited atonement, absolute inability and immediate imputation, his views, we suppose, are in harmony with those of Dr. Woods, and Dr. Richards of Auburn. His positions on these doctrines, and his earnest inculcation of the duty of immediate repentance and submission, led to something of a controversy when he came to New York, which did not, however, end in his discomfiture. We have before us a pamphlet, noted in its day (the day of "The Triangle"), entitled "*History of the Young Men's Missionary Society of New York, containing a Correct Account of the Recent Controversy respecting Hopkinsian Doctrines, 1817*". The subject

of debate was "the employment of Mr. Cox", "a theological pupil of Mr. Spring", the latter being chairman of the Committee, then in session. There were "strong suspicions respecting the orthodoxy" of Mr. Cox. "The Chairman was asked if he said Mr. Cox was identified with the Hopkinsians"; to which he replied: "Yes, with what are called Hopkinsians here, but I do not admit that he is a Hopkinsian". In order to settle the matter more definitely, it was proposed that the chairman himself should be examined, so that in this vicarious way the "orthodoxy of Mr. Cox" might be tested. And the Committee actually examined its chairman; the result of the whole being, as this report says, "that on the doctrines of original sin, atonement, total depravity, justification, and the nature of true love to God — Mr. Cox's ideas, as represented by the chairman, were judged contradictory to the creed of this Society". This result is stated with a breadth and inaccuracy not uncommon among polemics, but the whole document is a significant evidence (comparing the present with the past) of the changes which time has wrought even in theological controversy. The views of Dr. Spring on all these points have been unchanged; but who now would venture to maintain that they are heretical, and "contradictory" to the standards of the Presbyterian church? And to his high honor, it must also be added, that he has never been drawn either by misrepresentations or by insinuations into the arena of theological controversy, where laurels are often so easily won. With his unquestionable force and ability he might have become the conspicuous leader of a powerful party: but he has always preferred the things that make for peace. Neither of the divided theological factions claims him as its own. He is chiefly known, not as a zealot for ability or for inability, for imputation or non-imputation, but as a preacher of Christ and him crucified, honoring the divine sovereignty and abasing man's self-righteousness. More than half of his published works have the Cross of Christ for their specific and central theme. Some of the most significant articles of Dr. Taylor in the New Haven controversy were occasioned by Dr. Spring's Dissertation on the Means of Regeneration (1827), reviewed in the *Christian*

Spectator, 1829; but he still kept on his course, trying to win souls to Christ, without appealing to self-love as the spring of moral action, or invoking the aid of the power to the contrary. Of the rupture between the Old and New School in 1837, he says, that though his "sympathies in doctrine and polity were with the Old School", yet neither he nor his church "could ever be persuaded that such a wholesale excision, without any previous trial, was consistent with sound Presbyterianism". And he adds (p. 29 of Memorial): "Our decision to remain with the Old School was prompt and firm, and not less prompt and firm was our protest against its excising acts, and that protest now stands on the records of the Presbytery".

The published works of Dr. Spring number seventeen volumes, besides numerous occasional discourses and articles in our leading theological journals, the latter for the most part anonymously contributed. In addition to the volumes already spoken of he has published *Memoirs of Rev. Samuel J. Mills*, 8vo, 1820; *Fragments from the Study of a Pastor*, 12mo, 1838; *Obligations of the World to the Bible*, 12mo, 1844; *The Attractions of the Cross*, 8vo, 1845; *The Bible not of Man*, 12mo, 1847; *Discourses to Seamen*, 12mo, 1847, reissued in 1854 under the title, *Short Sermons for the People*; *The Power of the Pulpit*, 12mo, 1848; *Memoirs of Hannah L. Murray*, 8vo, 1849; *The Mercy Seat*, 8vo, 1849; *First Things*, 2 vols. 8vo, 1851; *The Glory of Christ*, 2 vols. 8vo, 1852; *Contrast between Good and Bad Men*, 2 vols. 8vo, 1855; *Brick Church Memorial*, 1861. These volumes give their author a distinguished position in our practical religious literature. They have helped to elevate and deepen the tone of religious thought and culture. They have been blessed to many souls in the great struggles of life. Several of them have passed through numerous editions. *The Attractions of the Cross*, and *the Glory of Christ*, take them all in all, are perhaps the ablest of the series, presenting the Redeemer's person and work in all his fulness and fitness to man's wants, and illustrating the divine character in its highest manifestations. The theme inspires the preacher and carries him to the very height of his intellectual and moral power. The

Power of the Pulpit is an admirable volume for ministers, as well as people; it is a faithful portraiture of the principles which have made Dr. Spring's own pulpit a tower of strength to the cause of Christ in this city, and in this land also. The Mercy Seat is an excellent spiritual commentary on the Prayer of our Lord. The Contrast between Good and Bad Men is a biblical biography, analyzing the characters presented in the Scriptures for our imitation or for our warning. First Things is a series of Lectures on the great facts and moral lessons first revealed to mankind, exhibiting both facts and doctrines in a novel and attractive style. And all these works are pervaded by a profound religious spirit, nurtured in the faith as it is in Christ Jesus, and abounding therein with thanksgiving. It is no wonder that, as preached, they often produced such a deep impression, and were, under God, the means of spiritual renewal and sanctification to so many souls. Visitations of divine mercy attended the word so faithfully declared. Revival after revival of pure religion blessed the church of which he was the faithful and beloved pastor. Few churches have ever had such a ministry; few ministers have had such a church. That church is now made up of his spiritual children, the crown of his rejoicing, the monument of his faithful labors. From Sabbath to Sabbath for more than fifty years he has taught them, and they have felt, the power of the pulpit, and the attraction of the cross. His commanding person, still erect; his open face, instinct with thought and emotion; his distinct and emphatic utterance, often rising to the tones of fervid feeling, when his weighty thoughts bore upon the conscience and the heart; and the evident sincerity and depth of conviction which pervade all his discourses—these "aids" to the pulpit have doubtless enhanced the impression of his discourses; but the hiding-place of his strength is in the truth itself, so fully believed and so thoroughly studied. This has enabled him to speak with authority, as an ambassador of Christ. And here is the secret of his long and honorable career, and of his acknowledged influence.

From his first entrance into the ministry, more than fifty years ago, Dr. Spring has always occupied a conspicuous

position. This he owed in part to his church; but his church is also deeply indebted to him. The account of the Memorial Meeting, in this point of view, is of peculiar interest. The old sanctuary was closed May 25, 1856; the new church on Murray Hill was dedicated October 31, 1858. The pastor and people had prayed that he who had so long ministered to this congregation might be spared to witness the completion of this work. Not only was he thus spared, but two years afterwards he celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of his ordination with an admirable discourse on his favorite theme—Redemption God's Greatest Work. Two months later, October 15, 1860, the Memorial Meeting was held—a Memorial of fifty years of arduous ministerial labors; of fifty years of a united church and congregation; of fifty years of God's gracious guidance and favor. For more than half of that period, Dr. Spring has been the oldest settled minister of any Presbyterian church in the city of New York. Two generations had passed before him, both of which he had trained in the ways of the Lord. Those that then gathered around him were his own spiritual children, many of them already gray-haired men. And they poured forth their offerings of honor and of thankfulness, first to the Great Head of the Church, and then to him who had been a faithful bishop to their souls. Remarks were made by Shepherd Knapp; a long address by Horace Holden followed (in which he said that a single lecture of Dr. Spring "decided all his future"); an eloquent tribute by Daniel Lord succeeded, with the presentation of a valuable silver service. Dr. Spring replied in a felicitous and touching manner, and also offered a resolution for the erection of a tablet to the memory of Dr. John Rodgers. Deceased members of the church, who had given it strength in days past, were appropriately remembered by the different speakers. Dr. Krebs read an address from the Presbytery of New York, saluting Dr. Spring as the "Father of the Presbytery". Other addresses were made by Drs. Rodgers, Humphrey, Murray, Hoge, etc. Dr. Murray's remarks contain an allusion to the possibility of his "saying something on a future occasion", about Dr. Spring, "when his work is ended"; but Dr. Murray

has been first called away. The honored patriarch of the New York pulpit still holds his place, earnest as always for the whole truth of God. And in this dark hour of our nation's history, the crisis of its fate, his voice has given courage to the weak, rebuked the faltering, and helped to revive the old patriotism allied with the old trust in God. *Serus in cœlum redeat.*

ART. VI.—THE BEAUTY OF HOLINESS.

BEAUTY, in the natural world, is that assemblage of graces, or properties, which pleases the eye. It is not easy to specify the elements that constitute it; perhaps we cannot say more, than that, in whatever it is found, whether in the human form, or face, in the tree in blossom, or in the richly-colored landscape, it consists in whatever pleases the beholder.

There is beauty in other things beside those which address themselves to the senses. We do not speak unintelligibly, when we speak of the works of intellect as beautiful. The mathematician understands himself when he speaks of a beautiful theorem; and the chemist does not feel that he is burying himself amid undefinable abstractions, when he speaks of the beauty of an experiment. There is beauty in thought, as truly as in the flower. A beautiful argument, a beautiful narrative, a beautiful poem, are as truly realities, as the blushing tints upon the canvas, or the speaking lips upon the almost living statue.

We are also susceptible of the same delightful emotions from the contemplation of moral objects. Moral beauty indeed has a charm which does not belong either to natural or intellectual beauty. Goodness is attractive beyond all the objects of mere sense or intellect. No color, no form, no fragrance, no sound, no demonstration so much charms, as when we look upon the loveliness of virtue, and the "beauty of holiness". In predicting the triumphs of the great Messiah, the sacred Psalmist uses the language: "Thy people shall be

willing in the day of thy power ; in the *beauties of holiness*, from the womb of the morning, thou hast the dew of thy youth". Zion is called "*the perfection of beauty*". Describing the spiritual character of Jerusalem, the prophet declares : "Thou wast exceeding *beautiful*, and thy renown went forth among the heathen for thy *beauty*, for it was perfect through the *comeliness* which the Lord God had put upon thee". Nor is it easy to find more attractive descriptions of moral excellence than that given by the Prophet Isaiah, when he represents the Church as saying : "I will greatly rejoice in the Lord, my soul shall be joyful in my God ; for he hath clothed me with the garments of salvation, he hath covered me with the *robe of righteousness*, as a bridegroom decketh himself with *ornaments*, and as a bride *adorneth herself with her jewels*".

The first and most obvious thought by which the preceding observations may be illustrated, is, that *holiness is beautiful* IN ITS OWN NATURE.

Not more certainly do we look upon the rainbow, as its arch spans the heavens, or listen to the song which fills the grove with melody, with an *intuitive* perception of their beauty, than we intuitively discover an intrinsic beauty in holiness. It is in itself beautiful and lovely. It consists in conformity to the law of God. It is the love of God and man manifested and acted out in Christian graces and moral virtues. Toward God it is the love that is supreme, and that is expressed in delightful complacency in his whole character ; in gratitude for his goodness and mercy, and in adoring views of his greatness ; in ingenuous sorrow for having offended him, in implicit submission to his will and authority ; in confidence in his truth, and a cheerful devotion to his service and glory. Toward man, it is the impartiality of a benevolent mind ; kind and unenvying ; bearing and forbearing ; gentle and unostentatious ; meek and forgiving ; unselfish and of seemly demeanor ; unsuspicious, and at war only with wickedness ; rejoicing in the truth and full of hope ; confiding, unwearied, and it "never faileth". No right-minded man can look upon

such an assemblage of excellence, without pleasing and gratified emotions. So gratified are we, that the delight we feel in contemplating it seems as if diffused over the object which excites it.

We make our appeal to the moral sentiment of mankind, if such excellence is not beautiful? Moral distinctions are as obvious as the distinctions between mind and matter, light and darkness. Character may be abhorred because it is ugly and repulsive; it may be admired because it is attractive and beautiful. There is something in the principles and emotions of holiness which in their *own nature* distinguishes them from those that are wicked and vicious; they possess essential qualities, or attributes, which constitute them what they are, and which render them worthy.

It is worthy of remark, that the beauty of holiness is independent of the circumstances under which it is seen; it exists, indeed, when no created mind sees and contemplates it, and when it is approved and loved only by the uncreated One. It existed in the Deity before created minds were brought into existence; and it exists in millions of created beings in the solitude of their retirement, in the depression of their grief, in the ecstasy of their joy, in the secrecy of their devotions, and in the unpublished, unuttered acts of their self-denial and kindness, which are observed by no eye but God's, and recorded only in the book of his remembrance. They are beautiful because they are what they are.

Nor is it that beauty is dependent on the state of mind with which it is contemplated. It is not the less beautiful because there are those who contemplate it with indifference, and to whom it "has no form nor comeliness"; nor because there are those who contemplate it with disgust and abhorrence, and by whom "it is despised and rejected". Such minds are depraved and blinded; they are disordered minds, and in a state of moral derangement. It is no proof that the rich painting of the clouds, when gilded by the setting sun, is not beautiful, because a blind man does not behold it; nor is it any proof that the Oratorio of Handel is destitute of beauty, because a deaf man cannot discern the harmony and majesty of its mu-

sical combinations. There must be a moral sympathy with holiness in order to discern and appreciate its beauty. A truly virtuous man has but to inspect it, and he feels its attractions. Set it before him, not in its shadowy image, nor its gorgeous costume, nor its frigid formality, but in its native and true loveliness, and he is touched by its charms. It matters not what modifications of moral goodness we contemplate; whatever be its moral coloring, it delights the eye of the mind as soon as it is seen, and when it speaks, is music to the ear. We move amid such an association of holy minds, as amid beds of spices, and their fragrance reminds us of the "smell of a field which the Lord hath blessed".

The native character of man is an odious character; it has no moral beauty until it is transformed by the power of God. The more immediate effects of that transformation are beautiful to look upon, though they present but the faint lineaments of the veriest babe in Christ. Its first emotions of love, its first beamings of hope, its first lisplings of prayer, its first notes of praise, how beautiful and heavenly they are! We are told that "there is joy among the angels of God when one sinner *repenteth*". A beautiful sight it is, when, though he treads the straight and narrow way alone, he enters upon the path of life. There are thoughts of wisdom in his bosom, and there are transparent emotions, and heaven-imparted purposes of devotedness to God, which are in sympathy with angels. It is a renovated mind which he possesses, one that "is come to excellent ornaments", and one that will be recognised and honored in the day "when the Lord of hosts shall make up his jewels". And when such instances of moral transformation are multiplied, and simultaneous, as they often are when the Spirit is poured from on high, what scenes of beauty does the eye rest upon! How much more beautiful than dewy landscape, or blushing morn, when "the desert thus blossoms as the rose, and the wilderness becomes as the garden of the Lord"!

Holiness is also beautiful, in proportion to its purity, its constancy, its uniformity, its vigor, and its symmetry. We could advert to the character of holy men and holy women,

whose names are the emblem of excellence, and the remembrance of whose virtues is as "ointment poured forth". They are scattered throughout the Scriptures, and throughout a most instructive Christian biography; time fails us to dwell upon them. When the Grecian painter Zeuxis painted the celebrated Helen, for the temple of Juno, he selected five of the most beautiful women, and copied all that was most beautiful in the form of each. Some good men have clustered graces and virtues, and more than usually falls to the share of any one man. It would seem as though such *completeness* of character was made up of the finest and most enviable traits that adorn different men. Their inner life and their outward conduct are in such perfect keeping, that we cannot think of them without being instructed, reprov'd, stimulated, and made better. They are captivating illustrations of moral beauty. There is nothing in this inferior world so fair to look upon. They are like the oasis in the African desert; fertile spots, watered by springs and covered with perpetual verdure, though amid arid sands. Man has indeed natural characteristics that are beautiful. His intellectual faculties may delight and instruct us; we may be captivated by the blandishments of his person and manner; in his natural temperament, he may be winning and attractive; but his fairest, brightest adornment is holiness.

God himself is glorious "in his holiness". Good men have high complacency in his character; not a few there have been, and are, who have taken delight in contemplating his excellence, and to whom it has been, and will be the theme of delighted and everlasting admiration. It is not so much his power, nor his knowledge, nor any of those perfections which are comprised in his infinite greatness, great and glorious as they are, that excite their gratified and admiring complacency, as it is that combination and concentration of moral excellencies that constitute his holiness. His holiness is his highest beauty. It is this which makes all his attributes beautiful, for which he claims the supreme reverence and delight of angels and men, and for which he is the highest object of complacent delight to his own infinite mind.

The beauty of holiness is apparent also, in its BENEVOLENT TENDENCIES.

We are no advocates for the theory that *utility* constitutes either the essence, the foundation, or the measure of moral virtue. Because a course of conduct *actually secures* the well-being of others, or our own, it does not follow, that, on this account, it is virtuous; nor does it necessarily follow that it is virtuous, because this is its *tendency*. If there be no other criterion of moral rectitude than its benevolent effects, we see not how the inference can be repelled that there is no such thing as moral rectitude in the universe. If this be true, happiness is the supreme good, and moral rectitude is but the means of securing it. That it is not true, is perfectly obvious from the single fact, that all men naturally love happiness, and as naturally hate moral rectitude. Moral rectitude is the supreme good; it is the duty of men to pursue it as such; while there is no such excellence in mere happiness, nor are men ever justified in making it the supreme object of their pursuit. Holiness *produces* happiness; but it is as distinct from happiness as the cause is distinct from the effect. It is the *tendency* of holiness to produce happiness; but this tendency does not constitute it holiness. So far from its essential excellence consisting in its conduciveness to good, this conduciveness arises from its essential excellence. "It must be obvious to every mind, that a principle may in its nature, when put into practical exercise, be fitted to produce happiness, whilst yet the production of happiness is not that which constitutes the rectitude of the principle." It is not holiness on account of its benevolent tendencies; it has these benevolent tendencies because it is holiness. Though it is holiness, irrespective of the good it produces, the good it produces is but a manifestation of its excellence.

And in this we see one of the beauties of holiness. Like its divine Author, it not only "*is good, but does good*"; good is the native and appropriate result of it. The more accurately and extensively we mark the practical operation of it, the more do we perceive its wise and wholesome tendencies. Inspect its principles, analyze its emotions, trace out its influ-

ences; and you will see that the uniform and invariable tendency of them is to produce a happy state of mind. While "the wicked travaileth with pain all his days", the "ways of wisdom are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace"; and while the former is "like the troubled sea, when it cannot rest", a "good man is satisfied from himself". Holiness, in all its forms, commends itself to man's spiritual nature; it delights his intellect, interests his imagination, and satisfies his conscience; while in all the active pursuit of it, he is employed in occupations that consult his true honor and dignity. If it ever produces grief, and throws a shade of pensiveness over the soul, it is only for its own imperfection, and the abounding iniquity of a world that lieth in wickedness; and even then it is a cherished sadness, and one by which the heart is made better. There is nothing in the most ardent and strongest holy emotions that produces satiety or weariness; nor is the mind ever so exhausted or used up by them, as not to look forward to higher gratifications. The sources of enjoyment which it furnishes are never drained and never become impoverished. Its views are not unfrequently unutterably delightful views. Its powerful impressions of God's truth, its sense of the divine presence, its habits of devotion and obedience, are joys such as a stranger meddeth not with. It has the advantage over every other source of enjoyment in the habits it forms, the sins it subdues, the exalted end it aims at, and the immortality it seeks after. There is nothing except holiness, of which it may be said, that it is uniformly conducive to good. No pleasures of sin have this tendency, because they are followed, and often immingled with remorse; because they are not lasting; because they lose their relish by repetition, and destroy the relish for purer and higher joys. No exemption from care and toil has this tendency; because man is formed for action, his nature requires thought and effort; lassitude and inertness are the bane even of his hopes. Nor have wealth, and splendor, and earthly honors, and princely power this tendency; rather do they create more desires than they gratify, jeopard more tranquillity than they secure, and not unfrequently leave their envied possessors themselves to

envy the less agitated and more secure enjoyments of the more humble and unaspiring. The greatest and most permanent of all sinful pleasures, are never attended with the light of His countenance, whose favor is life, and whose loving kindness is better than life.

These benevolent tendencies of holiness form one of its high commendations. Wherever it goes it is on errands of love. It drops like the rain, and distils like the dew. There is no mind it influences that does not gratefully acknowledge its influence. Whatever bosom it dwells in, and whatever portion of the world it visits, but for its conflict with evil, it makes that portion of the world, and that bosom happy. Nay, its very conflict with wickedness is proof of its loveliness; for it wars only with wickedness, wickedness which it would fain neutralize and eradicate; and though the process may produce agitation and effervescence, they are from causes which only indicate its intrinsic excellence. Its object is to reform and renovate; to illuminate and make happy; to "pour water upon him that is thirsty, and floods upon the dry ground". It is the great healer of the maladies that affect our race, gradually alleviating the curse upon man, and the curse upon the ground for man's sake. It is the fountain which sends forth streams of gladness, immingled with no bitter ingredients; like waters which issued from the sanctuary, "everything shall live whither the river cometh". And is there nothing beautiful in such benevolent tendencies? Is not the light beautiful which chases the darkness from so many minds curtained with the shadow of death? Is not the love beautiful which hears the sighing of the prisoner, and binds jarring humanity in one sweet brotherhood, so that they shall not hurt, nor destroy in all God's holy mountain? Is not the joy beautiful, at which the mountains and the hills break forth into singing, and all the trees of the field clap their hands? The charms of nature, and the mere imitative creations of art, are limited and inferior departments of beauty's empire. Purer loveliness and beauty far more attractive crown this work of God, compared with which the sweetest and most fragrant flower his hands have planted becomes shapeless and

fades away. Bashan languisheth, and Carmel, and the flower of Lebanon languisheth; while the beauty of holiness never withers, nor is its leaf less green in the year of drought, nor does it ever cease from yielding fruit.

The beauty of holiness is still more conspicuous IN CONTRAST WITH THE DEFORMITY OF SIN.

We look at sin in others, we inspect it in ourselves, and we see its deformity, and need no other proof that it is that "abominable thing which God's soul hateth". Reason abhors it; conscience revolts from it; and did it not find a friend and patron in the heart of man, no place would be found for it this side the world where it meets its just recompense. Yet have we no doubt that He "who is wise in heart and mighty in strength", so overrules it that in its final results it is turned to good account. "Surely the wrath of man shall praise the Lord, and the remainder thereof he will restrain". Nor is the thought an unnatural one, that *one* of the objects which a wise providence purposes to accomplish by allowing it to exist, is to make it show forth in bold relief, and strong contrast, the beauties of holiness.

We say, this is not an *unnatural* thought; we may add, it is a *revealed* thought. "There must be heresies among you", says the Apostle, "that they who are approved may be made *manifest*". Truth never appears so true and pure, as when seen in contrast with error; nor is it ever so highly valued by its friends, as when, like the moon, walking in her brightness, it makes its path luminous amid a night of storms. So holiness never appears so beautiful and lovely, as when contrasted with sin, and its varied colors are vividly painted upon the dark and retiring cloud of human wickedness. It would be an impeachment of the divine wisdom to affirm that created minds are imperfectly constituted; nor is it any evidence of their imperfection, that they *may* be so constituted, as that, in order to know the good in the highest degree, they must have the knowledge of the evil. If the analogy holds good in the moral world, which confessedly exists so extensively elsewhere, holiness is seen in its true splendor only when distinguished from

and in contrast with that which is sinful, and when, like a stream of purest, whitest light, it descends upon Egyptian darkness.

The time was when there was no sin in the universe; nor is it too much to say, that the sinless hosts of heaven knew not how pure they were, nor how to appreciate their unsullied purity, nor how highly favored of God they were for being preserved in holiness, until they saw some of their own number fall from their high estate, and become deformed and odious and scathed by sin. That hateful apostacy had a reaction upon the views and character of the unfallen that is felt to the present day, and that will be felt through interminable ages, if it be but to give emphasis to their words when they say: "Holy! holy! holy is the Lord of hosts! the whole earth is full of his glory!"

Ever since man's apostacy in Paradise, *sin* has been the native and natural element of the human mind: "The whole world lieth in wickedness". And when the first ray of holiness fell upon it, how brightly it shone! and when that early promise that embodied it was uttered, and began to be developed in the heavenly purity and hopes it imparted, how beautiful was its lustre, and how bright its beams as it began its course! And now when for six thousand years, sin and holiness have had a place on the earth, how obvious is it that they have been making each other "manifest"; and that not more certainly does holiness illustrate the nature and deformity of sin, than sin illustrates the nature and beauty of holiness.

We have but to look at facts. If we are Christians, we can perceive the change which the grace of God has made in us and for us. And how beautiful are those emotions, and how precious those hopes, which are the fruit of his Spirit, contrasted with the enmity of the carnal mind, and those dark fore-shadowings of the future which once enwrapped us, because we were without God and without hope in the world. If you look at others, at home and abroad, far off and near, you will have new views of the beauty of holiness. Set before your minds the hard frozen heart of the obdurate sinner, who is unmoved by all the power of God's truth, and all the persuasive motives of the Gospel; who has eyes but cannot see,

and ears but cannot hear; who when God calls does not answer, and who, while he has a name and a place among living men, is himself dead in trespasses and sins. And then fix your thoughts upon one who is humbled in the dust and hastens to prostrate himself at the foot of the cross, and commit his guilty soul into the hands of sovereign mercy. See that wretched prodigal as he breaks away from the restraint of the divine authority, and the bosom of divine love, and wanders in the drear wilderness, and wallows in his lusts, and worn by famine, dies in remorse, agony, and despair. And then mark the footsteps of one who, ashamed of his folly, traces his weary way to his father's house, takes the place of a child in the family of God, comes to his bed of death in peace, and in the vigor of faith, and the serenity and cheerfulness of hope, commits his departing spirit to one who will keep it to the day of his appearing. Look over the face of human society, and mark the career of the man, whose sin, shame, and misery multiply and augment the sin, shame, and misery of the world in which he dwells; who is worse than useless because he is the enemy of God and man, and the instrument of perdition to others. And then mark the career of the man whose character is an ornament to his race, who lives to be useful, whose wisdom, virtue and honor make the world in which he lives brighter, and better, and happier. In such a view, who has not new and more vivid impressions of the beauty of holiness?

We may also inspect these opposites more closely and in some of their more distinctive attributes and characteristics. There is the malignity of sin; and the benevolence of holiness. There is the irritation, the resentment, the fury of sin; and the meekness, the forbearance, and the forgiving spirit of holiness. There is the fraud, the falsehood, the treachery, of sin; and the honesty, the truth, the fidelity of holiness. There is the licentiousness, the debauch, the squalid wretchedness of sin; and the circumspection, the honor, and the purity of holiness. There is the ignoble meanness and egotism of sin; and the noble generosity and self-denial of holiness. There is the profanity of sin, setting its tongue against the heavens, and its mouth feeding on foolishness; and on the other hand, there

is the respect for God, the reverence for God, the worship and honor of God, where holiness presents its incense and a pure offering. On the one hand, there is the folly of sin, turning the Sabbath into a day of care, toil, and dissipation, and making the lives of men bitter with hard bondage; and on the other, there is the weekly jubilee of holiness, enjoying its loved repose amid the quietness and devotions of God's day of rest. Here there is the unhallowed avarice of sin, with all its host of evils to individuals, to families, to the world; there, there is the contentment of holiness with all its innumerable train of blessings, chasing away from the hearts and habitations of men the thousand passions which agitate and torment. There is Nero singing on his lyre while Rome is wrapt in flames; and there is Paul exclaiming: "I am ready to be offered, and the time of my departure is at hand". There are angelic smiles, and demoniac frowns. There is a miniature hell, and a miniature heaven. And in this contrast, has not holiness a beauty; and do we not contemplate it somewhat as angels contemplate it and with some measure of their joy?

If we would have these impressions still more vivid, we may turn our eye from lands cheered by the light and love of Christianity, to the dark regions of Paganism. We may transport ourselves to the banks of its sacred rivers, and to the rites of its polluted temples, and as we survey the deformed and abject population, think of the people who have "heard the joyful sound, and walk in the light of God's countenance". Or we may forget the golden age in which we live, and what it is that constitutes its charms, and gives it its high preëminence, and throws around it so much of the beauty and fragrance of those coming days of which it is the precursor, and carry ourselves back to those leaden and iron ages of the world in which the "Fatal Sisters" wove the web of human destiny, and the Prince of Darkness swayed so widely his cruel sceptre. And we may contrast them with those coming days which shall restore its lost holiness to our world, and the primitive Eden shall again bloom in beauty. Oh! what scenes of loveliness are these, some tints of which already begin to gild the blushing morning of that coming day. And what a heavenly

radiance will be thrown around it, when God shall cause "righteousness and praise to spring forth before all nations"!

There is a last thought we may not suppress in these illustrations; it relates to the beauty of holiness *in the perfection which it is destined to attain in its own native world*. If the beauty and glory of man's nature consists, not only in what it is, but in what it is capable of being, and will be, his capacity for holiness must be regarded as the crown of that beauty and glory. No created mind can gauge that capacity, nor measure its attainments in rectitude.

In the strange and barbarous mixture of sin with holiness as it exists in this fallen world, beautiful as it is, its perfect beauty is never seen. There are rare examples in which its lustre shines forth; but as exemplified in the great mass of good men, it has no such glory. Even in the best, its beauty is defaced, is marred with blemishes, and has alloy and wickedness. Abraham must equivocate; Moses become impatient and angry; David, impure and cruel; and Peter must lie and swear. It is not to earth that we must look for holiness in its transparent loveliness. It has never been seen but one bright and untarnished exemplification of what holiness is; and so pure was it, and so reproachful to human wickedness, that men cried out, "Away with him! away with him! Crucify him! crucify him"! No; the spoiler has entered here. With all the power of the Mighty Healer, the poison rankles in every human bosom. The freest mind bears the marks of its native servitude; and though the chains are broken, they have left the deep furrows of their bondage.

Yet is there this precious truth, in regard to the holiness of men on the earth. Not only is it, in so far forth as it is holiness, beautiful, and like the holiness of angels, and like its divine Author; but its character is progressive, and its course is onward and upward to perfected excellence. From its first act of prostration before the mercy-seat, where it lifts its hands and heart to God; where it pours into his ear its voice of alternate penitence and praise; and where, in full view of the blood of the covenant, its faith takes hold of his righteousness and his promise; it rises, though it may be in unequal

progress, higher and still more high, till at last its anticipations are realized in views that are to be never obscured, in affections of unmingled purity, and in the fulness of joy. Wondrous words are those uttered by the Apostle when he says: "Beloved, now are we the sons of God; and it doth not yet appear what we shall be; but we know that when he shall appear, we shall be *like* Him, for we shall see him as he is".

But how can man illustrate or impress this beautiful thought? If it requires holiness to discover the beauty of holiness, it is no marvel that it is not for lips of clay to speak of its perfected beauty. Reason and judgment have here no labored work to perform; for God hath revealed it all by his Spirit. Imagination here wings its way in silence, and its pinions droop. The impoverished heart, and even its sweetest, richest experiences, scarcely tread the hither verge of those fields of light. It is arrested, and moved to tears, and it may be to precious hopes; and when it grasps the mighty reality, it is by a vigorous faith. Oh! how sin and the world separate the heart from God and heaven. Yet is the assurance a delightful one, that it will not always be thus; and that the little holiness that exists in the present world, is an earnest of the holiness that will be. Beautiful for contemplation is it, even imbedded as it is with the gross materials of earth; nay, the lowest and most imperfect degree of it possesses excellency with which no other created thing can be compared. And how beautiful when detached from the mire and rubbish of earth, and severed from all this sublunary alloy, it shines and sparkles in its own native firmament! "Behold", says Bildad to Job, "behold even to the moon and it shineth not; and the stars are not pure in his sight; how much less is man that is a worm, and the son of man that is a worm"! Yet glorious, beyond thought, is the destiny of this abject worm. We look upon it, and then look up to the moon and stars. Resplendent as they are, man that is a worm will be more resplendent. Those lights of heaven are not pure in his sight; but man will be more pure. Brilliant as is yonder firmament, and decked with beauty as it is, scenes of brilliancy there are

far surpassing these. Matter is a perishing thing. It is the mind that lives. Stars, and suns, and systems shall be rolled together as a scroll, and pass away. It is holiness that lives, gilding heaven with its beauty. Denude that pure world of its purity, and it is no longer heaven. There is nothing for which it is to be so much desired, nothing for which its glorious Architect so much values it, as its holiness. Its wall is holiness, its gates of pearl and its streets of gold are holiness. Its city is holiness, "as it were transparent glass". There "shall in no wise enter into it anything that defileth". It has adornments from earth; but they consist of "the nations of the saved" which walk in the light of it, and of "the glory and honor of the nations" which they bring into it. "It has no need of the sun, neither of the moon, to shine in it; for the Lord doth lighten it, and the Lamb is the light thereof."

Theological and Literary Intelligence.

THE *Codex Sinaiticus*, it is well known, is to be published in four folio volumes. Dr. Tischendorf will receive, by way of honorarium, a few copies, ten of which he intends to offer for sale, and these are all that will be sold. The editors of the *Journal of Sacred Literature* have secured those ten copies for England, and offer them for £25 each. The printing will be completed in August, 1862. Two or three copies ought to be secured for libraries in this country.

Considerable progress has been made in exploring the ruins of the ancient cities of Phœnicia. Operations were commenced at Saida and Sour early in the year, and are now almost complete. Remains of the Crusaders were found at both places, but none above ground of the Phœnicians. Gigantic blocks of granite, marking the limits of the ancient port of Sidon, still remain; also on the plain to the east of the site of the old city, a subterranean Sidon has been discovered. Here, in 1855, the sarcophagus of Eschmanuzar, in the cavern of Apollo, was found. This is the only great inscribed Phœnician sarcophagus hitherto discovered. Portions of another have been found in the same place by M. Renan. Also, on the rock-caves of Sidon, some of which are anterior to the time of Alexander, sarcophagi of various forms, some of terra cotta, ornamented with garlands, have been discovered. Other remains of different epochs have been examined, and portions have been brought to Paris. Some of the sculptures, etc., resemble those of Egypt; others those of Nineveh and Persepolis. Among the objects found in the caverns and brought home are many articles of dress and common use, Phœnician coins, and a leaden sarcophagus of good workmanship. M. Renan has discovered at Tyre, a mosaic, consisting of seventy-two medallions, containing mythological designs of great beauty.

Even Mohammedanism meditates religious reforms. There has just appeared in London, *The New Koran; or, Text Book of Turkish Reformers in the Teaching and Example of their esteemed Master, Jaido Morata*, of which it is said: "The boon of the Syrian prophet opens a gateway through what has hitherto been considered an insurmountable barrier to Mussulman progress. It separates spiritual religion from dead forms and superstitions; offers a common ground of reconciliation to Christians, Jews, and Turks, and promises to bring about, by moral and pacific means, a far more important reformation in the East than is likely to be effected by Abdul-Aziz or the sword of Wahabites".

Literary Discoveries in Asia Minor. The *Moniteur* publishes the following report to the Minister of State from M. Perrot, formerly a pupil of the French school at Athens, who has been charged with a scientific mis-

sion in Asia Minor. He states: "Angora (ancient Ancyra), August 28th. I have made a valuable epigraphic discovery. We found, in visiting the vicinity of the temple, all the first part of the Greek translation of the Testament of Augustus, of which Hamilton copied the end. Having ascertained that it existed in a good state of preservation behind a wall of bricks, forming the back of a Turk's house, we purchased the wall and pulled it down. By laboring from morning to evening during five days, I have made a copy of the inscription. I have eight columns complete, not like those of Hamilton; for at least several of them are the beginnings or ends only of columns; and that brings me down to the middle of the third column of the Latin, and fills up many blanks in the original text, which is much more mutilated than has been believed from the copies hitherto used. The first four columns of my Greek text also contain omissions, but in the fourth and three following ones only a word here and there is wanting. I cannot tell you all the new facts that my discovery makes known respecting the life of Augustus, the honors which he received, etc. At the end of the first column of the Latin is a blank which is made up by the columns of the Greek text. They speak of the 'absolute power' which he refused, the 'perfection' which he exercised, the 'consulate for life' which he would not accept, the 'perfection of morals,' and his title of 'Prince of the Senate,' all of which are wanting in the Latin. The date also of his testament is given. By means of these supplements, I can add much more than I had dared to hope to the knowledge and true interpretation of this important epigraphic monument. I am at this moment in negotiation for the purchase of the adjacent house, which contains the middle part of the inscription. That which Hamilton had partially pulled down only contains the end. The text which he gives begins Table 4 of the Latin. There are, probably, therefore, two columns of Greek to find, in order to reestablish the text of this important inscription, and I hope that I shall succeed in discovering them."

Jewish Prize Essays. The Israelite Alliance has put up for competition the following prizes: A gold medal of the value of 1000f. for the author of the best paper on the questions as to what are the elements which the Jewish religion has bequeathed to those which have succeeded it as regards religious dogmas. 2d. A gold medal of 1500f. value, for the best paper, tracing out the present statistics of the Jewish people on all points of the globe. These papers may be written in Hebrew, Latin, French, German, or English.

At Prague, Dr. Wessely, a Jew, has been appointed ordinary professor of criminal law in the Prague University.—Dr. Weil, known in the learned world by his History of Mohammed and of the Caliphate, has been appointed ordinary professor in the University of Heidelberg. This is the first time that a Jew has been appointed ordinary professor at Heidelberg, or in an Austrian University.

GERMANY.

The fourth annual Report of the Committee on the grand monument to Luther at Worms, from Ritschl's designs (of which we gave an account in vol. 2, p. 729), estimates the total expense at 200,000 florins, of which 151,000 have been collected. Of this amount, 81,195 florins are from foreign sources: Russia, 15,000; Norway, 5,800; South America, 1,561; United States only 144, etc. Two of the twelve statues, viz. those of Luther

and Wycliffe, have been completed by Prof. Ritschl, and are to be cast at the Einsiedel art-foundry in Prussian Saxony.

Prof. Lassen of Bonn is engaged in investigations upon the Old Inscriptions of Java and Sumatra, published in Batavia in 1857 by R. H. Friedrich. It is said that they cast new light upon the history of these islands, and of the Buddhist religion. The first half of the 4th vol. of Lassen's *Indian Antiquities* relates to Deccan, Burmah, Siam, and the islands of Ceylon, Java, and Sumatra, from A.D. 819 to the Portuguese conquest.

Philip Wackernagel's invaluable Treasury of German Hymns, from the most remote times to the beginning of the seventeenth century, is to be re-issued, in a more complete edition, 4 vols., each volume to consist of seven or eight parts, at 20 groschen each. The whole work will cost about twenty dollars. A prospectus, signed by many of the most eminent German divines, recommends it in the strongest terms.

The *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, vol. 6, No. 2, 1861, opens with an article by H. Schmidt, Repetent in Tübingen, on Augustine's Doctrine of the Church. The Donatist schism gave the first occasion for the development of the conception of "the Church", and of its attributes and relations, just as heresy had, up to this time, helped to give definiteness to doctrine. Augustine's views are presented under the three heads of, "the definition and universality of the Church", "the doctrines of grace" as mediated by the Church, and "the relation of Church and State". The writer finds in him the germs of many of the subsequent manifold Roman Catholic assumptions, with fundamental views essentially evangelical and Protestant, but not yet developed, as in the Reformation, with a sharpness sufficient to exclude errors and exaggerations. A complemental dogmatic treatment of the subject is added. The second article is a Biblical and Dogmatic Study on the Wrath of God, by R. Bartholomäi, pastor in Wildenstein (Wurtemberg), giving a full and candid exegesis of the biblical passages in which the expression occurs, and then, after establishing dogmatically the *reality* of this feeling in God, meeting the objections drawn especially from God's Immutability and Love. In the third article, the question, May we Pray for the Dead? is answered by Dr. Stirm, Counselor of the Upper Consistory in Stuttgart. After showing that the custom prevailed, especially on the anniversaries of funerals, down to Augustine's time, though no proper sanction for it as a dogma can be found in his works, especially in the scholastic form of the doctrine of Purgatory and the efficacy of the priestly offering in the mass; and that even Luther does not wholly reject it (all these founding the custom upon a view of the intermediate state as a period of purification even for the believer, and perhaps of change for all not fully obdurate at death, or who have died out of the communion of the Church, or ignorant of the Gospel), the author aims, in the exegetical and dogmatic parts of the article, to justify the belief of many modern German theologians in such an Intermediate State as a preparation for the final judgment, with its irreversible issues, and as a state in which conversion may occur. A Letter to the Churches of Germany, by Prof. M'Cosh, describing the English methods of bringing religious truth before the people in preaching and publishing, the recent revivals, and the leading forms of opposition to evangelical doctrine in England, is introduced by a note from Dr. Dorner, who had in 1860 written a similar letter upon the theological condition of Germany, which was published in England. This is followed by a full review of the Mansel and Maurice Controversy, by Dorner, with a criticism of Sir W. Hamilton's *Essay on the Philosophy of the Unconditioned*, and, in reply to various

demands upon German Theology in a published letter by Dr. Fitzgerald, Bishop of Cork, a criticism of the English methods of metaphysical and theological argument, and recommendation of the German as alone sufficient to meet the forms of scepticism now rife in England. The article, occupying fully one half of the entire number, is of great clearness and value, written in a genial earnest spirit, by one whose residence of a year in England and Scotland, when a Repetent at Tübingen, for the very purpose of studying their forms of religious life and thought, and whose carefully maintained familiarity with both English and American theological literature ever since, peculiarly fit him to do this. His present position as, since Julius Müller's sickness, the leading scientific evangelical theologian of Germany, gives warrant for the thoroughness and comprehensiveness of the views presented.—The third part for 1861 has Ritschl on the Historical Method as applied to early Christianity—a thorough criticism of Baur's destructive processes; Von der Goltz, on the Theological Bearings of Bengel and his School—as opposed to scholastic theology and idealism; Kalchreuter on the Original Gospel; Diestelmann on the Baptism for the Dead (1 Cor. xv, 29)—“baptized in the hope of a resurrection in Christ from the dead”; Prof. Schaff of Mercersburg on the Origin and Character of Monasticism—an able article; Wittichen on the Church and its Officers. The fourth part has a long account of the Oxford Essays by Diestel; Zöckler on Species, in its theological bearings (reviewing Agassiz and Darwin); and Harries on Luther's doctrine of Justification, as avowed before A.D. 1517. The first of these articles is in the main a *resumé* of the positions of the Essayists. Their relation to German theology is judged to be rather superficial. The second article contains incidentally a high tribute to the merits of President Hitchcock's Religion of Geology. It speaks of Agassiz as Professor in the “Unitarian” university of Cambridge.

The *German Quarterly for English Theological Investigations and Criticisms* (*Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift*, etc.), edited by Dr. Heidenheim in London, and published in Gotha by Perthes, is a new periodical, designed to foster the literary and theological communion of England and Germany. The first number, whose contents we have previously noticed, was published March 31, 1861. The second number, dated August 31, opens with an interesting article by Prof. A. P. Stanley of Oxford, on the Study of Church History, translated into German. It is a lecture of his course at Oxford. The second article is a continuation of the account of the Mormons from Mormon sources, by Dr. J. Overbeck of London. One of the objects of this review is to render an account of the ancient Syriac and other mss. in the British Museum. A series of communications describes a Hieroglyphic work supposed to belong to the times of Joseph; Rabbinic notices of the Burial-place of Joseph; Phœnician Inscriptions, a codex of the Prophets of the sixth century, and a Syrian Hexapla of the Psalms, in the Museum. There is also a valuable sketch of the Samaritan liturgical literature (19 mss. in British Museum), and a Samaritan hymn. This number concludes with criticisms of the *Essays and Reviews*, of Thrupp on the Psalms, and of the Life and Epistles of Paul. There are also two plates of facsimiles of the inscriptions, etc. The work promises to be a very valuable addition to periodical literature.

Laemmer's *Monumenta Vaticana* contains instructions to, and reports from, the various papal nuncios and legates in the early part of the 16th century.

The *Zeitschrift f. wissenschaftliche Theologie*, the organ of the Tübingen school, Parts 3 and 4, 1861, has Holsten on Paul's Vision of Christ in

1 Cor. xv, 8; Hilgenfeld on the Quartodecimani of Asia and the canonical gospels; Zeller, a reply to Ewald's attack on Baur; Kunze, the position of the moon on the day of Polycarp's death—he makes the death of Polycarp to have occurred 26th March, A.D. 166; Böhmer, Memorials of Mideldorpf; Hilgenfeld on the apocryphal books of the Old Testament—a continuation; Volkmar on the Book of Enoch and the General Epistles; Ochler on Gelasius and the Nicene Council; Lang on Baur, in reply to Gelzer and Landerer; the concluding part of an able sketch on Julian the Apostate.

Ewald's *Jahrbücher für biblische Wissenschaft*, vol. xi, 1860-1, has articles on the Hebrew Language; the Structure of the Proverbs; the Dramatic Element in the Prophets (Micah vi); the Biblical representations about seeing the Invisible; the Prophecies of Christ and the Apocalypse; Relation of Biblical Science to our Times; Survey of Works on Biblical Science, 1860-1. His attack on Baur was written before Baur's decease, and is replied to by Zeller, as above.

The *Theologische Zeitschrift*, edited by Dieckhoff and Kliefoth, represents the stricter form of Lutheranism. It is issued every two months. Among the articles are a continuation of Luther's Doctrine about Grace, giving a full account of his views on baptism; an Address on the Founding of the German Church by Boniface, by Dieckhoff; a long article on the Romanizing Tendencies of a German periodical, *Das Volksblatt für Stadt und Land*, by Reich. Prof. J. Bachmann contributes a full history of the Book of Judges in the Christian Church, giving an account of all the commentaries, etc. No one of the scholastics wrote on the Judges, and only two of the mystics, Rupert of Duytz, and Hugo of St. Victor. The patristic literature abounds in commentaries. The Song of Deborah has received the most attention. The subject is to be continued. Prof. Keil reviews, with sharp criticism, Bleek's Introduction to the Old Testament, saying that he had only a superficial acquaintance with the Hebrew language. M. G. Schött gives an account of the revivals in America, Ireland, etc. from the stable Lutheran standpoint.

The *Deutsche Zeitschrift*, now issued monthly, contains Prof. Schlottmann on Christian Truthfulness in Polemics—against Hengstenberg; Prof. Diestel, The Present State of Introductions to the Old Testament—reviewing recent works; an extract from Sudhoff's Lectures, on Servetus,—an impartial account of his trial; a criticism by Lange of Rothe's idea of God and theory of creation; an excellent account of Gnosticism, by R. Baxmann, with reference to the recent works of Möller and Lipsius; Bernstein on the Exiles in Silesia; Beyschlag on the Order of Evangelical Worship, an address before the Union of Saxony; Erdmann on the Prussian Reformer, Speratus, two articles; a severe criticism by Prof. Hupfeld, of "the theosophic and mythological interpretations of Scripture", as seen in the works of Hofmann, Baumgarten, Kurtz, Delitzsch and others.

The *Theologische Quartalschrift* (Rom. Cath.), part 8, 1861, contains a continuation of Gams on the Ancient Church History of Spain; Kerker on Preaching in the last part of the Middle Ages; Hefele on the question, whether Gregory VII (Hildebrand) sought to have his election to the papacy confirmed by Henry IV? affirming that he did, and that this was the last instance. Nolte reviews at length Dr. Hussey's new edition of the Church History of Sozomen, in a very learned critical article.

The *Zeitschrift für lutherische Theologie*, Heft 4, 1861, continues Rudelbach's Confession, an autobiographical sketch of the state of religion and theology in Denmark. This portion relates to the years 1800-1805, and

gives most interesting details about men and parties. The whole work will make 8 vols. The second article by Mehring, on the Angel of the Lord, defends against Hofmann, Delitzsch and Kurtz, the position, that the Angel is Jehovah manifested—in the early books of the Old Testament; but takes the ground that in the prophets (particularly Zechariah and Daniel) the Angel is distinguished from Jehovah. The other articles are Schott on 1 Cor. vii, 24–40; and Haase on the Roman Question.

Guericke's Christian Symbolism appears in a third, thoroughly revised edition, pp. xxviii, 789.

Schlosser, the historian, died at Heidelberg, Sept. 24, aged 85. The decease of the eminent jurist Savigny is also announced.

Dr. Döllinger has recanted or modified his statements about the temporal power of the papacy, now saying that "the Pope, in the defence of his temporal power, was fighting for the most just cause; that the cause of the Pope was also the cause of all legitimate monarchs and of the public peace and order of all Europe; and that if he were stripped of his dominions, the restoration of his temporal power should be made the common cause of Catholic Christendom."

A number of valuable biographical works, illustrating the history of the church, have been published in Germany the last year, besides the series on the Reformed church edited by Hagenbach, and that on the Lutheran church, just begun. Among these are two works on the Swabian reformer, Ambrose Blaurer, one by Keim, and a fuller account by Pressel. The Slavic reformer Truber (translator of the New Testament into the Wendish), is commemorated by Sillen. Francke's correspondence with Spener, and his autobiography, have been published by Kramer; much of the matter is quite new.

HOLLAND.

A writer in the *Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* divides the theological movements in Holland into four parties. 1. The strict Orthodox. 2. The mild Orthodox. 3. The moderate Liberals (the school of Groningen). 4. The Liberals proper—degenerating on the extreme left into a materialistic tendency. The 1st has its chief seat at the Hague, and is represented by Groen van Prinsterer, who has been a minister of state, and a deputy, resigning the latter post when the government abolished specific religious instruction in the schools. He contended strongly against all infidel tendencies, and vindicated the idea of the Christian state (like Stahl in Prussia). Capadose, Makai, and Elout van Souterwonde, also belong to this party, which is small in numbers. A "methodistic-pietistic" abhorrence of the world is also ascribed to them. They hold in general to the decrees of Dort. (The poet Bilderjik, who died in 1831, began the revival which led to the formation of this party, which is separated from the national church. In 1845 they formed a Reunion of Christian Friends, of which Van Prinsterer is the President.) 2. The mild orthodox are united in a society called Earnestness and Peace, and publish a journal with the same title, edited by Chantepe de la Saussaye, one of the pastors of the Walloon Church at Leyden. He has lately published a work in Paris on the Religious Crisis in Holland, in reply to Van Prinsterer's charges that he had abandoned orthodoxy. Among the other representatives of this tendency are Domine Beets, President of the above Society, a pastor in Hemstede near Haarlem, well known as a poet and re-

ligious writer; Domine Helldring, the Wichern of Holland, founder of a Magdalen Asylum at Steenbeck; Hasenbrock, reputed the first pulpit orator of Amsterdam; Van Rhyn, who visited the East Indian missions and wrote an account of them; Van Osterzee, the author of some of the best portions of the new Bible-Work of Lange; Prof. Doedes of Utrecht, who has written ably against the deistic and pantheistic tendencies; Trottet, a pupil of Vinet and Neander, who has written for the *Revue Chrétienne* an account of Dutch theological affairs, which Van Prinsterer accuses of misrepresenting the strict orthodox. — This school is ethical in its tendencies, though holding to a positive revelation in Christ. Da Costa of Amsterdam is spoken of, as mediating between them and the strictly orthodox. 3. The School of Groningen. The head of this school was Van Heusde of Utrecht, the distinguished Platonist, who published in 1881 (he died 1845) "The Socratic School in the 19th Century". The tendency is Platonizing; and it has an infusion of Schleiermacher's system. Hofstede de Groot of Groningen is its present representative. In their theology, they are Arians, with a mystic tendency. 4. The Liberals, "who think as rationalists, talk biblically, and live in a worldly way". The University of Leyden represents this school, on the whole, though most of the clergy belong to it.

Prof. Scholten of Leyden (Prof. of Theology) maintains a kind of "deistic-pantheistic" scheme in his "Doctrine of the Reformed Church in its Fundamental Principles", and his "Comparative History of Philosophy and Religion". Like Schweizer, he advocates Predestination in a merely philosophical sense, as a fixed necessity. Professor Opzoomer of Utrecht, the successor of Van Heusde, raised a storm by his Inaugural Dissertation on "Reconciling Man with himself by means of Philosophy", advocating substantially the pantheistic scheme. Pastor Pierson of Rotterdam is one of his followers. Opzoomer is said to have great influence among the young men of the University. Kienen, an Orientalist at Leyden, denies the inspiration of the Old Testament.

Schwartz's *Heraut*, a weekly journal, and Helldring's *Vereeniging*, a monthly, give, it is said, the best account of the state of religious affairs in Holland.

The general subject of the Religious Question in Holland was discussed by J. P. Trottet in the *Revue Chrétienne*, Paris, May and June, 1860. He refers, as authority, to an Historical Exposition of the State of the Reformed Church in the Netherlands, published by the Walloon Commission, 1855. M. Pierson of Rotterdam replies to Trottet in the July number of the *Revue*. Van Prinsterer's book, referred to above, is entitled, *The Anti-Revolutionary and Confessional Party in the Church of Holland*. Amsterdam. 1860.

FRANCE.

The death of the eloquent Abbé Lacordaire is announced. He was born in 1802, educated for the bar and then for the priesthood; and associated in 1830 with Lamennais and Montalembert in the bold and liberal *L'Avenir*. When the Pope condemned the doctrines of this journal, Lamennais revolted and Lacordaire yielded. In 1836 he wrote a letter on the Holy See, opposing his old principles. His *Life of St. Dominic* appeared in 1840. His Conferences at Notre Dame made him famous. In 1860 he was elected to the French Academy, filling the chair of De Tocqueville.

The Abbé Migne has in preparation a Complete Collection of Councils, 80 vol. 4to, for 500 francs. It will comprise twice the matter of Mansi's collection, and four times that of Labbe and Cossart. He also proposes to publish a series of works on the Agreement of Reason and Science with the Catholic Faith, in sixteen volumes, for 100 francs.

The *Revue Chrétienne* for May has a continuation of the excellent article on Marguerite de Valois, and a review, by Bonnet, of Vinet's work on the French Preachers. The June number contains an excellent essay by Charles Secrétan on Progress, in a Christian acceptation; a review of the Oxford Essays and Reviews by De Pressensé, on the whole unfavorable to them, though in favor of the independence of scientific investigations; the conclusion of Godet's treatise on the Song of Songs, in reply in part to Renan. The July part contains a sketch of the Later Friendships of Fenelon by Froissard; Diombres on Christian Life as viewed by Modern Catholicism, and a review of Quinet's poem, Merlin the Wizard, by Lelièvre. The August number has F. Kuhn on the Moral Element in the Romance; Trotet, an instructive account of the Religious Crisis in Switzerland; Bastide on Individualism; Grenier, the Grand Epoch in Christian Art. Each number also has a Bibliographic Bulletin, and a review of contemporaneous events. Every three months, there is likewise published a Theological Supplement. The second Supplement contains a translation, by Sardinoux of Uhlhorn on the School of Tübingen; a translation (from the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*) of Weizsäcker's review of the recent French works of Pécant, De Rougemont, Coquerel, Reuss and De Pressensé. The third Supplement contains a long article by Prof. Jalaguier, on the Old and New Theology, attacking the positions of Secrétan in his *Recherches sur la Méthode*, with a reply by Secrétan. The new Professor at Montauban, le Bois, defends his inaugural address on the Supernatural against the exceptions of Réville in the *Strasburg Nouvelle Revue de Théologie*. — Articles promised for subsequent numbers are by pastor M. G. Fisch, on the United States; Dorner on the Sinlessness of Christ; Astié on the Theological Crisis; De Pressensé on Inspiration, etc. — The September part has a warm eulogy, with large extracts, of Mrs. Stowe's fragment, *The Pearl of Orr's Island*.

The famous work *De Tribus Impostoribus* has been reissued in elegant style, the Latin text compared with that of the Duke de la Vallière, now in the Imperial library, with various readings from other sources. Only 432 copies are issued, all numbered, from 8 to 4 francs each.

The *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, edited by Bonnetty, published every month, has had during 1861, among other articles, two by De Larroque on the authorship of the Imitation, of which we give elsewhere a synopsis; two excellent articles on the Truce of God, by De l'Hervilliers; on the Parsees and their belief, from a Parsee in Bombay, by Léon de Rosny; on the work of Peltier on Traditionalism; three valuable essays on Human Sacrifices among the Canaanites, the Egyptians, Phœnicians, Carthaginians, Athenians, Spartans, Thebans, etc. by Dr. Bourdin; a review of Blanc on Infallibility, by Domazan; Prémare on the Primitive Monotheism of the Chinese; a criticism of Nott and Gliddon's Types of Mankind, by De Charenay, etc.

The Gobert prize of the Academy has been accorded to Dargaud's *Histoire de la liberté religieuse*, and to Gêruzez' *Littérature Française*. The latter work is said to be the most exact, conscientious and interesting of its class.

The Grand Rabbín, M. L. Wogue, Prof. at the Israelitish Seminary of

Paris, is engaged on a translation of the Bible, with a commentary; only Genesis has as yet been published.

The *Nouvelle Revue de Théologie*, Sept., has a second article on Theodore Parker by M. Burckhausen; a second article on the Religion of the Ancient Egyptians by Trottet; a continuation of Bost's essay on Orthodoxy and the Gospel; bibliography of historical theology, etc.

An account of Woman in the East has been published by the countess Dora d'Istria, 2 vol., Zurich. The real name of the author is the Princess Koltzoff Massalsky; her maiden name was Helena Ghika, daughter of Prince Alexander Ghika of Wallachia. So she was Roumanian by birth, Russian by marriage; she was educated at Athens by Papadopoulos; and she is almost a Protestant in her religious views, as well as a liberal in politics. *Athenæum*.

The recent new edition of Rapin's Inedited History of Jansenism, has been roughly handled by Abbé Maynard in the *Bibliographie Catholique*. The editor, Abbé Domenech, seems to make sad work with his publications. His American Pictography (of 228 plates) has become a joke for all Europe—he mistook school boy scrawls for hieroglyphics, and made a deity of a word which means sausage.

The Correspondence Littéraire exposes the great alterations made by M. Mommerqué in his new edition of Mde. de Savigné's letters. Some of the most characteristic parts are wholly omitted. This edition will be in ten volumes.

V. Hugo's new work, *Les Misérables*, has been sold to a publisher, it is said, for 400,000 francs. Its scene is the field of Waterloo.

M. Guizot has published a work entitled *The Church and Christian Society* in 1861, advocating the continuance of the temporal possession of the Pope. Eight thousand copies were sold the first day. There are twenty-four chapters, some of which bear the following titles: "Why I write this." "The Christian Church." "The Supernatural." "On the alliance between State and Church." "The Catholic Church and Liberty." "Universal Suffrage in Italy." "The Future of Europe," etc.

A new pamphlet called *L'Angleterre, L'Autriche, et les Entrevues de Compiègne*, compares England to Carthage, and predicts that one day, forced to struggle everywhere, she will become exhausted. The writer believes Prussia has thrown off the English yoke, and advocates the seizure of Madagascar and French Hayti, and the extension of Algeria, without more deference to England than England pays to Europe.

Abbé Guetté, the author of a *History of the Jesuits*, and of a *History of the Church of France* (also editor of the *Union Religieuse*), has just published a pamphlet entitled *La Papauté moderne condamné par le Pape St. Gregoire le Grand*. It shows that St. Peter never was Bishop of Rome, that the first Popes regarded as profane the title of Universal Patriarch, and that the expressions "Apostolic See," and "Holy See," were applied not only to Rome, but to all churches founded by the Apostles.

Abd-el-Kader is preparing for the press a volume of poems in French. Well known as an elegant Arabic poet, he will now appear for the first time as a writer of French verse.

M. Geoffroy de St. Hilaire, the distinguished French naturalist, died on the 10th November, in the 57th year of his age. So remarkable were his attainments in natural philosophy, that when only nineteen years old, he became a teacher at the Museum.

The circulation of the Paris press is given by a letter to a London journal as follows: *The Moniteur* prints 18,700 copies; *La Siècle* (thorough Liberal

and progressive), 55,700; the *Constitutionnel* (ponderous and government-al), 22,000; the *Débats* (refined and select), 11,800; *Le Monde* (clerical), 8,660; *L'Ami de la Religion* (milder and less offensive), 3,700; *L'Union* (Henry V), 5,000. Each evening *La Presse* (progressive) puts out 21,000; *La Patrie* (semi-official), 22,000; *L'Opinion Nationale* (Prince Jerome), 21,500; *Le Pays* (Mirès), 6,000; *Gazette de France* (Henry V), 5,500; *La Temps* (Protestant), 2,100.

In France, there have been published, in the six months ending the 29th of June last, 6,160 works of all kinds, including new editions, reprints, pamphlets, pasquinades, and small poesy. During the same period there have been published 1,552 musical pieces, and 1,618 engravings, lithographs, portraits, landscapes, etc.

ITALY.

Father Passaglia has ranked next to Perrone among the Italian theologians. He edited the collection of Monumenta, which celebrated the declaration of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, and also a new edition of Petau. Though opposed by the Jesuits, from whom he had separated, he still taught in the Roman University. But he has now declared against the temporal power of the Papacy, and been obliged to flee to Turin. His two works on the Italian Cause (*Pro Causa Italica*), and on the Duty of the Bishop of Rome to remain in Rome, even when it shall be the capital of Italy, have produced a profound impression. A third work has the title *Observations on Excommunication, by a Catholic Priest*. The object of this pamphlet is to show that the Roman Pontiffs themselves admit that they may be mistaken sometimes in the application of ecclesiastical punishments and censures; and that it may happen that a person excommunicated by the Church is not so by God. The prelate Liverani, canons Pedimonte and Reali, Abbé Simonetti, and others, are said to sustain the position of Passaglia. The Cardinal d'Andrea has quarrelled with the Jesuits, and resigned his position as Prefect of the Congregation of the Index. Theiner has published a collection of documents on the Temporal Power, A.D. 756-1884.

Schelling's Bruno has been translated into Italian by L. Waddington, and published with a preface by Mamiani. V. Garelli, Turin, has published the second edition of his *Logic and Theory of Knowledge*.

M. Fabio Mutinelli, custodian of the Venice archives, has published four volumes entitled *Secret and Anecdotal History of Venice*, giving documents from the 17th and 18th centuries, including letters between the governors of Milan, and the viceroys of Naples. The *Athenæum* gives extracts from letters of Nani, the Venetian ambassador at Rome under the pontificate of Paul III, showing that the Pope was in perpetual fear of being poisoned, and that he took minute precautions for safety.

Abbé Armellini thinks that he has discovered, in an Arabic manuscript of the Vatican of the 14th century, a letter of Aristotle to Alexander, on the Art of Reigning, mentioned by Philoponus and Diogenes Laertius. The letter is to be published, translated from the Arabic.

Mazzini is said to be writing memoirs of his Life and Times. Signor Daelli, of Milan, is collecting the political and literary works of Mazzini, which he proposes to publish in about twelve volumes. A translation into English of his "Duties of Man", is nearly ready for the press.

Niccolini, the chief Italian dramatist of the century, died at Milan, Sep-

tember 20, in his 79th year. His tragedies of Nabuco (one of his earliest), Foscarini, Strozzi, and Arnold of Brescia, are well known. A History of the House of Hapsburg from his pen has been often announced, but has not yet been published.

Ansonio Franchi has published, at Milan, Philosophical Studies, on Bacon, Descartes, etc. He agrees with the French view, as expressed by De Remusat, that "Bacon was a critic, and Descartes a creator".

The sifting, arranging, and copying of Michel Angelo's manuscripts is nearly completed. They were left, three years ago, to the town of Florence by Casimir Buonarrotti, the Tuscan Minister, in which legacy was comprised the old family house of the Buonarrotti, with all the objects of art it contained, and a sum of money destined to keep a conservator of the Buonarrotti Museum. The manuscript collection proved to be far more important and comprehensive than was at first anticipated; and with the help of it the life of Michel Angelo, will be written anew.

G R E E C E .

COMMON SCHOOLS IN GREECE.—The newspaper *Hellas*, of the island of Zante, gives the following statements respecting the *demotic* or common schools of the lower grade. There were within the bounds of Free Greece in 1855, 873 public schools, of which number 341 were for males, and 82 for females; besides 22 private schools of the same grade, 16 for males and 6 for females. In 1860 there were 566 public schools (490 for males and 76 for females), and 50 private schools (31 for males and 16 for females). In attendance upon these 616 schools there were 61,198 scholars, of whom 6,278 were girls. The public schools are all sustained by the government, and instruction therein is wholly gratuitous.

A bill to regulated Mixed Marriages has been adopted by the Greek Legislature. The solution of the vexed question has been made by enacting provisions better suited to an intolerant state than to one which professes to allow the utmost latitude of civil and religious liberty. The following are the leading features of the obnoxious law. Marriage between persons belonging to the Eastern Orthodox (Greek) Church and some one of the other Christian religions is valid, if it be celebrated by a priest of the Eastern Orthodox Church, if all the demands of the Greek law be complied with, and if there be given by the party belonging to the heterodox (foreign) religion, a promise, in the presence of the justice of the peace of the locality in which the marriage is performed, that the children who may be born of this marriage shall be baptized and brought up in the Eastern Orthodox Church. A record of this promise shall be drawn up by the justice, and signed by him, by his clerk, and by the promising party. In case that the latter shall be unable to write, mention of the fact shall be made in the record. The violation of this promise is punishable according to the 270th section of the Criminal Code. Permission to celebrate the marriage will not be given without the above promise. If such promise be not given, the invalidity of such marriage may be alleged by any interested party, or by the king's attorney. In a foreign country the promise shall be made in presence of one of the consuls of Greece, and a record made by him which shall have the same force as if made by a judicial officer. Mixed marriages celebrated before the promulgation of this law by a priest of the Eastern Orthodox Church, even without the permission of the bishop, are regarded as valid, and the child-

ren born of them are legitimate. This law was pronounced by a member of the Council (Mr. Kyriakos), during the discussion, to be repugnant alike to the constitution, to the principles of the Gospel, and to the spirit of the nineteenth century. "Greece and the prevailing religion of our country," said he, "have their enemies, and doubtless the law now contemplated will give them fresh opportunities for bitter accusations."

Greek Bishops and Bible Distribution.—While the Greek Church has never so bitterly opposed the Bible in the vernacular as the Roman Church, and while a few prelates, such as the bishop of Laconia, even favor its distribution, others display a determined opposition. Within a few months we have noticed two such instances. The bishop of Vodena, in Macedonia, lately made great exertions to secure the entire stock of the Scriptures in the possession of an agent of the British and Foreign Bible Society, that he might destroy them, and the Archbishop of Arcadia, within a month or two, has arbitrarily seized the copies of the Bible which the same indefatigable agent had left in the hands of the grateful prisoners confined in the city of Tripolis (Tripolitza).

ENGLAND.

The October number of the *Journal of Sacred Literature* joins the name of B. H. Cowper (the Syriac scholar) with that of Burgess as editor, and opens with a declaration of its position and principles, as opposed to both Romanism and Rationalism, and in favor of candid criticism. The chief articles are remarks on Dr. Temple's essay in the *Essays and Reviews*, censuring some of its crude statements; a translation of the two Epistles on Virginity ascribed to Clement of Rome; Chronology of our Lord's Last Passover; Modern Miracles—the Abbé Paris; Time of Book of Judges; Prayers of Christ as illustrating his Humanity; Ecclesiastes; Emblems of St. John; of the Divine Nature—to show that it must have a threefold mode of being; and the usual varied Correspondence and Intelligence.

The Christian Remembrancer, Oct.: The Discipline of the Clergy; the Sybilline Oracles; the Eighteenth Century—Burke and Washington; Life and Letters of J. A. James; Character and Conduct of Henry VIII; Mountains and Climbers; The Sephardim—a very valuable essay on the Jews in Spain; Studies of the Western Church, 1815–1861—a slight sketch of the history of the Roman Catholic church; the Churches of the British Confession—an able article, maintaining that the Gospel came to Britain from Gaul, and not directly from the East, and was modified by the historical circumstances of the British people; the Modern English Cathedral.

The *National Review* for October contains articles on the following subjects: Principle and No Principle in Foreign Policy; Mediæval English Literature; Piers Ploughman; The Great Arabian; British Columbia; Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes and Elsie Venner; The Science of Language; Street Ballads; Tracts for Priests and People; Is Cotton King? The American Constitution at the Present Crisis.

The British and Foreign Evangelical Review, July, 1861, has a good article on the Style of Preaching adapted to the Times, from the German of Rüling; another on Hofmann's System and Scripture, also from the German of Dieckhoff; False Theories of the Atonement—viz. McLeod Campbell and Baldwin Brown; Schaeffer's Future Prospects of Toleration; Introduction to Epistle to Romans; Scripture and Geology; Calvin

and Beza—their theological differences, candidly considered and stated, etc. The first article of the October part is entitled Recent Introductions to the Old Testament (Keil, Bleek, McDonald on Pentateuch, etc.), though it is chiefly occupied with a criticism of McDonald on the Pentateuch. Protestantism in Southern France is a valuable sketch translated from the German; Buckle's Civilization—sharply dealt with; the Practical Application of Calvinism—an article of nearly 70 pages, candid and discriminating, in opposition to Arminians and to Archbishop Whately; Recent Geological Speculations on the Antiquity of Man; Lechler on the Church Theories of the Early Reformers; Recent Phases of the Atonement Controversy in England, etc.

The Wesleyans in England are making rapid advances in all that pertains to literature and education. Their *London Review* takes a high position among the quarterlies; their monthly *Magazine* has a circulation of 81,000. They have two colleges, at Sheffield and Taunton, connected with the London University; a Normal School, that sends out annually a hundred teachers (the building at Westminster cost £40,000); 500 to 600 day schools; two Theological Schools at Didsbury and Richmond; and Schools for Preachers' Children at Wood-House Grove and New Kingswood. The *London Review*, October, has articles on Religious and Political Centralisation in France; American Poets; Du Chaillu's Explorations; Social Legislation under the Tudors; Prof. Edward Forbes; Robertson's Sermons; the Bible in South India; Angell James and William Jay; and the American Crisis.

A new work is in preparation by Mr. Darwin, the author of *The Origin of Species*, of which it may probably be considered the sequel. It is called: *On the Fertilization of British Orchids by means of Insects*.

The *Thumb Bible* (first so called in the reprint of 1849) was first published in Aberdene, by John Forbes, 1670, under the title *Verbum Sempternum*—measuring 1½ by 1½ inches, containing 140 leaves. The Bible is dedicated to Queen *Katherin*, and the New Testament "To the High Majestie of King Charles". The third edition in England has the *imprimatur*, 1698.—*Notes and Queries*.

Hindustani and English Clavis to the New Testament and Psalms, by Prof. C. Mather, is announced for publication by the Longmans. The Raja Radhakanta Bahadur's Sanskrit Encyclopædia, called *Sabdakalpadruma*, is to appear at Calcutta in a new edition, 4to, ten livraisons.—A Turkish-English Lexicon by J. W. Redhouse is announced.

De Lagarde's edition of the Syriac version of the Old Testament Apocrypha, is published for 20s.

The second part of Vol. 1 of the Works of Gregory of Nyssa, edited by G. H. Forbes, has been issued from the Pitsligo Press, Burntisland.

The Journal of Sacred Literature says that C. D. Ginsburg's recent commentary on Ecclesiastes is the most important that has appeared for many years. His commentary on the Song of Songs was published four years since.

Wm. Webster's Greek Testament is now complete in 2 vols. for £2 4s.

Alexander Bain, author of the works on the Intellect, Emotions and Will, has in press "On the Study of Character, including an Examination of Phrenology."

The Surtees Society has published the long expected Landisfarne and Rushworth Gospels, Part II, from mss. in the British Museum and Bodleian Library. This Part contains St. Mark edited by Mr. Waring. Matthew was published in 1854, edited by Rev. Jos. Stevenson. The Anglo-Saxon glosses accompany the text.

Cardinal Julian, who accompanied the last crusade, presided at the council of Basle (1431), and was active in the negotiations about Huss and Jerome of Prague (see Gieseler, iii, 240, 840), has at length found a biographer in Rev. Robert Chas. Jenkyns. The work is published by Bentley.

The *Westminster Review*, while vehemently dissenting from the theory advocated by Mr. Goldwin Smith, in his recent lectures at Oxford on the Study of History, yet says, that "he is clearly master of a power of expression which has scarcely a rival amongst us. His language has a native strength and purity which rises not seldom into pure poetry." The Lectures are a very vigorous assault upon the theories of the positivists.

Rev. P. S. Desprez, *The Apocalypse Fulfilled*, 8d ed., makes all its prophecies to refer to the first era of Christianity, and the fulfilment to consist in the consummation of the Mosaic economy. An article on the Apocalypse, in the last *Westminster Review*, considers it as a part of the apocryphal literature, and "as a daring and wildly beautiful poem". It finds the mystical number 666 in the Greek Η ΔΑΤΙΝΗ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΑ.

The Inaugural Lecture of Monier Williams, Wilson's successor as Boden Professor of Sanskrit in Oxford, was upon the Study of Sanskrit in relation to Missionary Work.

Rev. Ralph Churton in his *Influence of the Septuagint Version of the Old Testament upon the Progress of Christianity* (Macmillan, 1861), shows that the Hellenistic dialect was one of the chosen means by which God declared the truth of the Gospel to man. In this combination of the Hebrew and Greek, a language was produced which could express all the profound truths of the Christian system. He shows in particular how the terms Faith, Repentance, Conversion, Justification, Redemption, Salvation, and the like, were thus transformed and transfigured for the use of the new dispensation. We owe to the Septuagint this very name of Christ.

Mr. Bolton Corney in the *Notes and Queries* on Johnsonian Quotations, shows that the great lexicographer quoted two lines of Pope, under four words, and contrived to introduce twelve faults in the citation. The couplet was :

But let a lord once own the happy lines ;
How the wit brightens ! how the style refines !

The words under which they are cited are, Brighten, Refine, Style, and Wit.

"Aids to Faith" in reply by various authors to the Oxford Essays is just published by Murray. Three thousand copies were subscribed for in advance.

One of the most costly literary enterprises ever undertaken by English publishers has just been brought to a close. We refer to the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Although the statistics of the cost have been given before, it is worth while to preserve them. Mr. Black, the Edinburgh publisher, stated at a public dinner, that he had paid to contributors, £41,970 ; for paper, £52,508 ; for printing and stereotyping, £86,708 ; for engraving and plate-printing, £18,276 ; for binding, £22,612 ; for advertising, £11,081 ; for miscellaneous items, £2,269 ; making a total cost of £184,421, or nearly one million of dollars. At such a cost it ought to be, as it is, a library of science and letters. It is interesting to know that more than 1,400 sets have been sold in this country.

SCOTLAND.

A curious theosophic work, said to show a good deal of research, has been published by William Hamilton Stewart, Glasgow, 2 vols. entitled *A New System of Nature on the Basis of the Holy Scriptures*. The substance of deity is love and truth; his form is a human body; his residence is the centre of the sun. From him first proceeds a spiritual sun; then the natural sun; then the solar heat, which is sublimated gold, and the solar light, which is volatilised silver. Gold, fire, heat and the sun all mean the same thing in Scripture—and are equivalent to the divine goodness; silver, light and the moon signify the divine truth, etc.

The work of Rev. Jas. Gilfillan on the Sabbath, in the Light of Reason, Revelation and History, is highly praised as a very complete discussion of the subject, including a history of the literature and controversies. It counteracts some of the positions advanced by Dr. Hessey in his Bampton Lectures for 1860. The views of the English Reformers are carefully examined.

The *British and Foreign Evangelical Review* says of the Sermons of Dr. Addison Alexander: "When we place this volume side by side with the best sermons that have recently issued from the British pulpit, we are not sure that they are equalled by anything that has recently appeared among us." "The impression that we have at the close of many of these sermons is overpowering."

James Douglas of Cavers died Aug. 17, 1861, in his 71st year. He is well known as the author of works on Prophecy, Popery and Infidelity, the Philosophy of the Mind, the Advancement of Society in Knowledge and Religion, and Errors regarding Religion.

The *North British* for October opens with a vigorous and eloquent paper on Pascal, ascribed to Isaac Taylor, describing the resurrection of the real Pascal, after his long perversion at the hands of friends and foes. Prof. Blackie writes on Plato—showing the affinity of Platonism and Calvinism, in a trenchant style. The First Book of Discipline of the Scotch Church directed that Plato and the New Testament should be read in Greek. The article on Comets is ascribed to Brewster.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The *North American Review* for October has among its articles, a thorough review of Mr. Buckle's theory of civilization; an interesting account of St. Anthony; and a valuable summary of Rev. Samuel Lyde's work on the Ansaireeh or Nusairis of Syria. They number about 200,000—for the most part rude and vicious. They are divided into Shemsee (men of the sun, northerners) and Kumreel (men of the moon, southerners); the former may be descendants of the Canaanites; the latter, foreigners, brought their present religion into the land. The name Ansaireeh is probably derived from the founder of the sect, Nusari, dating from the ninth century. Their sacred name is Khaseeb, from the apostle of the sect. In many points they have affinities with the Assassins. They believe in the divine unity; in three personalities, the second and third being created. The first person, the supreme deity, is *Manna* or Meaning; the second, *Iam* or Name; the third, *Bab* or Dove. Of the supreme deity there have been seven manifestations—the last is Ali, Mohammed, and Salmaan il Farisee. Ali is the highest manifestation of God—alone to be adored. There is also a system

of hierarchies, bewildering in numbers, 14,000 Near Ones, 15,000 Cherubim, 16,000 Spirituals, 17,000 Saints, 18,000 Hermits, 19,000 Listeners, 20,000 Followers—in all 119,000—besides prophets, apostles, and heroes. The doctrine of metempsychosis is strictly held, and minutely delineated. They receive the Old and New Testaments and the Koran, with many apocryphal works.

The Boston Review completes its first volume with the November number. It treats the current religious and theological topics in a popular, and often trenchant style. The contents of the last number are, Distinctions with a Difference; Homes of Literary Men; Bossuet; Communing with Spirits; Exegesis of Ephes. i, 3-6; After the Storm; Centres of Ministerial Influence, etc.

The Free Will Baptist Quarterly, Oct. 1861 completes the ninth volume. It has articles on the United Netherlands; Modern Unbelief; Slavery and Ancient Rome; the Voice of Blood; the Trinity; Bible Finance; Ministerial Qualifications; Capt. Jotham Parsons, etc. The article on the Trinity reproduces some of the earlier speculations of Dr. Bushnell.

The American Oriental Society met in New York, Oct. 16, 17. Communications were presented by Prof. Jas. Hadley on the Greek Inscription Stone from Daphne; by Rev. Ed. Webb of Dindigal, S. India, on the Scythian Affinities of the Dravidian Languages (from Caldwell's Dravidian Grammar); by Rev. Dr. Martin of Ningpo, a Chart of Chinese Ethics; by Rev. N. Brown, D.D., formerly of the Assam mission, a Brahman's Sermon; by D. C. Gilman, on Recent Explorations of the Lake Country of Eastern Equatorial Africa; by Rev. D. N. Marsh, on the Ruins of Nineveh; Notes on the City of Yedo, by Dr. R. Lindau; on Lepsius's Standard Alphabet, by Prof. W. D. Whitney; on Bernay's edition of the Chronicle of Sulpicius Severus, by Prof. C. Beck.

Dr. Ebrard of Germany, whom the Western Synod of the German Reformed Church elected Professor in the Theological Seminary at Tiffin, some months ago, has declined this call.

Wm. L. Stone is writing a memoir of Sir William Johnson. Lorenzo Sabine is preparing a new edition of his "American Loyalists." Buckingham Smith is engaged upon a grammar of the Nevome dialect of the Pima language, Sonora. Swedberg's *America Illuminata* (on the Swedish colony) is also in preparation. The life of Felix Andreis, from the Italian, gives valuable sketches of the introduction of various Roman Catholic Orders into this country. These Orders now number fifty.—*Hist. Magazine*.

The London *Athenæum* says of Whittier's Ballads and Poems: "Here is poetry worth waiting for, a poet worth listening to. . . . His song is simple and sound, sweet and strong. . . . It has the healthy smell of Yankee soil with the wine of fancy poured over it."

The *Methodist Quarterly*, October. Hamilton's Lectures on Logic; Leonardo da Vinci; Is the Modern Camp-Meeting a Failure? Darwin on the Origin of Species; The Culdees; Brahmanism; Arminian View of the Fall and Redemption. The last article, by the editor, is an ingenious attempt to harmonise the Methodist doctrine of original sin with the theory of gracious ability. Before act, the descendants of Adam are "presumptive, imputative sinners" only; "conceptually under sentence of eternal death". The theodicy is constructed on the ground, that if redemption had not been provided, the race would have come to an end in Adam.

Brownson's Quarterly, Nov., is chiefly polemical, replying to Various Objections; recanting most of his objections to Gioberti, in a previous number; recommending the Study of the Scriptures, with complaints of the Douay

version; and urging emancipation as the only deliverance from the perils of our present campaign. This last article is one of the very ablest published in this country on Slavery and the War.

The *Danville Quarterly Review*, No. 3, attacks Dr. Hodge's theory of immediate imputation in brisk style. It traces this theory, rightly we think, back to supralapsarianism, and contends for the vanity of the distinction between immediate and mediate imputation. It represents Dr. Hodge's view as amounting to this: "That God first imputes guilt to the innocent; then punishes it by imparting moral corruption; which moral corruption is afterwards punished with eternal death." And as to the analogy to the imputation of our sins to Christ, it says there are the following differences: 1. Christ voluntarily undertook the office. 2. The imputation of our guilt to Christ did not consist in making him morally corrupt. 3. Christ fully bore the penalty—but that penalty was not his moral corruption. 4. The penal infliction on us involves the desert of eternal punishment; which was not the case with Christ. Another article, on the Church and State, has respect to the action of the General Assembly about the War. It takes ground against Dr. Hodge as to the right and duty of the Assembly to make "a deliverance"; but says it was not right for it to make the deliverance it did. It also denies the position of the Protest, that the Resolutions "introduced new terms of communion". It says, that a project was on foot in South Carolina for dividing the Assembly, by demanding the repeal of the legislation of 1818. As to reuniting with the New School, it declares that all the "conservative" part of the Church will be solid against any such project.

The *Historical Magazine*, New York, for August, contains the earliest account sent to Europe, by Father Dablon, Superior General of the Jesuits, of Marquette and Joliet's Discovery of the Mississippi, in 1674.

Isaac Taylor's new work on *The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry* will be soon published by Carleton, New York. It vindicates the divine origin of the Old Testament revelation by its internal characteristics. Dr. William Adams prefixes a valuable Biographical Preface, presenting many facts in the life of Taylor and his family, which have never before been published, and giving a brief sketch of all his works.

We are glad to know that four additional volumes of Mr. White's *Shakespeare*, from the 9th to the 12th, will soon appear. This edition, so carefully and honestly prepared, with so much sympathy and so much learning, reflects great honor upon the spirit of the country. We shall gladly welcome its completion.

Samuel H. Turner, D.D., Professor in the General Theological Seminary of the Episcopal Church, New York, died December 20. He has long been known as the ablest exegetical divine of his denomination. Among his works are commentaries on Genesis, Romans, Galatians, Ephesians, and Hebrews; an account of the Jewish Rabbis; Essay on the Discourse at Capernaum; Thoughts on Prophecy, etc.

Literary and Critical Notices of Books.

BIBLICAL LITERATURE.

Introduction to the Pentateuch: an Inquiry, Critical and Doctrinal, into the Genuineness, Authority and Design of the Mosaic Writings. By the Rev. DONALD MACDONALD. 2 vols. Edinb. T. and T. Clark. New York. Chas. Scribner. 1861. Mr. Macdonald is well known to students of theology by his careful work on the *Creation and Fall*, published in 1856. His subsequent studies upon the earlier portions of the Scripture have borne their fruits in these elaborate volumes, of which the *Journal of Sacred Literature* (London) says, that they "accomplish what the title promises," and prove "the Pentateuch to be the genuine production of Moses". Less learned and acute than the work of Hengstenberg on the Authenticity of the Pentateuch, it is also less liable to the charge of arbitrary hypotheses, and is better adapted to the methods and tastes of English readers. The copious materials are distributed into three books. Book First, on the Subject of Inquiry and the mode of conducting it, contains an account of the names, divisions and contents of the Pentateuch. Book Second discusses its genuineness, authenticity and authority, entering into all the questions and theories of earlier and later critics, and vindicating its antiquity, authorship and credibility. The second volume is devoted to the third, and decidedly the ablest, portion of the work, on the Design of the Pentateuch as a Divine Revelation, and the basis of the Hebrew Constitution and Polity. The chief end of the Pentateuch is to reveal God; man is the object and medium of this revelation. The Pentateuch gives the truest and noblest view of man's condition and prospects, and reveals in general outline the plan of redemption, and the person and offices of the Redeemer, that thus a people might be trained to be the medium of the purpose of redemption. The last chapter presents an outline of the relation of the Pentateuch and the Mosaic institution to the New Testament dispensation. This brief sketch will be a sufficient indication of the general value of the work, and of its adaptation to inquiries, which are now more than ever rife. It is indispensable to all who are engaged in these investigations; and it is a candid and able work. Of course where such a variety of points is introduced there will be a difference in the critical decisions as to particular instances. Some of the author's solutions may seem to be too external, while his general conclusions may be accepted. He is a resolute opponent of all the forms of the Document-Hypothesis, from the fragmentary conceptions of Eichhorn and Vater, through the complement and supplement theories of Tuch, De Wette, Hupfeld, and Von

Bohlen, down to the fivefold chronicles which the ingenuity of Ewald has spied out. He finds in the word Elohim the general designation of God, in Jehovah the special name of God in relation to redemption, and having a future signification. The transition from the one to the other he thinks was made in the passage, Genesis ii, 4 to iii, 24, where both are employed about twenty times. The alleged contradictions in the Pentateuch are for the most part fairly met and shown to be insufficient to invalidate the strong evidence for its authenticity and credibility.

Theological and Homiletical Commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew. Specially designed and adapted for the Use of Ministers and Students. From the German of J. P. LANGE, D.D. By the Rev. ALFRED EDERSHEIM. Vol. I. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Charles Scribner. 1861. 8vo pp. 468. We have repeatedly spoken of the great value to ministers and students of this commentary of Dr. Lange, and are glad to welcome it in this well-executed translation. It forms the ninth volume of the Third Series of Clark's Foreign Theological Library, and embraces twelve chapters of Matthew's Gospel. Though Professor Lange has a passion for schematising, and is sometimes arbitrary and fanciful in his arrangements, yet he also understands the art of making a book for use. The commentary has uniformly, under each section, a threefold division, viz. exegetical, doctrinal and homiletical. The hints and theses for sermons are often excellent and suggestive. Many of them, to be sure, are better adapted to the German than the American pulpit, and it would have been well to have their place supplied by references to the English and Scotch discourses on the texts, for which abundant materials might easily have been gathered from Darling's Cyclopædia. But still we cannot expect all excellencies in one book, and are sure that our clergy will be profited by what they find here offered them. It combines advantages which no single commentary has heretofore had in so high a degree. Its success in Germany has been very great.

Commentary on the Epistles to the Seven Churches in Asia. Revelation II, III. By RICHARD CHENEVIX TRENCH, D.D. New York: Scribner. 1861. Pp. 312. Affluent learning, clear exposition, sober judgment, and orthodox interpretation distinguish the commentaries of the Dean of Westminster. This new exposition of a difficult yet attractive portion of the Apocalypse is among the very best of his works. Lectures delivered three times to the theological students of King's College formed the groundwork of the volume now published. It is fruitful in theological, as well as practical suggestions; it is eminently a thoughtful commentary. The Seven Churches are viewed as representations of churches in diverse spiritual conditions, and this diversity is found in all times. The author rightly rejects the predictive interpretation, which makes these epistles refer to seven ages of the church; an interesting excursus at the close of the volume gives the history of this method. He considers the "angels of the churches" as equivalent to bishops; but this point seems to us less thoroughly handled than most of the others. In agreement with the best interpreters he finds in the number 7 "the sign and signature of God's covenant relation to the world"; it being made up of 3, the sign of man, and 4, the world's number. On the novelty of the apocalyptic titles of Christ; on the originality of the promises contained in these epistles; on the symmetrical arrangement of the epistles, all being shaped on one model—the reader will find many profitable hints and germs of thought. To ministers and students, the work will be of great aid for private study and

public use. It is, as Dr. Trench says, a matter of regret, that in the daily service of the Episcopal Church, only two chapters of the Revelation and parts of others, are appointed to be read; and that "under no circumstances whatever can the second and third chapter be heard in the congregation". So much the more reason for preaching upon them.

Historical Lectures on the Life of our Lord Jesus Christ. By C. J. ELLICOTT, B.D., Prof. of Divinity, King's College, London. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1862. New York, for sale by Phinney, Blakeman & Mason. Pp. 382. The body of this valuable treatise is made up of the Hulsean Lectures for 1859, which are further illustrated by critical and historical notes. The lectures themselves give a simple, clear and full comment upon the chief events in the life of our Lord on earth, constituting in fact a harmony of the evangelists, in a form admirably adapted to impress and edify the reader. The life of Christ is exhibited in its unity, and in its main aspects and relations. The Hulsean Lecture, like the Bampton, has produced several remarkable theological works during the past few years, for example, those of Maurice and Trench; but no one of the series is so thorough, so conscientiously studied and well wrought out, as is this work of Dr. Ellicott. Already well known by his commentaries on the Pauline epistles, his reputation will be greatly enhanced by this new volume. It is intended in part to meet and rebut sceptical criticism, and infidel tendencies. The author justly sees and states, that the controversy about Christianity centres in the living person of Christ; that here is where all is to be won, or all is to be lost. He is familiar with the sweeping hypotheses of German infidelity, and with the fragmentary objections of a less scientific scepticism. His statements and combinations, even where the unlearned reader might least suspect it, are framed in view of the difficulties and alleged contradictions, urged by these critics. The notes contain ample and varied learning, compressed with much skill. The tone of the work is firm and thoroughly reverential, strictly adhering to the facts, and not allowing fancy to delineate unreal scenes for the sake of mere popular impression. We have long felt the need of just such a volume as this; it well supplies a desideratum in our theological and religious literature. Our ministers, teachers and theological students will find it to be the book they have often looked for in vain. It would have been a still better book, if the author had not been somewhat hampered by the form of the Lecture, if he could have thrown the most of his materials into the shape of a consecutive narrative.

Spots on the Sun. By Rev. T. M. HOPKINS, Geneva, N. Y. Rudd & Carleton, 1861. Pp. 367. This volume is chiefly made up of a series of papers upon some perplexing questions of interpretation. The narrative about Samson and his Foxes is explained by translating the Hebrew word *shoval*—bundle; so that the meaning is, that Samson took three hundred bundles of grain, and turned the sheaves tail to tail, and applied the torch. The Dial of Ahaz it is supposed may mean "a flight of stairs" (as Josephus renders it), used in some peculiar and unknown way to mark time. The Standing Still of the Sun is explained as a quotation from the book of Jasher. The other articles are on the Resurrection, the God-likeness in Man, the Inexorable Element in Law, and on the question Did Christ preach the whole Gospel? All imputation of sin is denied. The author has evidently given much attention to these topics, and writes in a spirit of earnest conviction. His book may stimulate the investigations of those who do not agree with all its conclusions.

ספר תהלים. *The Book of Psalms, in Hebrew and English, arranged in Parallelisms.* Andover: Draper. 1862. A very beautiful and useful book, accurately printed. The Hebrew text is that of Hahn; the parallelism, with few variations, is from Rosenmüller. The English text is from the common version, which fits the Hebrew with surprising accuracy. It is a *vade mecum* for the Hebrew student.

T H E O L O G Y.

Der Mensch, das Ebenbild Gottes (Man, the Image of God; his Relation to Christ and the World; an Essay on Primeval History). Von P. F. KEERL. Bd. I. Basel, 1861. 8vo, pp. 804. This volume, substantial though it be, is only introductory to the author's real theme—to exhibit man in his central position in creation. The three divisions of the volume are on the Whole Sphere of Creation, the Narrative of the Creation, and Paradise. It is a theosophy, highly speculative, yet also taking up the scientific questions raised by modern physical research. The general position of the work is, that the Bible contains the real philosophy of the natural, as well as of the spiritual world, and both in harmony, making one divine system. It develops views akin to those of Behmen, Steffens, and Schelling in his later works; also following out theories of Delitzsch, Kurtz and others. Every thing in nature confirms, he says, the central position of man in the universe. Our planetary system itself, as Herschel holds, is comparatively isolated. The surface of the earth, he maintains with Cuvier, experienced a violent revolution about 5,000 or 6,000 years since; in connection with this point he shows the inconsistencies of Bunsen and other Egyptologists. In his interpretation of the creation, he makes the six days' work to comprise the geological evolutions and revolutions, by which the world was shaped out of chaos—that chaos being the chemical elements held in solution—the elements, not of this world alone, but of the whole planetary system. The "waters above" are the substratum out of which the lights were formed in the vault of heaven. All the successive geological formations are described, showing the fruit of laborious studies. The geological fauna and flora were made on the first half of the third day; but our present fauna and flora came after another catastrophe. This catastrophe, namely, was brought about by the fall of Satan. The world as now constituted, was made in view of this fall, and for the reception of a race, that through Satan was to become apostate. Some of his other hypotheses are, that the fixed stars are the abode of the angels; that they consequently will not be destroyed at the last day; that the primeval Paradise (not the garden, but *in* the garden) and the Paradise at the end of all things, are in reality the same, etc. History at its end returns to its beginning. If any one wishes to see an examination of all the hypotheses about the primitive world, mingled with much speculation, he will be abundantly satisfied with the contents of this elaborate, yet somewhat fanciful work. And at the end he may be inclined to ask, Was the Bible really meant to teach us natural science?

Essais de Critique Religieuse. Par ALBERT RÉVILLE. 8o. Paris, 1860. Pp. 423. M. Réville is pastor of the Walloon Church in Rotterdam, and recognised as one of the ablest leaders of the liberal theological party. This volume consists of a collection of papers, previously published in periodicals, and devoted to questions of theological criticism. The tendency is in

many points kindred with that of the Oxford *Essays and Reviews*. The subjects discussed, eight in number, are, the Christian Church in the First two Centuries; the Epistle of Clement of Rome; Nero, the Anti-Christ; History of Dogmas; the Song of Songs; Legends of the Rhine; Theological Curiosities; Revival of Religious Studies in France (the latter including a criticism of Renan's Book of Job). In the essay on Nero the number 666 is referred to him thus: NRON KSR (Emperor)—the numerals for these letters in Hebrew making out by addition the sum total. The Epistle of Clement is recognised as coming from the last part of the first, or the beginning of the second century, and inferences are drawn from it adverse to the later pretensions of the Papacy. The Song of Songs is analyzed and commented on as a song of earthly love, falsely ascribed to Solomon. The discussions on early history and the history of dogmas are pervaded by a tendency adverse to the formulas of orthodoxy, which is also the strain of the long introduction, where the author defines his theological position.

Tracts for Priests and People. Cambridge. Macmillan & Co. 1861. This series of tracts was called out by the Oxford *Essays and Reviews*, to express the views of certain independent thinkers of the Church of England upon some of the questions raised by the Essays, and other topics of theological interest. The leading writers are Maurice, Hughes (author of *Tom Brown's School Days*), Davies, and others. The series, seven of which are before us, may perhaps be said to represent the views of the Broad Church in contrast with some of the positions of the Essays. The authors plead for manly and candid discussion, and deplore the violence with which the new latitudinarians have been assailed in certain quarters. They do not enter with any particularity into the questions of Biblical criticism; but rather seek to vindicate some of the general truths of the Christian system, as the Incarnation, the Trinity, the Atonement (in a modified sense, akin to Coleridge's views), and also to defend miracles and prophecy from objections. The subjects of the tracts already issued are: 1. *Religio Laici*, by Thomas Hughes, a manly and honest plea for freedom of discussion and for the essential truths of Christianity. 2. *The Mote and the Beam*; a Clergyman's Lessons from the Present Panic, by Rev. F. D. Maurice, enforcing the necessity of a more living belief in God and Christ. 3. *The Atonement, as a fact and as a theory*, by Rev. F. Garden: insisting on it as a sacrifice, and disclaiming the theory of satisfaction. 4. *The Signs of the Kingdom of Heaven*, by Rev. J. Llewellyn Davies: chiefly on miracles. 5. *Terms of communion*. 6. *On the Bishop of Oxford's Sermon on Revelation, a Dialogue* by J. M. Ludlow; and *Morality and Divinity*, by Maurice. 7. *Two Lay Dialogues, on laws of nature and the positive philosophy*, by J. M. Ludlow.

Debt and Grace, as Related to the Doctrine of a Future Life. By C. F. HUDSON. Fourth thousand. New York: Rudd & Carleton. 1861. Pp. 489. Is immortality, unending future existence, native to the human soul, or a gift of divine grace? Shall we say of the soul, (as Augustine said of the body) *posse non mori*; or *non posse mori*? Or, in other words—the other aspect of the same question—is the penalty of the law annihilation or endless pain? This is the question which Professor Hudson discusses with acuteness, learning, and zeal. He is by far the ablest and most plausible advocate of the doctrine of the annihilation of the wicked that has appeared, not only in this country but in the history of theology. His book is well arranged; its abundant learning is compressed; its statements

are clear; its arguments are often acute. He is weakest in the interpretation of Scripture, and strongest in advocating the hypothesis on which his interpretation is founded. If pain, suffering, is predicated in the Bible, as we think it unquestionably is, of the future and eternal punishment of the wicked, his argument falls to the ground. It all depends on the point, whether death, as a penalty, is equivalent to annihilation or to suffering. Death does not properly mean annihilation. Eternal death, as the opposite of eternal life, must mean pain rather than non-existence. Besides, we do not think that the argument for Christianity gains anything by the subversion of any of the recognised principles of natural theology. The sceptic will be very likely to adopt the arguments against native immortality, and infer that a superadded immortality is irrational and unnatural. Christ's teachings presuppose monotheism and immortality.

Sermons Preached in the Chapel of Harvard College. By JAMES WALKER, D.D. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1861. Pp. 397. Grave and elevated diction and a high moral and religious tone mark these discourses, by the late President of Harvard University. Dr. Walker is at once the most philosophical and one of the most conservative representatives of Unitarian divinity. To the students of the college he neither preached polemics nor denials nor doubts. Every sermon has a distinctly positive element and aim, even in those cases where we might look for opposition to orthodoxy; for example, on the Mediator, the Inward Manifestation of Christ, and the Day of Judgment, including the awards of eternity. We do not, of course, mean that he preached orthodox theology; but what he did preach is not incompatible for the most part with orthodox views. He seizes on the vital point of our controversies with infidelity, when he says, that "by recognising God in Christ we are naturally led to contemplate and approach the Infinite One under the aspect of his *personal* qualities and relations, by which we may hope that the strong pantheistic tendency of modern thought will be counteracted"; and hence infers "the necessity, and the *growing necessity*, of a Divine Mediator". Several of the discourses are direct refutations of infidel objections; most of them enforce moral duties from the highest ethical point of view. They must have been of eminent benefit to the students, and any one must be very spiritual or very bigoted who cannot derive from them instruction and religious improvement.

A Year of Church Work. By F. D. HUNTINGTON, D.D. Boston: Dutton & Co. 1861. This anniversary sermon, by the Rector of the Emmanuel Church, is not only an eloquent but also a most instructive discourse. The parochial work of this church seems to be thoroughly laid out and administered with system and zeal.

Natural and Revealed Theology. A System of Lectures. By JOHN L. BUTLER, D.D. Dover, N. H. 1861. 8vo. Pp. 456. *A History of the Free-Will Baptists.* By Rev. I. D. STEWART. Vol. I. From the year 1780 to 1830. Dover, 1862. Pp. 479. *Christian Baptism.* By G. H. BALL, of Buffalo, N. Y. Dover, 1860. Pp. 85. *The Free-Will Baptist Register*, No. XXX, for 1862. Dover, 1862. We have received these volumes through the courtesy of the Free-Will Baptist Printing Establishment, and have found in them honorable evidence of the progress of that denomination, which now numbers 1,285 churches, 1,219 preachers, and 58,055 communicants, about half of whom are in the New England States, and nearly one sixth part in New Hampshire alone. Practical religious zeal has always marked its ministers and churches, ever since Randall, its founder, was

ordained in New Durham in 1780. Their early history showed an excess of the voluntary principle and of mere individualism; but these deficiencies were combined with great energy and a disposition to labor for the common people, especially in rural districts. During the last thirty years their organisation and efficiency have greatly improved, and they have manifested a growing interest in the encouragement of learning and literature. Mr. Stewart's history has the air of a candid and truthful narration. The story is clearly and simply told, and the arrangement of the matter is good. It is made up, to a large extent, of personal and local incidents, which give variety to the narrative. As the first attempt at a complete history, it supplies materials from widely-dispersed sources, which are here fitly gathered up. And it is a valuable and instructive work, not only for Free-Will Baptists themselves, but also necessary for all who would acquaint themselves with the denominational history of our country. We have also been very much interested in reading the lectures of Dr. Butler, professor of theology in the Theological School at New Hampton, N. H. They embrace all the main points of theology in a natural and logical order. Without making any pretence to metaphysical refinement, the various doctrines are proved in a clear and candid style, and objections obviated in a lucid and common-sense manner. Though the author is, of course, an Arminian, he is neither captious nor bigoted. Some of his objections to Calvinism are evidently the result of misapprehension. He confounds hyper-Calvinism with Calvinism. Zealous as he is for free-will, he is a believer in native depravity as a moral corruption, and insists upon the necessity of divine grace in regeneration and sanctification. We are glad to see that he takes so high a view of the immutability of moral distinctions, discarding the utilitarian hypothesis. His views on the Atonement and the Trinity are much more orthodox than those advocated by some contributors to the last number of the *Free-Will Baptist Quarterly*. The little treatise on Baptism, by Mr. Hall, considers the duty, the act, and the subjects, in accordance with Baptist views, in a plain and practical method.

THE CHURCH AND ITS HISTORY.

König Friedrich Wilhelm IV und die Verfassung der Evangelischen Kirche. Von Dr. L. RICHTER. Berlin. Kings nowadays seldom write on church government. But the late Frederick William IV of Prussia was deeply interested in this subject, made it a constant topic of conversation and discussion, sent such books about it as pleased him (for example, Gladstone's *Church and State*, of which he set on foot the German translation) to the leading Prussian clergy, and also himself wrote largely on the question. Dr. Richter has edited and published a considerable portion of these studies. They indicate a thorough appreciation of the theme, a recognition of the difficulties that beset it, and an enthusiastic interest in the welfare of the church. Of the learning, the thoughtfulness, and the religious spirit of the king, they give convincing evidence. Though the topics, as here handled, hardly have much practical value in this country, yet some of his statements and positions are of deep interest to all who have at heart the welfare of the church.

"I intend," writes the king, February 23d, 1845, "to write down on these pages my convictions and knowledge about the constitution of the Evangelical Church. I do this with the serious feelings with which a will

is drawn up, for these thoughts are to be my legacy to the coming generations." "While there are now in this land many more persons than at the beginning of the century, who know that one thing is needful,—*the salvation of the soul*; there has yet hardly been a time in which the one thing needful *for the building up of the church* has been so little in men's hearts and minds as now." He then comments in strong terms on the lack of church feeling, "the churchlessness", of the general mind. "But, some one says to me, if thy episcopal rights weigh so heavily upon thee, why not throw them off? To which I reply: I long with all the powers of my soul for such a time . . . but this would not help the matter nor satisfy my conscience . . . (which, in ecclesiastical matters, is very sensitive)." "The State has, as it were, put into commission the episcopacy, which was excluded by the Reformation, and which was also an integral part of the old imperial system. The circumstances were then imperative and unavoidable. As a provisional arrangement, and so the reformers expressly regarded it, it was wise and good; but on this very account it is bad and unwise, when viewed as a permanent condition, as the real organisation of the church. The State must give back the episcopate which it has put into commission." But into whose hands and how? The bulk of the volume is taken up with this problem, without presenting any very satisfactory solution. The reorganisation is to include an episcopate (like the primitive), a true presbyterial constitution, and also a participation of the whole church, so far as practicable, in church affairs. The ideal of the king seems to be made up of a sort of compromise between the three leading forms of episcopacy, presbyterianism and congregationalism. The Lutheran system he evidently thinks to be the poorest of all. Some of his statements on these points are as follows: "At the risk of seeming bizarre and paradoxical, I declare that, in itself considered, I have nothing against *presbyters*, nothing against *bishops*, nothing against *consistories*; in truth I am a friend to all these, and consider them indispensable to the church; and yet I am a decided foe of all *presbyterial* constitution, of all *episcopal* constitution, of all *consistorial* constitution. Why? Because I see safety only in *churches* organised. Yes, *churches*. That is the one thing which the church needs, that she may *become, be, and remain a church*. Yes, *churches*! that is my constant and loud call to the evangelical church in Germany, which has no churches." "The true spirit is the chief thing. It can elevate the most corrupt constitution, and without it, the most ideal government is an empty form. But yet I am a decided and irreconcilable foe of the sad and frequent application of this phrase, now so common." "I confess that I dread episcopacy in its best present form, and yet I have said that I consider the episcopacy indispensable. . . . The Romanizing Britons are quite right when they say that in the Apostolic times there was no church without a bishop, and that the apostles set bishops in office with the laying on of hands. But they err, I hope unwittingly, when they say that the bishopric of York, and of Durham is the same as the church of Jerusalem, of Ephesus, etc., in the time of the apostles. They are suspiciously silent about the episcopacy of the middle ages, as being the episcopate which has really come down to our times." "The Reformed (Presbyterian) church has a real organisation, while the Lutheran church has as many constitutions as there are countries and provinces in which it is found; in other words, it has no organisation. . . . A Reformed church consists of two main parts, the ecclesiastical senate or clergy and the people. But the clergy is divided into three parts, pastors, presbyters (elders), and deacons. The first have the care of souls, the second of morals, the third of the poor. The people are represented

in the church by the heads of families." He eloquently defends the universal priesthood of believers: "There cannot possibly be in the church a special priesthood". "The apostles distributed the members of the church, who are all priests, into three orders, that of *elders*, that of *deacons*, and that of the *congregation*." He compares these to the circulation of the blood: "The elders are the veins that carry the blood to the heart; the deacons divide the blood in the heart; the congregation constitute the arteries by which life streams from the heart to the whole body". He concludes with an earnest appeal: "Does not the history of our land, our growth, our fall, our resurrection, our thirty years of peace, but above all else, does not our very element of life, the Reformation, call out to us, that God is with us! Yes, God is with us! Amen."

History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ. By Dr. J. A. DORNER. Division Second, from the End of the Fourth Century to the Present Time. Vol. I. Translated by Rev. D. W. SIMON. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Charles Scribner. 1861. 8vo. Pp. 456. The publication of this volume labors under the disadvantage which will however be soon remedied, of introducing the reader to the middle of the "development" before he has seen its initial germs. The first part is to be translated by Dr. Lindsay Alexander. The whole work will make about six volumes of Clark's Library. Of its great value it is now in almost superfluous to speak. When it first appeared in the form of articles a review, the German theological and philosophical public was at the height of the conflict with the Hegelian dialectics, which presupposed that the highest always came last in order, and which assailed the faith of the Church in the specific and unmatched dignity of the Person of our Lord. Historical criticism was striving to substantiate this philosopheme, and to do away with the primitive testimony to the person of the Godman. Dr. Dörner took up this historical line of argument, and met and rebutted the criticisms of the destructive school point by point, and step by step. His articles in the *Tübingen Zeitschrift*, 1835-6, were enlarged, and in 1839 issued in a volume of 555 pages. Meanwhile the controversy ran on, and the slender book expanded to two thick octavos (1845-53) of more than 1600 pages, which develop the marvellous history of this central doctrine of the Christian faith in a true philosophical method, combined with the most indefatigable research. The late Dr. Baur elaborated the whole subject in his *History of the Trinity and the Incarnation*, 3 vols. 1841-3; and the last edition of Dörner has constant respect to the destructive methods and inferences of this head of the modern school of Tübingen. The substance of the whole matter, and all its ramifications, are comprised in these remarkable volumes. They are among the ripest fruits of modern German theological science. Scholars will welcome them; and no one can say that he is really conversant with the history of doctrines until he has mastered this work. The volume now issued begins with the Council of Constantinople, A.D. 381, and conducts us through the scholastic refinements of the Thomists and Scotists, to the borders of the Reformation. It appears to be conscientiously, if not elegantly translated. E. g., p. 24: "It was reserved for the Reformation to bring the unio hypostatica to a crisis,—the effect of which was the more decided appropriation of the Divine Person to the human nature, and the revindication to the unity, of the sphere of the natures, their powers and their attributes (idiomata)."

History of the Modes of Christian Baptism. By Rev. JAMES CRYSTAL. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1861. Pp. 324. For sale in New

York by Phinney, Blakeman & Mason. The author is a member of the Episcopal church, and his object is to vindicate the position "that Christ enjoined trine immersion." The preference expressed for this mode of baptism by the rubric of the Anglican church, he thinks is well founded in Scripture and Christian antiquity. Incidentally he shows that the Antipædobaptist sects have no proper "baptismal succession". The volume contains much of curious research, and is valuable for its collection of testimonies from the most ancient writers down to the divines of the English church. But we hardly think the proof satisfactory, that either Christ or the apostles enjoined or practised trine immersion. Still less can we see any such vital connection, as the author seems to suppose, between trine immersion and the abolition of heresy and schism. Though the main postulate and the chief inference of the book are not established, yet, as a collection of materials, it has an interest for students of theology.

A Text-Book of the History of Doctrines. By Dr. K. R. HAGENBACH, Prof. in Basle. The Edinburgh translation revised, with large Additions from the fourth German edition and other Sources. By HENRY B. SMITH. Vol. II. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1862. 8vo, pp. 560. This volume completes the American edition of Hagenbach's invaluable work. To the latter portion of the history Hagenbach made large additions in his fourth edition, all of which are here for the first time translated, together with much matter from Baur, Neander, and others. Besides this, the American editor has added several entirely new sections, amounting in all to some sixty pages on the German Reformed Theology; the School of Saumur; Theology and Philosophy in England and Scotland; English Deism; and Theology and Philosophy in the United States. The literature of English and American theology, including all the different denominations, is quite fully collected. A copious Index facilitates the use of this manual.

A Text-Book of Church History. By Dr. JOHN C. L. GIESELER. Vol. IV. Pp. 598. Translated by HENRY B. SMITH. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1862. This volume of Gieseler contains the history of the Reformation and its results, A.D. 1517-1648. Only a small portion of it is comprised in Clark's Edinburgh edition. It is one of the most elaborate, though in this country and in England least known, portions of Gieseler's great work. The history of the theological conflicts of the Reformation is written with unusual impartiality and accuracy. None of our current ecclesiastical histories go over this ground so fully and thoroughly. Of the great value of Gieseler's history the verdict is unanimous among all scholars. It is indispensable as a guide, and it has the rank of an authority.

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

The Puritans; or the Church, Court, and Parliament of England, during the Reigns of Edward VI and Queen Elizabeth. By SAMUEL HOPKINS. Vol. III. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon. 1861. 8vo, pp. 675. The typographical elegance of this volume predisposes the reader to a favorable judgment. The labor of years, too, is here completed—years of careful and conscientious research, well spent in the preparation of an attractive work, upon a noble theme, with which the author is in the fullest sympathy. And the interest deepens to the close. Some of the points to which sundry critics objected in the earlier volumes, particularly the free use of the imaginative and dramatic element, are sensibly ameliorated in the progress of the narrative. But those parts which are most

strictly historical are enlivened by the author's undoubted skill in portraying characters, and marshalling events in the most impressive manner. Old facts receive the heightened interest of novelty from their new juxtapositions. The faithful researches of Mr. Hopkins have enabled him to correct many errors into which his predecessors had fallen: and he has also availed himself of some new ms. materials, partly derived from the collections of Dr. Waddington, illustrating the rise of Independency. That portion of this volume devoted to the trial of Barrow, Greenwood, and Penry, not only presents the facts with a more thorough sifting of the evidence than ever before, but contains scenes and descriptions of the most affecting interest. Twenty years of the struggle of people, parliament, and court, pass in review. Among the leading topics are the famous controversy between Travers and Richard Hooker; the Babington Conspiracy of 1586; the *Annus Mirabilis*, 1666, comprising a vivid sketch of the Spanish Armada and its dispersion; the Martin Mar-Prelate tracts; the divine right of bishops, well ventilated; the Cartwright controversy; the discussions on the Sabbath; a full account of the successive Parliaments and their doings, successfully vindicating the policy of the Puritans. The closing scenes of the life of Elizabeth have the interest of a romance; the summary of her character is full and candid. She is relieved from the odium of being privy to many of the persecutions set on foot by her constitutional advisers, and kept from her knowledge. Mr. Hopkins lays more stress upon the complicity of the wife of the Earl of Leicester in his sudden death, than the facts seem to us to warrant. On other points of criticism there will be differences of judgment. The advocates of prelacy will hardly be satisfied with the tone of the book. But the descendants of the Puritans will find their faith confirmed and enlightened by the truthful descriptions of the conflicts and sufferings of their sires in behalf of civil and religious freedom. The whole work is a consecutive argument for the principles which lie at the foundation of our republic. It deserves a liberal patronage. It is well worthy of a place in our public and private libraries. Read these volumes, if you would understand the real history of Puritanism.

The Constitutional History of England, since the Accession of George Third. 1760-1860. By THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, C.B. The first volume of this valuable history is just reprinted by Crosby & Nichols, of Boston, in the same excellent style as their reprint of Hallam. Although, as the author remarks, the accession of George III presents no natural boundary in constitutional history, no one can survey the last hundred years without seeing that questions of the utmost importance have been practically decided. The freedom of the press, the rights of the crown, religious liberty, the relation of England to her colonies, the revenues, India. We can indeed only begin to enumerate the subjects which attract and repay the student of constitutional history. Some of the topics which Mr. May specially considers in this volume are, the influence of the crown under the various circumstances in which it was found, such as the regency, the minority or incapacity of the Sovereign; the Revenues of the Crown; the House of Lords; the House of Commons; and the relation of Parliament to the Crown, the law, and the people. These subjects are discussed with great fairness, but with a thorough conviction in favor of the beneficial effect of the development of popular liberty.

Another volume will comprise a history of party; of the press, and political agitation; of the Church, and of civil and religious liberty; and a general view of English legislation, its policy and results.

Leben und ausgewählte Schriften, etc., (Lives and Select Writings of the Fathers and Founders of the Lutheran Church). With an Introduction by Dr. K. J. NITZSCH. III. *Melanchthon*, von Dr. C. SCHMIDT. VII. *Urbanus Rhegius*, von Dr. G. UHLBORN. Elberfeld. 1861. The success of Hagenbach's series upon the Founders of the Reformed Church has doubtless had its influence upon this corresponding project in respect to the Lutheran. The whole series will comprise eight volumes; I. II., Luther by Schneider; IV. Bugenhagen by Vogt; V. Osiander by Lehnerdt; VI. Brenz by Hartman; VIII. Various biographies, among them Speratus, Jonas, Chemnitz, Chytræus, etc. The volumes are well got up, and very cheap; Melanchthon, for example, a thick volume of over 700 pages, with an excellent portrait, costing only one and a half thalers. And it is altogether the most thorough and complete view of the life and works of the great *Præceptor Germaniæ*, which has yet been published, much superior to the work of Galle, and more complete than any of the monographs which appeared in 1859, in celebration of the ter-centenary of the Reformer's decease. Rothe's address on this occasion was translated in a previous number of this Review. Dr. Schmidt has performed his task with great skill and fidelity, with minuteness, even, of investigation and description. The volume on Urbanus Rhegius, introduces the English reader to a part of the Reformation with which he is less familiar than with the words and deeds of Melanchthon. Rhegius labored at first in Southern Germany, Innthal and Augsburg, and was involved in the Sacramentarian and Anabaptist disputes; then he became efficient in preaching the reformation and organizing the churches in the North, at Celle, Lüneburg, Hanover, and other places. He was born in 1489. It is a curious fact that his son, who wrote his memoir, was undoubtedly incorrect in saying that the family name was *König*, and that, out of modesty, he latinized it as *Rhegius*, instead of *Rex*. The family name is shown by Uhlborn to have been *Rieger*. He died in 1536. His seal bore the motto: *Christus mundum transigit*.

Memoirs and Reminiscences of the late Prof. GEORGE BUSH. Edited by W. M. FERNALD. Boston: Otis Clapp. 1860. Pp. 408. Professor Bush was born in Norwich, Vt., 1796; was graduated at Dartmouth College, 1818; studied theology at Princeton; became Professor of Hebrew in New York, 1831; embraced Swedenborgianism in 1845; and died in 1859. He was an enthusiastic scholar, a popular author, a lovely and genial man. His ardent and versatile temperament led him to frequent changes of opinion; but no one ever doubted that he was conscientious in his convictions, and willing to make any sacrifice for the cause of truth. His life was the life of a scholar. In 1832 he published the *Life of Mohammed*; in 1838 a treatise on the Millennium, as already past; in 1834, parts of a Commentary on the Psalms; 1835, a Hebrew Grammar, simple and valuable; Scriptural Illustrations, 1836; Commentaries on Genesis to Judges, in 1840 and subsequent years; the Hierophant, 1844; his Anastasis, 1845, aroused a long controversy; Valley of Vision, 1844. Among his Swedenborgian works are Statement of Reasons; Letters to a Trinitarian; Memorabilia; Mesmer and Swedenborg (a partial defence of Mesmerism, giving rise to a long discussion with Tayler Lewis, about the "Poughkeepsie seer," Davis, etc.); a Reply to Dr. Woods on Swedenborgianism; New Church Miscellanies; New Church Repository, 8 vols.; Priesthood and the Clergy unknown to Christianity, 1857, which excited commotion among the Swedenborgians. Mr. Fernald's Memoir consists to a great extent of letters and contributions from friends of the deceased, viz. Rufus Choate, W. B. Hayden, N. F. Cabell, Dr. Bellows, and many others. These are all interesting, and in-

crease our regard for the man in his personal relations. But the scholar needs, and we trust will have, a more permanent tribute to his acquirements and worth.

Bunsen's Bibelwerk, von B. BAEHRING. Leips. 1861. *Bunsen als Staatsmann und Schriftsteller*, von H. GELZER. Gotha. 1861. Both pastor Baehring and jurist Gelzer are the eulogists of the ardent and versatile Bunsen. The former discusses, in over 100 pages, the importance of his Bible-work to the present times, anticipating the most desirable and needed results from his combination of free criticism with reverence to the revelation. Herr Gelzer's pamphlet is an obituary address, and gives an interesting picture of the life and services of Bunsen as a statesman and an author. Both are valuable tributes to the memory of a great man, whose half-truths will be forgotten when his inspiring faith in Christ and in the future destiny of the race will still be stimulating others to noble thoughts and deeds.

BOOKS OF TRAVEL.

The Okavango River; A Narrative of Travel, Exploration, and Adventure. By CHARLES JOHN ANDERSSON. New York: Harpers. 1861. Pp. 414. The travels and adventures of the famous Swedish explorer, narrated in this finely illustrated volume, were in the years 1858-60, to the west of Dr. Livingstone's course, ranging from 22° to 17° south latitude. The party of eleven were well provided with all the necessary means and materials, including oxen, donkeys, sheep, goats, and dogs. Delayed by rain, and impeded by jungles, their course was toilsome and slow. They were alternately deluged by the rain, and suffering from extreme thirst. One horse went seven days without water; and some of the men became speechless from thirst. The most exciting parts of the narrative are the descriptions of elephant hunting. On one occasion Andersson "bagged" two monstrous fellows, and had the satisfaction "of breakfasting on an elephant's foot, done under the ashes, and a dish of honey—a meal fit for a king". The chief result of the expedition was the discovery of the Okavango River, running eastward to the heart of the continent. Sickness prevented Mr. Andersson from completing his explorations. The work is issued in handsome style, and is a valuable addition to the remarkable series of works on the African regions, published by the Harpers, now numbering 14 volumes, including Anderson's previous work, on Lake Ngami and Southwestern Africa; Livingstone's and Cumming's South Africa; Burton, Barth and Du Chaillu on Central and North Africa; Davis's Carthage; Wilson's Western Africa; and Ellis and Pfeiffer on Madagascar.

The Last Travels of Ida Pfeiffer; inclusive of a Visit to Madagascar. With an Autobiographical Memoir of the author. Translated by H. W. DULCKEN. New York: Harpers. 1861. Pp. 281. With a portrait of Madame Pfeiffer. The autobiographical sketch of the most extraordinary female traveller of modern times is full of interest. Her son, Oscar, prepared with filial care her last manuscripts for the press. They include sketches of visits in various parts of Germany, Holland, England, France, and the Mauritius. But the most novel part has respect to the island of Madagascar, its scenery, towns, morals, and manners, under the late king. The change of dynasty, and the probable reintroduction of Christianity will attract general attention to this portion of Madame Pfeiffer's work. She was a very "strong-minded" woman, of indefatigable perseverance, with a clear head, sharp eye, and a passionate interest in all classes of human society, and all the phases of human life.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

Lectures on the English Language. By GEORGE P. MARSH. First Series. Fourth Edition, revised and enlarged. New York: Charles Scribner. 1860. 8vo, pp. 715. Of this noble contribution to the history of the English language and literature, we gave a full account in the first volume of this Review. It has been welcomed by the public, both in this country and in England, with a cordiality in some good degree proportioned to its merits. In this fourth edition numerous minor errors are corrected, and some twenty pages of illustrative citations and proofs are appended, fortifying particular statements. These give new evidence of the careful learning and research of the author. It is universally conceded, that his attainments in this branch of literature are unrivalled in this country, and second to few, if any, in the mother country. His admirable course of lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute in Boston, is promised as a second series; and we trust that his position as the honored minister of our country at Turin may not long defer the publication of the volume. This course had particular reference to the history of the English language, and its lexical and grammatical changes, including its literary capabilities and adaptations. Wherever the English language is thoroughly studied, at home or in college classes, the work of Mr. Marsh must also be studied.

Bibliotheca Orientalis. Manuel de Bibliographie Orientale. Par J. M. ZENGLER. Vol. II. Leipzig: Engelmann. 1861. An invaluable bibliographical work, though somewhat costly — \$5 for this second volume. It contains a supplement to Vol. I. (Arabic, Persian, Turkish literature); the literature of the Christian East — seven lists of works on bibliography, literary history, lexicons, grammars, chrestomathies, versions, etc.; the Literature of India, of the Parsees, of Indo-China and Malasia, of China and Japan, Maudchu, Mongolia and Thibet. A third volume will give the works on the geography, history and philosophy of the East; a fourth, projected, is to contain extracts and translations.

The British Poets. Little, Brown & Company still continue the publication of their beautiful edition of the British Poets, and have just brought out the works of LORD BYRON in ten volumes. This makes a hundred and twenty volumes of the series, already published. A few more — Chaucer among them, are yet to come in order to complete the imperial list from Chaucer to Wordsworth. The whole will form an edition more elegant, more complete and cheaper than has ever before appeared. A generous and philosophical criticism regards the poets not merely as giving us individual pictures of life, or evanescent images of beauty, but as, in some sense, intellectual representations of the ages in which they lived. The poetry of Lord Byron, and the same may be said of Scott — breathes largely the spirit of his time — its restlessness, its fire, its energy, its love of strong sensation, its passion, its recklessness, its power and habit of thought. The natural and artificial scenery of the age is caught and reflected by his mirror. It shows also, we must acknowledge, the wild, unsubdued, and to a certain extent, irreligious spirit of a clique or a class. The faults of his poetry are too well known to need pointing out. In spite of them, though never so popular as once, his works will live. Though their light is not always pure, they have taken their place among the constellations.

Lessons in Life. By TIMOTHY TRICOMB. Seventh Edition. New York: Scribner. 1861. Pp. 844. The seventh edition, or seventh thousand, to which this finely printed book ran in two or three weeks, in such times as these, attests the wide popularity of Dr. Holland's writings. He talks in a

natural, forcible, and picturesque way about matters which interest everybody ; e. g. moods and phases of mind, bodily imperfections and impediments, the rights of woman, undeveloped resources, men of one idea, proper people and perfect people, half finished work, and the like. He is a kind of lay-preacher on the morals and manners of life, to our young men and women. It is a good sign that so healthful a writer is so popular.

Elijah, a Sacred Drama, and other Poems. By ROBERT DAVIDSON, D.D. New York: Scribner. 1860. This collection is beautifully printed on tinted paper, and chiefly devoted to Scriptural and religious themes, made more attractive to many minds in the form of verse. A new version of the *Dies Iræ* is one of the minor poems. Several of the notes show that the author is a scholar as well as a devotee of the muses.

The Partisan Leader. By BEVERLY TUCKER, of Virginia. New York: Rudd & Carleton. 1861. Pp. 892. This work is reissued as "a Key to the Disunion Conspiracy". It was originally printed in Washington, by Duff Green, in 1836, and issued in two volumes with the anticipated date of 1856, under the name of Edward William Sidney. Written by a disciple of Calhoun, its object was to foment the project of a Southern Confederacy. Its appearance was in the midst of the Jackson and Calhoun imbroglio. What is remarkable about it is, that slavery is not introduced as the cause or occasion of the projected revolt. That line of policy had not then been adopted ; Southern statesmen and Christians were not yet ripe for the advocacy of that "institution" as the corner-stone of a republic. Apart from this political object, the tale has many features of novelty and interest, though not the highest order of literary merit.

The Cloister and the Hearth ; or Maid, Wife and Widow. A Novel. By CHARLES READE. New York: Rudd & Carlton. 1861. Four English volumes are compressed into this single volume, and sold for 75 cents. For these times of war, this novel has had "a great run", having already reached a sale of 8000 copies. One of the author's previous works is wrought into it, with a change of plan. The well-known characteristics of Mr. Reade, his vivacity and descriptive talent, his capital conversations and sharp delineations of character, are as prominent as ever ; while there is a manifest advance in the management of the plot and the shaping of the materials. It is at once his largest and his best work.

The Silver Cord. A Novel. By SHIRLEY BROOKS. New York: Harpers. 1861. 75 cents. The interest of the reader is kept perpetually alive by the skill with which Mr. Brooks handles the details of the mysterious separation of a young husband and his fair wife, until they are reconciled and reunited. The characters are skilfully portrayed. The volume is illustrated with spirited sketches.

Notice to Quit. By W. G. WILLS. New York: Harpers. 50 cents. Pp. 156. The singular title of this interesting novel refers to the summons of death made upon the hero after a life spent in the search for money and honor. When worldly prosperity is attained, he finds that a disease of the heart leaves him but a short lease of life. Variety is given to the tale by the description of scenes and events connected with the progress of modern social life. The moral tone is unexceptionable.

Streaks of Light ; or Fifty-two Facts from the Bible for the Fifty-two Sundays of the Year. New York: Harpers. 1862. Pp. 843. This beautiful volume by the author of "The Peep of Day", etc., is just the book for a New Year's gift to children.

The Eclectic Magazine of Foreign Literature. W. H. BIDWELL, editor and proprietor. The January number is adorned with two striking prints, one of Trumbull's Battle of Bunker Hill, engraved by Perine in a very spirited style. The other is Sartain's plate, executed with his usual skill, of the Wife of Bunyan interceding for his Release from Prison. The Hon. Edward Everett also contributes a finished sketch of the Battle of Bunker Hill. The selections of this number, twenty-three in all, are exceedingly well made, and such as to interest all classes of readers. There is no better miscellany for the family circle.

Harper's New Monthly Magazine is now in its twenty-fourth volume; for twelve years it has furnished the greatest variety of entertainment, including an abundance of excellent illustrations, at a wonderfully cheap rate. The number for January, 1862, has, among other illustrated articles, Bayard Taylor's Franconian Switzerland; Lossing's United States Navy; continuations of Trollope's Orley Farm and Thackeray's Adventures of Philip; and a variety of minor articles.

POLITICAL AND CIVIL QUESTIONS.

Our Country and the Church. By N. L. RICE, D.D. New York: Scribner. 1861. There are four positions, from which ministers may make their election, in respect to our national government in its present unprecedented trials. They may be openly patriotic; or, they may be outspoken for secession; or, they may be indifferent and silent; or, they may judge that they ought not to say anything about it, and then preach about it. The last is the position of Dr. Rice. As a preacher of the Gospel he takes the attitude of neutrality—the same attitude which England has professed to take. This might be pardonable in a foreigner, but we hardly expected it of a prominent minister of New York. His sermons contain, of course, many sensible observations, and just criticisms on some of our national sins. But he talks of slavery tenderly, and against abolitionism earnestly. The central idea of his discourses, that ministers and churches, as such, should have nothing to say in the great pending conflict, is one which no logical skill can make to be plausible. Can the church be rightfully indifferent to the question of loyalty or disloyalty? If it can—on what grounds? Dr. Rice's answer is: "That ministers and churches, as such, cannot settle those moral questions, which depend upon secular, civil and political questions". And as they cannot "settle" them, he implies that they have nothing to do with them. But the principle is false, and the conclusion pernicious. What is to be said about Sunday laws? about gambling? about immoral spectacles and games? about intemperance? about the death penalty? about the slave trade? about polygamy? These are all "moral" questions, which the church cannot "settle"; and they may all depend, and have often depended upon "secular, civil and political questions". And yet Dr. Rice would doubtless grant that in all these cases, the church has a right to speak, that it is its duty to take sides. That is, his assumed principle is no principle at all in application to any of these moral questions. It is a principle framed for a special use, to be applied to the present conflict. And how is it there applied? He says, that the question of "allegiance" is one depending on the interpretation of the Constitution, about which good intelligent men may differ. But this is the case in almost all civil wars. It was just so in the time of the Revolution. Ought ministers and churches to have kept silent then? If not, why now? His doctrine seems to us to amount

to this, that as long as a government is in no sort of danger, the church may uphold it; but when there is organised opposition by "intelligent" and "moral" men, the church is to keep silent. When her help is most needed she is to be impotent. When her influence is not needed, she may lift up her voice and cry aloud in the streets. When there is no conspiracy, and no rebellion — ministers may preach against conspiracy and rebellion; when conspiracy is doing its foulest work, and rebellion assumes an armed and defiant front, ministers and churches must retire from the scene, and say nothing, or say something on both sides. When everybody is loyal, the church may pass patriotic resolutions; when disloyalty threatens the very life of a nation, the church must suppress all resolutions and stifle all discussion. Loyalty in the abstract is all right; but loyalty in the concrete may be inconvenient. It is our duty to pray for our rulers, and to submit to the powers that be; only we must be very careful not to do it, when the rulers are in danger, and when the powers ordained of God are threatened with extermination. Dr. Rice says very truly: "In what I have said concerning the troubles, and the proper position of the church with reference to them, I have taken neither the Southern nor the Northern view". Neither the Southern, nor the Northern view! He is *on* Mason's and Dixon's line.

Woman's Rights under the Law. In Three Lectures, delivered in Boston, Jan. 1861. By CAROLINE H. DALL. Boston: Walker, Wise & Co. 1861. Pp. 164. For sale in New York, by Jas. Miller, 522 Broadway. Whatever theory may be held about the rights of woman in the abstract, no one who reads this volume with care can deny, that there are many legislative wrongs to which she is still subject in the most enlightened countries. The facts as here brought out in relation to French and English legislation, and to the laws of some of our own States, give abundant evidence, that those who differ on the propriety of conceding to woman some civil privileges, (for example, that of suffrage) may yet agree in the desire and effort to have the relics of barbarism effaced from the statute-books. The author writes in a forcible and nervous style.

A Letter on the National Currency, addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury. By ELEAZAR LORD. New York: Randolph. Pp. 24. Mr. Lord, whose services in respect to the banking system of the State of New York are well known, in this able and comprehensive Letter, advocates the necessity of establishing a national currency, secured against great fluctuations, uniformly current in the country at par value. He contends, that a purely metallic currency cannot secure these results; nor yet a currency of coin and paper conjoined, redeemable in coin. The true system, he argues, is that of national treasury notes, on the basis of national stock, made a legal tender in all payments. It differs from the plan of the Secretary of the Treasury, in that the latter contemplates the redemption of the secured notes by specie. Mr. Lord's suggestions as to the state of things after the close of the present war are forcibly put, and entitled to great weight.

Slavery and Secession in America, Historical and Economical. By THOS. ELLISON, F.S.S. London: Sampson, Low & Co. 1861. Pp. 369. This volume is evidently the fruit of much research, and its sympathies are with the Free States, though its prognostics are somewhat doubtful. The author adheres closely to the economical standpoint; and the moral impression is chiefly derived from the cogency of the facts in favor of freedom. Not always accurate in minor details, and often careless in style, the general impression is still sound and healthful. The first Part recounts the Rise and Progress of Slavery; the second Part exhibits the growth of

the Secession Movement; the third Part compares Free and Slave Institutions, as seen in the Northern and Southern States respectively. The history includes three months of President Lincoln's administration. The Appendix has the Constitutions of the United States and of the Confederacy, and various public documents.

Among the addresses and discourses, called forth by the present state of our national affairs, is a philosophical and eloquent exposition of the true idea of the Free Christian State in relation to the present struggle, by GEORGE L. PRENTISS, D.D., of New York, delivered before the Association of the Alumni of Bowdoin College; a sermon preached on the day of the national Fast, by Prof. R. D. HITCHCOCK, D.D., on our National Sin of materialism, full of forcible thoughts and suggestions couched in a felicitous diction; a patriotic and sharp oration on Patriotism and the Slaveholders' Rebellion, by C. S. HENRY, D.D.; an able sermon on the Offered National Regeneration, by Rev. GEORGE LEON WALKER, pastor of the State street church, Portland, Me.; a vigorous Thanksgiving Sermon, by Rev. H. N. DUNNING, of Gloversville, N. Y.; a calm and thorough review of the crisis, by DAVID MAGIE, D.D., of Elizabeth, N. J., in a Thanksgiving sermon. These discourses all recognise in slavery the root of bitterness, the real cause and origin of our calamities, the great sin of our nation. The immediate occasion of the rupture was the loss of political power on the part of the South and its leaders, whose motto seems to have been: *Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo*. But yet the real cause was in the ambitious project to form a separate government, based on slavery, urged on by both envy and hatred of the free and growing North. But while conceding all this, hardly any of the above discourses recommend universal emancipation as the rightful battle-cry of the nation; they rather insist upon it, that, as it is a war under and for the Constitution, so it must be a constitutional war. Otherwise,—if we ourselves transcend and violate the Constitution, there remains no justifiable legal, political ground, upon which we can seek to bring back the revolted States to their allegiance. The only ground on which we are justified in doing this is the constitutional compact. That defines and prescribes our rights, our duties, and their limitation. It does not give to the general government the power of abolishing the institution of slavery in any State, or of making void its laws on this subject. All the power that we have over slavery is incidental to the war power, and has relation solely to the rebellious. A rebel, by being a rebel, forfeits his right to life and property. The national government can rightfully confiscate all his property, and appropriate it to the public use. Slaves, which he may hold as property under local laws, can also be confiscated. And this, in effect, insures their freedom, because our government could never dispose of them as chattels personal; it has no right to be buying or selling slaves. The extent to which this expedient of confiscation may be resorted to is a question simply of political necessity and wisdom in the conducting of the war. We shall have questions and difficulties enough about those slaves who may thus be thrown upon the care of our government, without resorting to any sweeping and indiscriminating decree of universal emancipation, which, besides, would make the subjugation and final reconciliation of the Slave States well nigh a physical impossibility.

Statistics and News of Churches and Missions.

A PROFESSOR in the University of Berlin makes the following estimates about the population of the globe :

Population of Europe, 272,000,000; of Asia, 720,000,000; of America, 200,000,000; of Africa, 89,000,000; of Australia, 2,000,000. Total population of the globe, 1,283,000,000. The average number of deaths per annum, in certain places where records are kept, is about one to every forty inhabitants. At the present time the number of deaths in a year would be about 32,000,000, which is more than the entire present population of the United States. At this rate the average number of deaths per day is about 87,761, the average per hour, 3,653, the average per minute, 61. Thus, at least, every second a human life is ended. As the births considerably exceed the deaths, there are probably 70 or 80 human beings born per minute.

The Cost of War.—The following table exhibits the population of the principal countries of Europe, with the amount of their armies in time of war, and the proportions of these armies to the population, the last column showing the average number of inhabitants it takes to support one soldier in the field :

	<i>Population.</i>	<i>Army.</i>	<i>Average.</i>
Austria,.....	35,000,000	680,000	55
Spain,.....	15,000,000	280,000	61
France,.....	36,000,000	515,000	70
Holland,.....	3,500,000	60,000	58
Prussia,.....	18,000,000	375,000	48
Russia,.....	72,000,000	800,000	90

From this table, which is taken

from the most accurate sources, it will be seen that the lowest ratio—that of Russia—is one soldier to 90 inhabitants; and the highest—that of Prussia—one soldier to 48 inhabitants.

LONDON contains a population of 2,950,000; Paris, 1,525,525; St Petersburg, 494,656; Vienna, 476,222; Berlin, 438,961; Naples, 413,920; Madrid, 301,660; Lisbon, 275,286; Brussels, 268,481; Amsterdam, 248,656; Rome, 180,359; Turin, 179,658; Hamburg, 171,696; Copenhagen, 113,685; Venice, 118,172; Dresden, 117,750; Munich, 114,734; Stockholm, 101,502.

The Evangelical Alliance.—The fifth anniversary of this conference closed its session at Geneva, Switzerland, on the 12th of September, having been together for twelve days. The several meetings were attended by crowded houses. It is believed that nearly two thousand strangers visited Geneva during the Conference. The hospitality of the Genevese was unbounded. Many of the evening meetings, at the residences of gentlemen in the vicinity of the city, were attended by delegates from all parts of the world. At the house of Col. Troncher, the great friend of the Bible cause, some eighty persons were present, and excellent speeches made. At one of the public meetings, toward the close, four hours were devoted to the civil war in this

country, and the following resolution was adopted:

"The Conference of Evangelical Christians, assembled at Geneva from various countries, desire hereby to convey to their brethren of the United States of America, an expression of deep sympathy under the sad and terrible crisis in which they are now placed; they would unite in earnest and persevering prayer that this calamity may be overruled by God to the furtherance of the interests of humanity, of the cause of freedom, and of our common Christianity. Impressed with the conviction that the origin of this war is to be traced to slavery, the Conference would entreat Almighty God to dispose the hearts of his own people in America to use the means dictated by wisdom and Christian principle for the speedy and complete suppression of a system alike opposed to the spirit of the Gospel, and to the peace, prosperity, and progress of that great people. And whereas our brethren of the United States have appointed Thursday, the 26th inst., as a day of special humiliation and prayer, this Conference earnestly invite their fellow-Christians of various countries to unite with the brethren there before the throne of grace in humiliation and prayer, remembering the words of Scripture: If one member suffer, all the members suffer with it."

UNITED STATES.—*Anniversary of the American Board*—Cleveland, Ohio, Oct. 1st, 1861.—The annual sermon was preached by Dr. Storrs, of Brooklyn.

Six persons have entered upon the missionary work for the first time within the year; and seven have returned to the fields which they had previously occupied. Eleven persons are under appointment.

The entire income of the year has been as follows, to wit: Ordinary donations, \$283,186.87; legacies, \$52,537.19; other sources, 4,808.50; making a total of \$340,522.56; of which \$7,629.27 were contributions

to the "Mission School Enterprise". The expenditures have been \$369,874.29. As the balance in the treasury, August 1st, 1860, was \$1,466.19, the present financial year commenced with a debt of \$27,885.54.

MISSIONS.

Number of Missions.....	20
Stations.....	118
Out-stations.....	171

LABORERS EMPLOYED.

Number of ordained missionaries (seven being physicians).....	152
Number of physicians not ordained, other male assistants.....	7
female assistants.....	171
Whole number of laborers sent from this country.....	335
Number of native pastors.....	29
native preachers.....	318
native helpers.....	406-658
Whole number connected with the Missions.....	988

THE PRESS.

Number of printing establishments.....	4
Pages printed last year, as far as reported.....	83,008,079
Pages printed from the beginning.....	1,264,106,296

THE CHURCHES.

Number of churches (including all at the Sandwich Islands).....	161
Number of church members (including all at the Sandwich Islands), so far as reported.....	24,456
Added during the year, so far as reported.....	1,944

EDUCATIONAL DEPARTMENT.

Number of seminaries.....	9
other boarding schools.....	10
free schools (omitting those at the Sandwich Islands).....	298
pupils in free schools (omitting those at the Sandwich Islands).....	8,118
pupils in free seminaries.....	276
pupils in free boarding schools.....	236
Whole number in seminaries and schools.....	3,680

Old School Presbyterian Church.—During the year ending May, 1861, two new Synods were organised, viz., Sandusky and St. Paul; also four new Presbyteries, viz., Wyandota, Toledo, Philadelphia Central, and Corisco.

Synods in connection with the General Assembly.....	85
Presbyteries.....	176
Licentiates.....	869
Candidates for the Ministry.....	545
Ministers.....	2,767

Churches.....	8,684
Licensures.....	149
Ordinations.....	107
Installations.....	141
Pastoral relations dissolved.....	101
Churches organized.....	107
Churches dissolved.....	19
Ministers received from other denomina- tions.....	24
Ministers dismissed to other denomina- tions.....	18
Churches received from other denomina- tions.....	4
Churches dismissed to other denomina- tions.....	2
Ministers deceased.....	29
Members added on examination.....	18,680
Members added on certificate.....	9,174
Total number of communicants reported.....	300,814
Adults baptized.....	8,679
Infants baptized.....	13,436
Amount contributed for Congregational purposes.....	\$1,821,352
Amount contributed for Boards of the Church and Disabled Ministers.....	492,384
Amount contributed for miscellaneous purposes.....	211,537
Whole amount contributed.....	2,525,168

From the Minutes of the *New School Presbyterian Church* we gather the following statistics:

Synods.....	22
Presbyteries.....	105
Ministers.....	1,558
Churches.....	1,478
Licentiatees.....	188
Candidates.....	238
Members added on examination.....	4,800
Members added on certificate.....	4,817
Total of communicants.....	134,760
Contributions for Domestic and For- eign Missions, Education, and Pub- lication.....	\$292,755 82

In the New School Presbyterian body, the number of ministers is eighty more than the number of churches; while in the Old School the churches outnumber the ministers nine hundred and seventeen.

SEVERAL of the Presbyteries of the Old-School Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States held their regular fall meetings, and, without exception, passed acts of separation from the General Assembly of the church, and appointed delegates to attend at Augusta, Georgia, on the 4th of December, for the purpose of forming a General Assembly of the Southern Confederacy portion of the denomination.

THE *Messenger* gives the following summary of the statistics of the German Reformed Church for the last year, as gathered from the Minutes of Synod just published: Classes in the two Synods, 25; ministers, 414; congregations, 1,053; members, 97,307; baptisms, 11,818; confirmations, 6,420; received on certificate, 1,497; communicants, 87,609; excommunicated, 158; dismissed, 654; deaths, 3,716; Sabbath Schools, 871. This shows an increase on the report of last year of 1 classis, 23 ministers, 8 congregations, 5,023 members, 1,662 baptisms, 660 confirmations, 111 received on certificate, 5,475 communicants, 100 excommunicated, 75 dismissed, and 835 deaths. The number of Sabbath-schools is 25 less than reported last year.

The reports are still very imperfect in some of the items, no report having been received from the Virginia and North Carolina classes; and several charges and one whole classis in the Western Synod, the Sheboygan, consisting of ten ministers, not having reported a single congregation.

SYNOD OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY.—This (New School) Synod met at Newark, N. J., October 15th. Rev. Drs. Wilson, Adams, Newell, and Governor Pennington and Hon. E. A. Lambert, were appointed to present resolutions on the state of the country. They reported a series of resolutions, which, with the admirable speech of Governor Pennington, on the present rebellion, were ordered to be printed in an appendix to the Minutes. The following is the resolution on slavery:—

“That while we do not feel called on to add any thing to the repeated testimony of our Church on the subject of Slavery, nor to offer any advice to the Government on the subject, still, fully believing that it lies at the foundation of all our present national troubles, we recommend to all our people to pray more earnestly than ever for its removal; and that

the time may speedily come when God by his providence shall take it away, that nothing may be left of it but the painful record of its past existence."

A copy of these resolutions was sent to Secretary Seward, who replied as follows:

"DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, November 27, 1861.

"To the Synod of New York and New Jersey: Reverend Gentlemen: The minute, containing your resolutions on the condition of the country, which you directed to be sent to me, has been submitted to the President of the United States.

"I am instructed to express to you his great satisfaction with these proceedings, which are distinguished equally by their patriotic sentiments and a purely Christian spirit. It is a just tribute to our system of government that it has enabled the American people to enjoy unmolested more of the blessings of Divine Providence which affect the material conditions of human society than any other people ever enjoyed, together with a more absolute degree of religious liberty than before the institution of that great government had ever been hoped for among men. The overthrow of the government, therefore, might justly be regarded as a calamity, not only to this nation, but a misfortune to mankind. The President is assured of the public virtue and of the public valor. But these are unavailing without the favor of God. The President thanks you for the invocations of that indispensable support, and he earnestly solicits the same invocations from all classes and conditions of men. Believing that these prayers will not be denied by the God of our fathers, he trust and expects that the result of this most unhappy attempt at revolution will confirm and strengthen the Union of the republic, and ultimately renew the fraternal affections among its members so essential to a restora-

tion of the public welfare and happiness.

"I am, very sincerely,

"Your very humble servant,
"WILLIAM H. SEWARD."

CENSUS OF CANADA.—The *Quebec Chronicle* says that although all the Census Commissioners have not yet sent in their complete returns to the Bureau of Agriculture and Statistics, enough is known to make it tolerably certain that Upper Canada has increased 40 per cent since the last census, and Lower Canada 30 per cent, bringing the population of the whole country up to about 2,800,000. This would give Upper Canada an excess of population over the Lower Province of 200,000.

Religious Statistics of Newfoundland.—A synopsis of the census returns of Newfoundland in 1857, is published in the *St. John's Record*, from which we learn that there were then in Newfoundland, 57,214 Catholics and 67,074 Protestants, the latter of whom are thus classed: Church of England, 44,285; Wesleyans, 20,229; Kirk of Scotland, 302; Free Kirk, 586; Congregationalists, 847; Baptists and others, 44. On the Labrador coast, under the jurisdiction of Newfoundland, there are 1280 Protestants, not classed, out of a population there of 1650 souls.

Religious Denominations of Nova Scotia.—The census returns give the following as the numbers belonging to the different religious bodies:

Church of England,.....	47,744
Church of Rome,.....	86,281
Church of Scotland,.....	19,068
Presbyterian Church of Lower Provinces,.....	69,456
Baptists,.....	55,386
Wesleyans,.....	84,056
Free-Will and F. Christian Baptists,.....	6704
Christians, Disciples, and Reformed Baptists,.....	901
Congregationalists,.....	2188
Reformed Presbyterians,.....	286
Lutherans,.....	4882
Universalists,.....	846
Quakers,.....	158
Sandemanians,.....	46
Bible Christians,.....	112
Campbellites,.....	89
Evangelical Union,.....	148

Swedenborgians,.....	18
Mormons,.....	27
Deists,.....	8
Other Creeds,.....	822
No creed given,.....	2814
Total Population of the Province,.....	380,357

ENGLAND.—By a summary of the results of the late census, published in anticipation of the detailed and revised tables, it is shown that on April 8th, 1861, there were in England and Wales 20,061,725 persons, of whom 9,758,852 were males, and 10,302,873 females. During the last ten years the actual increase was 2,169,576, which is about 12 per cent. In the purely agricultural districts the increase is very small compared with what it is in the great seats of commercial and manufacturing industry. The number of houses is 3,955,368, being an increase of 497,264. The total number of emigrants who sailed from the ports of the United Kingdom during the last ten years, is 2,287,205, of whom by far the largest proportion were natives of Ireland. This is more than half a million in excess of the number of emigrants between the census of 1841 and that of 1861.

THE Annual Report of the Commissioners on Popular Education in England, presented to Parliament, April, 1861, shows an attendance of 2,535,462; the whole number of children between the ages of 3 and 15 is 5,311,534. Of these 917,265 were in the government schools. The work of popular education was in the hands of the British and Foreign, and the National Society, from 1808 to 1839. The Government first gave money in 1832, £30,000; it now gives £800,000. The more particular statements are as follows:

1. Church of England Schools,.....	1,187,086
2. British,.....	151,005
3. Roman Catholic,.....	85,000
4. Wesleyan (Old Connection),.....	59,873
5. Congregational,.....	33,000
6. Other religious congregations,.....	32,319

These numbers, however, refer only to the pupils of the day-schools, and, in order to guard against wrong in-

ferences, we subjoin from the census of 1851, the number of day-scholars and of Sabbath-scholars:

	Day Scholars.	Sabbath Scholars.
Church of England Schools,.....	929,476	935,392
British,.....	62,597	..
Roman Catholic,.....	41,883	33,254
Wesleyan,.....	41,144	429,727
Congregational,.....	50,186	843,475

The proportion of week-day scholars to the respective populations at the present time, in the following countries, stands thus:

England and Wales,.....	1 to 7.7
France,.....	1 to 9.0
Holland,.....	1 to 8.11
Prussia,.....	1 to 6.27

Contributions in England.—For foreign missions during the past year, 1,764,000 Church of England members gave £119,000; 772,000 Wesleyans, £84,000; 607,000 Independents, £54,000; 380,000 Baptists, £19,000.

This amounts, for each Baptist, to one shilling; for each Churchman, one shilling and three pence; for each Independent, one shilling, eleven pence; for each Methodist, two shillings, two pence.

Rejection of the Church-Rate Abolition Bill.—The motion of Sir Trevelyan for the third reading of the Church-Rate Abolition Bill came up on Wednesday, June 19. Contrary to expectation the vote was a tie, and the speaker cast the deciding vote, against the bill. Had all the absentees been present, and voted as there was reason to expect, the result, instead of being a tie of 274 on each side, would have been a majority in favor of the bill of 25 (334 against 309). The Tories have gained eight votes, and the Liberals lost seven on a comparison of the divisions on the second and third readings.

Increase of Bishoprics.—The project for multiplying Bishops was suddenly killed. It came up in the House of Lords, and scarcely any one ventured to advocate it. When the vote was taken, eleven peers voted

for it, and sixty-eight against it. The Bishop of London made a severe and most damaging speech against it. He considered it as the embodiment of one of the Premier's jokes, who had told a certain deputation, if people would consent to pay for Bishops, they ought to have them. The indignant Prelate pronounced the measure as "nothing better than a sham."

The statistics given, show that Congregationalism is retrograding in England. The number of Congregational churches in England is given at 1,600; the resignations and removals during the year at 195, or the astounding proportion of nearly 1 to 8. This is not the worst feature; for, on looking through the list of churches under the heading "County and District Associations," 176 are marked vacant, or nearly 1 in every 9.

Blending the resignations and removals with the vacancies, it is manifest that 1 in every 4½ churches throughout England were in an unsettled condition in 1860. Were these vacancies solely to follow on deaths or old age, a proper ratio would be, according to the present value of human life, about 45 or 46, and not from 300 to 400.

SCOTLAND.—The whole sums raised for the various objects of the Free Church of Scotland, for the year from March, 1860, to March, 1861, were: Sustentation Fund, £113,462 17s. 7d.; Building Fund, £36,529 8s. 11½d.; Congregational Fund, £100,134 6s. 1½d.; Missions and Education, £62,487 4s. 5d.; Miscellaneous, £16,759 6s. 11d.; total, £329,383 8s. 11½d.

IRELAND.—There are some striking facts brought to light by the census of 1861 in reference to the state of things in Ireland. In 1841 the population of the four provinces was 8,175,124, in 1861 it was 5,784,543, giving a decrease of 2,390,581. In 1834 the returns to Parliament showed that in round numbers there were 6,500,000 Roman Catholics,

about 800,000 members of the Church of England, and about the same number belonging to other religious sects. In the census of 1861, 4,490,588 are set down as Roman Catholics, 878,661 as Episcopalians, and 595,299 as Presbyterians and other religionists—showing that there are now about *three and a half* times as many Roman Catholics as Protestants in Ireland, and that they stand to the members of the Episcopal Church (which is the Established Church) in the proportion of *seven to one*.

FRANCE.—*The Expenses of Public Worship in France.*—The expenses of public worship have considerably increased since the Restoration. They were 21,000,000*fr.* in 1818; 35,000,000*fr.* in 1819; 39,000,000*fr.* in 1847; and for 1862, they are estimated at 49,869,986*fr.* All forms of worship are tolerated in France, but only three are paid by the State, the Roman Catholic, the Protestant, and the Jewish, and the latter has only been so since 1831. In the Roman Catholic Church there are 81 prelates; 16 of them archbishops, of whom one, that of Paris, receives 50,000*fr.* a year, the others 20,000*fr.*; and 65 bishops who are allowed 15,000*fr.* each. An addition of 10,000*fr.* is given to six of the prelates, on account of their being cardinals; and as in the quality of cardinals they are senators *ex officio*, they receive a further sum of 80,000*fr.* a year. 30,243 other priests receive from 900*fr.* to 1200*fr.* according to their age. The total expenses for Roman Catholic worship amount to 47,000,000*fr.* The Protestant clergy consist of 814 ministers, who receive from 1500*fr.* to 3000*fr.* each, and of two assistant ministers, who are paid 700*fr.* to 750*fr.* The total outlay for Protestant worship is 1,498,436*fr.* In the Jewish community there are 10 chief rabbis, paid from 3500*fr.* to 7000*fr.*; 51 communal rabbis, from 800*fr.* to 1500*fr.*; and 62 officiating priests, from 500*fr.* to 2000*fr.*

Educational Statistics.—The num-

ber of children in France able to attend school is 5,200,000, of whom 4,017,000 receive primary instruction at the hands of 68,500 teachers; of these 1,800,000 are taught in free schools. Nearly one fourth of the instructors are members of religious fraternities and sisterhoods, there being 16,000 of them.

Protestant Churches.—The General Conference of the Lutheran and Reformed have unanimously (with the exception of one vote) petitioned for a restitution of the old synodical organisation of the churches, in place of the present *Conseil Central*, which is under governmental control. It is also offered to any supreme ecclesiastical tribunal under state authority. M. Coquerel has proposed a projet de discipline, advocating a Central Council of seventy-one members, to be appointed by government: but this meets no favor in the Reformed Church.

SPAIN. — Spain has a population (census of 1857) of 15,464,000, an increase of over 3,000,000 since 1846. The clergy at the time of the French Revolution numbered 180,000 (population of 10,268,150); they now number only 42,000. Peasantry, about 1,000,000; merchants, 120,000; artisans, 150,000. The privileged laity (exempt from taxation) numbered 844,000 about a century since; now the nobility is reduced to 1,456, and all are taxed. According to recent official statistics, out of 489,332 in the province of Madrid, 266,992 could neither read nor write. In the province of Tarragona, out of 321,886 inhabitants, 271,404 could neither read nor write; and in the district of Moncado alone, out of 26,000, 23,000 could neither read nor write.

ITALY. — *St. Peter's Pence.* — The Archconfraternity of St. Peter's Pence at Rome has celebrated the first anniversary of its foundation. On this occasion Monseigneur Nardi delivered an address on the origin of St.

Peter's Pence. He said that in the space of two years it had given to the Pope more than 4,000,000 crowns, of which 8,000,000f. came from France; 1,775,000f. from Ireland; 2,000,000f. from the German provinces of Austria; 100,000 florins from Hungary; and 1,500,000f. from the Catholic dioceses in the United States of America. From a report just issued by the London Association, it appears that England had forwarded 22,500f. up to June last, and an additional sum of 7500f. has since that time been also remitted.

Statistics of Rome. — The *Correspondence de Rome* gives the following statistical details for the year 1860: There are in Rome 54 parish churches, 37,706 families, 84 bishops, 1,417 priests, 2,390 monks and religious men, 9,081 nuns, 886 pupils of seminaries or colleges, 884 inmates of the apostolical palaces, 218 infidels and heretics. There were 96,293 men, 87,856 women—total, 184,049. The number of births in 1860 was 5,957, or one birth to twenty-eight inhabitants. The number of deaths was 5,764, or one to every twenty-nine inhabitants. The number of marriages was 1423. There were also 4,468 Jews in Rome in 1860.

The *Monde* gives a list of eighteen convents of Dominicans, Augustinians, Servites, Minims, Cistercians, Franciscans, Conventuals, Barnabites, and Carmelites, which have been suppressed in the diocese of Perugia, Italy. The buildings are now used as schools, asylums, tribunals, printing-offices, barracks, etc., and the Convent of St. Dominique de Pedri will be appropriated to the Academy of the Beaux-Arts.

ASIA.—*Protestantism in Siam.*—The King of Siam has approved of a proposition to erect a Protestant church at Bangkok, and will contribute for its erection. The most liberal and enterprising policy appears to prevail.

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ART. I.—MODERN PHILOSOPHY PANTHEISTIC.

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OUR organs of sense in some way become affected, and we perceive outer objects by means of these organic affections. By affections in the eye we apprehend colors, in the ear sounds, in the mere touch temperatures and the muscular touch solids, in the mouth tastes, and in the nose odors. The perceptions are the modes in which whatever may be without us reveals itself to us in our consciousness. For the inner sense we have no organs, but our own agency gives inner affections, and in these we perceive the modes of our inner activity.

We call the perceived objects *phenomena*, because in the outer sense we have the world and in the inner sense ourselves as *appearance* and not as *existence*. We hereby attain the qualities of an outer world and not its essential matter, and the exercises of an inner world but not its essential spirit. Each one apprehends his affections as modes of appearance

in himself and has the phenomena of the material and spiritual worlds as apprehended in his consciousness, but whether these phenomenal worlds are the same to one as to another, we have no capability of deciding. Each man is to himself the measure of truth for his own phenomena.

The phenomena are, in the sense, singly and separately apprehended, and by the connecting judgment referred as qualities and exercises to their respective things and agents, and we thus know the world as made up of distinct things and agents perpetually undergoing successive changes.

The animal has organs of sense in common with man, and apprehends phenomena and groups qualities and events together in a judgment of experience, and thereby to man and animal there is a phenomenal world in common. But to man there is the higher endowment of reason, and this so interpenetrates and illumines the sense and the judgment that the perceptions of the man are thereby modified to become something other than the perceptions of the animal. A spontaneous insight perpetually yet often unconsciously goes along with the perceiving and judging, and space and time, and substance and cause, and adaptation and design, etc., are seen by man in an intelligible world to which the irrational brute can have no access. An untaught peasant cognizes forces and ends and rights and claims in nature which the animal, though passing through the full experience of nature, can never attain. It thus occurs, that even when man has not yet found his reason as a distinct function of his intellect, and knows not specifically what reason is, yet he abundantly manifests the unconscious possession of his high prerogative above the animal, in the incipient apprehension of physical laws and ethical rights and religious claims with which no animal can come in communion with him.

By this spontaneous working of the rational within us, we may be asking questions and seeking answers from nature, that shall lead us a long distance in the attainment of knowledge beyond where any animal can follow, while as yet we have not at all discriminated the function we are using and which separates us so widely from the brutes. The facts both

of matter and of mind may be gathered, and these may be analysed and generalised and classified in systematic arrangement, and the general made to include the particular through all the kingdoms and orders of nature, till we have built up widely extended and varied sciences, and in the study of such facts and their relations we may attain to much physical, ethical, and even theological learning. There is here no insight to any principle which has determined the facts, and therefore no facts nor combination of facts can be comprehended or expounded, but taken as they have been given in the sense, they have been classified and embodied in systems of much practical use and convenience. We do not read and intelligently apprehend the documents, but we diligently gather and arrange them in what we deem their appropriate pigeon-holes, and put our technical labels upon them.

Here is no philosophy which has reached to the laws of their being and working, and determined the facts to be as they are and not otherwise, but taking them just as they are we have named and classified them. It is not, however, at all uncommon that this is mistaken for philosophy, nor that some, who may have given much of this but no higher cultivation to their minds, may deem themselves quite competent to pronounce with authority upon the labors of such as have been profoundly philosophical. We have frequent snatches of criticism, and flippant strictures, and sometimes long and sapient reviews giving oracular decisions concerning philosophical speculations, and in which it is most painfully and pitifully manifest that their authors were utterly incompetent to enter into the method or the meaning of the works they were so trenchantly overhauling. Fondly deeming that they have a mission to detect and scourge philosophical delusions and errors, they strike valorously and unhesitatingly at what to them appears to be some monster absurdity, but their hardest hits and cleverest cuts are seen by the discerning to be but sorry blunders of their own ignorance, and all the humor of the matter turns wholly to their own expense.

Occasion may be here taken to refer to the first article in the last October number of the *Princeton Review*, which was

doubtless intended to be a final refutation of the revised edition of the *Rational Psychology*. There has all along been in that periodical a perpetual pattering of offensive allusions at what has been taken as the radicalism, rationalism, and Germanism of this same author of the *Rational Psychology*, and which have been directed with about equal perspicacity as the strictures in the above-named article. The distinguished Editor of the *Princeton Review* is understood as asserting that the world needs a more Christian Philosophy than that which is given to us by Sir William Hamilton, and certainly, therefore, a higher philosophy is necessary than any thing reached by the authors of these allusions and strictures.

The article above named manifests throughout that the writer of it has an entire want of discernment of the philosophical distinctions between phenomena and things in themselves, the becoming and the being, the nominal and the real, the natural and the supernatural, the relative and the absolute, etc., and in this indiscrimination is the full evidence that he has not yet taken the first step in that long path which philosophy has for so many ages been travelling. To him all objects are just what and just as the senses give to us, and all investigation of them can attain to nothing other than that which the analyses and deductions of the logical faculty can make out of them. The speculation pursued in the *Psychology* is often misconceived, more often entirely beyond his apprehension, and the only answer to the *Review* that is practicable would be that for which there is not found a sufficient inducement, viz., the pointing out item by item the perpetual failures to attain the rational meaning of the work which the Reviewer has taken in hand. This may be charged by him to be the fault of the work itself in its obscure thinking and expression, but surely if it were too obscure for his apprehension he was not bound to study it, nor to review it; certainly was bound not to review it till he had intelligently studied it.

The ends designed in the *Psychology*, and believed to be fairly reached in the estimation of those who comprehend the matter, are such as the Reviewer would himself, doubtless, desire might be attained, viz., the philosophical validity of

our knowledge of an outer substantial world, and of an Absolute, Personal Deity. This desired result is sought in the only practicable method of attainment, by an *a priori* process; and the natural consequence induced by his dogmatic assertions of error and emptiness through the whole speculation, to such as put any faith in his sayings, will be to foster a conviction that all valid knowledge of an outer world and a Personal God is a philosophic impossibility. The ground is left completely open to such as are perpetually insisting that Reason and Religion, Philosophy and Faith, must stand to each other in lasting hostility. The only way to keep our religion and our faith will be to disparage and discard our Reason and Philosophy. The Oxford Essayists and Westminster Reviewers may have all things their own way, in all cases where any honest and independent thinking is allowed.

And now, such uninstructed criticism, however innocent and honest the critic, can only help the scepticism which he deems himself disposed to deny, and weaken the forces on the good side which he thinks he would desire to uphold. In his blindness he is striking at a friend, and not an enemy, and holding up to misguided derision and reproach the very defences and support of his creed, and without which his adoption of it can be nothing but unreasoning credulity. The true spirit with which such misjudging assailants are to be met, is with our suffering Lord to say, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do". They will become both more amiable and more comfortable when they shall have grown wiser. Their present position comes from their adoption of the foul logic both of an *Argumentum ad ignorantiam* and of an *Argumentum ab ignorantia*. The most lamentable part of the matter is, that very extensively the ductile minds of coming laborers are passing on to their responsible life-mission under the like negative instructions and positive perversions.

But we turn from such reflections to the theme immediately in hand, viz., The Pantheistic tendencies of Modern Philosophy. We shall pursue the track of philosophical speculation so far only as necessary to apprehend its modern bearing. The able article in the last number of the THEOLOGICAL RE-

view, on the Two Schools of Philosophy, precludes all necessity for dwelling upon the leading distinctions of an *à priori* and *à posteriori* method. We shall find as the result of our search, that the whole drift of modern speculative teaching is towards some one modified form of Pantheism.

A careful reflection upon the phenomena of the sense finds them fleeting and transitory, constantly coming and departing. The color or the sound of one instant is not that of the next, but a continual repetition of impressions is made upon the organs, and also a perpetual variation of phenomena occurs. To such as contemplate nothing but the phenomenal, it must appear that "all things flow". The instant of the arising in sense is also the instant of evanishing, and we cannot say at any time this is, but only it is coming into manifestation. Nothing is in one stay, and hence we know the phenomenal only as *the becoming*.

But the logical understanding cannot be satisfied with merely a phenomenal becoming, and cannot form a judgment of connected things without some permanent to give unity to the diversity. As the phenomenal in congelation passes to a liquid, and thence to a vapor, there has been in the judgment a permanent which has neither come nor gone with the alternations of the phenomena, and hence all the phenomena are judged to inhere in that one thing that has perdured through all the coming and departing. This permanent has had *real being* continually, and to such as contemplate intellectually only the permanent real being, it must be apprehended that "all things stand". The permanent real being in the judgment changes its modes of appearance in the sense.

And just here, between the flowing and the standing, is the point in which all philosophy has had its origin. Here two ways open, and the Ionic philosophy exhausted itself in striving to determine the becoming, and the Eleatic philosophy spent itself in the effort to determine the being.

In this old conflict where Greek met Greek, it was not competent to relieve the antagonism by the defeat of either party. They each had opposite sides of the same truth, and philosophy could not afford that either one should be lost. Both

must be retained and become harmonized in a philosophy which has attained a higher stand-point. Ionicism and Eleaticism both survive and become reconciled in Platonism. The permanent being in the judgment determines the phenomenal becoming in the sense, and thus while the intellectually apprehended being "stands", the sensibly perceived becoming "flows". One is object for one function of knowing, and the other is object for another function; and the permanent being as known intellectually can appear no otherwise than fleeting, when perceived sensibly.

PLATO, from his original peculiarity of intellectual endowment, was specially inclined to investigate the truths which related to the permanent being, and had little interest in any speculations terminating only in the becoming. To his penetrating reason, the phenomenal was only as the passing shadow of a deeper reality; and this deeper real, itself permanent and essential, determined all the phases of the fleeting phenomenal. His striking illustration of the wide distinction between objects in the sense and objects in the reason is presented under the analogy of men imprisoned in a cave, with their backs toward the entrance, the real objects are behind, and determine all the shadowy forms which are perceived on the back side of the cave before them. The insight of the reason is directly at the real objects in their full light, and knows these objects in themselves and not their shadows, and knows also how the real objects determine the passing shadows which the imprisoned senses can have as their only objects. The imprisoned men of sense deem the phenomenal objects to be all that can be known, and they busy themselves in registering and classifying their appearing and relations; the rational man knows the phenomenal to be shadow, and that the only real is away from the directions of the sense, and that the phenomenal can be truly known only by being taught of the reason how the real determines the phenomenal. The reason-objects are the real being, and yet as never coming into sense, they are solely existent in an intellectual world, and are therefore properly ideal. They alone have true being; they determine all appearance in the sense; they can be known only by the reason

itself; they are thus "Ideas", not "Images"; and stand as the basis of that which constitutes the grand peculiarity of the Platonic philosophy.

The Ideas are all distinct, and yet are so mutually connected, that from a cognition of one all may be attained. The wheat-corn truly is, in the inner vital force which is its purely intellectual idea, and which also determines all the sensible appearances it may manifest in its germination and growth; and so also the earth, the water, the sun, etc., have their inherent forces as purely intellectual ideas; and yet all these ideas of the wheat-corn, the earth, the water, the sun, etc., have their mutual affinities and connection, and so all through the universe, one idea may draw after it all other ideas in its connections.

The world is a complete organism of all the single ideas, and this has its grand source and comprehension in the Absolute Good, the truly living, personal Idea which is the Source and Sovereign of all. In the Philosophy of Plato, the idea is always the true reality, more perfect in the absolute than in us the human, but everywhere that, by the intellectual apprehension of which and its determinations, we can alone attain to any true science. We may study phenomenal shadows as we will, yet can we comprehend and expound them only as we have apprehended intellectually and clearly their determining ideas. In their ensouling of all phenomenal becoming the Universe is, and in their original being in the Absolute Good, a personal God is. All truth and all being is in him, and the eternal ideas direct the eternal purpose and secure eternal wisdom and righteousness, and thus a pure Theism, excluding all forms of Pantheism, is attained and held in Platonism.

But as in most cases, so with Plato, the philosophic impulse, becoming enthusiastic in its progress and success, pushes its speculations inordinately and extravagantly. As the determining ideas alone could bring anything of experience within true science, so they were sought to be extended to all that was desirable should be truly known; and as the original archetypes and paradigms of all things were true and original

being in the Absolute Good, so the ideals constructed by the human mind were put among the ideas that had a true and real being. Yea, as the many phenomenal attributes and qualities in the becoming were determined in the one permanent idea, so the particulars and individuals were sought to be determined and produced from the one generic conception. The generic man, tree, etc. contained and determined all particular men, trees, etc. In this way the ideas came to be applied to all that was sought to be known, and as phenomenal qualities must have that which in the general holds the truth that belongs to the particular, so there were ideas of color, heat and cold, etc.; and also the more abstract general conception became an Eternal Idea, having true being; as even Plato himself says, the idea may be applied wherever a multiplicity can be indicated by one and the same name, thus opening the field for the endless dispute of the Nominalist and the Realist.

This excessive and extravagant application of the ideas made a restraining and correcting criticism necessary, and the Aristotelian method became a philosophical demand. The Platonic ideas, if retained at all, must be remanded to the real being and excluded from the phenomenal becoming, and also from merely mental constructions and abstract general conceptions.

ARISTOTLE has a First Philosophy, and which refers only to true being, as really as Plato, and complete science can be attained only in this first philosophy. But from a native peculiarity of mind he was fitted to investigate the phenomenal, and had little interest or success in speculations relative to the purely intellectual. Experience, he held, must guide in all human investigation, and that which transcends experience, though necessary for true science, is mainly above the reach of human attainment. Completeness of knowledge for man would demand a complete and universal experience. Particulars are first given, and from these we must rise toward the universal and eternal. The Aristotelian method is thus an inversion of the Platonic, and deals with the being through the suggestions and analogies of the becoming.

The ideas of Plato are controverted by Aristotle with earnestness, not to say sometimes with rival bitterness. He attacks them and seems only to apprehend them as they had been extravagantly carried into the phenomenal, and applied to abstract general conceptions. He ridicules the Ideas as made of these general abstractions by only adding the expression, thing *in itself*, to the general notion. Thus man, tree, etc. is made an eternal idea, really including all men, and all trees, etc., by only saying, man *per se*, tree *per se*, etc. In this way the generic is held really to contain the particular, and the immortal ideas are only made from the abstractions of the dead things of sense. And even when thus assuming the abstract man or tree to be thing *in itself*, he shows that it would be impossible by any intelligible process to determine the particular man or tree from such idea. By this criticism, the ideas were fairly excluded from the phenomenal and its abstractions where they had wandered beyond their domain, but with no prejudice to their occupying the purely intellectual field of true being, where alone Plato should have attempted any recognition of them.

In connection with what may comprehensively be known as the Logic of Aristotle, we have his First Philosophy in reference to true being, and which we give in its most general method, as having a bearing on our present purpose. In all our experience of the becoming, there is the *Matter* and the *Form*. Matter is passive, without qualities or attributes, and distinguishable from blank nothingness no otherwise than as somewhat that may come into sensible manifestation. It can be known and spoken of only as the possible. Form is that which particularizes and gives peculiar manifestation to matter, and in which the passive possible becomes actual. In order that the possible, eternally existing as wholly unqualified matter, may take on its peculiar forms, it is necessary that there be *Motion*, or some process of actually taking on its qualities. But in order that any motion may be, it is necessary that there be a *Moving Cause* and a *Final End* to be attained. Motion, which involves this moving cause and final end, belongs thus to form rather than to matter. The form, possessing

moving power and final end, and therein competent to give manifestation to the passive possible, considered as standing ready to qualify matter, is *Essence*; and such essence, in the process of actually qualifying the matter, is the phenomenal becoming as a perpetually flowing experience in the sense.

But motion, which cannot originate in the passive matter, and must first be in the form, has, as a condition for its origin, the necessity that there be first a movable and a possibility of setting in motion; and yet a generation of such movable and possibility of setting in motion would itself be motion, and on this account motion cannot have had a beginning, but has been eternal. Such eternal motion must have a mover, himself unmoved, and this conception of an unmoved Mover holds the secret of the Deity. In order to the elucidation of the divine mystery, we must apprehend that the lovable or desirable moves to choice without being moved, and also that the knowable moves to knowledge without being moved. God is eternally desirable and eternally knowable, and herein he is eternally unmoved mover.

As desirable, the unmoved mover gives motion to somewhat that is out of himself; but as knowable, he gives movement to himself, for it is reason only which can be known by reason, and which thus, in knowing itself, moves itself in intelligence. The eternal reason as knowable, and in this unmoved, is also eternal reason knowing itself, and in this is eternally moving. Thus Aristotle made the Deity to consist in speculative and not practical reason; an eternal movement in thought, and not in moral purpose; and on this account we have his famed sententious announcement, that the Activity of God is the Thought of Thought. The object of movement and the subject of movement are one, and thus Aristotelianism attained and held the very life-germ of the Schellingian and Hegelian identity-schemes, wherein the object thought and the subject thinking are identical. If Aristotle could have renounced his eternally passive matter, and made all things to consist in the logical process of his active form, the very flower of modern German philosophy would have bloomed in Athens more than three centuries before the Christian era.

In this method of carrying up his *prima philosophia* from experience, in its highest generalized abstractions of matter and form, Aristotle had attained to the recognition of a Deity; but when we carefully scrutinize the conception, we shall be obliged to admit that it can but poorly satisfy the claims of either philosophy or piety. The Deity moves the world only as he is desirable to the world, and therefore, beside that the eternal matter is passive, even if it could be moved to desire by the desirableness of God, the activity must in this way be wholly in the world and not at all in the Deity, and we must make up our Intellectual System of the Universe wholly through the connections of such craving desires, and out of which process there could not be a consistent philosophy. On the other hand, the movement of God being only as both knowable and knowing, the intellectual movement of thought, he can go out only in necessitated logical processes and never in free moral purposes. He can be conscious thinker and knower, but never Moral Personality and Sovereign Ruler. Absolute thought is not at all Absolute Will in Liberty, and can never become Author and Governor of a moral realm. There must be Plato's Absolute Good, as having in himself the law of Liberty, a self-law in the conscious end of his own dignity and glory; and without this last, all religious love and worship are impossible.

The post-Aristotelian philosophy has little for our present purpose. The Stoics combined the matter and the form, and made both to be in God, the matter as the passive, and the form as the active side of the Deity. Hence, inasmuch as the active side had nothing to condition and determine its activity in the passive side, all was held in a blind fate; a cause ever working, with nothing in that on which it worked to determine what the product should be. Jove himself was subjected to this blind Fate, that was beyond his removing. The Epicurean left his assumed gods to indolence and careless repose, absorbed wholly in their own pleasure, and thus taught man to make the most of this life for himself, for there was none to care for him here, or to secure for him any hereafter. The revived Aristotelianism of the scholastic age had little freedom

and independence, but was held in ecclesiastical domination and subserviency to the decrees of Popes and Councils, or was tolerated in empty speculations which could have no bearing upon any imposed articles of faith. The Scholastic Logic became thus a reproach and a burden, and ultimately was lost to the world in universal contempt and neglect, and in this the ancient philosophy died out.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY begins with Des Cartes. Aristotle had generalized *matter* to the unqualified possible and *form* to the thought of thought, and both inconceivable except as correlatives of each other; matter without form could have no attributes and form without matter could be only an intellectual notion; so that matter and form, body and spirit, must eternally exist for each other, or they could have no manifestation or expression. But Des Cartes assumed the essence of body to be extension, and that of spirit to be thought, and held these to be separate and distinct beings, so unlike to each other that there can be no communion between them. Body cannot act upon nor react against spirit, and spirit cannot propagate its agency over into body. Body and Spirit cannot come into unity, but must be conceived as wholly and eternally disparate beings. The machine of nature can never move except as the crank is turned by some hand on the outside; and hence the Cartesian doctrine of "occasional causes", viz., that on occasion for the interactions of body and spirit, God directly interposes and makes the efficient communion. All natural philosophy was in this way resolved into the immediate agency of the Deity, and the Deity was assumed to be, from the consideration that a most Perfect Being was a necessary conception. This assumed most perfect Being was made to work in and on body, while the foundation principle of the philosophy was, that from the necessities of the case, the distinctions of spirit and body were such they could not interact with or upon each other.

Spinoza gave logical unity to Cartesianism by making thought as the essence of spirit and extension as the essence of matter to be the different attributes of one common Sub-

stance, and this one Substance was the sole and infinite Being. This Infinite Substance alone is, and all spiritual and bodily phenomena are but different modes in which this one infinite Substance is manifested. Both physical and logical consistency was herein given to Cartesianism, but only by involving it wholly in Pantheism. The one Substance is the All, and spirit and body its different forms in appearance. The Infinite Substance has no Personality, and is used only to give unity to the varied spiritual and bodily phenomena.

Where the infinite Substance of Spinoza has failed to satisfy, the incommunicable distinction of body and spirit has forced to one of two methods of philosophizing, viz., either to begin with body and produce the facts of spiritual appearances from it, or to begin with spirit and thence produce the facts of bodily phenomena. Locke had at large answered the enquiry, what can man know? by limiting the human Understanding to perception and reflection. Experience is our sole teacher, and this comes only through the senses. What we perceive furnishes all the elements of our knowledge, and reflection upon these can abstract and give parts, can compare and give relations, can combine and arrange in classes, but nothing can be embraced in our knowledge that has not first come through the sense. This theory was widely accepted, and philosophy was made to work within its limitations in striving either to get spirit from body or body from spirit.

On one side, Materialism began with body, and conceiving outer things to induce affections in the bodily organs by impressions upon them, it was assumed that these impressions of body upon body could not be carried out beyond the bodily organs. All the results in our inner conscious exercises of feeling, thought, and choice, are wholly to be accounted for from bodily impressions upon the nicely arranged bodily organs. Thus all we can know is matter; spirit is wholly incognizable by man. On the other hand, Sensationalism begins with spirit, and as all our sensations in the organs are spiritual, and we can never go beyond the sensation, so all our knowledge is of spiritual, and cannot take hold of material being. Limited by Locke, the French Materialist derives all

the supposed spiritual perceptions from body, and the Berkeleyan Sensationalist derives all the supposed material perceptions from spirit.

If now we take the phenomena, whether supposed to be bodily or spiritual, as perceptions of sense singly and separately apprehended, and keep ourselves rigidly within the limits of Locke's Theory, we shall have in our knowledge only single exercises or single qualities, and shall be able to know nothing of any substances or causes in which they may be connected. What is extensively known as Dr. Emmons's Exercise Scheme, true to these limits of Locke, allows to us only these single exercises in the spiritual world; and President Edwards in his argument for the identity of all men in Adam, in his *Treatise on Original Sin*, gives the same separations of phenomena in both the spiritual and bodily experience. The flow of these separate phenomena in our experience can have no known connections, and there can be no unity or identity of object except through the immediate agency of God. The Deity only gives such connections to mind and matter by an immediate efficiency that holds the exercises and qualities in a divine constitution. Phenomena have no substantial connections; successive events have no causal adhesion; what are deemed second causes are merely sequences with no efficiency, the antecedent being wholly disjoined from the consequent and utterly gone when the consequent comes. The direct act of God in constituting the sequences is that alone which perpetuates the successions.

The philosophy of Emmons and of Edwards here is the same with that of Hume and of Comte. The first two have also a theology with the philosophy, and assume a God in their faith, which they then use to account for the connections of the separate phenomena, as having by direct efficiency bound them together in a divine constitution. But the theology is wholly above the philosophy, for that limits all human knowledge to the phenomenal. The theology is moreover directly against the philosophy, for that must deny to this assumed Deity any other being but separate exercises and attributes. We cannot know any unity and identity in the

divine exercises, and can thus have no source for combining in unity and identity the human exercises. The last two names, with the same philosophy, discard all theology, the one sceptically and the other positively, and therefore leave nature without any divine constitution to no other relations than the appearances in experience. We may by frequent repetition come to the belief that the sequences have some necessary connection, but the philosopher knows that such a belief is mere credulity.

The Atheist is here more consistent than the Theist, for he steadfastly follows the light of his philosophy, and stops where that ceases to shine. The Theist takes a Deity in his faith, but gives to him a personality and an efficiency, and goes on to make connections in phenomena by him, altogether in contradiction to the philosophy. The philosophy is indeed thoroughly Atheistic, and the assumed theology rests only in a faith which the philosophy subverts. This philosophy is in fact retained only by the Atheist, for scarcely any Theist can now be found standing on the Exercise scheme of Dr. Emons, and President Edwards did not habitually and consistently deny efficiency and connection to second causes. The faith in a God that such a philosophy allowed, would be an interminable succession of exercises, and then its connections in nature would be wholly Pantheistic.

A *modified form* of the philosophy of Experience is now quite general among such as still assume to maintain the limits of human knowledge prescribed by Locke. The readiness with which the reason spontaneously supplies the judgment with the notions of substances and causes, has induced the assumption that substance and cause are given in experience. Sometimes it is said that our own experience of acts of will has in it a consciousness of causality, and that this is transferred to all causality, and thus the notion of cause is really made to be a phenomenon of the sense. All this at once carries with it its own refutation, when it is apprehended that it can thus only make phenomena to be connected by other phenomena, but without refuting we wish here only to state the philosophy. Locke had himself admitted the great

convenience of the notion of substance, and he made the grouping of qualities by the sense to be almost a judgment of substance in which was given a permanent thing, and now both for substances and causes it is widely assumed that they come into our cognition somehow through experience. Second causes are allowed to possess efficiency, and the antecedents among consecutive events have that which goes over into and produces and remains in the successors.

In this assumption of substances and causes the material world is recognised as passing on through its changes in the physical connections of cause and effect, the preceding determining the succeeding and the whole series fixed in its order with no alternative. The spiritual world also passes on in its events with the like unbroken order. The exercises of thought and feeling arise from the conditions given in nature, and with such conditions the thought and the feeling could be no otherwise. These thoughts and sensations introduce the motives to executive action, and choices and volitions result accordingly. The choices and volitions are known as moral acts because they belong to a moral agent, but their connections are of the same kind and equally necessary in their conditions as the connections of cause and effect in matter. God determines the causes and supplies the motives, and thus governs material and moral worlds at his pleasure.

In the fullest meaning and closest application this is now the prevalent philosophy. The morality and theology of the persons may very considerably differ, and they may very diversely speculate about freedom and responsibility, and belong to fiercely contending different schools and opposing creeds in religion, but when driven to the last exposition of their freedom or their faith, they all have this one and the same philosophy. Notwithstanding the apparently wide difference in expression between the control of an innate taste and the possession of power to the opposite, in all cases it is ultimately assumed that the moral act is as the last dictate of the judgment in reference to the highest happiness, and this will disclose the prevalent strength of motive and the execu-

tive will follow in its gratification without an *alterum*. The will always is as the last judgment of what the highest happiness is.

There can be but one issue, in reference to the acknowledgment of a Deity, to this method of philosophizing, whether applied to matter or to mind. The changes in material nature may be followed upwards towards their source, and this source may be assumed to have been reached in some highest cause. But such so-called highest cause will have nothing but priority to distinguish it from any other. It has already in it that which must come from it, and it and all its effects stand fully conditioned in the constitution or nature that it already possesses. This assumed First Cause has now all the substantiality and efficiency of the whole that shall come from it, and is the all, and thus the only Deity; and yet it is but nature in its source, and has no more there any personality than in any of its future products.

If this natural Pantheism, which is but Pancosmism, is sought to be evaded by assuming for this First Cause a sentient agency, then the philosophy must proceed after this method. This assumed First Agent, knowing his own sentient craving and what will best gratify the desire, has the impulse from what he finds within to go out in action and attain the objective means of highest gratification. As the animal and the man in their common sentient constitution seek what is agreeable and thus act as they *please*, while this pleasing is conditioned in the sentient constitution, so the only God which this philosophy can recognise has freedom to follow the craving for gratification which he finds his sentient being experiences. If his better judgment more discriminatingly and correctly determines that which shall best gratify the sentient want on the whole, this makes no distinction in kind, for the Animal, the Man, and the God, go out after that which the last dictate of the judgment determines to promise the highest happiness. This is the highest freedom the philosophy knows; it is the highest it affirms that can be conceived, to do as the being pleases. And yet this pleasing is conditioned in the sentient constitution. The Deity finds within himself such cravings

for gratification ; they are, and from his sentient being they can be no otherwise, and he must follow the judgment that decides what best may gratify, or be miserable. The constitutional craving with the experimental judging of what best may please is the All, and is the Deity, and yet is only sentient nature still and can have no personality. It is wholly Animalism, but as it is the highest and only acting power, it is Pantheism.

The prompting of their reason may spontaneously induce the assumption of a personal God, and they may have in their faith, unconscious from whence it comes, the acknowledgment of quite another Deity than their philosophy admits, and such assumed personal God may be held as the Author of the substances and causes in nature and the sentient constitution in humanity, but this assumption is both wholly beyond and entirely against the philosophy. If the substance have its beginning, then that from which it is produced is the substantial ; and if the cause have its producer, then is it only event and the producer is the causal ; and if the sentient in humanity was made, then the sentient in the Maker is the determining constitutional craving ; and all runs up and finds its lodgment in this source of all substances and causes and sentient desires ; but when we assume to have reached this source, the philosophy allows us to recognise in it nothing, at the furthest, but an impulse that has produced substances and causes and sentient desires from a constitutional want, which must have been so gratified or have endured its inward unalleviated misery. The faith assumes, from the working of the reason, a personal God ; the philosophy denies the possibility of such conception, and makes its highest point the impulse of the sentient craving and the empirical judging, and will allow no shrine more sacred than Pantheism.

The CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY of Germany reverses wholly the old method. The objects do not determine their forms of appearing as the seal determines the impressions on the wax, but the regulative forms are already in the mind as in the seed or the egg, and these primitive mental forms determine the objects. The matter for the object is assumed to be given

in sensation, but our human mind is constituted for knowing this matter only in the peculiar forms of its own ordering. This readily soon extended itself to the doctrine, that the sensation as the matter of the object was as truly ordered by the mind as the forms and connections in which the object appeared. A living movement, with an inherent logical law, was held to develop itself into all the objects of nature and humanity. At length it was taught, that an absolute thought-movement developed itself unconsciously into nature, and reflectively coming into consciousness as mind and organizing itself in individual thought-processes in humanity, ultimately attains full self-consciousness in knowing itself as the subject of the thinking and the object in all the thoughts, and herein is perfect Deity.

From the method of following the *Ego*, or thought-movement, through all this logical process, the philosophy has been known as Egoism, Egoistic Idealism, German Transcendentalism, etc. It uses many Platonic terms, but its method is wholly Aristotelian, in that it generalizes facts and knows no ultimate principles determining the facts. It uses the logical faculty as connecting judgment only, and not the insight as comprehending reason. It only differs in that it goes further for its facts, and assumes to find them in a thought-process antecedently to their coming out in conscious experience. But these transcendental facts are wholly inexplicable by any rational principles that guided in their making.

The only possible issue of this philosophy is a Pantheism of the most sublimated conception. Creation is a logical process of thinking, and the Cosmos is the successive positing of logical results. The thinking movement is the All, and in its development it states its own results as already conditioned, with no purpose directed to its own End, and thus with no Personality. An Absolute Deity may here be assumed as source and guide for the evolving thought-process, but this is above the philosophy not only, it is directly against it. The absolute itself is taken to be wholly a logical movement, and any assumption of an originating personality, to begin and guide the movement, must be remanded back to the logical process it assumes

to originate and govern. The philosophy allows no other devotion than to an *idealistic or transcendental* Pantheism.

Once more only; without at all mastering, or indeed using any of the profound processes of the transcendental Logic, there is a philosophy pretty widely spread and of much present persistency, which simply assumes the fact of development, and applies the naked unsolved fact to nature, humanity, and history. Matter and mind are in parallel harmonious development, and all the single facts in each are but the successive outcoming from this perpetual ongoing. The whole must receive connection and form from the secret resistless power which is evermore silently and steadily and spontaneously working out its issues. All seeming evil in any part is but unmixed good in the whole, and the events, each in its place, have no alternative of being or circumstance. This inner power which so mysteriously develops itself in the particular is the God of the whole, and the fact developed is but an expression of the power developing. If a Deity be assumed as opening the evolution and personally determining the process, the philosophy must exclude the Theism, for the developing power in parallel lines is the All, and necessarily evolves itself in its one order of working. It is Pantheism as a development of the One in the many, but it does not go up in its philosophy to its germ, that we may characterize it as being a *realistic* or an *idealistic* Pantheism.

In some one of the above forms of pantheism will very nearly the whole of all modern methods of speculation terminate. Fully carried out, few will be found to escape this issue. The logical understanding is set to the work of expounding the problems prompted by the reason, and this function can work only amid the connections of nature, and can have no dealings with the supernatural. Many, perhaps most of these modern speculators, have a personal God in their creed, and many of them doubtless worship him in spirit and in truth, but their philosophy more than ignores, it positively excludes a personal Deity. The Theism cannot be in the creed but at the expense of the philosophy. The most intelligent and active supporters of the radical scepticism of the

age well know that their philosophy is identical with the great mass of the theologic world, and they are resting their persistent objections to all the claims of spiritual piety and worship, upon processes of speculation completely in common with those processes which sustain the philosophy of the multitude of religious Theists. They limit human knowledge to sensation or to the logical faculty judging according to sense, and then let the methods of speculation be what they may, it must issue in their favor and against all Theism which adopts the same limitations for the human mind. It is becoming more and more manifest that Theism must attain to some higher philosophy, or the Pantheist has the whole field of speculation to himself, and can carry all matters in it his own way and for his own conclusions. The spontaneous working of the reason and the teaching of revelation may suffice for faith in a personal God while it is left wholly unquestioned, but when the man's philosophy is radically pantheistic and he is driven to examine his faith in the light of his philosophy, one or the other must necessarily be renounced.

The truly pious theist will doubtless sacrifice his philosophy and keep his theology, but how halting and hesitating must he often be in directing his onward footsteps! And as it relates to the world at large, can a stable Theism be maintained and propagated, when it has been forced to admit that it can live only by choking and smothering all philosophical thinking? The sufficiently significant forewarning is already given in the estimate made of such Theologians as habitually decry reason and denounce all philosophical discussion. And more specially is the admonition startling to every pious mind, when it comes to be admitted that with these assumed necessary limitations of human thought, the very terms and the only terms in which we can give expression to our Theism will involve self-contradiction and absurdity. If the experimental Christian be retained in spite of the logical contradiction, little ground is there for hope that the logical Sceptic will be won over to embrace or respect the faith which cannot fairly clear itself from such encumbrances. If wiser and more comprehensive theological thinkers come not to the rescue, the hold of re-

vealed religion upon independent minds will surely grow weaker and weaker.

There is thus the most urgent need of a philosophy in harmony with a Theistic Creed, and directly concurring with the teachings of revelation. Theology cannot triumph in the adoption of a philosophy which gainsays it. There will necessarily to us be mysteries beyond reason; even mysteries still remaining while the Bible may have brought some within reason; but never will a truly divine revelation enjoin faith upon any man in that which is against reason. Those calm and thoughtful men, therefore, who are earnestly and prayerfully laboring for a philosophy sufficiently comprehensive to accord with and stand by their Christian Faith, while they may awaken the needless fears of the timid and encounter the mistaken reproaches of the ignorant, will nevertheless be sure of the encouragement of all enlightened minds, and may piously expect the approbation of God.

And now, the philosophy which the Bible recognises is clearly the product of a rational insight, and not a mere logical deduction from naked experience. All formal and technical and philosophical terms and statements are excluded, and yet everywhere it is assumed that principles are prior to facts and have determined the facts to be, and to be just as they are. The facts disclose the divine wisdom and goodness and righteousness, not because they are the mere products of Omnipotence, but because the power which made them conformed itself in the making to the rule of eternal principle. The old Patriarchs and Prophets knew little of modern science, but they did clearly see that the order and harmony of nature was the result of power regulated by eternal Law. Hence Job says of the God of the Universe, "He maketh peace in his high places". And David says, "Thou hast established the earth and it abideth. They continue this day according to thy ordinances". David never apprehended the particular mathematics of the heavenly movements, but he did have a most lively apprehension that the hand of their Creator was moved in the beginning by immutable truth when he said, "The heavens declare the glory

of God, and the firmament showeth his handy work". Solomon had given himself to a broad examination of nature, and a wide observation of vegetable and animal life, and though he knew little of the modern application of statics and dynamics, or the technics of modern physiology, yet how sublimely did he rise above experience, and go back of all the epochs in creation and stand alone with God before a fact yet was, and apprehend the eternal principles personified in the Wisdom which was to determine all facts yet to come, and say, "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. When he prepared the heavens I was there; when he set a compass upon the face of the depth". There must be truth older than the facts, and guiding the hand that makes the facts, or we can recognise no wisdom from the facts. We may admit the being of substances and causes, and that they give efficient connections to sensible qualities and events, and in such connections we may have a philosophy which gives unity and consistency to nature, but if the substances are barely apprehended as standing under and holding the qualities, and the causes as merely standing between and linking the events, but we have no insight there of the eternal principles determining and expounding these connections, it will be but a very vague and unsatisfactory philosophy. There will be a notional connecting the phenomenal, but how and why thus and not otherwise will all be left in darkness.

But when we attain a clear conception of Force, and how equilibrating activities become static, we in this apprehend the intrinsic being of Substance itself, and the eternal law for its determination of the qualities; and when in the conception of Force we also see how countervailing activities become dynamic, we in this apprehend the intrinsic being of Cause and the eternal laws for all motion and change. Nature is thus made luminous in its substantial being and efficient working, and every cause becomes an intelligible Idea; a living, acting, real being in the Platonic acceptance, and in itself clearly

revealing how it must determine the phenomenal becoming. A true Platonic philosophy with an intelligible cosmology is given, and in full harmony with the Bible representation; a revealing of the true "Idea" and a restriction of it to its legitimate being, and thus a revived Platonism which no future Aristotle may controvert or discard.

And still further, the Theism of the Bible is in an important and most sublime sense a Pantheism. In the Scriptures God is made to be "All in all". "By him all things consist." We "live and move and have our being in God". He is the All in such a sense that all things come from and stand in him, and a withdrawalment of his energy in anything must be followed by its instant annihilation. But the distinction between the Bible and all heretical Pantheism is broadly marked in this; the Bible starts with an absolute will in Liberty, and thus with a proper personality, and this personal God "in the beginning creates the heavens and the earth". With creative power wholly at his own disposal, and exerting and guiding it entirely by what in himself he sees is due to himself, he speaks the word and the worlds stand forth. They come from him in such a meaning that his constant act sustains them and when that activity is withdrawn they are no more. "These wait all upon thee,—Thou takest away their breath, they die and return to their dust. Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created and thou renewest the face of the earth." All heretical Pantheism starts with an impersonality, a germ of physical or logical energy, which is the same in its being at the beginning as at its close and merely changes its modes of manifestation. All its changes run their course from no ethical rule, but completely in an already conditioned necessity which admits no alternative. The last is always and everywhere nature; the first is wholly supernatural, above time and irrespective of space, and both nature and nature's space and time are the products of his originating activity. "Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honor and power, for thou hast created all things and for thy pleasure they are, and were created."

The turning point for a philosophy of Pantheism or of a

Bible Theism is in the clear conception of a Will in Liberty, in the recognition of which only can any proper personality be apprehended. Nature has no Liberty, but in its first cause and last effect the whole is throughout a conditioned necessity. This is as truly so in sentient life as in material forces. The constitutional craving determines the happiness and the act to gain it, in the animal, as necessarily in the conditions as does the force of gravity in its conditions determine the motion of matter. Nor is mere spontaneity, as with Coleridge, sufficient for the conception of a personal will, for even the thought-movement of the German Idealist is a pure spontaneity, and assumed to be carried up to absolute spontaneity, but its going forth of its own accord in logical development is quite another matter than a going forth for its own excellency's sake in an ethical purpose. No spontaneous thinking is a free willing, and no free thought is a moral purpose. The spontaneity of will in Liberty is no blind act, but has the insight of a rational spirit knowing what is due to itself to direct it. The spirit is neither senseless matter, nor sentient animal, nor logical thinking, but other and more excellent than them all. This spirit in knowing itself knows that all the former should be held in subserviency to its own end, and that it will debase itself to put itself subservient to them. It must be its own end and not means to any foreign end. In this knowing what is due to itself in its own right, the spirit is a law to itself and finds in itself a rule for directing its entire executive action. It may in this keep itself free from all foreign coercion whatsoever. It is the high prerogative of a rational spirit that it may and should direct all its agency to the end of its own worthiness or proper dignity. Nature has its control imposed upon itself from without, spirit is supernatural and has its control from within, and in its consciousness of its own behests can exclude or deny all the solicitations or threatenings of nature. Not mere consciousness, but this consciousness of self-claim, and thus the power of self-control, gives a proper will and constitutes personality.

This prerogative of will in Liberty admits of an accurate discrimination through various peculiarities in a short compass,

and this is so important to our ultimate design that it may hardly with justice be omitted.

The executive function for attaining any end of an agent and thereby doing his pleasure we will here include under the term Will in its most comprehensive acceptation (*Arbitrium*). The end which the executive action is to gain in sentient nature is happiness. There may be prudential considerations coming within the judgment from experience, that shall determine between immediate passionate gratification and the greater happiness upon the whole, yet in each case the end is the same, and the last dictate of the judgment wherein is the greater happiness carries the will without an alternative. This is very generally put as the only conception of will, and the highest freedom that can be known is assumed to be the doing as one pleases. But this pleasing is in the sentient constitution itself, and thus as wholly within nature and as little in liberty as the movement of the tides or the changing of the seasons. It is merely the executing of sentient craving desire and is only animal will (*brutum arbitrium*). But the consciousness of the rational spirit, revealing what is due to itself in the right of its intrinsic excellency of being and the claims of its highest worthiness, sets at once an ethical rule over against the sentient gratification and gives the agent freedom from the domination of appetite. In this only have we a free executive that can at all be known as a responsible will (*liberum arbitrium*).

The animal will is solely in execution of the sentient pleasing, but can possibly have no ethical end for its execution. We here leave this as of no further use than that we should clearly discriminate it, and take into consideration only the proper ethical will as having alone any liberty and true responsibility. The rational spirit with its end in worthiness and not in happiness, and by which there is self-law and therefore liberty, may be incarnate and the ethical and sentient ends stand together in one being, in which compound ends of agency we have the human will (*lib. arbitrium humanum*). The rational spirit may also be apprehended as standing out in purely incorporeal being and separate from all that is sen-

tient, and here we have the purely spiritual will (*lib. arbitrium angelicum*).

The human will should hold all sentient appetite subordinate to worthiness of moral character, and it may be so conceived as holding happiness strictly and constantly in subjection to the end of worthiness; and so also the purely spiritual will may be supposed to restrain from all inordinate spiritual promptings; and here, in both man and angel, we have the controlling good will (*lib. arbitrium regnans*). On the other hand, the human will may fall in with the sentient desire, and discarding its own end, may set itself to work for the ends of the sentient, although in thus subjecting itself to the animal it does by no means lose itself in and become the animal; and the angel also may admit discontent within the spirit and seek to usurp some higher station and execute the impulses of spiritual pride and envy and hatred; and in each case we have the evil will which has sold itself in bondage (*lib. arbitrium serviens*).

Both the man and angel may have their period of probation in which it is designed that the good will shall be exercised, tried, and strengthened, and yet, however steadily and firmly it may endure and hold itself in sovereignty, it is perpetually in an enemy's country and must maintain a constant watch and warfare (*lib. arbitrium militans*). But when the probation has been passed and the man and the angel enter their state of reward and confirmation, justified on the ground of a gracious substitution or of personal merit, the good will is henceforth in the position of a crowned conqueror (*lib. arbitrium triumphans*). In himself, the crowned victor is still open to temptation and liable to lapse into bondage, yet has he passed into such a region of divine influences that a way of escape is ever made, and the triumphant spirit holds on his eternal course with a perpetually justifying conscience (*lib. arbitrium approbens*).

We lastly, conceive this rational spirit as standing above all, supreme and independent. There is to it in possession all archetypal principles, and in the end of its majesty and dignity all ethical rules, and there is in this a personal will

wholly absolved from all outer conditions and all foreign determinations (*lib. arbitrium absolutum*). The perfection of being and station possessed by the Absolute Spirit places him beyond all possible proposing of any end that can collide with that of his own worthiness and glory. "God cannot be tempted of evil." Nothing can come in conflict with the end of his glory; "he cannot deny himself". There is not merely a justifying conscience as with the finite good will that holds a vanquished foe continually under, but the serenity and tranquillity which never knew an inward conflict. The blessedness of undisturbed holiness (*lib. arbitrium complacens*).

And here, in this thoroughly completed conception of a Will in Liberty carried up to Absolute Personality, we have a truly rational Psychology in which is the only door of escape from Pantheism and a philosophical entrance upon a pure Theism. Here is a true, holy, personal Deity in full conformity with the revealed God of the Bible. He can originate being from himself and intelligibly be Creator of universal nature, and not, as in all heretical Pantheism, a cause caused, necessarily evolving itself as already nature. He executes, not at all from sentient impulses toward happiness, but solely from the reason-claim of his own dignity, or what is the same thing, for his own glory.

In his own agency he can set activities over against and balancing each other, and herein create real static being which is a substantial world. He can combine the static forces with such excess of energy in given directions as shall induce motion and give inherent dynamic efficiency. The stable world is thus also a changing world of causes and events passing on orderly and intelligibly under his providential government and guided to the consummation of his purposes. The unseen spiritual activities constitute the substantial forces, and these determine the organic impressions which induce all the sensible appearances. "The worlds were formed by the word of God, so that the things which are seen were not made of things which do appear."

ART. II.—RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION IN COLLEGES.

By DANIEL R. GOODWIN, D.D., Provost of the University of Pennsylvania.

I. *Reasons for Religious Instruction in Colleges.*

1. It belongs to the *original idea of the College*, as a matter of *fact*. The European Universities, the English, and the American Colleges were founded more especially for religious purposes. In Europe this idea has been very much lost; in England and America, to a good degree, retained. The difference in *character* and *aim* between a German University and an English or American College is now so great that there is scarcely any room for an analogy between them. And the different *results* of the two systems upon the prevailing style of thought and speculation, upon national character and development, upon morals and religion, are scarcely less marked and diverse.

2. It belongs to the *proper idea* of the College, in *theory*. Colleges are intended, not to teach young men some one definite art, or trade, or science, or several such, but to lay the foundation for an honorable and useful life, in a generous culture of the whole mind and character.

3. Moral and Religious training is an *essential part* of this work—quite as essential as classical, or mathematical, or scientific training; and the Religious is not less essential than the Moral, for, among other reasons, no moral training can be complete in itself, or have any safe or solid basis, without religion.

4. The experiment of banishing religion from College was tried, under Jefferson's influence, in the University of Virginia, and failed. The proscribed Chapel it was found absolutely necessary to restore.

5. Religious Instruction is *necessary* in our Colleges. Without it they would be very unsafe places for the four years' residence of large classes of young men. The College has peculiar *dangers*, arising among other causes, from the assemblage of a large number of young men freed from the wholesome restraints and sweet influences of home. It should, therefore, furnish in its bosom, it *must* furnish, peculiar *safeguards*; and these are best found in religious influence and instruction. Of course we here have in view the New England idea of a College, i. e., an institution which takes the *whole* charge of its pupils for the time being, and stands toward them *in loco parentis*.

6. Religious Instruction in Colleges is highly *useful*. The benefits to be derived from it by the pupils with reference to their highest interests and *future* happiness are incalculable, and therefore I do not propose to estimate them or dwell upon them. There are also *present* advantages to the *pupils* derivable from religious instruction as furnishing the highest and most powerful motives to all that is good, and the strongest restraints from evil, and to the *Faculty*, not only as men but as teachers and moral governors.

7. Religious Instruction in Colleges is the dictate of general *policy*. If religious training were banished from our Colleges, Christian men must lose much of their interest in them, and they would cast about for some new institutions—call them what you may—where religious and intellectual culture might be combined. Colleges without religious instruction might not be useless,—might not be productive of positive mischief,—but they would certainly fail to accomplish the full measure of good, and especially that particular kind of good, with which a Christian could not, without absolute necessity, consent to dispense. But our Colleges have been and still are, for the most part, under the special control of certain religious denominations, and they are accustomed to appeal for their support to the religious community. There cannot, therefore, be any *necessity* for their dispensing with religious instruction.

II. *The nature and extent of the Religious Instruction to be given.*

1. This is not easily defined with precision, and I shall not undertake any complete or detailed statement. In general, however, it should be sufficient to produce the impression upon the students' minds, that religion is the genius, the pervading and controlling influence, of the place.

2. It should be free from cant, but distinctively, thoroughly, and boldly *Christian*. We should not be ashamed or afraid, as Christian Instructors, in Christian Colleges, to speak of Christ and his Gospel, his authority, his precepts, his example, his Spirit, his Cross, and his Salvation.

3. It should be connected with a recognition of *Christian Institutions*. The Lord's day and other religious ordinances should be treated with due observance. The College routine should involve a recognition of the supreme and constant claims of religion in daily hours of common prayer.

4. I do not say that it should be rational or liberal, because those terms have been abused both by claimants and opponents; but it should be *intelligent*. It should set forth the great *principles* of Christian truth and morals. It should be particularly characterized by a thorough dealing with *principles*.

5. It should contain a patient and philosophical *apology* and *defence* of the Christian System, its Evidences, the grounds of Faith, its harmony with reason and science, with nature and experience.

6. It should be *plain* and *direct*, *practical* and *personal*, applied to the daily habits and character, and to the peculiar duties and temptations of a College life. Students need to learn that the College does not release them from the claims of humanity, morality, and religion. It annuls no old duties, but adds new ones. The responsibilities of students are only greater—not less—than those of other men.

7. Above all, it should be supported and confirmed by the force of Christian *example*. There should be preserved among the Teachers in a College a prevailing tone of Christian ear-

nestness, devout feeling and practical piety. Example is the most potent instructor. The general spirit makes a far deeper impression than the particular lesson.

III. *Obstacles and Objections.*

The analogy of classical training may be appealed to as a means of obviating many of the objections that are made to Religious instruction in Colleges—as when it is decried as *unpopular*, as *antiquated*, as out of harmony with the spirit of the age, etc., etc. The simple answer in both cases is, that *Colleges* should be *Colleges*. But it will be necessary to answer some objections more in detail.

1. "*Irreligious Teachers.*—Our Colleges are not (and ought not to be) so constituted that Christian piety is a necessary qualification for their Professors; and therefore it is inconsistent to require them to give religious instruction." None of the Teachers in a Christian College should be atheists or infidels—none such should be employed. Some of the Teachers, at least, should be *religious* men, and charged with the special office of religious instruction. For the rest, a wise discretion may be used in securing the highest talent and the best men in the several departments of instruction.

2. "*An irreligious Age.*—Religious instruction in Colleges may have been very well in earlier and more religious times, but in an irreligious age like this, as it is uncalled for by the public mind, it is out of place, and must be comparatively useless." Perhaps the present age is no more irreligious than former ages. It probably is not so irreligious as the age immediately subsequent to the American Revolution, when President Dwight gave religious instruction in Yale College. But if the present age is distinguished as peculiarly irreligious, Colleges should resist and check the downward current instead of falling in with it. This is their proper office and their imperative duty. It is the true *policy*, too, as well as the bounden *duty*, of Colleges, not to throw away the ægis of religion. The highest science and the greatest learning are certainly compatible with religion—nay more, are elevated, and pro-

moted and vitalized by its influence upon the mind and character.

3. "*Sectarianism.*" We need only pronounce the word; the objection will develop itself. But there certainly is no *need*, in order to have religious instruction in College, of *Sectarian* teaching in any offensive sense of the word. And if there were, it would be better that each sect should have its College, than that Colleges should have no religion. I certainly regard the religious tenets of some Christian denominations as very erroneous and defective. But after all, the general positive teaching of any denomination, when the teachers are men of liberal culture, will, for the most part, be good, true, and wholesome. I do not believe that there is, in our Colleges, on the whole, any undue disposition, under cover of religious instruction, to make proselytes. This is done in a more private and insinuating way, if at all. *Policy*, if not *principle*, is here a sufficient safeguard. In fact, the objection of *Sectarianism* is rather plausible than pertinent. There is far more danger of too little religion in Colleges, than of too much *Sectarianism*. Parents may prefer the college of their own denomination; and so, if they are earnest and true Christian men, they should; but, if they are wise, they will prefer the College of any Christian denomination to a College without any religion.

4. "*Peculiar character and mental habits of students,—rendering them especially insusceptible to religious impressions.*"

If this be true, it is an argument instead of an objection. For in this case, college students require that special care and pains should be devoted to their religious training. If to be neglected is dangerous to others, it must be doubly dangerous, it must be absolutely ruinous, *to them*. Besides, it is of the last consequence that they who are to have so great an influence in shaping the opinions and character of their own and of the next generation should not be left to sink into the gulf of indifference, irreligion, scepticism, and infidelity. The objection only reveals the peculiar and vast importance of special religious instruction in Colleges.

5. "*Some of the Funds of our Colleges were not designed for this purpose.*"

This is very true. But none of the funds of our Colleges were designed by their donors to prohibit or exclude from these institutions this department of instruction. I trust that the offer of funds, however large, on such conditions, would be indignantly refused by any College in the land; certainly it would be so refused by any College in New England. The offer of such funds would be an insult to the Christian religion, and such a foundation ought to be voided in law. Even in Girard College,—and I do not forget the peculiar sense in which it is called a *College*,—it has been found advisable and necessary, on all practical grounds, to introduce a thorough system of religious instruction,—only without the intervention of clergymen, but none the less sectarian, none the more effective for all that. It may not, indeed, be honestly consistent with the intentions of the founders of some particular professorships that those who are to occupy such chairs should be required to be men of Christian piety or of a strictly religious character. But that is a very different thing from excluding religion and religious instruction wholly from every department in such Colleges. And, on the other hand, it is a serious question whether there is any College—at least in New England—where it would not be a gross perversion of some, and perhaps, of a greater part, of the funds, to exclude religious instruction entirely. But reason and honesty both require that, if any religious instruction is given or attempted, it should not be a mere pretence, or a mockery; and *that* it must be, unless a serious effort is made to render it thorough and effective. No religious instruction at all is better than a mere heartless formality or a hypocritical make-believe, or a mere slurring it over to save appearances.

6. *“Religious Instruction had better be left to other independent and purely ecclesiastical agencies, while the College organization should take care of the Literary, Scientific, and (perhaps) the Moral, training of the Students.”*

If other and independent agencies will do this work for Colleges, and so far as they can and will do it,—*well*. But unless they do it, and so far as they fail to do it, it still remains the bounden duty of each College to do it for itself. If Col-

lege students can conveniently attend public worship in the parish churches on Sunday, it is well; indeed, it is, in my opinion, *better*, in many important respects, than that they should attend such worship by themselves in a College Chapel;—though the Chapel and the Church may, perhaps, in some cases, be advantageously *combined*. But after all, College students need a great deal of peculiar religious and moral instruction, and a great deal of constant religious training and influence which the parish churches will not afford. They are committed to the parental care of the College, and the Christian College is bound, *in loco parentis*, to provide and secure for them all that religious instruction and influence, training, care, and discipline, which a Christian parent is bound to seek and secure for his children.

7. "*Religious Worship and Instruction may be very well in Colleges, as voluntary exercises; but they should be forced upon nobody; attendance upon religious worship or instruction should not be compulsory, but should be free to those who choose it, or, perhaps, required of those—but only of those—whose parents or guardians may desire it.*"

This objection proposes, in its *animus*, entirely to ignore the fact that College students are, for the most part, *minors*, are all in a state of *pupilage*, and are, therefore, not to be left to themselves to judge what they will attend to and what they will not attend to, but are "under tutors and governors", are to learn obedience, learn to submit to restraint, guidance, instruction, and not to be followed with mere persuasions and entreaties. And thus this objection loses unwittingly more than half its logical force when, at last, it admits that parents and guardians may prescribe what their sons and wards may be required in College to attend. If *they* may so prescribe, then the College may prescribe what *all* its students shall be required to attend. And if it is suggested that, at least, those students whom their parents or guardians may desire to be excused altogether from attending religious exercises and receiving religious instruction, should be accordingly excused, I answer that, even if this suggestion were admitted, the cases which would call for its application would—I think and trust

—be very few and rare. But it involves a false *principle*, and is not to be admitted. For the Christian College does not undertake to represent each individual parent with all his peculiar opinions and tastes and whims and prejudices, in regard either to the course of study to be pursued or to the style of instruction, or to the methods of discipline, or to the rules of morality, or to the doctrines of philosophy or religion, that are to be taught. The phrase, *in loco parentis*, does not mean, in place of *the* parent, of *each* parent, but, in place of *a* parent.

The College stands, to every one of its students alike, in the place and relation of a wise and judicious Christian parent. It may not reject even Infidel, Jewish, or Mohammedan pupils, but it must receive them only on condition that they will submit, with the rest, to a Christian education. In justice to itself and to its Christian pupils, it cannot do otherwise. And if *they* do not choose to receive a Christian education, they must go elsewhere. Such persons, or their friends and co-religionists, have, with us, the same liberty which every denomination of Christians also has, to establish appropriate schools or colleges of their own.

8. "*It is inconsistent to demand religious instruction in Colleges and to dispense with it in the Common Schools.*"

Perhaps it is. And certainly religious instruction is very desirable in the Common Schools. I wish with all my heart it could be secured. But, after all, their case and that of Colleges are different. The Common Schools are State Institutions, supported from the common taxes and the common treasury; and in them all classes and denominations of the community have an equal right and claim. Colleges, on the other hand, have, indeed, certain rights and immunities secured to them by the State—and so have churches—and sometimes receive a certain degree of patronage or aid from the State, as a free gift; but they are essentially *eleemosynary foundations*, private institutions, are under the charge of private corporations (with more or less of oversight, it may be, from the State), and are controlled, in almost every instance, by some one or more bodies or denominations of men, professing—in connection with the special peculiarities of each—

the *common Christian faith*. The State allows, or should allow, every sect or denomination of religionists to have and endow its own College, if it will; and endeavors, or should endeavor, to treat them all with impartiality. None, therefore, has any right to complain that he is compelled either to forego a collegiate education, or to receive it together with a sort of religious instruction which he repudiates. If there are any Colleges which are as properly *State Institutions* as the Common Schools are, there is then, doubtless, much the same objection to special religious instruction in one case as in the other. Still there is, even then, one further difference in the two cases. The Common Schools are, and must be, so arranged that the children attend them day by day from their homes, and while under the domestic charge of their parents and friends; so that the Common Schools are not under the same responsibility in regard to the thorough moral and religious training of their pupils as the College is under; which, as we have said, assumes, *in loco parentis*, the entire charge, for the time being, of the guidance and training of its pupils, of the formation and development of their whole character.

9. "*Informal, individual, general, spontaneous, religious influence in Colleges is to be preferred as more effective than an established, organized, official, and formal routine and method.*"

This may be true. But why especially said of *Colleges*? This secret, quiet, invisible, yet all-pervading spontaneous, personal influence is of the greatest importance in Colleges; and without it no machinery, no organizations, no perfunctory instruction, no formal routine will produce any considerable good effect. It must give life and soul to the whole body of means. But the same is true everywhere else as well as in College. Nevertheless, it has not yet been generally thought advisable to abolish the Christian Church and all its institutions, all regular external and formal religious instruction and worship. Indeed, it is equally true that, without these, those invisible influences would not produce half their effect, and—what is more—in the course of time, would inevitably and utterly die out of the world. The soul without the body

is no more fit to perform its functions, in the present state, than the body without the soul.

10. "*But finally, as matters are, this routine of formal religious service and instruction in Colleges is productive of very little practical good effect.*"

If this were simply denied, it would not be easy for the objector to prove his point. But I am ready, with regret indeed, yet freely and fully, to admit, that religious instruction in Colleges, like many other parts of the College curriculum, is felt by too many of the students to be irksome, stupid, *a bore*; and that, on the whole, it is much less effective than were to be desired—I may even add—almost discouragingly ineffectual. But the same may be said of preaching in general, and of formal religious instruction everywhere. Yet who would venture to say how much worse the world would be, and how much worse our Colleges would be, if all established routine of religious service and all formal religious instruction were abolished? The adage applies here, as in so many other cases: "The duty is ours, the result is with God".

But, after all, I am confident it will be found, on a fair and impartial examination of the facts, that religious instruction in Colleges is not without manifest and most important results. I believe it is, on the whole and on an average, more successful there than any where else in the world. Not only does it lead, in cases not a few, to the formation of a thorough religious character, accompanied with an open profession of Christian piety; but it is, in fact, one of the most effective agencies by which large numbers of young men are rescued from immoral courses, from the scepticism that so naturally besets their age and circumstances, from infidel tendencies and opinions, from open hostility to Christianity, from religious indifference, and from the sway of merely worldly motives; and are annually sent forth into the world as defenders and bulwarks of that religion to which otherwise they might have proved the most persistent and dangerous foes.

I believe that multitudes of the graduates of our Colleges look back with thankfulness to the religious instruction there received, as having been among the most important and effect-

ual means of quickening, deepening, and steadying their religious convictions; that comparatively few will refer to it as having had no good influence upon their minds; and that a very small number indeed will charge it with having produced upon them—even by their own perversion—any injurious consequences.

I believe that, where the services of the *College Chapel* have been conducted and attended with that degree of propriety which ought to be, and may easily be, observed and maintained in them, those services will be remembered and referred to by the great mass of graduates with a hearty gush of reverence and gratitude and delight.

MORE *religious instruction*, and *not less*, is the reform that is needed. This, at least, is my profound conviction. Our Colleges require it. The Christian community demands it. As Christian men, we who have the immediate charge of Colleges, cannot allow ourselves to become parties to any combination or movement to refuse it. We must gladly and heartily bestir ourselves to secure it.

ART. III.—SWEDENBORG'S THEORY OF THE DIVINE-HUMAN.

By EDWARD A. LAWRENCE, D.D., Professor in East Windsor, Ct.

EVERY system claiming to be Christian must be judged of by the view which it gives of Christ. He is central in Christianity, not simply as its great teacher, but as its substance and author. The human and the divine are in him. Any philosophical rendering of the facts of Christian history must admit these two elements as fundamental, and give some intelligible and consistent account of their nature and relations. Are they one substance merely, or two? Are they identical, or distinct? If the latter, in what do they differ, and in what agree; if the former, what constitutes their unity? Upon

these questions, the great majority of the followers of Christ have ever been in substantial harmony. A few in almost every generation have dissented from the common faith. Some have elaborated new systems with more or less constructive skill, and claimed the merit of originality and the reputation of philosophers. Others, with like ingenuity, have wrought the same nebulous materials into different forms and asked for their work the authority of revelations, and for themselves the character of seers.

Of this latter class is Emanuel Swedenborg. He claims that God appeared to him in person, and commissioned him to unfold the hitherto concealed truths of his Word, and that he promised to *dictate* to him what he should write. He affirms that in this capacity of a revelator of the spiritual sense of the Word, he was Christ's vicar, and came in his stead as the predicted second advent. Passing by his extraordinary pretensions as an infallible exegete and revelator, we wish to examine his doctrine of the Divine-Human. We have the greater interest in ascertaining what this doctrine is, because it is central in his system. It is held by his followers as "the master-mystery", the chief of the "disclosures vouchsafed by the Lord to his servant Swedenborg". It involves some of those fundamental doctrines on which, what claims to be the New church differs from the Old, which the Swedish seer, a hundred years ago, pronounced corrupt and dead or dying. "Not a single truth", he says, "remains in it". "It knows nothing of eternal life." "The whole Christian world hath acknowledged three Gods." The faith of the New church and the Old "do not agree in a single point or particular". They are "diametrically opposite to each other in their nature and quality." And he supposed that the old doctrine might be entirely discredited in the church in about eighty years, chiefly by means of his writings, especially his "Brief Exposition."

"I do not recollect", says John Mill, "that I ever saw a passage in Swedenborg's writings that indicates anything about reforming the churches. . . their utter *annihilation* is taken for granted. Yes, Swedenborg, we must have a New church, for the Old one is dead—dead as a door-nail".

This belligerent attitude excites our curiosity. Its boldness of proscription surprises us, and its radical destructionism, coming from such earnest men, claiming to be "the Christians", almost startles us. It is well to examine the standpoint of these accusers with carefulness and candor; well to know exactly what the Apostle of this New church teaches on the vital points of the Christian religion. He must, therefore, be allowed to speak for himself. And if there shall be mystery as to his meaning who claims a divine commission to make *plain* the meaning of the inspired writers, his most intelligent followers must be his interpreters.

Any full view of the teachings of this school upon the subject before us, brings under inspection the two elements — the Divine and human, God and man, Theology and anthropology. The Swedenborgian idea of the Divine will unfold itself as the one Substance or Unity, the Trinity, and Personality.*

1st. The one Substance. "God is Substance or Being Itself, the first and the only Substance," or, what is the same, "the one only Substance is God." This is the original, absolute divine, and in the strictest sense, the divine Unity.†

"God is also Form itself, the first and the only real Form." Thus the Unity passed into a Dualism. The Substance and Form are distinct in conception, yet absolutely inseparable. "Substance which is not also form is a non-entity." God can no more exist without Form than a man, or a tree, or a stone.‡

These two, Substance and Form, stand related as primitive and derivative; yet their oneness is called *marriage*. This is the conjugal in God, and is a fundamental element by which the system may be distinguished as the Conjugal theology. The first marriage was not between two *persons*, but between Substance and Form, two abstract principles in the divine

* The writings of Swedenborg, to which reference is made in this article, are indicated by the initials, the numbers denoting the sections. The following are the works: *Arcana Celestia*, *True Christian Religion*, *Divine Love and Wisdom*, *Apocalypse Revealed*, *Apocalypse Explained*, *Doctrine of the Lord*, *Brief Exposition*, *The Last Judgment*, *Doctrine of Life*, *Heaven and Hell*, *Athanasian Creed*, *Canons*, *Divine Providence*, *Conjugal Love*.

† T. C. R. 18, 76.

‡ T. O. R. 21, 28, 49.

nature. All marriage is essentially the same. Love and wisdom are synonymes for these conjugal partners in the divine. So are *Esse* and *Existere*, Will and Understanding, Good and Truth, Affection and Thought, Charity and Faith, Man and Woman, Heat and Light, Soul and Body. All these are only different terms for the dualism of the Divine Nature, — Substance and Form.

The result of this ideal marriage in the Divine is outbirth—called creation. It is the emanation of the One Substance into the universe, the formation or modification of God—the finiting of the Infinite, the limiting of the Limitless, the conditioning of the Unconditioned. Thus the universe and God are the same Substance. Creation is only *evolution*, expansion, or the formation of God. The universe, as substance, always was; and theology, by this philosophy, runs itself into cosmology, and cosmology into Pantheism.*

2d. The Trinity. The idea of operation, Proceeding, or modification of the one Substance, brings out the Swedenborgian Trinity—the *Esse*, *Existere*, and *Procedere*. In the Christian garb of this philosophical formula, the *Esse* or Substance, is called the Father-principle; the *Existere* or Form, is called the Son-principle, and the *Procedere* the Holy Spirit-principle. Thus the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost become the three essentials of one God, which make one like the soul, body, and operation. This trinity exists in the Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, born into the world, and is the trinity of the New church.

Although this is called a trinity of essentials, yet Swedenborg expressly teaches that it was not before the world was created, but after. “That God was triune before the world was created, the Sacred Scripture does not teach, nor does reason, thence illuminated, see.” “When God became incarnate, the trinity was provided and made, and came into being in the Lord Jesus Christ. Previously there was neither Unity in Trinity, nor Trinity in Unity, for these are in the Lord Jesus Christ only.”†

* T. C. R. 33. † T. C. R. 166, 188, 170, C. on Trinity, chapters 1–5.

This, we believe, is a correct view of the New Church Trinity. It denies all personal distinctions in the Godhead, and rests its claim on a trinity of essentials. Yet, it ignores, virtually, this trinity of essentials, as unscriptural and unreasonable, and thus seems to deny exactly what it affirms. An essential of God is something which is necessary to his Being, and hence eternal, without which he would not be God, but something else. If, therefore, the trinity was not from eternity—not until creation, then God, the Divine did not exist from eternity, but became God at the creation. Swedenborg allows a potentiality or capacity in the One Substance of evolving a trinity of essentials, but this before creation was not a real trinity, but only a possible, an ideal one. In reality, there was neither Unity in Trinity before the world was created, nor Trinity in Unity.

3d. The doctrine of the divine Personality is as peculiar as that of the Trinity. God is declared to be one *in* Person. The Triune is one because it is *of* one person. The divine and the human in the Lord *are* one person.* But as the trinity is not from eternity, but was brought into being in the Lord Jesus Christ, it is evident that the personality was produced in the same way. God was in person, after the world was created, in the Lord Jesus Christ. Was he a person, or in person before? The system, if we understand it, says, No. As there was no trinity in essence from eternity, so there was no Personality of substance. Personality is no more proper to the divine *Esse* by this philosophy than is the trinity. Each, from eternity, is only ideal. Neither trinity nor personality is intrinsic or substantial, but both circumstantial and extrinsic. God, as Spirit or Substance, is not a person. The Father is not a person, nor the Son, nor the Spirit. But He operates into and in Jesus Christ as *in* a person. The personality is in the sphere of nature and not of spirit, the finite, and not the infinite. It is a product, of which time and space are the factors. It fades away where these are not, in the realm of spirits, and there turns into the idea of *thing*.

* D. L. W. 146; D. L. 34; A. C. 13.

That this is a just rendering of the system, is evident from its general treatment of the idea of person.

1st. It allows no personal Satan. By this term is meant only evil in the abstract, or the complex hell.*

2d. It excludes the idea of person from the spiritual sense of the divine Word. It is allowed to be in the *letter* or natural sense, but perishes and turns into the idea of *thing* in the spiritual.†

3d. It excludes the distinctions of person from the spirits in heaven. The soul in its essence and origin is spirit—pure substance, and non-personal. Hence nothing is known in heaven concerning a single person spoken of in the Word—not who Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are, but *what* only. “Hence the angels always remove ideas of person, and remain in ideas of things.”‡

4th. The idea of person is excluded from the distinctions in the divine nature.§ Swedenborg admits that “the Christians of the first ages, who read the word according to the sense of the letter, distinguished the divinity into three persons,” that “the Lord prayed unto the Father as to one different from himself”, and that “he spoke of the Father as of a different person”. But this was only an *apparent* truth, the representation of the letter. The Rev. Mr. Hayden also admits that the language of the New Testament conveys the idea of a personal Trinity, and that the whole scheme of salvation employs the apparent persons as instruments to an end, but holds, with Swedenborg, that this representation is illusory, and has led the church to Tritheism. “These representations of the letter of the Word, though in accordance with much of the thinking still prevalent”, he says, “are not the actualities of our subjective experience, as they reveal themselves to a higher reflection. They stand out in a certain marked contrast to that calm compactness of order, and that serene and passive solidity of sequence with which the God of nature, as he stands before our modern reason, goes forward to the accomplishment of his purposes”. The Rev. Mr. Barrett also concedes that, according to the lit-

* A. R. 550.

† A. C. 5225, 8343.

‡ A. C. 5253, 5434; A. E. 625.

§ T. C. R. 170.

eral sense of Scripture, the Trinity *appears* to be a Trinity of persons. But this literal sense of Scripture he thinks gives out an unscriptural doctrine, which the spiritual sense breaks down. The apparent truth is a real falsehood, not only "unreasonable, but most unfriendly to the growth of pure religion". Nay, it is "downright Tritheism."

Thus the system appeals for support from the natural and plain import of the Word, to an occult, so called spiritual, or correspondential sense. It adjusts the contents of Revelation to the "subjective experience", the "higher reflection" of the reader, the "modern reason" of a few, who set aside the experience, reflection and reason of the great majority of Christian thinkers from the first ages to the present.

5th. The exclusion of personality is carried, finally to the very substance and *being* of God. This is necessitated by Swedenborg's general doctrine of personality. But he teaches explicitly that the substitution of the idea of *thing* for that of person is the only way in which men or angels can commune with God, or even conceive of him. The idea of *person* contracts and limits thought to time and space, to nature and the finite, whereas things do not limit and concentrate, but extend it to the infinite *and thus to the Lord*. The idea of *thing* makes thought and discourse universal, and enables the angels to express things ineffable. "Hence, everything of their discourse flows into the infinite and into the eternal, consequently into the divine of the Lord." Hence, Swedenborg says those who think of God from the idea of person only, or who, from person think of his essence, think not spiritually, but materially.* Such is the Swedenborgian doctrine of personality in general, and the fate of the Divine Personality in particular. The idea is completely banished from the province of pure spirit, essence—from the Divine. This is infinite, and hence impersonal, universal and therefore abstract. Man is not a person as to his soul, which is the only real man, but he becomes personal when the one Substance is expanded into humanitary forms of stratified and fixed substance. God,

* A. C. 5225, 5252, 8985, A. R. 611.

as Divine and One, is not a person more than the ocean is a person. He became Personal as he became Triune, in the natural *form* of the Lord Jesus, only as the ocean becomes personal when distributed into waves, or poured into casks. Thus he was *in* person, and *of* a person, according to the formula, yet really and essentially abstract and impersonal. And, by the same philosophy, there are as many divine persons as there are humanitarian forms, which are the receptacles of the divine (or into which it is distributed). Every son of man is therefore as really the person of God as was Jesus the Son of Mary.

The accredited expositors of the system cast some light on this view. According to Wilkinson, Jesus Christ is that divinely human form in which God is a personal God. Mr. Noble speaks of this person as a something produced. Mr. Hayden says "person—per and sona is a thing that is sounded through—the mask worn by actors in the old amphitheatres, with a speaking trumpet for a mouth-piece." So he says "the Son is the per-sona of God the Father". This glorified form, the love and wisdom in it, "are not the supreme divinity but only the mask or mouth-piece of the divinity—a natural form assumed for bringing divinity into the world, far enough inferior to and below the Father, and as subordinate to the divinity as a man's body and outward manner are to his soul." This is the doctrine, by one of its clearest and coolest expounders. Jesus Christ, the Son, the very per-sonus of God, in which is the Trinity, is not God. He is only a "natural form", "a humanitarian garment", a mask and mouth-piece of the divinity, as far inferior to the Father as the body is to the soul.

Thus from the three points of Unity, Trinity, and Personality in the Divine, the system steadily returns to its point of departure—the One Substance-doctrine—the *proton pseudos* of the Swedish seer's philosophy, and of all schemes of Pantheism.

Turn now to the New church doctrine of the *Human*. If we do not mistake, it makes this *identical* with the Divine. The Divine is the Human, and the Human the Divine. The one substance which is "very God", is also "very man", all things of whom are infinite. This identity of the Divine and

Human is absolute, and constitutes the divine unity,—the one substance, which is God.

God is also “in the human form and *is* that form”. Thus as to the dualism in him, substance and form, the Human and the Divine are the same. God has a human body and everything belonging to it, head and hands, heart and lungs, tongue, teeth, face, breast, loins, legs and feet. All things external and internal, essential and substantial, organs of articulation, locomotion, and generation,—all things which make a man to be a man belong to God. Thus he is the Infinite, uncreated, absolute God-man.*

This Divine-Human the system represents also as a derivative human, as form is a derivative from substance, the *existere* from the *esse*. The divine *existere* is the divine-human. But this human is as essentially divine as human. It is the humanity which the Lord derived from the Father, and therefore *is* the Father. The *esse* and *existere*, this Human and Divine, are “the very essential Divine”, “the all-begetting Divinity”—and therefore identical.†

Another phase of this human is the “Natural Human”, or “the third degree” of the Divine Nature. This was assumed, or rather developed at the Incarnation. “When the Lord came into the world, he superinduced over his former Human another Natural-Human, that was like the human of another man, in the world, except that both were Divine”.‡ Thus there are three degrees in the Human as in the Divine,—a Trinity of essentials in the Very Man, the same as in the Very God. Each essential in both is “infinite and increate”. No one part of this “Very Man who is God” is any more man than God. No degree serves a purpose, in the flux and reflux of the common substance, so peculiarly human as not to be, by the same peculiarity equally divine. As to substance and essence—as to *being*, Divine is a perfect synonym for Human, and Human for Divine, as God is for Man, and Man for God.

* D. L. W. 18, 19, 22.

† Ath. Creed, 17. Doot. Lord. 46. T. C. R. 20, 23.

‡ D. L. W. 221.

Further, God is not only infinite and essential Man, but "the only man". "No one is man but Jehovah alone". What are called created men, are only finite parts or abridgments of the Uncreated Man—the forms and organs, coolings or contractions, grosser or finer, fixed and fluent of the one only God-man. Thus, what the Word of God explicitly denies—"God is not a Man"—this system as explicitly affirms.*

The merely "material human" which the Lord derived from the Mother, was not man. It was not the human soul or essence, but a mere "dead form", a temporary "covering" which a man puts on at birth, and off at death. The soul, all that is spiritual and intellectual in man, by this philosophy, is from the father:—the material an animal from the mother.† The conscious spirit of Jesus of Nazareth was the living God—was *from* the Father, and *was* the Father.

But the identity of the Human and Divine is maintained in respect to the external human form. Was the body of Christ a natural form organized out of the One Substance in a "fixed state" which, Swedenborg says, is called "matter"? So is the body of every other man. But since the First and only substance is God, and since it is immutable and cannot cease to be God, the very bodies of men are as essentially one with God as was the soul of Christ. They are in the human form, and God is not only *in*, but "*is* that Form". This identity reaches even to the inmost and essence of man. "The soul of man is his *life*."‡ Yet there "*is* but one life", and that life is uncreated and God. "God only lives" and acts, and "God is in man, and *is* his life".§ Therefore God is as really the only living and acting spirit of every man, as of the Lord Jesus. Hence "the term man signifies in its genuine sense, that *Esse* from which man originates". This is evident because "no one is man but Jehovah alone"; and further, because "whatsoever exists *from* an *Esse*, makes one with the *Esse*", and "what proceeds from God himself *is* himself". Thus is made out the identification of man with God, both as to what is called the external and the internal man—the form and the very substance. As an

* A. C. 299, 1894. † T. C. R. 92. ‡ A. E. 26. § D. L. W. 359.

illustration Swedenborg says, "It is not the eye that sees, but the spirit by the eye. . . This also does not see of itself, but from a vision, still more interior, which is that of the rational principle; nay, even this does not see of itself, but there is a sight still more interior, which is that of the *internal man*.

. . . But we must advance still further, for neither does the internal man see of itself, *but it is the Lord*, by means of the internal man, who *alone* sees, because he *alone lives*, and he gives to man the faculty of seeing and with it the *appearance* as if he saw himself".* Thus man's agency, as well as his existence, in the last analysis, is resolved into God's. As it is God who alone lives, so it is he alone who sees, hears, speaks, thinks, wills, and acts. Man thinks that he lives and acts, or appears to himself to think so, and God gives him this appearance as if he really did. But it is an illusion, a fallacy, and a falsity. Man is simply God's organ, not an agent, but an instrument. In respect to the faculty of sight, he is an optical instrument.

In harmony with this rendering, Mr. Hayden holds that "All life, Infinite and finite, is in substance and essence one and the same". Mr. Barrett says, "We have only to conceive the Trinity existing in every regenerate man, to be infinitely *expanded*, and we have the Divine Trinity". God is therefore only an *expanded* man, and man a contracted God. One writer of this school is a little more open and says, "God is an infinite Man and man a finite God". Mr. Henry James, an eloquent and philosophic expositor of the New Church doctrines, says outright that the soul is "infinite and eternal". "Viewed spiritually it is uncreated, is in simple verity, God". Upon the problem of the soul's "becoming a creature", or subject to time, space, and person, Mr. James thinks Swedenborg sheds a flood of light, by showing that this does not take place "really as to its own apprehension, but only *apparently*". It is in this way that the doctrine of appearances is made to render such important service to the system. There *seems* to be a difference between Infinite and finite life, but they are

in reality "one and the same". Man *appears* to be a creature and man, but this is an illusion. He is God. We are conscious of living and seeing, but our consciousness deceives us. All our senses deceive us, and that in regard to the very essence and substance of things.

But does not this denial of a real, finite being to man, also deny it to everything else? Swedenborg's doctrine of creation is that it is a *finiting of the Infinite*,—so modifying the One Substance by an apparent pressing the Divine out of it, and a distribution, that it shall seem to be manifold, and "fixed substance or matter". But this must be only an apparent process. The idea that God, who, according to the philosophy cannot *create* another substance, should so *alter* a part of his own unchangeable Being that it should really pass from mind into matter, so *divide* his indivisible nature, that, from One it should become many,—that the Eternal Living Spirit should so *recede* from Itself in concentric atmospheres, as, by cooling and coagulation, to be "the Divine out of Itself", and finally to expire in the "ends of the atmospheres" into dead matter—that all this, which is the great *apparent* truth of the system, should be eschewed in its inmost reckonings, as only an appearance, is a compliment to that strong common sense which sometimes rebels against the oppressive vagaries of the speculative reason. But the escape from these absurdities is just where the spiritualistic type of Pantheism, ancient and modern, always escapes—through a *cosmism*—a phenomenal creation—the phantomic finite.

But the Lord is called "The Divine Natural". Is not this from his *identity* also with Nature? If all life in God, man, and matter, "in substance and essence, is one and the same", because life is uncreatable, all substance in them must be one and the same, for substance is also uncreatable.

Swedenborg's doctrine of Correspondence, if we do not mistake, rests on this substantial *oneness* of God and nature. Prof. Bush exhibits it as "a law of creation", and the key to the New Church Theology. Mr. Olissold calls it a relation "between a spiritual cause and a natural effect". Mr. Wilkinson tells us what *kind* of a relation it is when he says that the emanative

ray, and the *forms* which it leaves in its creative passage, "are all one in soul". Mr. James repeats the same in saying that there "is no essential discrimination or discrepancy between the Creator and the creature", because "the Creator constitutes the *sole* and *total* being of creation". This collateral teaching falls back for support upon the dicta of the "illuminated author"—Nature and all things in it exist from God as the *Esse* Itself, and "whatever exists from an *Esse* makes *one* with the *Esse*, because it is *one* from the *Esse*".* This one is not only *in* every thing of the other, but "it is *all* in all of the other as *in itself*", and thus makes it not *another*, but the *same*. The cause *is* the effect, and the effect the cause. The Creator is the creature, and the creature, the Creator—God, nature, and nature, God. Thus "the Divine Natural" comes into the system, as the Divine Human does, by the law of correspondence, or essential identity. Things which are thus one,—the spiritual world and the natural, mind and matter,—"*act* as one by correspondence", for the plain reason that, in substance and life, they are one.

Nor do Discrete Degrees, on which the system relies to save itself from Pantheism, bring any relief. Theoretically, they distinguish the one substance into what are called end, cause, and effect, which is only another mode of stating the doctrine of correspondence. In this ideal discrimination, God is the end, the Spiritual Sun which emanates from him and in which he resides, with its three atmospheres, is the Cause, and the natural sun, emanating from the spiritual, with its atmospheres, is the effect. In what is called "successive order", these proceed from each other, as Love, Wisdom, and Use; First, Prior, and Ultimate; Simple, Congregates, and Composites. In what is termed "*simultaneous* order", they proceed as Inmost, Interior, and Exterior. The doctrine of Degrees, as a means of working the system, strictly speaking, is the science of *mensuration*. It is the method of computing heights and distances—the dimensions of the One Substance. "That dimension", says Swedenborg, "which consists of discrete de-

degrees, is called *altitude*, and that which consists of continuous degrees, is called *latitude*”.* This discloses the law of correspondence or mensuration, and gives its use.

But do these imaginary distinctions or distances disturb the essential *oneness* of the things distinguished? Are they not all contained within the One Substance, as solids are in their superficies? They are all predicated of the Divine Itself, and distinguish the One indivisible Jehovah into three essentials of the one God, as they do God and the universe into End, Cause, and Effect, or First, Prior, and Postremes. But Swedenborg makes this doctrine of the identity of God and nature perfectly evident by explicitly teaching that these degrees, “taken together always make one”†—that the things which they distinguish are “homogeneous, that is, of the same genius and nature”, and that they cannot be of a different nature.‡ The first is not only in the subsequent degrees, but “it is the *sole* in them, and being so, it is the *all* in them”. This dogma is put into the most compact philosophical formula. God is not simply in everything of the universe; “he *is all* in all in the universe”, “the Infinite All”. We cannot account this a rhetorical exaggeration, as in some mystical writers; it is the guarded postulate and central position of the whole system. It is the result of the author’s profoundest speculative reason—the ultimate abstraction and law of all his dialectic processes. It is the key to his doctrine of Discrete and Continuous Degrees, of his doctrine of Order, successive and simultaneous. It gives him his three senses of Scripture, his new doctrine of the Sacred Canon, and his allegorical principles of interpretation. In short, it harmonizes his system, as much as any central principle can harmonize a system containing so many confused and contradictory statements.

In its æsthetic dressings, it has seemed to some a profoundly religious philosophy. It enables one to see God in everything, because it apotheosizes man and the universe by making God the sole substance of everything. It is thought to give a deeply spiritual religion. We question if it is not just the reverse. It debases our ideas of God, the sole object of wor-

* D. L. W. 165.

† D. L. W. 184.

‡ D. L. W. 197, 198.

ship, by confounding his nature with man's. Mind and matter, God and a stone, are *homœousian* in the New Church system, as the Father and Son are in the Old. Spirit is only invisible nature, and nature visible and stratified spirit. Everything is God, and everything is man, and the God-Man is everything. "This external world", says the *Monthly Religious Magazine*, "has no fixity, it is only the *form* of man's soul—the soul brought down into the plane of the senses. All that we can draw from the universe is man. All that it proves is man. *It is man*". And since "Jehovah alone is man", we have an averment of the purest Pantheism. And the *Review*, in its neophytic admiration of the Swedenborgian philosophy, thinks that "the time of forty thousand pulpits in America could be profitably employed for the next ten years in simply repeating and *reiterating* the thought of the Humanity of God—that God is a man, that the difference between him and us is . . . *simply the difference between the greater and the less*".*

Whoever will take the trouble to compare this system with the various phases of the Pantheistic philosophy, as exhibited in the history of human opinion, will see their essential agreement. On the one-substance doctrine, the root of all Pantheism and of some Mysticism,—on the substitution of emanation for creation, the substantial *identity* of the Divine and Human—God and the Universe, the impersonality of God and of man, as pure substance, and their antagonism to the Christian Church,—the Neo-Platonists, Spinoza, Swedenborg, and Strauss are only successors in the same tutorial chair.

Strauss, the living teacher of this school, defines the Divine-Human as the "Infinite manifesting itself in the finite"; The incarnation of God in the whole race of mankind, he holds is a truer one than an incarnation limited to a particular point of time and to one person. Feuerbach exults over this idea as a marvellous achievement of modern illumination. He says, "We have reduced the supermundane, supernatural, superhuman nature of God to the elements of human nature. Our process of analysis has brought us again to the

* Vol. 21, pp. 52, 53.

position with which we set out. The beginning, the middle, and the end of religion is *man*". He explains the rejection of this view by the church of all ages, in the same way that Swedenborg does—from its ignorance respecting God and man. The church is natural; and its ideas sensuous. "So long as man knows not that he is a spirit, he cannot know that *God is man*." Our own nebulistic Emerson, in his aeronautic gyrations, departs from and returns to the same "One stuff with its two ends". "Star, sand, fire, water, tree, man—it is still one stuff." "The act of seeing and thing seen, the seer and the spectacle, the subject and the object are *one*." "In all conversation between two parties, tacit reference is made to a third party, to a *common nature*. That third party or common nature is not social, it is *impersonal*,—it is *God*." "I am divine. Through me God acts, through me speaks."

Thus clearly and closely, in its parentage and progeny, does this New Church doctrine of the Divine-Human, ^{itself} ~~by~~ itself with the Pantheistic family of speculators. And in this we find the ground of that diametrical opposition in which the Swedish seer places the doctrines of the New Church to those of the Old. They stand opposed as Theism and Pantheism do, and have always done. And Armand Saintes, the biographer of Spinoza, gave the animus of the school when he said, "The ultimate struggle will be, not between Christianity and philosophy, but between Christianity and Spinozeism, its strongest and most inveterate antagonist."

The bearing of this philosophy of the Divine-Human on the doctrines of the Christian system is so important as to require a fuller examination.

In the Incarnation of the Lord, Swedenborg's theory says, that he did not assume from the mother a rational soul, but only a material, animal organism.* "Man is distinguished from a mere animal", according to Swedenborg, "by his rational, spiritual mind", by virtue of which he is immortal.† Hence, as Christ received no such mind from the human parent, he assumed at the Incarnation, not the humanity, but

* T. O. R. 82.

† Doct. of Life, 86.

a mere *animality*. With the fallen human *soul*, which was all that needed to be redeemed, God came into no kind of sympathy or connection in the person of Christ. The pneumatic element on the human side was wholly wanting.

Yet this, so called human, which the Lord derived from the mother, is made the subject of hereditary *evils, iniquities, and falsities*. "For the Lord to bear, or take upon himself, iniquities and evils, except in an hereditary way, from the mother, was impossible."* From these iniquities and evils, Christ is represented as praying in the 51st Psalm to be purified, and as declaring that when this should be accomplished, he should be "pure" and "holy". For it was not king David that made such confession of sin in the Psalm, but, according to the internal sense, the Lord, who was the real David. Swedenborg does indeed state that the Lord, as to the inner man, which is the Divine, and Jehovah, had no "sin or evil which was his own": [†] "But everything in him which was not Jehovah, call it "natural mind," "human essence", or "Son of Mary"—all was "polluted with hereditary evils from the mother, and falsities thence derived". These evils in him were not either inoperative, or confined to a brief period antecedent to moral action. "Hereditary evil consists in *willing*, and thence *thinking* evil." It is in the *will* itself, and the thought thence.† The evil in the will-principle could not produce its legitimate falsity in the intellectual principle "before man is initiated into scientifics and knowledges". "It may be matter of surprise to many", Swedenborg says, "to hear speak of hereditary evil from the mother belonging to the Lord. But as it is here declared so manifestly, and the subject treated of in the internal sense is concerning the Lord, there can be no reason at all to doubt its being so". The passage referred to, the internal sense of which makes this dogma so plain to the seer, is Gen. xiii, 7, in the exegesis of which, Canaanite "denotes hereditary evil from the mother", and Perizzite "falsity thence derived". And as these were "in the land", there is "no reason at all to doubt" that hereditary evil and falsity were in the Lord.‡

Some of the collateral writers veil a little this dogma of

* A. C. 1573.

† A. C. 4317.

‡ A. C. 1573.

their author, but the drift of the system carries others to its fullest expression. Mr. Barrett teaches that the human nature of Christ was "full of impure and unhallowed principles", some of them of such "a subtle and interior nature as appertain to spirits and angels", and which were not wholly "put off till the resurrection or after". "The death of Christ", says the *Religious Monthly Magazine*, "does not mean the mere rending away of the fleshly body, but the putting away of the whole *selfish* and earthly nature". Mr. Hayden says, "There existed in his person from the first, two organic, living forces, acting in *opposite* directions,—the one humanly derived and acting *towards evil*, the other divinely derived and acting *towards good*". "The human nature from the virgin mother was no whit more pure or immaculate than the constitutional inheritance of Peter, or John, or Paul, or Silas." "For thirty years was the old, hereditary man being off, and the new, divine man being put on."

This is a dark picture of Him whom, for eighteen hundred years, the entire Church has clasped to its bosom as of stainless purity. It is scarcely surpassed by those modern leaders of the infidel forces, who cry "Havoc" upon the Church, and "let slip the dogs of war". Mr. Theodore Parker says of Christ, "He is not without errors, not without the stains of his times, and I presume, of course, not without sins,—for men without sins exist in the dreams of girls, not in real fact". Strauss is only hypothetical. "If Christ was entirely free from inward conflict, from all vacillation of the spiritual between good and evil, he could not be a man of like nature with us." He, whose affirmation of himself was—"The Prince of this world cometh, and hath nothing in me"—of whom one apostle says, "he was holy, harmless and undefiled", and another, that he "did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth",—this man, Christ Jesus the Lord, is affirmed to have been "full of impure and unhallowed principles". To sustain this impeachment, there is not, we believe, one reputable philosophical theory which is not anti-Christian and Pagan in its parentage. Not a single fact in the life of Christ lends it support. His whole history confronts it and says, "I find no fault in him".

Further, what is called our Lord's Regeneration or Glorification proceeds on the same view of his human nature. "He was willing to be born as another man, and instructed as another man, and, as another man, to be *re-born*, with this difference, that man is re-born of the Lord, but that the Lord regenerated and glorified himself, that is, made himself divine."* During the regenerative process, which continued till his death, and was effected by means of temptation, Christ put off all the human which he had from the mother, and so separated it from himself, that he was no longer her son. But at the same time he put on a human from the Father, and made it divine. Thus "he became God",—"one with the Father and himself Jehovah". Thus were "the divinity and humanity united together in one person", and "God is man, and man God in Christ".†

On this construction of the person and character of Christ, we must impugn the apostle's statement that "he was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin". Other men are tempted through the spiritual nature,—the soul. God's law is spiritual, and it is only the rational spirit that can feel either its obligations, or a temptation to transgress it. But *such* a human mind Christ did not possess. How then could he be tempted *as we are*? Further, all his merely human instincts, appetites, and affections were *depraved* and *polluted*, and in his temptations, were excited towards evil and against good, and thus cannot have been "without sin".

Again, if all that was not Jehovah in Christ, was only what he derived from the mother—a soulless, material form, was he capable of temptations, or of anything but mere, unfree, animal suffering? The Divine,—Jehovah, was the only rational mind in him. But Swedenborg says, "The Lord did not suffer as to the Divine, but the human". "The Divinity cannot suffer or be tempted." Neither can the unrational, material humanity. Therefore Christ was not tempted at all. And still further, wanting that which "distinguishes man from a mere animal", "a spiritual mind", he was incapable of anything, in the experiences of the wilderness, the garden, and the

* A. C. 6138. † A. C. 2649. Doct. of Lord, 35. T. O. R. 102, 103.

cross, but mere *animal* suffering. We can find in him neither *example* in purity, nor sympathy in our temptations. Some theorists hold that the Divine nature suffered, and thus find what they call God's example and sympathy in Christ's sufferings. The common doctrine is, that the complete human nature,—a veritable human soul,—was tempted and suffered in such a union with the complete Divine Nature, that we have in our Lord a perfect example, fulness of Divine sympathy in our temptations, and atonement for our sins. But this system denies all these to its adherents, by denying that the Divine in Christ could suffer, or be tempted, and that he had any rational soul but the Divine.

Another problem deserves a brief inquiry. On what principle, except that of the identification of the Divine and Human, is "God man, and man God in Christ"? Was it by the *assumption* of the human nature in the Incarnation? But that which constitutes the human nature and is its essence,—the human soul,—Christ did not assume. Nor, for the same reason, could this be effected by God's being *united* to, or conjoined with man. That with which he was united in the Incarnation was not man, but what, being without a spiritual mind,—was not "distinguished from a mere animal". With what truth can it be said that "the divinity and humanity were *united* together in one person", when the divinity *is* the humanity, and there was no other real humanity in Christ with which it could be united?

How, indeed, could God *become* man by incarnation, when he *was* man from eternity—"the very and only man"? But his "human was *made* divine", and thus Christ was glorified. Which of his humans was made divine? His divine-human, conceived from the Father, was already and *essentially* divine. The material, "human-human", from the mother, was all separated from him, and put off, even to its "total *extinction*". It is not easy to see how *this* human could be made divine, and yet *destroyed*,—utterly separated from the Divine, and by the same process, forever united to it, so as to "become Jehovah". And this is the more difficult as Swedenborg teaches that the "human nature cannot be transmuted into the divine essence,

nor can it be commixed with it".* It is therefore alike impossible to make the human, divine or the divine human.

What, then, is the real significance of the Incarnation and Glorification in this system,—God become man, and man God? "When the Lord *put off* the human from the mother, he *put on* the human from the Father, and *thus* became one with the Father and Jehovah." "The Father came nearer and nearer in the acts of redemption to the Lord, till at length they so conjoined themselves that they were not two, but *one*."† But who is this "Lord", and who "the Father" that are put in such intense *personal* relations to each other? How did the Lord, in the Incarnation *put off* the "human from the Father", the putting *on* of which is his glorification, and makes him Jehovah again? In what sense did the Incarnation make them "two", and the glorification "one"? Does the Incarnation present the Father and Son as two divine *persons*? This the system holds as the great heresy of the Old Church.

The distinction is between the two "Essentials of the one God", and expresses their abstract relation. That Jehovah should, in the Incarnation, separate himself into two or three essentials, accords with the doctrine that God was "not triune, before the world was created", and that "the Trinity was brought into being in Jesus Christ". But there is a mystery in this explanation of mystery. How can he who is one indivisible substance and essence from eternity, *separate* himself in time, into three essentials of the one God? We do not see, except on the principle of emanation or proceeding,—of "finiting himself", as, in what the system calls *creation*. But, though God would not be "triune before the world was created", there would be after that as many essentials of the One God as there were "finitives" and proceedings of the one substance. This would make the Incarnation of God to begin in Adam, and to be repeated in every child of Adam to the end of time. Such an incarnation of God in the whole race, which Strauss calls a *truer* one than that limited to Christ, harmonizes with, and explains Swedenborg's doctrine that God is the inmost

* D. L. 35.

† T. C. R. 97.

Essence, Life, and Being of every man as really as of Jesus of Nazareth—that he dwells in the body, blood, bones, and brains of every man as an “organ recipient of God”, and “a receptacle of God”,—that man’s will and understanding are not his, but the *Lord’s*, and the *Lord himself*, and that in every man, it is “God alone that lives”,—that “sees”—that “acts”.

God was as *really* incarnate and man, on this theory, and man God, in Abraham as in Christ. The patriarch was as essentially the Form and Person of God as the Messiah. Hence Abraham, in the spiritual sense, “signifies the Lord”. “By Abram no other is meant in the Word than the Lord.”* Indeed it is expressly affirmed that “Abram is the Lord’s internal man, which is Jehovah”.† Thus the Incarnation of God in Abraham is as unmistakable as in Jesus. The difference is merely circumstantial. The external man proceeds “substantially from the internal—yea, is nothing else than the internal so *formed* that it may act suitably in the world wherein it is”.‡ Thus Jehovah, as Abraham’s internal man, was formed into Abraham as into His own external man. The visible material man was only a *formation* of Jehovah, as the one indivisible and only man. This oneness of God and man is softened by the terms “representative”, “significative”, and “correspondence”. But it stands out unveiled in the postulate that “no one is man but Jehovah alone,” that He is “Very Man” and the “Only Man”.

One step further in the line of this attenuating explanation reduces the Incarnation and Glorification to their feeblest significance. The distinction between the Father and the Son is that of Good and Truth. Good is called the Father-principle, and Truth the Son-principle. But are they two distinct *essentials* of the One God, capable of separation, so that one shall *go forth* from the other, or appear *out of* the other? Swedenborg says, “The Lord in his essence is *nothing else* but Divine Good”, Good and Truth “are not two, but one”. “The Godhead is indivisible.” What then is the import of this termin-

* A. C. 1989.

† A. C. 1894.

‡ A. C. 5337.

ology—Divine Truth “derived from”, “proceeding” or “going forth”, from Divine Good “in the Incarnation”, and “returning”, and being “united to it” in the Glorification? Swedenborg answers, “For Divine Truth to proceed from Divine Good, or the Son from the Father, is to present oneself the same, only in another form”. It is “the Divine, *formed* as a man”. But if the Godhead is indivisible, and the Lord is nothing else than Divine Good, and Good and Truth are “not two, but one”,—why are they so sharply distinguished as *two* essentials in one essence,—one *going out* from and *returning* to the other? Purely “for the sake of man’s apprehension”, is the answer. Prof. Bush, in the guileless honesty for which he was distinguished, expresses the extreme difficulty of grasping the process of this “going forth” and “returning”. The heat of the sun coming forth in the light of the sun, is Swedenborg’s most frequent and felicitous illustration. But the disciple, far richer in Biblical lore than his master, justly thinks “a further effort of the mind is requisite to conceive of the Divine Truth as coming forth from Its purely abstract form, and embodying itself in human nature”. But in the final analysis, this difficulty vanishes. In reality, there is no such process. “Progression”, says Swedenborg, “is not predicable of Love or Wisdom, or of Good or Truth, for these are real God”.* Thus the central wheel relied on for working the system—proceeding, progression, or going forth, falls, with other things of time, and space, and person, into a phantom.

The Incarnation then, as now defined, was not of the Son of God, as a proceeding from the Father, but of the one only essential, Divine Good, as the Father-principle, presenting himself “the same, only in another form”, “the Divine, *formed* as a man”. But what is it for the Divine to be formed as a man? Does not the system hold God to be essentially man, and in man’s form? How can that “be *formed* as a man”, which, from eternity, is *in*, and *is* man’s form? Again, how could the Father present himself as the Son, in the Incarnation, “the same, only in *another form*”, when the system al-

* B. E. 119.

lows but *one* Form, and that is God's? He can no more appear in another *form*, than in another substance. And, we do not see how the other part of the definition is any more consistent,—“to present oneself before *another* in a form accommodated to *him*”.* There is no *another*. He himself is the only *one*, whether called man, form, esse, or entity. Thus the whole idea of a Trinity of essentials, of Proceedings, of Incarnation and Glorification, is unreal and illusive. The whole terminology of Father and Son, Good and Truth, coming forth and returning, making the Divine Human, and the Human Divine, by the internal sense of the system, means in reality this and nothing more,—the One, Infinite, and Eternal Substance, called God-man, or Love and Wisdom, *appears* to go forth *from* Itself, and in Its own form, presents Itself *to* Itself, to be perceived and apprehended *by* Itself, and then return and be united again to Itself. This self-evolving and self-involving process, called in the documents, flux, influx, and reflux, going forth and returning, is eternal. It never began and will never end. It is continued from a central “cardiac” and “pulmonic force”, as unfree and essentially physical as the beating pulse, or the law of gravitation.

In concluding this article, we wish to glance at the bearing of this philosophy on the great practical doctrines of Regeneration, Redemption, and Sin.

The definition given of *Regeneration* is, “From natural to become spiritual”. The process is the same as that by which Christ's natural, in his regeneration, was made Divine, and is the reverse of generation. The change is effected by the influx of Love and Wisdom, or Good and Truth, which Swedenborg says are the “real God, or God himself”. This flows into the natural evil forms of fixed substance, form within form, and fills, refines, and quickens them from fixed to fluent substance—from gross to finer,—from nature to spirit. This is the reputed process of this metaphysical regeneration.

One of the peculiarities of it is that it *never ends*. Prof. Bush calls it “an everlasting act”, Mr. Olissold, “a perpetual

process". Swedenborg says it begins in infancy and continues to "eternity".

Another peculiarity is that, though it professes that from natural, men become spiritual, it does not so change a man's nature that from *evil* and *false*, he becomes essentially good and true. "There are states of evil, and of the false in *every* man without end."* "Evil, as well hereditary as actual, with the man who is regenerated, is not exterminated so that it disappears, or is made none, but is only separated, and by an arrangement from the Lord, is rejected to the circumferences."† "Hereditary evil from the father is of a more interior nature than that from the mother, and remains to eternity, for it can never be eradicated."‡ Spirits and angels in heaven are not so regenerated but that "by virtue of their proprium, they all have a continual tendency towards hell"§ —"are impure, yea, nothing but evil".||

We think it is a sad defect in this New Church creed, that it holds for fundamental truth such an ineffectual doctrine of regeneration. It leaves the regenerated, in himself, just where, according to the author, it finds him,—*nothing but evil*. How inadequate to the condition of man! How unsatisfactory to all who hate sin and love holiness! What a forlorn hope does it hold out! Vain struggle after an ideal, unattainable good!

The central doctrine of *Redemption* undergoes a similar reconstruction. Its comprehensive definition is—"the subjugation of the hells, and the establishment of order in the heavens, and after this, the institution of a church".¶ In the battle which the Lord fought with the hells in the spiritual world, at the Last Judgment, in the year 1757, "he tore up from their places the hills and mountains which the infernals in the spiritual world occupied, and removed them to distant places, and made some sink down; he deluged their cities, villages and fields with a flood, and tore up their lands and cast them, together with the inhabitants, into whirlpools, bogs, and fens; besides many other things.**

This doctrine of Redemption will strike our readers as new,

* A. C. 894.

† A. C. 4564; D. P. 79, 279.

‡ A. C. 1573.

§ H. H. 596.

|| D. P. 279.

¶ T. C. R. 84, 95.

** T. C. R. 124.

except, perhaps, those to whom the genius of Virgil, Dante, or Milton, may have made it familiar. Although the author assures us that it was "a spiritual battle", the whole aspect is singularly physical and Cyclopean. But does this redemption secure a full deliverance from sin? As it denies the church-doctrine of the Trinity, so it does, with equal explicitness, that of atonement for sin and justification by faith. And it goes still further in its denials. "It is an error of the present age, that evils are thought to be *separated*, yea, cast out when they are remitted. That no evil into which a man is born, and which he actually imbibes, is *separated* from him, but that it is only removed in such a manner that it doth not *appear*, hath been given me to know from heaven. Before that, I was in the belief which most people entertain in this world, that evils, when they are remitted, are cast out, and that they are washed off and wiped away, like dirt from the face, by water. But this is not the case with evils and sins".* "If a man, in his childhood and youth, hath appropriated to himself a certain evil, by doing it from the delight of his love, as, if he hath defrauded, blasphemed, revenged, committed whoredom, then, forasmuch as he hath done these things from liberty according to his thought, he hath also appropriated them to himself. But if he afterwards repenteth, shunneth them, and considers them as sins which are to be abhorred, and thus, from liberty, according to reason, desisteth from them, then there are appropriated to him goods to which those evils are opposite. But *the evils cannot be so cast out as to be said to be extirpated*." "This is the case with all hereditary evil, and at the same time, with all *actual* evil of man".† When sins in the regenerated are removed towards the sides or circumferences of the soul, "it then *appears* as if evils were rejected, and thereby man purified from them, or, as they say, *justified*". Yet all the angels of heaven, who, according to Swedenborg, are only the spirits of redeemed men, "confess that what appertains to them, so far as it is from themselves, is *nothing but evil, and the false thence*". "Those who, while they lived in the world, have confirmed in them, that they are justified and without

* D. P. 279.

† D. P. 79.

sins, and thus that they are holy, are remitted into a state of evils from what is actual, and what is hereditary, and are kept in it, until, by living experience they know that, of themselves, they are *nothing but evil*"; and that "the good in which they had *seemed* to themselves to be, was from the Lord, consequently that it was not theirs, but the Lord's".* He speaks again of those, "who, after death, were taken up by the Lord into heaven, . . but carried with them a belief that they were cleansed and pure from sins, and therefore not in a state of guilt; at length, they came to *boast* that they are no longer sinners like others, and to exercise a degree of *contempt* for others when compared with themselves". "That this imaginary belief may be removed, they are *remanded* from heaven, and let into their evils which they had contracted in the world, and at the same time, it is shown them that they *are in hereditary evils* of which they knew nothing before. And, when they have thus been *forced* to acknowledge that their evils are *not separated* from them, but only removed, and so that of themselves they are *impure*, yea, *nothing but evil*, . . they are again taken up by the Lord into heaven".†

It is not strange that the Christian world, after a hundred years of inculcation, is slow to exchange the old doctrine of redemption for this new one. What is there of "glad tidings" to a lost world in that gospel which leaves sin "uneradicated", and uneradicable to eternity — which does not pardon the sinner till he ceases from all his sins, and holds that, then, he does not *need* pardon? What kind of *salvation* is that which leaves the *saved*, in their best estate, with their evils and sins not "extirpated", not "separated", nor "cast out"; and who, in their own proper nature, are impure, yea, *nothing but evil*? Surely it is not an "imaginary belief" that the redeemed in heaven are purified, justified, and so sanctified by the Lord Jesus that they are without sin; much less is it an offence so great that those who entertain the belief are "remanded from heaven" into the hells, where they are "*forced* to acknowledge" the doctrines of this new Christianity. It may seem strange to the ordinary reader, that the Lord should send the

* A. C. 4564.

† D. P. 279.

saints out of heaven into the hells, to convince them of this Swedenborgian doctrine that they are still *sinner*s. But the student of the system finds that this is a favorite expedient for securing conviction upon debatable subjects. All discussions in the spiritual world, of which there are many in Swedenborg's writings, end in the triumph of Swedenborg's party. All good spirits become converts to the system, and all who reject it, are bad ones.

In regard to the doctrine of *sin*, it is claimed as an excellence of the new system, that it treats sin and evil as a disease that needs not forgiveness, but *cure*. As a violation of law or order, it is no more capable of atonement by the death of Christ, than a violation of the law of gravitation, or a fit of sickness. The unitive force of the system makes all laws, as Mr. Hayden says, "one in kind", and "of one class". The distinction between moral and natural law is pronounced "man-made, and has no corresponding objectivity in the nature of things". The confounding of all things in one nature, logically necessitates this doctrine of one *law*. Matter and mind, though distinguished nominally by a discrete degree, are "of the same nature". The ethical and physical are the same. Metaphysical science is also mechanical, and Christianity an essential chemistry. Fire is visible love, and ice congealed, stratified hate. Sin is a disease, or infestation, and needs not a mediator, but only a physician or exorcist. It is as absurd to speak of forgiving a fault, as a fall from a precipice, or a fever. But the New Church system does not supply any adequate medical or chemical treatment for the disease. It furnishes neither successful physician, machinist, nor exorcist. Its *Materia Medica* has no more a curative than a pardoning power. The very God-man proves an incompetent Restorer of the breach. The blood of Christ does not cleanse "from all sin", nor from *any* sin. For, of all that come under the dominion of sin, whatever the amount of "opposite goods" he may be kept in, not one finds deliverance.

But there is another step in this analysis, which, if we do not mistake, leaves "disease" only a rhetorical expression for sin, which, in reality, is *substance*. Good is substance. Evil,

as an entity, is the opposite pole of the same one substance. Good is substance at the centre of the spiritual sun, evil the same at the "ends" of the receding atmospheres, or the "circumferences". One is the first "self", the other, the ultimate, or postreme "self". One is Pure, Living, Fluent, Divine, and God; the other is the same substance and nature, gross, dead, fixed, with "the divine pressed out", and Satan. Thus "influent good" or pure substance when it flows into the *forms* of evil, in the ultimates, is turned by them into gross substance and evil. It is on this principle of sin as substance, that neither in regeneration nor in redemption, can it be exterminated, or "made none", but only removed to the circumferences. Mr. Fernald accounts for the origin of evil on this theory of his favorite author. "Man derived all his substance from the Creator, but he was so far discreted from the Divine Being, that his substance lost by a necessity which God himself could not prevent, . . . a portion of its perfection, and so was *originally* disordered, and so the origin of evil." Thus, he says, "Man was an imperfect production from the hands of his Creator, and was comparatively evil." This is a logically consistent statement. Man, at the first, did not *become* evil. He was *made* so. Swedenborg's allegorical construction of the first two chapters of Genesis, proceeds upon this view. The first cognition it takes of man as finite or ultimate, is as *needing regeneration*. It knows nothing of a sin or fall, prior to this necessity. And to accommodate the history of the creation of man to this theory, he says, "To create, to form, to make", in the Sacred Record, "signify to *regenerate*".* Nor does his idea of man as a *vegetable* production militate with this theory, viz., that he dropped from "a fruit-tree", which bore "a small egg" on a "parturient branch", into which nature had collected "as into a sort of ark, her most distinguished treasures", and within which "was the first happy token of connubial intercourse of spiritual essence with the supreme aura of nature".† Mr. James thinks the service which Swedenborg has "done to the rational or scientific mind by the light he has cast on the great truth of human solidarity is in-

* A. C. 16.

† Worship and Love of God, pp. 43-50.

calculable". "He shows us that since the world has stood, no man has been chargeable before God with either his moral good or evil, because neither the one nor the other *originates* in the man himself." "In order that God himself should charge us with any of the good or evil which we, with obdurate stupidity, are forever charging upon ourselves, it would be necessary for him first to forget his creative relation to us, and begin to look upon us as essentially *underived* and independent existences, which is absurd."

Hence it is, that, according to the New Church, God never is angry with the wicked. He never curses, or punishes them, in this life or the next.* He does not even judge them, or in any way impute evil to them, or criminate them, or accuse them of it, or condemn them for it. Thus, as a personal Ruler, God makes no *essential* distinction between sin and holiness. He is personally as little pleased with the one, as displeased with the other—a logical result of the *identity* of the human and divine nature, which is the central principle in this New Christianity. Nor do the unregenerate, or the spirits in hell, feel any compunction, regrets, or remorse for sin. Why should they? As God feels no displeasure towards them, on that account, why should they towards themselves? There is a kind of suffering in the hells which the author calls torment, and sometimes, by figure of speech—punishment. But it is purely physical, by "compression", by the "bruising process", by "plates of red-hot iron", by sitting on "ant-heaps", and by "gyratory motions" and revolutions upon a tight "rope". All is the *reciprocal* operation or infliction of the infernals upon themselves. Thus *evil* is angry with *itself*, accuses, tries, condemns, and punishes *itself*, through a chemical process by its "odor" or "stench", as do carrion and all excrements. The good are admonished of its presence by the sense of "smell", and the devils perceive the presence of good and truth by snuffing their exhaling "odorous particles". "The imputation of evil after death does not consist in accusation, blame, censure, or in passing judgment, as in

* A. C. 245.

the world ; but the *evil itself* effects this." "And inasmuch as evil is there perceived, as it were in its *odor*, it is *this* which accuses, blames, finds guilty, and judges, not before any particular judge, but before every one who is in good ; and this is what is meant by imputation. The imputation of good is effected in the same manner", that is, by its odor, and the sense of smell.*

A doctrine so essentially new and exclusive would naturally require for its propagation the *instrumentalities* of a New Church. And the church, which, resting its claim on the Bible, announces itself as the only living church—"the church of the Future", would of course be forearmed with expedients for adjusting that Book into conditions of success. What are some of these expedients ? This is one. The almost universally recognized Canon of Scripture is impeached. Thirty-two, out of the sixty-six books of the Bible are excluded, as *not a part of the Word of God* ;—all in the New Testament, except the four Gospels and the Apocalypse, and ten of the Old Testament.† The ground of this exclusion is the doctrine of correspondence. Nothing is the Word which is not divinely inspired, and nothing is thus inspired, which is not written according to correspondence, and hence, has the celestial, spiritual, and natural sense. The Divine Word is a ray of God's pure substance, emitted and extending through the celestial and spiritual spheres into the natural, and is the *same* Divine Substance in each. Hence this "*inscripturated* Word", as well as the Incarnate Word, according to the doctrine of Correspondence, *is* God. "It is *from* Him", says Swedenborg, "and *is Himself*".‡ In 1854, the Executive Committee of the Swedenborgian Convention of the United States, by a Sub-Committee, reported, "That it is expedient to publish a new edition of the Scriptures, containing the books of the Word *only*". It is further reported "that they have made some progress, but have not completed the revision." Prof. Parsons regards it as one of the inestimable

* Brief Exposition, 110 ; C. L. 524.

† A. C. 10, 320-25, 9094.

‡ T. C. R. 776.

blessings which the Lord is giving to mankind through his New Church, that the canon of Scripture is now determined and *settled* "for future ages, by the unerring test of the science of Correspondence".

But this doctrine of Correspondence performs still more important services for the New Church. After excluding from the Bible nearly half its books as not divinely inspired, it subsidizes the entire contents of those that remain, by the principles of interpretation which it establishes. As every thing in the Word is written by Correspondence, so nothing in it can be understood except by the same law. According to this law, the genuine doctrine is taught only by the internal sense. But this sense, though contained in the letter of the Word, is so "*concealed*" in it, that it can be discovered only by Correspondence, which is "the key". This locks up the Word and unlocks it. For reasons that seem very satisfactory to Swedenborg, it was hidden from the Apostles, and for seventeen hundred years after, from the entire Christian church, and then given to *him*. With this he claims to have unfolded, by divine and infallible dictation, the genuine doctrine, as the basis of the New Church. What that doctrine is, it has been our main object in this article to show. But when it is confronted by the obvious grammatical and historical sense of the Word, that sense is pronounced the mere covering of the Word, "the skin", the "shell", the "bark and rind", the "husks". "Without the internal sense", says Swedenborg, the Word "may be compared to a sack, balloon, or bladder that is collapsed and flaccid". Thus the defence is withdrawn from the province of ordinary Biblical criticism, within the lines of this occult correspondential sense. Here, in this *terra incognita*, the learned author constructed his chief works, defensive and offensive.

His reputed intromission into the spiritual world, considering the tendencies of men to seek communication with that world, has very considerable strategic force. We believe that this spiritual world, with the Swedish Seer, as with the seers of the present day, was the world of *his own mind*. The spirits and angels were his own thoughts and affections. They could tell

him nothing which he did not know before, or which his own mental or mesmeric processes would not give him. Hence he wisely never ventured to converse with any spirit or angel which he had not known in this world, either from personal acquaintance, from hearsay, or from history. His "intromission" was the external Swedenborg proceeding into the internal Swedenborg. In other words, it was his process of *interior* thought. "They who think much on religious subjects", he says, "and are so intent upon them as to see them, as it were, inwardly, in themselves, begin also to hear spirits speaking with them."* This gives the key to the "Revelations", and the "Seership" of the Swedish Philosopher, for, from the fiftieth year of his age,—he was an intensely religious thinker. It also explains the phenomena of his visions—the great number of spirits he saw—from ten to twenty thousand *daily*. They all converse, lecture, and debate in exactly his vocabulary and style—as a man's thoughts always do. They talk with him at all his waking hours, day and night. They contradict and deny when he hears Old Church preaching, satirizing the English Bishops, who did not favor his new system, in nearly the same words that Swedenborg employed for a similar purpose in his didactic treatises. They even accused him of intemperance, when they thought he ate more bread and milk than was good, as a man who studied much, took little animal food, and much coffee without milk, at all hours, day and night, might, in certain moods, be supposed to rebuke himself.

But the boldest adventure in the New Church polemical strategy, is, in its assault upon the motives and character of some of the most distinguished teachers of the Old Church. In this movement, the author passes from principles to *persons*, from rational argument to the pronouncing of judgment. By the "goats", referred to in Matt. xxv, 31, whom the Saviour condemns to everlasting punishment, he says, are meant those "who are in the present justifying faith of the Old Church†". The Reformers, who, he asserts, entirely separated good works

* H. H. 249.

† B. E. 84, 85.

from justifying faith, because the laity accounted these as necessary to salvation, "*pretended* to insert them into justification merely to tickle the ears of the vulgar"—and "that their system might not appear to contradict the Sacred Scriptures, but have the *semblance* of religion, and thus be *salved over*".* Swedenborg says that Luther, with whom he claims to have spoken about a hundred times in the spiritual world, "owned to him that he received the doctrine of justification by faith alone, *merely* with the intent that he might make an entire separation from Papacy", and this too, "contrary to the warning of an angel".† "There is in the Reformers, a certain deep-seated opposition and aversion to actual repentance, which is so violent that they cannot force themselves to self-examination, and to see their sins, and to confess them before God. They are seized, as it were, with a *certain horror at the very intention of such a thing*."‡

Of the Moravians, whose heroic Christian charity has carried them with the Gospel to the darkest portions of the globe, Swedenborg says: "They had cherished nothing of charity towards their neighbor, and nothing of love to the Lord". The spirits who explored the interiors of their thoughts, declared that they *revile* the Lord, and that they *reject a life of charity, so as even to hold it in abhorrence*.§

Upon some of the inspired penmen, our author is even more severe in his judgments. David, the sweet Psalmist of Israel, notwithstanding his deep penitence, after more than twenty-five hundred years, on the testimony of the Seer, is excluded from heaven as an adulterer, and is without, among dogs and adulterers. The apostle Paul, he professes to have seen often in the spiritual world, and he gives his character as it was there disclosed to him. He accuses him of the most unbounded desire for self-aggrandizement, and of the grossest hypocrisy, and of being governed by these principles after his conversion, as really as before. "He did all things", according to Swedenborg's visions, from "the end of being greatest in heaven", associating himself with other demons "to make

* B. E. 79, 46. † Letter to Ortenger. ‡ B. E. 114. § Last Judgment, 86.

themselves God". He suffered "the bruising process" with adulterers and adultresses, by which it "was made known to all that he is of such a *nefarious character*".*

Contrary to obvious facts, he asserts that Paul "has not mentioned in the epistles the least word of what the Lord taught",—that "he received nothing from the life and discourse of the Lord", that he was not allowed to take one parable or doctrine from Him, and explain it, but that he derived *all from himself*.†

This makes a distinct issue between the chief apostle of the Old Church, and the apostle of the New. Prof. Bush, whose frankness we have always admired, acknowledges that, as New Churchmen they have "to succumb to the charge of defamation, or to attempt to sustain and vindicate the statements" of their author. And he admits the *dogmatic exigencies* which call for the attempt to sustain them. "We recognize in the epistles of Paul the greatest of all obstacles to the spread of the New Church. Nor, until the authority attached in the mind of Christendom to these epistles be *weakened*, do we see how the doctrines of that church are ever to accomplish their transforming work in the world." "What inference remains", he asks, "but that those writings are marked with *falsity*, and consequently cannot be possessed of adequate claims to rank with the truly canonical Scriptures of the Word?" This charge of falsity made by the Professor against the apostle, falls back on the incompatibility of his doctrines with the teachings of Swedenborg. "The prevailing systems of dogmatic theology", he says, "found themselves primarily upon the epistles", and "the whole structure of Calvinism rests upon Paul as its chief corner-stone. Deprived of this basis, where were its so called doctrines of grace?" "And are not these the doctrines whose sanctity is supposed to be assailed by the New Church? Is it not precisely *here* that the antagonism between the two systems mainly betrayed itself?" These doctrines, of which the inspired apostle is admitted as the "chief corner-stone", he characterizes as "Dragonism", a "congeries of falsities", and

* Spiritual Diary, 4561, 4631, 4413, 4412, 4311. † Spiritual Diary, 4412, 4.

as "favoring the natural and sensual man". "The New Church man cannot be built up under a ministration of such falsities, and especially one that *ignores the true object of worship*."

Another able Swedenborgian writer says, "We recognize in the epistles of Paul the original programme of a system of doctrines . . which stands in *diametrical opposition* to the whole genius of the New Church". "And so long as the sanctity and the verity of these epistles stands *unimpeached*, so long must the progress of the Lord's New Church be materially retarded."

These frank statements of the disciples, harmonize with the antagonism of the system as announced by the master. And, what is important, they disclose the *necessity* for the impeachment of the apostle's character and writings. It is purely *dogmatic*. His doctrines are incompatible with the speculations of the Swedish seer; hence they are false, hence not inspired; and hence he must have been a *bad man*, and the church which confirms itself in his doctrines, must be "dragonic" and dead.

This strong antipathy of Swedenborg to the apostle's doctrine and character, extends to his *social ethics*. The reprehension of what the Seer calls scortatory love, is explicit and just. It is "diabolical" and "from hell". But the great defect is in the definition of scortatory love. On the positive side, it includes only that adultery which the offender believes not to be sin, or evil, or "contrary to reason". On the negative side, it excludes, 1. Fornication before marriage, and after the death of a consort. 2. Concubinages, apart from the wife, for a just cause. 3. Mild kinds of adultery.* Cohabitation with a concubine and the wife *at the same time*, is contrary to the conjugal relation; but with the concubine while the wife is set aside, it is not in opposition to, but is "a relative" and part of the same holy covenant. So are fornication and "mild kinds of adultery" parts of it. They are "between what is greatest and what is least of the *same thing*".† Thus these clear infractions of this primal and central divine institution,

* C. L. 423.

† C. L. 425.

are summarily licensed as virtues of the same class, only in a less degree. Excess of fornication is hurtful, and, since but "few" can refrain without "too great restraint", and "damages", and "unknown evils"—there is no other "asylum" than what, "in French is called a *maitresse*". Thus "care is to be taken by parents" to guard their young sons against "immoderate fornications", by opening to them a "refuge" in what is moderate and regular. The occasions which justify this kind of concubinage are various infirmities and social or moral obliquities. The diseases which are a just and sufficient cause, Swedenborg says, after mentioning a large number, are "multifarious"—"cancers and other like ones"—"loss of memory and other like things"—"hernia, and other like diseases". Among other just causes, are "stubbornness, in not obeying what is just", "doing mischief", "excess of luxury", "publishing the secrets of the house", "besides more"—"when the mind of one goes away from the other", and "internal dissimilitude, from which is antipathy".*

Now, this is a very large license. Few libertines have pleaded for a larger. This is also a very indefinite kind of legislation for so delicate a subject—there are so many unmentioned "other like things". And it is worst of all that the offender is constituted judge of what, by this code, justifies his offence. To what insult, ignominy, and brokenness of heart, does such a doctrine doom multitudes of feeble, but faithful wives, and to what a vile slavery to licensed passion, does it give over as many husbands! What a derangement of social order, and prostration of domestic purity and peace, would come from such a trampling down of human and divine law, as is here sanctioned! Nor are these concubinal licenses limited to the unregenerate and sensual. They are as free to the Christian of the New Church, as to the Pagan. Why should they not be? Such a concubinage in this new ethics is not at all repugnant to the conjugal tie, nor does it diminish mutual love and esteem. It is "not against the Christian religion", for conjugal love is "the very jewel of the Christ-

* C. L. 251-253, 470-473.

ian life". It "does not injure the conscience", nor is it "hurtful" in any respect. It is proper, and right, and reasonable, and chaste in all.

That Emanuel Swedenborg should inculcate such a social philosophy, considering the laxness of the age, and the country in which he lived, and what he admits as his "strongest passion", and its long indulgence, is not very surprising. Libertinism was the reputable vice of many among the learned and the scientific. A distinguished Swedenborgian writer says, apologetically of Swedenborg—"His times and his position were such as to foster the corruption of every merely natural man to the utmost"—that his diary, at the age of fifty-five or six, records visions and dreams "grotesque and ludicrous", and "in many instances unquestionably *impure*",—that "the chambers of his imagery are manifestly tainted". But it is difficult to understand the zeal of those of his followers who are of the purest social virtue, in defending and propagating such teachings as infallible, and as making a part of the "heavenly doctrines" of the New Church. Can they really wish to make them prevalent? They hold that no writer does such honor to the divine institution of marriage as Swedenborg. But we have never read any other claiming to be Christian, that so *debased* it, by mixing with it fornication, concubinage, and adultery as of the same essence. Professor Parsons says, the works of Swedenborg "enthroned the majesty of chastity", more than those of any other mortal. This may be true of what Swedenborg *calls* the chastity of moderate fornication and concubinage. But he who breaks down the essential distinction between fornication and marriage,—between a courtesan and a wife, dethrones and *degrades* the latter, and does not know what chastity is. Thus the antagonism of this New Church reaches to the ethical system of the old Church, and sweeps it clean away, as it does its philosophy and Christian doctrine.

The issue, then, which the Swedenborgians join with the Christian Church is not a strife of words, as are too many theological controversies. It is not a debate about forms, or orders, or un-essential doctrines, on a basis of common, fundamental principles. On its own presenting, it assails the

whole Old Church system. It proposes no compromise. It allows no mediation. It began in speculation and a claim to superior charity. It ends in personalities and defamation of character. The war is exterminating. In the spirit of many of the belligerents, it is earnest, and we are bound to believe, *honest*. In some, it is kind, courteous, honorable. But in the intent and expectation of the leaders, it is radical, uncompromising, and exterminating. Will the Church withstand the assault? It has endured many such, as the student of history well knows. It has withstood *this* for a hundred years, and been all the while gaining in vitality and vigor, and we believe it will continue to do so, despite all opposing forces, for "the Lord God in the midst of her is mighty".

ART. IV.—THE HOMERIC DOCTRINE OF SIN, ITS EXPIATION AND ITS PENALTY.

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HOMER has no word answering in comprehensiveness or depth of meaning to the word sin, as it is used in the Bible; and that for the obvious reason that the consciousness of sin was awakened, the idea of sin was developed, under the peculiar discipline of the Jewish and the Christian dispensations, as they never were among the Greeks or any other people of ancient times. The noun *ἁμαρτία*, which is appropriated to express this idea in the Greek of the New Testament, does not occur in the Homeric poems. The verb *ἁμαρτάνειν* is used often in the sense of missing a mark (Il. 5, 287) or failing of an object (Od. 21, 155), but rarely of a sin against the gods, as in Il. 9, 501. The same verse is also the only instance in which *ὑπερβαίνειν*, the etymological equivalent of our *transgress*, is used in the sense of transgression or trespass: *ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβῇ καὶ ἁμάρτη*, *whenever any one may chance to have transgressed and sinned*, etc., against the gods. The corresponding noun *ὑπερβασία*, *transgression*, occurs infrequently, but al-

ways in a moral sense, of the violation of some law of God or man, as, for instance, the crimes of the suitors (Od. 3, 206 ; 22, 168), the violation of an oath which is an offence especially against Jupiter (Il. 3, 107 : μήτις ὑπερβασίῃ Δίος ὄρκια δηλήσῃται), and the sins and follies of youth in general (Il. 23, 589).

But the word which is most frequently employed to express wrong doing of every kind, is *ἄτη* with its corresponding verb. As this word shows most clearly the light in which sin was viewed by the early Greeks, it demands a somewhat careful examination. The radical signification of the word would seem to be a *befooling**, a depriving one of his senses and his reason, as by unseasonable sleep (Od. 10, 68 ; 12, 372) and excess of wine (Od. 21, 295), joined with the influence of evil companions (Od. 10, 68) and the power of destiny or the deity (Od. 11, 61, cf. 12, 372). The idea of some supernatural power or influence seems always to be associated with this befooling, and its ultimate source is always conceived to be the gods or the fates. Hence the Greek imagination, which animated and impersonated every great power, very naturally conceived of Ἄτη as a person, a sort of omnipresent and universal cause of folly and sin, of mischief and misery, who, though the daughter of Jupiter, yet once fooled or misled Jupiter himself, and thenceforth, cast down from heaven to earth, walks with light feet over the heads of men and makes all at times go wrong (Il. 19, 91, cf. 9, 505). Hence too when men come to their senses and see what folly and wrong they have perpetrated, they cast the blame on Ἄτη and so ultimately on Jupiter and the gods (Il. 19, 86-90) ; for the same folly and wrong, which, in the latter part of this remarkable passage, Agamemnon ascribes to the agency of Ἄτη, at the beginning, he refers to Ζεύς, and Μοῖρα and Ἐρινύς.

The passage is thus imperfectly rendered by Pope :

“ Nor charge on me, ye Greeks, the dire debate ;
Know, angry Jove and all-compelling Fate,

* I here follow very nearly in the footsteps of Nägelsbach, to whose section on this subject (in his *Homeric Theology*) I am indebted for valuable thoughts and still more for illustrative passages.

With fell Erinyes, urged my wrath* that day,
 When from Achilles' arms I forced the prey.
 What then could I against the will of heaven?
 Not by myself but vengeful Atë driven;
 She, Jove's daughter, fated to infest
 The race of mortals, entered in my breast.†

In like manner Priam, blinded by his fondness for the beauteous Helen, and for her paramour, his false and faithless son, relieves her of all responsibility for the war, by laying the blame on the gods (Il. 3, 164-5):

"No crime of thine our present sufferings draws;
 Not thou, but heaven's disposing will, the cause."

Yet Helen, in her reply, condemns and despises herself, and makes no attempt to cast the responsibility on the gods (Il. 3, 180, cf. 241; 6, 344). And Agamemnon elsewhere confesses his folly and wrong, repeating the confession (*ἁσάμην*, 9, 116 and 119) and making no attempt to shift the blame on a higher power; and the very same act of injustice to Achilles which in one place is imputed to an irresistible overruling power, is expressly referred, in another, to the monarch's own pride and self-will (Il. 1, 133, 185, *et passim*). So the riotous suitors and the inconsiderate comrades of Ulysses went under a kind of judicial blindness — nay, under an immediate divine impulse — to their doom (Od. 18, 346); and yet they went yielding to their violent and wanton passions, following their own strong inclinations (Od. 17, 431; *ὑβρεὶ ἐλξαντες, ἐπισπόμενοι μένει σφῶι*). And the two ideas are sometimes brought into immediate juxtaposition in striking resemblance to the Scriptures. The suitors, says Homer, were destroyed by the appointment of the gods and by wicked deeds. Even so the betrayer of the Lord Jesus went as it was written of him, and yet went under the impulse of his own blind passions to his own place; and

* Literally, *folly*, wrong, *ἄσσην*.

† The Greek is very expressive: *Ἀτὴ ἡ πάντα ἄσσει*. The agent, the action and the effect are all expressed by the same root. *Folly which fools all, infused wild folly (ἄσσειον Ἀτὴν) into my bosom*. And this *Folly* is only the executioner of *Jove* and *Fate* and another name for *Erinyes*.

though the Redeemer was delivered up according to the *determinate counsel* and *foreknowledge of God*, yet it was with *wicked hands* that his murderers crucified him and put him to death.

✕ In Homer, then, as in the Bible, sin is folly, blindness, madness so strange that it seems explicable only on the supposition of some external, supernatural, blinding and bewildering agency, and yet so fully and so consciously in accordance with the sinner's own inclinations, and in obedience to his own impulses, that he cannot shake off the responsibility. The wicked suitors have no knowledge; they are as unwise as they are unjust:

ἀφραδέων ἐπεὶ οὗτι νοήμονες οὐδὲ δίκαιοι (Od. 2, 282) :

they have wrought folly in Ithaca, as great sinners wrought folly in Israel (Josh. vii, 15; Gen. xxxiv, 7), and the whole people will reap the consequences (Od. 2, 239) unless they purge themselves of the iniquity. And this suggests another point of resemblance. ✕ In Homer, as in the Bible, sin is misery, calamity of the most dreadful kind; in other words, sin and its punishment are so inseparable, nay, so identical, that they are expressed by the same word. Readers of the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures are familiar with this so-called Hebraistic usage. But it is even more striking in the Iliad and Odyssey. ἄτη is both sin and suffering, both folly and calamity, sometimes the one idea and sometimes the other being more prominent, but neither at any time wholly excluded*. If the chief idea in any passage is that of folly, yet it is folly leading to calamity, perchance to utter ruin. If on the other hand, calamity seems, in any passage, to be the principal idea, it is still only that calamity which results from folly and moral blindness. The whole history of the suitors is a standing illustration of the great fact in the government of God, that moral blindness leads to deeper blindness, and

* Hence the mistake of Buttmann in making *calamity* the original and principal meaning of the word. Cf. Butt. Lex. sub. v. That it is a mistake, is sufficiently clear from the usage of the word as illustrated in the text.

sin is punished by more aggravated wickedness, *till at length persuasions and entreaties are useless*—such is the very language of the poet (Od. 16, 278)—*for their appointed day of vengeance has already come*. “And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient” (Rom. i, 28).

Man is a frail, feeble, erring and sinful creature, weakest and most to be pitied of all the animals that live and move upon the earth, easily elated by prosperity, and as easily depressed by adversity; impatient under the latter, proud, self-righteous, and self-confident under the former, and too often rebellious under both (Od. 18, 130–140).* As his tempter (Ἄρη) goes about all over the world (πᾶσαν ἐπ’ αἶαν, Il. 9, 506), harming men (βλάπτουσι ἀνθρώπους), and tempts all and leads them astray (παντας δᾶται Il. 19, 91), so sin and misery are universal in the world. In speaking of the race, however, or of themselves, or of their neighbors and acquaintance generally, Homer’s heroes are much more ready to deplore the misery than to condemn the sin. They never say such evil and bitter things of themselves, as David, Isaiah and Job; and nowhere in the Iliad and Odyssey do we read such pictures of human depravity, as we read everywhere in the Law and the Prophets and the Psalms, and not less in the Gospels and the Epistles. “By the law is the knowledge of sin”, even as by the Gospel is its remedy.

But the Gentiles are not *without* law. Even in the Bible of the ancient Greeks, sin is the transgression of law (ὑπερβασία). Law is that which is laid down (θέμις from θε- root of τίθημι, as *law* from *lay*), settled, established as the course of nature, the custom of society, the usages of mankind, the rights of individuals, families, communities, and nations; in short, the whole natural, social, and moral order of the universe. All this is included in the oft-repeated phrase θέμις ἐστίν, or ὅ θέμις ἐστίν, which in different connections means: as it is *right*, as the *custom* is, as is *proper* between man and man, as is *due* to

* This striking passage is quoted below, p. 290.

the host or the guest, as is *befitting* the king and commander, or the subject and the soldier. These various laws, of nature and custom, of right and fitness, are all laws of Jupiter (Διὸς μέγαλοιο θέμιστες, Od. 16, 403), and counsels or purposes of the gods (θεῶν βούλας, ibid. 402), which the wise and good man, like Ulysses, will carefully consult before he proceeds to action, and then scrupulously obey (ibid.), while the foolish and wicked, like the unreasonable and unjust suitors (οὔτι νοήμονες οὐδὲ δίκαιοι) or the mad-cap Arés himself, know no law (οὔτινα οἶδε θέμιστα, Il. 5, 761, cf. Od. 2, 281). Jupiter, with the co-operation of the other gods, is the author and executioner of these laws—their guardian and avenger. Moreover, human laws and governments proceed from him as their original source. He gives the sceptre to whom he will (Il. 2, 205–6); and by him kings reign and princes decree justice; literally, *before him* (πρὸς Διός, Il. 1, 239) they guard and execute the laws. So that all laws, human as well as divine, are clothed with something of divine authority, and all violations of them are sins in the sight of the gods.

The duties that spring from this natural order and divine constitution, fall naturally under the three-fold division common to all ethical systems, and distinctly recognised by Homer (Od. 2, 64–67), of duties to self, duties to fellow-men, and duties to God.

Among the duties which the Homeric hero owes to himself, or the laws which he feels bound to obey, especial prominence is given to the law of self-respect, the sense of personal worth, the pride of ancestral dignity, the desire to excel in bravery, the love of glory, the law of honor, the law of conscience, and the duty of self-control. “Be men, be mindful of yourselves” (Il. 15, 487); “be men, respect yourselves” (ibid. 561); “be indignant at the wrong yourselves, while you also regard the good opinion of others” (Od. 2, 64); or as Pope has the two former passages :

“Be mindful of yourselves, your ancient fame,
And spread your glory with the navy’s flame.”

“O Greeks! respect your fame,
Respect yourselves, and learn an honest shame.”

Such are some of the most frequent and stirring appeals which the leaders address to their troops on either side.

“To stand the first in worth as in command,
To add new honors to my native land;
Before my eyes my mighty sires to place,
And emulate the glories of our race.”

Such is the education which the Lycian Glaucus boasts to have received from his royal father (Π. 6, 206); and the Trojan Hector declares in the same book (442, seqq.) that he cannot withdraw from the deadly fight even to please his wife, for he not only dreads the reproach of his countrymen and countrywomen, but his own soul scorns the ignoble deed, since he was taught to be always brave, and fight among the foremost ranks for his own glory and the glory of his royal father.

“Juno, my son, and Pallas, if they please,
Can make thee valiant; but thy own big heart
Thyself restrain. Sweet manners win respect.”

These are the last words of counsel which the aged Peleus addressed to the youthful Achilles when he set out for the war—words which that impetuous hero did not heed, and so want of self-government blighted all the happiness of his brilliant but brief career. It is just this relinquishing of the helm to the control of the passions instead of the supremacy of reason and conscience, which gives *Até* the *opportunity* to bewilder and blind the soul still more, and thus work its ruin. And if the man blinded and maddened by passion refuses to listen to entreaty, the very ministers of mercy and mediation between heaven and earth at length turn against him and plead for vengeance (Π. 9, 510). So that even the sins and follies which the man perpetrates under her blinding influence, are voluntary and responsible in their *origin*, and the calamities which he suffers, and which, like the sins, are called *Atæ*, are self-caused, being the result of the voluntary abdication of the throne by reason and conscience to unrestrained passion, uncontrolled self-will, or, it may be, excessive pride and self-glorification.

Among the relative duties, none is more earnestly inculcated or more beautifully exemplified than duty to parents. See the filial love and respect with which the manly and heroic Hector, the bulwark at once of his family and of his country, still treats his honored mother (Il. 6, 264, seqq.). See the filial spirit of Telemachus, bound up in the fortunes of his long absent father, performing long journeys by sea and land, to glean tidings of his fate, weeping on his neck at the lodge of Eumæus, defending him, under the guise of a beggar, from the insults of the suitors in the palace, affectionate, confiding, watchful, and obedient to his every word, look, and action, till at length he receives the welcome sign :

"Slings his keen falchion, grasps his spear and stands
Armed bright for battle at his father's side."

And in living demonstration of the maxim of one of the Seven Sages, that parents may expect from their children that obedience which they themselves paid to their parents, look at that scene near the conclusion of the Odyssey, than which there is scarcely anything more touching in the whole range of history or fiction, where Ulysses, now victorious over all his enemies, reëstablished on his throne, and restored to the embrace of his beloved Penelope, cannot rest till he has sought out the aged Laertes, finds him in his garden clad in rags and toiling at menial employments, weeps in concealment over the sad spectacle, plies his faded memory with facts in their early history to convince him that it is indeed no other than his own long lost Ulysses, and holds him clasped to his bosom, till the old man recovers from the swoon which so unexpected and joyful an event has brought over his bewildered faculties. The boy Telemachus hardly treats his mother with as much respect and deference as the man Hector (for there is scarcely any age at which one submits to maternal authority with so little grace as when he is passing out of his teens); yet he refuses compliance with the demand of the suitors to send her back against her will to her own father's house, and paints in glowing colors the scorn of men (*νέμεσις ἐξ ἀνθρώπων*) and vengeance of the gods (*στρυγερὰς Ἐρινύς*) which Providence (*δαίμων*) will visit on an undutiful son :

"While thus he speaks, Telemachus replies,
 Even nature starts, and what ye ask, denies.*
 Thus, shall I thus repay a mother's cares,
 Who gave me life, and nursed my infant years?
 How from my father should I vengeance dread!
 How would my mother curse my hated head!
 And while in wrath to vengeful fiends she cries,
 How from their hell would vengeful fiends arise!
 Abhorred by all, accursed my name would grow,
 The earth's disgrace, and human kind my foe!"

In Homer, then, as well as in the Scriptures, "Honor thy father and mother" is "the first commandment with promise"; and the primal curse rests on filial ingratitude and rebellion.

Nearly allied to filial duty is that reverence which is due to age; and which, in Homer as in the Pentateuch, is rendered in the most touching and graceful forms. Priam relies on the united power of both these motives to move the heart of the slayer of his son, and urges the plea with a pathos which even the implacable Achilles cannot resist (Il. 24, 489):

"Ah! think, thou favored of the powers divine!
 Think of thy father's age, and pity mine!
 In me that father's reverend image trace,
 Those silver hairs, that venerable face;
 His trembling limbs, his helpless person see!
 In all my equal, but in misery!
 These words soft pity in the chief inspire.
 Touched with the remembrance of his sire,
 The reverend monarch by the hand he raised,
 On his white beard and form majestic gazed,†
 Not unrelenting: then serene began
 With words to soothe the miserable man."

The Iliad and the Odyssey have each its own matchless picture of conjugal affection and fidelity, the one a Trojan, the other a Grecian pair, the former doomed to a sad parting in the very beginning of their married life, soon after Providence

* Literally *it is not possible* to banish her from the house. Compare the similar but still more lofty answer of the youthful Joseph when solicited to sin (Gen xxxix, 9): How *can* I do this great wickedness and *sin against God*?

† *Ολκτείρων πολλόν τε κάρη πολλόν τε γένειον.*

had blessed them with a pledge of their mutual love; the latter destined, after long separation and sorrow, to meet and, in a serene old age, to enjoy the reward of their mutual faithfulness, but both, though dead yet speaking, to the hearts of millions, of the honor and blessedness of pure unchanging wedded love. Hector and Andromache, Ulysses and Penelope! when will those names ever be forgotten! And who that remembers them can ever forget the lessons which they teach! Over against them in the Homeric gallery stand another pair blackened and scathed by the indignation of gods and men, standing monuments of the guilt and ruin of conjugal infidelity—Ægisthus and Clytemnestra; a foul adulterer and a faithless friend, who with murderous hand stabbed their lord and king at the friendly feast, and whom, even in Hades, whither they have been sent by the avenging hand of Orestes, the injured and murdered husband still follows with his curses (Od. 11, 409 seqq.):

“O wife! thy deeds disgrace
The perjured sex, and blacken all the race;
And should posterity one virtuous find,
Name Clytemnestra, they will curse the kind.”

While, in Homer as in the Bible, there is thus a peculiar sacredness about the domestic relations, the violation of which brings down the special vengeance of the gods and the Erinyes, the stranger, also, is under the especial protection of Jupiter, who rejoices in the title of *Zeὺς ξένιος*, the god of the stranger and the guardian of the rights of hospitality (Il. 13, 624; Od. 14, 389), and who will surely avenge any wrong done to the stranger beneath the roof (Od. 9, 266–71; cf. Deuteron. x, 18), as well as to the host, who affords him hospitable entertainment, (Il. 3, 351–4). The fate of Troy and the catastrophe of the Iliad turn on the violation by Paris of the rights at once of the husband and the host, for which double crime the Trojan king and people have rendered themselves responsible by refusing or neglecting to make reparation (Il. 13, 625 seqq.), and must therefore suffer a dreadful overthrow.

With the stranger, the poor and needy, the beggar and the

suppliant are often associated as under the special guardianship of Jupiter:

"Low at thy knee, thy succor we implore,
Respect us, human, and relieve us, poor.
At least some hospitable gift bestow,
'Tis what the happy to th' unhappy owe;
'Tis what the gods require: those gods revere;
The poor and stranger are their constant care:
To Jove their cause and their revenge belongs,
He wanders with them and he feels their wrongs." (Od. 9, 266-71.)

It is a violation of established law (*οὐ θέμις ἔστι*) to dishonor the stranger; for all strangers and beggars are under the protection of Zeus (*πρὸς Διὶς εἶναι*)—a sentiment often repeated in the *Odyssey* (6, 207; 14, 57); and the gods and Erinyes are their avengers (17, 475).*

An implacable, unmerciful, unforgiving spirit is often censured as unlike the gods, and unbecoming helpless, dependent mortals. The suitors are as unmerciful as they are unjust; and the gods do not love cruel and oppressive deeds (Od. 14, 82). The aged friend of Achilles warns him to be merciful as he would obtain mercy, and not to scorn the entreaties of men, lest the gods spurn his prayers (Il. 9, 496).

"Now be thy rage, thy fatal rage resigned;
A cruel heart ill suits a manly mind:
The gods, the only great, the only wise
Are moved by offerings, vows, and sacrifice.
Prayers are Jove's daughters," etc.
"When man rejects the humble suit they make,
The sire revenges for the daughters' sake."

The argument is of the same *kind* as in the sermon on the mount: Be merciful, for God is merciful; and forgive, that you may be forgiven.

Human laws are not only called by the same name as divine laws (*θέμιοι*), but are administered under the same divine sanction. Kings and judges execute law and justice as in the presence and with the authority of Jove (*πρὸς Διὶς*,

* The like sentiment is repeated with emphasis in the Old Testament (Ex. xxii, 21; Lev. xix, 33; Deut. x, 18).

II. 239). The sceptre and the laws are his gift (II. 2, 205). Heralds are the messengers of Jove as well as of men (II. 1, 334). The oaths by which treaties are ratified and justice administered are witnessed by Zeus (II. 3, 276), and are even called his oaths (*Διὸς ὀρκία*, II. 3, 107); and though he may fail immediately to punish the violation of them, he will sooner or later accomplish the vengeance to which he is pledged (II. 4, 161), and Pluto, Proserpina (II. 3, 278) and the Erinyes (II. 19, 260) will be his unfailing executioners :

“Not thus our vows, confirmed with wine and gore,
Those hands we plighted and those oaths we swore,
Shall all be vain ; when heaven’s revenge is slow,
Jove but prepares to strike the fiercer blow.
The day shall come, the great avenging day,
Which Troy’s proud glories in the dust shall lay.
I see th’ Eternal all his fury shed
And shake his ægis o’er their guilty head.
Such mighty woes on perjured princes wait.”

Those who, like the suitors, disregard the rights of men, are also charged, as in the form of indictment for murder in the English law, with having no fear of God before their eyes :

“Laws or divine or human failed to move,
Or shame of men or dread of gods above.”

Such is the indictment of Ulysses against the suitors, who had long promised themselves impunity, but who now, at length, are overtaken with sudden vengeance (Od. 22, 25).

The chief duties to the gods are respect for their persons, worship at their altars, obedience to their commands, and submission to their will.

The penalty of a direct insult to any divine personage, though it be an infant god or a god disguised in human form, is death. At least those who dare offer such a personal affront to deity, never prosper, and never live long upon the earth :

“Know thou, whoe’er with heavenly powers contends,
Short is his date, and soon his glory ends ;
From fields of death when late he shall retire,
No infant on his knees shall call him sire.” (II. 5, 406-9.)

“Not long Lycurgus viewed the golden light,
That daring man who mixed with gods in fight, . . .
Nor failed the crime th’ immortals’ wrath to move,
Th’ immortals blessed with endless ease above;
Deprived of sight by their avenging doom,
Cheerless he moved and wandered in the gloom:
Then sunk unpitied to the dim abodes,
A wretch accursed and hated by the gods.” (Il. 6, 186 seqq.)

A sentiment not unlike the woe which the Scriptures denounce on him who striveth with his Maker, but how inferior in moral dignity and sublimity!

Men may expect to enjoy the favor of the gods in proportion to the frequency, abundance, and richness of the vows and prayers, sacrifices and offerings which they bring to their altars. Throughout the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, the gods are represented as moved by such offerings at their respective temples very much as earthly sovereigns are won by presents and obeisances offered in their courts, insomuch that Poseidon rescues Æneas on the score of his constant and acceptable offerings (Il. 20, 298), and Zeus is almost tempted to contravene the decrees of destiny in favor of Hector, because he has burned so many fat bullocks on his altar (Il. 22, 170, cf. 179). When we read of Nestor sacrificing to Poseidon at nine altars, and nine bullocks on each altar (Od. 3, 7), we are reminded of the thousands of victims which Solomon sacrificed, in the middle of the court as well as on the brazen altar, at the dedication of the temple, though the latter far exceeds the former in the costliness of his sacrifices, as well as in the grandeur and sacredness of the occasion. The neglect to honor any god or goddess with sacrifices which they regard as their due, especially the slight implied in his or her omission while other divinities receive their due honors, is an unpardonable offence. Thus the far-famed Calydonian boar was sent upon the Ætolians in vengeance for neglected sacrifice, because while the other gods were rejoicing in their hecatombs, to Artemis alone Æneus, king of the Ætolians, had brought none of the first-fruits of his fields and vineyards; whether the slight was intentional or not, it was a great mis-

take and a great sin (*άσκατο δὲ μέγα θυμῷ*, Il. 9, 537); and the fields and vineyards of Æneus must pay the penalty, and the whole nation must be involved in a calamitous war to expiate the offence (Il. 9, 535 seqq.).

An affront offered to a priest or other representative of a god, like an offence against his person or his altar, provokes the divine vengeance. It was Agamemnon's insult to the priest of Apollo and refusal to restore his daughter that brought the pestilence on the Grecian host and gave occasion to the wrath of Achilles, which was more fatal than the pestilence itself, to the Grecian cause; for in this case as in the somewhat similar case of David, the sin of the monarch was visited primarily on the people and the king was punished, and punished sorely, *through* the calamities that fell on them (Il. 1, *passim*, cf. 2 Sam. xxiv).

Robbed of his own captive prize in revenge for proposing the return of Agamemnon's, Achilles is ready to draw his sword and slay the monarch in the very midst of his assembled army. But Athene, sent by the queen of the gods, presents herself before him and bids him restrain his anger, "command his passions and the gods obey". Achilles instantly obeys, and assigns this good reason for obedience :

"Hard as it is, my vengeance I suppress;
Those who revere the gods, the gods will bless."

There is no conviction more deeply inwrought into the minds of all the leading men of both sides in the Trojan war, than this: not so much the right of gods to command as their power to bless or curse; not so much the duty of obeying the gods, but the sure reward of obedience and the certain punishment of disobedience; and there is scarcely a book in the Iliad or the Odyssey that does not furnish a practical commentary both on the belief and its realization.

From this same superiority of power on the part of the immortal gods over short-lived and changeful mortals, results the wisdom and necessity as well as the duty of fear (Od. 4, 389), of reverence (*αἰδέο θεούς*, Od. 9, 269; Il. 24, 503), of silent and unquestioning submission to their will: Do not by

any means, yielding to folly and rashness, talk large (*μέγα ελπεῖν*), but leave the matter to the gods,* since they are far more powerful (Od. 22, 287). Such is the sage counsel of the disguised Ulysses to one of the haughty suitors, while in giving the like advice to another, he indulges still more his natural vein of reflection and argument (Od. 18, 130):

“Of all that breathes or grovelling creeps on earth,
Most vain is man! calamitous by birth:
To-day with power elate, in strength he blooms;
The haughty creature on that power presumes:
Anon from heaven a sad reverse he feels;
Untaught to bear, 'gainst heaven the wretch rebels.
For man is changeful as his bliss or woe;
Too high when prosperous, when distressed too low,
Then let not man be proud; but firm of mind,
Bear the best humbly and the worst resigned;
Be dumb† when heaven afflicts, unlike yon train
Of haughty spoilers insolently vain.”

But his warnings are unavailing. Spoiled by prosperity and self-gratification, they all perish guilty at once of robbery towards man and rebellion against the gods. And not a few of the Grecian heroes triumph over the Trojans in the war only to fall victims to their own pride, folly and self-will on their return to their native land, thus lending the sanction of the greatest of Greek poets to the proverb of the wisest of Hebrew kings: The prosperity of fools shall destroy them. Ajax, the son of Oileus, is the most conspicuous warning, who, though wrecked and cast upon a rock, sinned greatly (*μέγ' ἄσσοθῃ*,‡ Od. 4, 503) by declaring that he would escape in spite of the gods, and so Poseidon smote the rock with his trident and soon sunk the rebel in the depths of the sea. And Agamemnon and Achilles, though neither of them directly rebels or opposes the will of heaven, yet both of them encroach too nearly, though in very different ways, on the prerogatives of

* *θεοῖσιν μὲθον ἐπιτρέψαι*, cf. Ps. xxxviii, 5: Commit thy way to the Lord.

† *σιγῇ*; literally, let him keep in silence the gifts of the gods, whatever from time to time they may give (appoint).

‡ This expressive phrase is repeated half a dozen times on the same subject, and occurs often in Homer.

the gods ; and the brilliant, self-willed and passionate career of the latter comes to a speedy conclusion before the fall of Troy, while the former triumphs over his enemies only to perish ingloriously in the embrace of his friends.

The paramount fundamental principle, then, which Homer inculcates in regard to sin is, that it is sure to meet with deserved punishment. For this, both parties habitually pray :

“ Whoe’er involved us in this dire debate,
Oh! give that author of the war to fate.” (Il. 3, 820.)
“ Give me, just Jove, to punish lawless lust,
And lay the Trojan gasping in the dust ;
Destroy the aggressor, aid my righteous cause,
Avenge the breach of hospitable laws!
Let this example future times reclaim,
And guard from wrong fair friendship’s holy name.” (Il. 3, 851.)

This they confidently expect. Jove will not be an abettor of falsehood and perjury (Il. 4, 235). Solemn treaties and sacred oaths cannot be violated with impunity (Il. 4, 158).

“ When heaven’s revenge is slow,
Jove but prepares to strike the fiercer blow.
The day shall come, the great avenging day,
Which Troy’s proud glories in the dust shall lay,
’Tis not for us, but guilty Troy to dread,
Whose crimes sit heavy on her perjured head.”

And these prayers are heard, these expectations are realized ; in the progress of the war and in the final issue, justice usually prevails, and crime generally meets with its deserved punishment.

These passages illustrate also the object or end of punishment. It is partly to satisfy divine justice or hatred of sin, and partly to deter others from transgression. Zeus is angry with fraud and wrong, and therefore shakes his dreadful ægis over the wicked (Il. 4, 168), and others will fear to repeat the crime, even in future generations (Il. 3, 353).

Punishment is the penalty due to sin ; or, to use a favorite expression of Homer, not unusual in the Scriptures also, it is the *payment* of the debt incurred by sin. When he is pun-

ished, the criminal is said to pay off, or pay back (*ἀποτίναι*) his crimes ; in other words, to expiate or atone for them :

*σύν τε μεγάλῳ ἀπέτισαν,
σὺν σφῆσιν κεφαλῇσι, γυναιξὶ τε καὶ τεκέεσσιν.* (Il. 4, 161-2.)

i. e. they shall pay off, pay back, atone, etc. for their treachery, with a great price, with their lives, and their wives and children. Or rather to show the certainty of this atonement, the past tense is used and they are represented as having already made the atonement.* The same verb is used of the suitors, with an accusative of the crime to be expiated or atoned for :

πρὶν πᾶσαν μνηστῆρας ὑπερβασίην ἀποτίσαι. (Od. 13, 193.)
"Till the suitors shall have atoned for all their transgression."

The middle voice of the same verb is employed in the sense to *get* payment for an offence, to *take* satisfaction for a crime, in other words, to take vengeance on the offender and punish the criminal (Od. 3, 206, 216). The prevailing sentiment of the Iliad and Odyssey is that punishment is the proper and only proper expiation of sin.

At the same time the doctrine is expressly taught that the gods may and sometimes do remit the penalty, when duly propitiated by prayers and sacrifices accompanied by suitable reparation :

"The gods, the only great and only wise,
Are moved by offerings, vows and sacrifice ;
Offending man their high compassion wins,
And daily prayers atone for daily sins.
Prayers are Jove's daughters, of celestial race,
Lame are their feet and wrinkled is their face ;
With humble mien and with dejected eyes,
Constant they follow where Injustice flies ;
Injustice swift, erect and unconfined,
Sweeps the wide earth and tramples o'er mankind,
While Prayers, to heal her wrongs, move slow behind.

* Cf. Rom. viii, 30 : *οὗς δὲ ἐδικαίωσεν, τοὺτους καὶ ἐδόξασε* : Whom he justified, them he also glorified, though the glorification was not yet accomplished, but it was the *certain result* of the justification.

Who hears these daughters of almighty Jove,
 For him they mediate to the throne above :
 When man rejects the humble suit they make,
 The sire revenges for the daughters' sake.
 From Jove commissioned, fierce Injustice then
 Descends to punish unrelenting men." (Il. 9, 497, seqq.)

There are many points of great interest in this remarkable passage. In the first place, *Sin* (*Ἄτη*, rendered Injustice by Pope) is here made to be the punishment of sin unrepented and unforgiven. In the second place, it is expressly taught, that the gods are sometimes propitiated and turned from their purpose (*παταρπωπῶσ'*) to punish sin by prayers, vows and sacrifices offered by the sinner. In the third place, Prayers are impersonated and represented as mediators between heaven and earth, daughters of Jove and divine, yet meek and lowly, feeble and *marred*, who, when accepted by the sinner, intercede in his behalf with the King of gods and men, but, if rejected, plead for double vengeance on his head.*

> We have a practical illustration of this doctrine in the first book of the *Iliad*, where Apollo averts the pestilence from the army, when the daughter of his priest is returned without ransom, and a sacrifice (*ἐκατόμβη*, v. 447) is sent to the altar of the god at sacred Chrysa. Here, too, there is an intercessor, whose prayers accompany the offerings and make sure their acceptance with the god, and that no other than the injured priest whose wrongs had first brought the pestilence upon the Grecian host. Apollo hearkens to the intercession of his priest, accepts the sacred hecatomb, is delighted with the accompanying songs and libations, and sends back the embassy with a favoring breeze and a favorable answer to the army, who meanwhile have been purifying themselves (*ἀπελυμαίνοντο*, v. 314) and offering unblemished hecatombs of bulls and goats on the shore of the sea which washes the place of their encampment.

The question has been raised, whether in this and the like

* Hence these Prayers (*Ἀπαί*) become Curses in other passages in the *Iliad* (12, 334), and in the Attic tragedies, another name for the Erinyes (*Soph. Eum.* 417).

cases in the Iliad and Odyssey we have a proper *sin-offering* which is supposed to have a truly atoning and piacular efficacy, or whether it is only in the nature of a gift accompanying the prayers, like presents to an earthly sovereign, and intended to add efficiency to the reconciling power of the petitions. It is not easy to meet this question with a decisive answer. The manner in which the gods speak of these sacrifices as their prerogative and portion (τὸ γὰρ λάχομεν γέρας ἡμεῖς, II. 4, 49, et passim) and the personal, not to say animal, rather than moral satisfaction with which they receive and enjoy the δαυτὸς ἐίσης, λοιβῆς τε κνίσσης τε (ibid. 48), favor the latter supposition. At the same time, the accompanying rites and ceremonies, the forms of expression and sometimes the expressed object of the sacrifice bear a striking resemblance to those of the Israelites in the Old Testament and suggest a similar original intention, though they have already lost not a little of their high and sacred moral significance. The object of the propitiatory embassy to Apollo in the first book, for example, is thus stated by Ulysses: Agamemnon, king of men, has sent me to bring thy daughter, Chryses, and to offer a sacred hecatomb for (ὑπὲρ) the Greeks, that we may propitiate (ἱλασθμεθα) the king who now sends woes and many groans upon the Argives; and the language certainly approximates at several points very closely to that of the Pentateuch, and of the Epistles to the Romans, and the Hebrews. Again, the sacrificial lambs and cups of wine, which were offered in ratification of a solemn treaty, represented the parties to the treaty, and symbolically bore the curse of its violation; hence they could not be eaten and drunk, but the wine was poured out on the ground as an offering to the gods, with the accompanying imprecation: So let their brains be poured upon the ground who first break the treaty, and the lambs, if sacrificed, by the people of the country, were buried in the ground; if by strangers, were thrown into a sea or river (II. 3, 291 seqq.; 19, 267).*

As to the punishment of sin in another world, Homer is explicit only in regard to great criminals, such as perjured

* Cf. Owen's Iliad, 3, 310, and Smith's Dictionary of Antiquities, under *Oath*.

persons and those guilty of unnatural crimes towards men, or rebellion against the gods. Pluto, Proserpine and the Eri-nyes are habitually invoked as the powers that under the earth punish departed souls who have sworn falsely (Il. 8, 277 ; 19, 259). And Ulysses, in his visit to Hades, sees Tityus, Tantalus, Sisyphus, and the like monsters of iniquity, suffering perpetual tortures corresponding to their crimes (Od. 11, 576, seqq.).

"There Tityus large and long, in fetters bound,
O'erspreads nine acres of infernal ground ;
Two ravenous vultures, furious for their food,
Scream o'er the fiend and raven in his blood,
Incessant gore the liver in his breast,
The immortal liver grows, and gives th' immortal feast.

"There Tantalus, along the Stygian bounds,
Pours out deep groans (with groans all hell resounds) ;
Even in the circling floods refreshment craves,
And pines with thirst amidst a sea of waves ;
When to the water he his lip applies,
Back from his lip the treacherous water flies.

"Next he beholds Sisyphus :
With many a weary step, and many a groan,
Up the high hill he heaves a huge round stone ;
The huge round stone resulting with a bound,
Thunders impetuous down and smokes along the ground.
Again the restless orb his toil renews,
Dust mounts in clouds and sweat descends in dew."

In general, the lower world, as represented by Homer in his famous *Nekyia*, is not so much a state of retribution, as an image and shadow of the present life, where mortals all live again, or rather live on, and live forever, retaining the same character and habits and following the same or similar pursuits, as they followed and possessed in the upper world—an idea of future existence, which seems to have prevailed among simple people and in barbarous tribes in all ages from the earliest inhabitants of the East to the aboriginal tribes of our western wilderness, as is evidenced by the articles which they bury with their dead and the offerings which they bring to the graves of departed friends. Thus Orion is a giant hunter still, and still drives the savage beasts before him with his pon-

derous club, while Minos still bears a golden sceptre and administers justice to the dead, and Agamemnon, Ajax and Achilles each preserves unchanged and unchangeable the essential character which he had when he trod the earth and breathed the upper air. Positive punishment seems to be inflicted only on heinous offenders. Others reap the natural consequences of their conduct in this life; only their character is there as unalterable as their state, and their ruling passions are intensified at the same time that they are removed beyond the reach of those objects which on earth afforded them gratification. Thus amid error and obscurity, Homer bears testimony to the great doctrine of retribution, and the soul of man everywhere intuitively believes not only in its own immortality but in that fundamental doctrine of revelation as an eternal and immutable law of its being: Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap.

ART. V.—THE PERPETUAL OBSERVANCE OF THE SABBATH.

By PROFESSOR EGBERT C. SMYTH, Bowdoin College, Me.

THE SABBATH IN NEW YORK. Document No. I of the New York Sabbath Committee. THE CIVIL SABBATH RESTORED. Document No. XV. SUNDAY. ITS ORIGIN, HISTORY, AND PRESENT OBLIGATION. Considered in eight Lectures, preached before the University of Oxford in the year 1860, on the Foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton. By JAMES AUGUSTUS HESSEY, D.C.L., Head Master of Merchant Taylor's School, Select Preacher in the University, etc., etc.

THE New York Sabbath Committee was formed at a meeting of citizens held in April, 1857. Its organization, however, was not completed until November of that year, when Rev. R. S. Cook was chosen Secretary. We have placed at the head of this article the title of the first document issued by this Committee, with that of one of the most recent. The motto of this last pamphlet—*The Civil Sabbath Restored*—is

a just and suggestive summary of the remarkably successful labors of the Committee.

Four years since, the Lord's day in our commercial metropolis was rapidly assimilating in appearance to the form which it has assumed in the capitals of Europe. Although there was a wide-spread and powerful sentiment of respect for the day as of divine obligation, manifold customs destructive of a civil rest-day had gained footing, and were rapidly acquiring alarming power. The census of 1855 gave as the population of the city, 629,810. A careful inquiry, instituted by the Committee, disclosed the fact that 9,692 places were opened for business and amusement on the Lord's day, that is, about one place to every sixty-five of the entire population. Through the efforts of the Committee the attention of the friends of religion was turned to this gigantic evil. The sound Sabbath sentiment of the community was successfully rallied for reform. We have not space to review the progress of the work, and must be content with referring to the admirable publications of the Committee in which its history is given. Let it be put on record, however, that a score or Sunday theatres have been closed, the liquor traffic greatly restricted, Sunday news-crying abolished, much useful labor expended among the foreign population, documents in German and English prepared and distributed in great numbers, a manifest advance secured in the popular apprehension of the claims and benefits of the civil Sabbath, the legal right of every man to a weekly season of repose and worship, vindicated; and, in brief, "a Sunday characterized by traffic, noise, drunkenness and vice", made to give place to "a Sabbath marked by refreshing stillness and sobriety", and an impulse given to similar reformatory movements in other large cities in this country, and also across the Atlantic.

Such results are a sufficient proof of the wisdom and energy with which the efforts of the Committee have been conducted. They shed light also upon the true method of prosecuting reformatory measures under a free government. The success which in so large measure has attended the enterprise to which we have referred is manifestly, in great part, due to

the just conceptions its authors have entertained of the Christian theory of reform. Frankly avowing their principles, and tenaciously adhering to them, they have avoided theoretical entanglements, casuistry and logomachy. Aiming at feasible ends, they have made practical issues. No ground has been taken from which they have been forced to retreat. Every advance has been a victory. Relying upon the power of truth, they have wasted no time in crimination and recrimination. Believing in the instrumentalities divinely instituted, they have used them quietly and perseveringly, without adding or working any noisy machinery. The country at large has known little of their labors. Even in the city of New York, few appreciated the importance and power of the movement until the end was in many particulars gained. It is refreshing to witness this practical faith in truth, and in the efficiency of calm, quiet, manly, Christian action.

It is evident that this reform could not have met with so speedy and signal success had it not been for a widely diffused and influential reverence for the sanctity of the Lord's day. This sentiment pervades the American mind. The venerable Duponceau, after long familiarity with our people, remarked, "that of all we claimed as characteristic, our observance of the Sabbath is the only one truly national and American, and for this cause, if for no other, he trusted it would never lose its hold on our affections and patriotism". With us Sunday has always been a day of piety and rest, a holy day, and not a holiday. As such it is entrenched in the heart of the nation, in our religious creeds, in our civil legislation. Never, we are disposed to believe, notwithstanding the diversity and power of foreign elements which have entered into the national life — never has the institution of the Sabbath stood among us more firmly than now. This is the omen afforded by the movement to which we have referred in our commercial metropolis. There the danger from foreign immigration, and other well-known causes, was greatest, and there the public sentiment has been shown to be sound and right. Even more significant is the fact that although we have recently had occasion to apply to our condition the old maxim — *inter*

arma, silent leges—the law of the Sabbath has maintained its authority. Soon after taking command of the army of the Potomac, Major-General McClellan issued the following general order :

"The Major-General commanding desires and requests that in future there may be more perfect respect for the Sabbath on the part of his command. We are fighting in a holy cause, and should endeavor to deserve the benign favor of the Creator. Unless in case of an attack by the enemy, or some other extreme military necessity, it is commended to commanding-officers, that all work shall be suspended on the Sabbath; that no unnecessary movements shall be made on that day; that the men shall, so far as possible, be permitted to rest from their labors; that they shall attend divine service after the customary Sunday morning inspection, and that officers and men shall alike use their influence to insure the utmost decorum and quiet on that day. The General commanding regards this as no idle form. One day's rest in seven is necessary to men and animals; more than this, the observance of the holy day of the God of mercy and of battles is our sacred duty."

Since his promotion to be General-in-Chief of the armies of the United States, the author of the above has issued a further order in the same spirit. They reflect the prevailing, the powerfully predominant sentiment of the country at the present hour, while in tone and phraseology they are true to our Puritan traditions.

So intimately connected is the weekly observance of a day of rest and devotion with the public welfare, so essential is it to the interests of morality and piety, that we gladly welcome any intelligent and earnest effort to enforce its obligation. To this meed of praise the Bampton Lectures for 1860 are fairly entitled. Their author is an English clergyman of the Established Church, a graduate of Oxford, and some time Fellow of St. John's College. He is evidently, as his election to the office of Bampton Lecturer would fairly lead us to presume, a man of good natural abilities, trained after the most approved English fashion. By the terms of the Bampton foundation, the eight annual lectures, for which it provides, must be delivered in about a year after the appointment of the lecturer, and be printed within two months after they are preached. Dr. H.'s book gives evidence that he has chosen a theme

which for a much longer period has occupied his thoughts. To the eight prescribed lectures he has added a body of notes covering, in smaller type, more than half as many pages as the text. These exhibit a somewhat wide range of reading, and extensive preparation for the discussions of the Lectures. We wish, however, that more space had been found for the critical examination of important points necessarily treated imperfectly in the discourses. The object of the Bampton Lectures is to defend and confirm the Christian faith. The lecture form of the series ordinarily requires, if a higher purpose is to be served than that of immediate popular impression, that there should be room, outside of the text, for discussions whose details cannot well be introduced into a sermon, though it be preached to a University audience. The value of such an apologetic manual would be increased if instead of extended illustrative quotations, often from authors of no higher repute than the Lecturer, there were a more thorough grounding, or further extension, of results assumed in the body of the work.

The first lecture in the course is occupied with a statement of existing theories respecting the Sabbath and Lord's day. The most general division of opinions is into two classes, which are termed, respectively, Sabbatarian and Dominical. The former term is used in no invidious sense, but merely as a convenient designation of all theories which trace the obligation of the Lord's day in any form directly to the Decalogue, or apply to the Christian day the law of the Sabbath. The latter term covers the views of all who make the Lord's day a purely Christian institution.

The last lecture is a practical application of the views elucidated in the previous discourses. The intervening sermons are chiefly historical. These are instructive and candid in their presentation of facts, and deserve attention. With all of the conclusions reached we cannot concur; and especially in some of his arguments founded upon utterances of the Fathers, and of the Reformers, we think that our author has not exercised one of the most important attributes of a good historian, the power of criticising opinions from the point of view occupied by their authors and advocates.

It is well known that several estimable and influential members of the Church of England have recently inculcated opinions respecting the origin and obligation of the Lord's day, which sever it from any divine sanction. Dr. Arnold cuts it off entirely from direct Scriptural supports, and appears to regard it as supplemental to Christianity. The Apostles, Paul at least, expected that the Gospel would raise men above the need of Sabbaths. But the "old sickness" remained, and the "old remedy" was found to be still necessary. Accordingly, while with the best of the Quakers, he finds no direct Scriptural warrant for setting one day in seven apart, with them also he earnestly deprecates as "most michievous" anything tending to weaken the respect paid to the Lord's day.* Mr. F. W. Robertson, following in the same track with less caution, preaches eloquently and popularly, from a text, whose genuineness, in the clause upon which he relies, is not altogether firmly established, upon the religious non-observance of the day; and, like the reasoners whom Paul long ago refuted, attributes the moral corruption and wickedness of criminals, whose career of iniquity began with Sabbath-breaking, to the restrictions of the law.† Mr. Alford infers from Romans xiv, 5, "that Sabbatical obligation to keep any day, whether seventh or first, was not recognized in apostolic times; and that the observance of the Lord's day is only binding on us from considerations of humanity and religious expediency, and by the rules of that branch of the Church in which Providence has placed us".‡ In Archbishop Whately's view, the Lord's day is a festival purely Christian, "observed in conformity with the practice of the Apostles and their followers in every Christian church from their time downwards".§ To the Apostles, however, in this particular he does not attribute any higher power than the Church now possesses, so that his view is substantially the ecclesiastical one.¶ Others still, as we understand Dr.

* See, in Stanley's *Life and Correspondence*, Letters to his Sister, to Mr. Newton, and to Mr. Justice Coleridge.

† Sydenham Palace Sermon. Sermons, Second Series, No. 14.

‡ Commentary on the New Testament.

§ *Essays*. Second Series, Essay 5, n. p. 128.

¶ *Thoughts on the Sabbath*, p. 18, referred to by Dr. Hemy, p. 189.

Hessey to intimate, adopt the theory recently advocated by Hengstenberg. All authoritative institution of the day, whether Ecclesiastical, Mosaic, or ante-Mosaic, is discarded; and its observance is supposed to have sprung from the desire of the first disciples to honor the memory of their divine Master. The same sentiment has perpetuated the honor originally paid to the day on which the Saviour rose. As all genuine Christian feeling is the fruit of the Holy Spirit, in a secondary sense the day is of divine ordination.*

These views of Sunday, obviously more or less directly impeach the completeness of the Scriptures. The necessity of the Lord's day is conceded. As human nature is, religion cannot thrive without it. Yet all Scriptural authority is denied it. Paul did not contemplate it as a part of the Christianity he enforced. It arose out of a need he did not provide for — perhaps did not foresee. To this extent, therefore, the Gospel is insufficient to meet the inevitable demands of human nature, if that nature is to be brought under the power of the Gospel. The written word is in this matter not a sufficient rule of faith and practice.

These theories also transfer to the domain of ecclesiastical authority the whole question of the Lord's day. Whether or not such a day shall be observed at all, or how often it shall recur, are matters as purely dependent upon the decisions and rubrics of the Church, as is the regulation of the order and forms of public worship. The same power, for example, whatever that may be, which ordains that there shall be on the first day of the week two or three public services, and within certain limits decides in what these shall consist, is, upon any ecclesiastical theory of the Lord's day, equally competent to abolish Sundays altogether. *Qui habet institutionem habet destitutionem* — or, as Dr. Hessey well paraphrases, "If the Church made the first day holy, she may make any other day holy instead; she may change the cycle, she may enlarge it indefinitely, she may get rid of holy days altogether" (p. 190).

* Hessey, p. 349. Hengstenberg, *The Lord's Day*. Translated for Clark's Foreign Theol. Lib.

Although ranking himself on the side of those who maintain what he styles the Dominical theory, Dr. H. takes a position which he thinks precludes such results. In his view the Lord's day is a positive Christian institution, ordained of God through his Apostles, as indicated in his inspired word, and not to pass away, until the close of the dispensation to which it belongs. The resurrection of our Lord upon the first day of the week, and his repeated appearance to his disciples on that day and the corresponding one of the succeeding week, together with the miracle, and the religious communications, of Pentecost—which in that year occurred on the first day of the week—signalized the day as one with which peculiar associations must ever be connected by those who hear "the Gospel of the Resurrection". These facts, notwithstanding Mr. Baden Powell's sneer at "visionary interpreters",* are at least sufficient to designate the first day of the week as one deserving especial honor, if, under the Christian dispensation, any day is to be set apart for religious purposes. That this condition was fulfilled is rendered in a high degree probable by various allusions in the New Testament implying an established custom, on the part of Christian believers, of assembling on the first day of the week for religious instruction and exhortation, for the celebration of the eucharist, and the collection of alms.† Especially important is the language of the Apostle John, in which he designates the first day of the week—so his words must be applied,—as the Lord's day. There is a matter of course way of alluding to the day as of peculiar religious significance, here and elsewhere noticeable, which is of great value. What the New Testament itself thus makes highly probable, the testimony of the principal writers of the two centuries immediately succeeding the death of John fully establishes. Unanimously, and with explicitness, they refer to the day as one held in especial honor, and received by them, "as a part and parcel of what was recognised as Scriptural (not merely as Ecclesiastical) Christianity". We have

* Article on the Lord's Day. Kitto's Cyclopædia of Bib. Lit. vol. ii, page 269.

† Acts xx, 7. Heb. x, 25. 1 Cor. xvi, 1, 2.

nowhere seen this evidence more fully and pertinently exhibited than it is by Dr. H. The following comments upon the difficulty felt by some on account of the paucity of the allusions made by the New Testament writers to the day, are well worth attention.

"It is impossible to estimate the comparative importance of an institution in the ancient Church by the mere number of times on which it is mentioned. The Sabbath is seldom spoken of in the historical parts of the Old Testament, albeit it was the sign between God and the Israelites. It was always and everywhere implied. So the Lord's day was implied under Christianity. For it should be borne in mind that the Κυριακή ἡμέρα of old was the day on which the Κυριακὸν Δείπνον was celebrated, on which Christians realized their connection with Christ and with each other, in a word, their 'risen life', most especially. He who absented himself from this ordinance virtually severed himself from 'the Body of Christ' and relapsed into heathenism. It was, therefore, scarcely necessary, in addressing those who had no earthly inducements to be Christians, but had rather every discouragement to being such, to urge them to honor the Lord's day. Their visible joining in the ordinance of the Holy Eucharist was of itself a doing honor to the day on which it is celebrated. Afterwards . . . the tone of Christian writers altered considerably. It seemed necessary . . . to warn Christians to observe the Lord's day, and to partake in the Lord's Supper. . . . So far, then, from considering the infrequency of exhortation to keep the Lord's day to be an argument that it was not held by the primitive Christians to be a scriptural institution, I conceive that it is an argument which tells just the other way. I should have been surprised to find more said about it. I should have suspected either the genuineness of the documents put into my hands, or a latent distrust on the part of the writers as to the *status* of the institution." (Pp. 68, 69.)

With our author's view of the Lord's day as a positive institution of Christianity we entirely concur. Received by the Church from the Apostles, it has a higher than ecclesiastical sanction. It does not come under the category of those things which any church "hath authority to ordain, change, or abolish". Neither is it the mere creature of Christian instincts and sacred memories, nor of the general influence of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of believers. It is the fruit of an inspiration peculiar to Apostles, an inspiration which infallibly guided them in their work of founding, and, so far as necessary, organizing Christian churches. Resting upon these con-

clusions Dr. H. discards all other Scriptural supports of the Lord's day as a divine institution. It is part and parcel of Christianity, and distinct from, and even antagonistic (p. 89) to the Sabbath. We cannot but think that the argument for the divine authority of the day is needlessly and seriously impaired by disconnecting it, as does the work before us, from the earlier institution. The reasons (so far as it is necessary at this point to consider them) which induce its author, and others who agree with him, to seek a foundation for the Lord's day so exclusively and purely Christian, are, the silence of the N. T. writers respecting any sanction of the Christian festival derived from that of the elder church, certain positive declarations of the Apostle Paul respecting days and Sabbaths, and the noticeable separation in the writings of the Christian fathers of the new day from the old.

The negative argument derived from the absence in the writings of the Apostles of any hint even that the Lord's day is a Sabbath, or that it is in any wise founded upon the Fourth Commandment, or is the fulfilment of a previous ordinance, need not detain us from an examination of the testimony of the ancient Scriptures. In case we discover any clear intimations in these that the observance of a weekly day of rest, a true and spiritual Sabbath, is in accordance with the revealed will of God, and binding upon all men, the silence of the New Testament will not avail to set this testimony aside. This silence, moreover, upon the Sabbatarian theory is easily explained. The Apostles received a collection of writings which they believed to be divinely inspired. These they commended unhesitatingly to their converts as profitable for instruction and guidance. They had no thought of establishing a religion without any day of religious obligation. This, their practice and the fact of the universal observance of such a day attest. They had no superstitious notions about the inherent sacredness of particular days; but they were practical men, and were divinely guided. They saw that Judaism was fulfilled in Christ, that the Sabbath as a mere ordinance of Judaism had ceased, that another day had been peculiarly honored by the Founder of Christianity, that it commemorated an event more

worthy of honor than the original creation, or the deliverance of their fathers from the bondage of Egypt—and they recognised and honored it as the Lord's, and so gave it to the churches. But this designation of one day in seven presupposes facts, which, recorded in their accepted Scriptures, entered into the simplest rudiments of their religious knowledge. These are, the existence of a hebdomadal cycle; the Scriptural idea of this period as a season of six days of labor with one of rest and devotion; and the expression of this idea in documents bearing on their face the evidence of universal relations. The Apostles did not introduce the week, nor alter it. It remained as at the Creation. It remained as recognised in the Decalogue. Its Scriptural idea was the idea familiar to their minds from the beginning of knowledge, and interwoven with all they had known of true religion. Their silence, therefore, respecting the obligation of a weekly day of rest is in itself easily explained. It was not because, as some have supposed, they expected that men would at once rise above the need of fixed times of worship. Neither was it for precisely the contrary reason which others give, because they saw that men need the Sabbath so much that there is no occasion for enjoining it—human necessities being sure to cry out for it, and human wisdom being sufficient to regulate it. It was because their only care and work was to make the long established weekly day of rest subservient to the New Dispensation, clearing it of all superstitious accumulations, and connecting it directly with the kingdom of Redemption. The obligation, the divine precedent and sanction of such a day, were not in dispute, and needed no discussion. The Apostles' care was to designate it, and to connect it with the Redeemer. This they did by inculcating that the old Sabbath had determined; and by observing, and teaching their followers to observe, another day of the established weekly cycle—the Lord's day. The obligation of a day set apart to religion was not questioned; it ceased no more than the weeks ceased to run their ceaseless round.

No more are we precluded by any positive allegations of the Apostles, or of the early Fathers, from looking into the

Scriptures of the Old Testament for authority for the holy day of the New Covenant. Referring to the language of the Apostle in Col. ii, 16, and Gal. iv, 9, 10, Dr. H. remarks, "No testimony can be more decisive than this to the fact that the Sabbath was of obligation no longer". This we freely grant so far as the Sabbath was merely a sign between Jehovah and the Israelites or Jews, a shadow, or a part of a system of shadows. But the inquiry may still properly be pursued in the light of the earlier Scriptures, whether this was the whole, or even the fundamental idea, of the Sabbath—or whether, not simply in its Mosaic, but in *every form*, the Sabbath was abolished. Dr. H. (pp. 177–180) successfully refutes those who find in these declarations of the Apostle, and in those of Rom. xiv, 6, any disparagement of the Lord's day. The same Apostle, who thus wrote, instituted the religious observance of one day of the week. Not such a day, therefore, in these passages, is before his thoughts; but the festal seasons and days, including the weekly Sabbath, of the Jewish law. His language, for this reason, does not debar us from the inquiry whether there is not, between the day he instituted and the Sabbath, historical and ideal connection; whether as a religious day it may not find its sanction in a previously existing, not merely Jewish, but *religious* institution; and whether, in connection with a temporary ordinance, there is not revealed a mandate of Jehovah, or some indication of his will, binding upon man as man.

If the apostolic teachings upon this subject thus leave the way open to us to repair to the Scriptures of the Old Testament, still more manifestly do those of the early fathers. Their testimony to the fact of the existence of the Lord's day as a part of apostolic Christianity, is conclusive; not so their opinions respecting Old Testament exegesis. Good men, in their interpretations of Scripture, seventeen centuries ago, may have been mistaken; as good men now may be. Nowhere, so far as we can ascertain, does any writer of the generations immediately succeeding that of the Apostles, refer to them as having dissevered the holy day of the New Dispensation from all connection, in any form, with the teachings of the Old

Testament: nor is any such doctrine communicated in their writings. Dr. H. makes an admission which is only just, that the Sabbath against which the fathers protested, and from which they so sharply and frequently discriminate the Christian festival, is not the Sabbath of the Law, but that of tradition. We are surprised that the bearing of this concession upon the previous use of patristic testimony is not more fully recognised. If we still further remember the intimate association of the word Sabbath with the temporary ordinances of the ceremonial law, and the shadows of a system designed to be merely introductory to a better; and if we transfer ourselves to a time when Judaism and Christianity, not in their divine principles and true relations, but in human interpretations, were in fierce conflict, the language of the early writers will not prejudice us against the idea of a historical and organic connection between Sunday and the Sabbath.

There are, moreover, positive reasons, antecedent to the investigation of the declarations of the ancient inspired Scriptures, why we cannot comply with the demand now so strongly made, that no foundation for the Lord's day shall be sought in the Old Testament. Dr. H. raises the inquiry, without, we conceive, fully answering it, how it came to pass that the Lord's day was universally accepted by the early Christians as a part of their religious system. The fact is undisputed. It points directly to apostolic authority. We cannot explain the early, universal reverence for the day, the regard shown to it as matter of Christian duty, save by supposing it to have been recognised as virtually of divine origin through the commissioned messengers of the Most High. This Dr. H. urges with effect against the ecclesiastical theory (pp. 184, 185). But the fact deserves further attention. At the time the Gospel was promulgated the hebdomadal cycle had not been introduced into the Roman Empire. Not until very many Gentile churches had been planted and Christianity had assumed its legitimate form, did the custom of reckoning time by weeks begin, even in domestic life, to establish itself. The week was virtually a Jewish institution, so far as these churches

were concerned. Yet the observance of one day in seven went hand in hand with the Gospel. It went into Greece, where time was reckoned by decades; into Italy, where the division was far more artificial and at least equally incompatible. What induced the Apostles thus to set apart one day in seven? Why thus practically ordain, not merely for Jews, but for Gentiles? Dr. H. admits that in determining what proportion of time should be the Lord's, the Apostles paid respect to the Sabbatical ordinance. "This *directed* them in their *choice* of a cycle", is the somewhat remarkable language used (pp. 25, 210). If they simply followed the precedent of the Jewish law, being directed by it, what choice had they? If, as he elsewhere affirms, they were merely rationally influenced by the analogy of the Sabbatical precept, wherein consisted its decisive and controlling reason? We cannot well conceive the Apostles deliberating and finally deciding upon the question, whether a religious cycle which we find recognised in the record of Creation, and ordained in the Decalogue, should continue. We wish, at least, that Dr. H. had more explicitly stated what weight he supposes the analogy of the Sabbath had with the Apostles. Were they at liberty to choose a different cycle? Did they feel no obligation resting upon them so to ordain in the churches they planted, that gradually, yet surely, a weekly religious day should be accepted by Gentiles as well as Jews? And may not Christians now discover in the Scriptures which they commended to their followers, which were read in the stated assemblies of their disciples, the reasons that controlled them? To us the admissions Dr. H. makes as to the early and universal reverence cherished for the Lord's day, combined with the equally extensive adoption by Gentile Christians of a cycle at first commended to them only as a religious one, and for whose origin, at least as religious, we must repair to the Jewish Scriptures, necessitates the recognition of a Sabbatarian connection between Judaism and Christianity. Dr. H.'s theory is weak without the support, at this point, of a Scriptural sanction—and for this we must look to the older dispensations.

There is another weak point in the Dominical theory, even in the form which Dr. H. advocates, which suggests the desirableness of not cutting off the Lord's day from its connection with the Sabbath, unless for the most decisive reasons. Dr. H., with every earnest and religious man, seeks to promote the religious observance of the Lord's day. He affirms his belief that "the way in which it is regarded is no uncertain index of Christian steadfastness or decline, *signum aut stantis, aut cadentis Christiani*" (p. 25). He holds it to be "a day set apart—a day for religion" (p. 307). He has no sympathy, we presume, with the merely ritualistic conception of the character and obligation of the day implied in the expressions of one of his reviewers.* Yet he cuts it off from all direct or authoritative connection with the only passages in the word of God which distinguish one day in seven as, in a peculiar sense, holy time. This he concedes in the following language, occurring at the close of a review of the New Testament authority for the day:

"So far as we have gone, the external character of the Lord's day at the close of the first century appears to be that of a positive institution of the New Dispensation. It is a day of Christians assembling at short periodic intervals of time, on which certain duties to God, to a man's self, and to his neighbors were performed. As a matter of fact the interval between one Lord's day and another is of the same length as that between one Sabbath and another. But nothing Sabbatical either in the sense of commanded rest (though rest to a certain extent would be a necessary condition to the fulfilment of its duties, and indeed, as we shall show hereafter, is implied in the very idea of the Lord's day), or in the way of implication that the whole of it is to be employed in directly religious observances, . . . is to be found in what may be called the Charter deed of the institution of the Lord's day" (p. 53).

As neither the Jewish Law, nor the Westminster Confession, nor any approved treatise upon the Sabbath, so far as we are aware, prescribes that the *whole* of one day in seven should be "employed in *directly* religious observances", we presume our author's meaning to be identical with that expressed by Paley

* See Ed. Rev. Oct. 1861, p. 278. Amer. Ed.

in the following passage. This is the more clear inasmuch as Dr. H. refers to it in a note to the above.—“The assembling upon the first day of the week for the purpose of public worship and religious instruction is a law of Christianity of divine appointment; the resting on that day from our employments longer than we are detained from them by attendance on these assemblies is to Christians an ordinance of human institution: binding nevertheless”, etc.

Dr. H. objects to the ecclesiastical theory, that it places it within the power of the Church to change, or even to abolish, the day. We see not but that his own view admits the right of shortening the time deemed sacred. If the right to alter the day is dangerous, far more so, because far more likely to be exercised, is that of reducing the hours directly consecrated to religion, or devoted to the repose and quiet which best prepare for the most beneficial use of the means of grace. Dr. H. argues, indeed, from the idea of the day, and from human necessities, the importance of suspending upon it all merely secular pursuits; but he advances no Scriptural reason for such a proportion of time. Unless he gives authority to the “analogy of the law,” he can find none. Dr. Chalmers’ argument, founded upon the delight the true Christian finds in the Sabbath, is criticised as merely “subjective”—“one that will hardly prevail with the gainsayer”. Dr. C. might refer such an one to his previous allusion to the fact that the law of the Sabbath “stands enshrined among the moralities of a rectitude that is immutable and everlasting”; but Dr. H. has no such refuge. He can only refer to an ecclesiastical authority which may not be recognised; or, if admitted, may be exercised to diminish, rather than enhance, a strict observance of the day: or to subjective reasons, which even good men, from education or prejudices of some sort, may not appreciate. One of the most distinguished and evangelical of living German biblical students several years since, in conversation with a friend, defended the popular custom in Europe of devoting a large portion of Sabbath hours to recreation. He reasoned from the necessities, as he believed, of his own mind—the impossibility of spending

more than half of the day in religious contemplations and employments. The lessons of history show that reliance upon merely subjective guarantees of the Lord's day as a religious institution, is attended with very great hazard. We may point our author not merely to the continent, but to an experience nearer home. Queen Elizabeth, by royal proclamation, gave her subjects a license upon Sunday far beyond any labor of necessity; ordering that "all persons, vicars, and curates shall teach and declare unto their parishioners, that they may with a safe and quiet conscience, *after their Common Prayer*, in time of harvest, labor upon the holy and festival days, and save that thing which God hath sent". The Queen herself, in the afternoons of Sundays, indulged in sports and pastimes, as on other days. The popular desecration of the day became so great that, in 1584-5, a bill passed both houses of Parliament "for the better and more reverent observing of the *Sabbath* day". The bill did not receive the Queen's assent, and its particular provisions are unknown; but, in presenting it to her Majesty, the Speaker of the House implored her to give law concerning the Fourth Commandment. This her Majesty was not willing to do, and only by the popular reformation which took place in connection with the efforts of the Puritans, and by way of reaction from the terrible evils of the previous license, was the nation saved from moral bankruptcy.* Respect for the Lord's day—the whole of it—as of religious obligation has, in no small degree, given to the English-speaking nations their moral superiority to other peoples. And this respect has been very largely founded upon the perception of a supposed Scriptural obligation to keep holy one day in seven. It is the result of Sabbatarianism. We do not make this reference in the way of proof that the Sabbatarian theory is the Scriptural theory. This must be shown from the record itself. But we maintain that such results as we have indicated are clear and forcible enough to establish the propriety of dismissing anti-Sabbatarian prejudices, and of demanding solid and convincing evidence that the religious cycle which the Apostles

* See Hopkins's *History of the Puritans*, Vol. III. Chap. on the Sabbath, p. 590.

seem to have adopted from their Scriptures and ours, but which they have not directly enforced, has no foundation and authority in these Scriptures. And we are the more persuaded of the necessity of such an investigation, when we find so intelligent an advocate of a better observance of the Lord's day as Dr. H., falling into a style of expression respecting it extremely liable to misapprehension, inasmuch as it seems to add to religious improvement and to the rest subsidiary to this, social enjoyment, change of air and scene, harmless recreation, as legitimate objects of the day (pp. 334-336). The language used is carefully guarded against perversion, yet it discloses a tendency which would easily lead to serious infringements upon the interests of religion and virtue.

These obvious theoretical and practical difficulties encompassing every form of the Dominical theory; the failure to provide an objective guarantee for the Lord's day, palpable to the common mind, and guarded from human alterations or abatements; the failure, also, fully to explain the early reverence felt for it as a divine institution, and to account for the universal acceptance by Gentile Christians, accustomed to diverse calendars, of the characteristic features of the Jewish week; and the regular recurrence, once in seven days, of a holy Christian festival—are at least of sufficient importance to commend to candid attention that view of Sunday which we may term Anglo-American as well as Sabbatarian, the theory which was the faith of our fathers, and which, modified in respect to some confessed exaggerations, is the common faith of their descendants.

The distinctive feature of this theory is, that it finds in the Word of God the explicit inculcation and enforcement of the obligation to keep holy one day in seven. As our argument is with those who admit the necessity for man of stated seasons of religious worship; and who admit, upon some grounds, the obligation of the Lord's day, and even make it an Apostolic institution; we scarcely need guard against a possible perversion of the Sabbatarian view. Yet, to remove every occasion for misunderstanding, it may be well to state, that the special consecration of one day to religion does not imply any irreli-

gious secularization of other days; any more than the dedication of one edifice as a place of worship, implies that other places, not so hallowed, are to be devoted to worldliness. As regards either intrinsic holiness, or the creature's duty of glorifying the Creator, all places, all seasons, all labor and rest, are alike. Christianity condemns, not the keeping of Sabbaths, but the profanation of week days; not the observance of stated festivals, but superstition and formalism. Strange that the Christian view of all days as holy, should be perverted into a secularization of all; that the ideal of a universal consecration to God of human powers and time, should be regarded as sanctioning the violation of the day which symbolizes the eternal Sabbath of rest. "They cry *spirit*, but they mean *flesh*." Even under the Mosaic Law special offerings were symbolical, and ancillary; not intrinsically religious, but ad-minicular to religion, and suitable forms of expressing its spirit. They were given as pledges of the whole; as helps to the right, the religious, use of the whole. A good man now, in consecrating one day in seven to holy rest, acknowledges thus that all days are the Lord's, and best prepares himself to use them all as the Lord's. Sunday offerings are offerings of the first fruits. There is nothing, even in that somewhat vague Gospel, the "spirit of Christianity", contrary to such a consecration. It is enough that Paul, just now in high esteem with liberalism, saw no inconsistency between esteeming every day alike, and recognising the utility of a religious distinction of the first day from the rest.

The classical passages in favor, not of a transference of the Jewish Sabbath to Sunday, but of a historical and organic connection between the earlier festival and the Lord's day, so that the obligation of keeping holy one day in seven may be seen from his own declarations to be the will of God, are Gen. ii, 2-3, and Exodus xx, 8-11. From the view taken by Dr. Hessey of the bearing and importance of these passages in the vindication of the Christian weekly festival, we are constrained, after the most respectful and patient canvassing of his arguments, to express an almost entire dissent.

The Sabbatical value of the declarations made in Gen. ii,

2, 3—using the term Sabbatical merely as descriptive of a weekly day of hallowed rest—is not dependent upon the decision of the questions, whether or not the patriarchs kept a Sabbath, or whether the Mosaic cosmogony was in any form disclosed to mankind before Genesis was written. The passage has an intrinsic weight which is sometimes lost sight of in attending to subordinate questions. Experience shows that periodic seasons of rest and devotion are a human necessity. That certain periods are too long, and others too short, may also be determined by the light of nature. What is the best cycle, in the absence of conclusive natural proofs, may well be made matter of divine revelation. We claim that the passage before us affords perpetual light upon this subject; and since the light is that of the divine example and promise, it has not only illumining, but directing power. It reveals to men, as long as the present natural economy lasts, the path of duty and happiness. The fact of the divine rest upon the seventh day, whenever disclosed to mankind, and to whatsoever subordinate uses appropriated, must ever remain one of universal interest. It stands in the record of the creation, not of Palestine, but of the world; not of Jews, but of man. It speaks not of the rest of Jehovah, but of Elohim. It announces not merely the divine cessation from creating, but distinguishes a period, gives to it a distinctive character, and sets apart one day for special duties and the communication of special favors. Though such a cycle is beyond clear and certain discovery by man as the one best fitted to his complex nature and doubly related life, still experience is competent to affirm its wisdom and worth. As really, if not as obviously, do mankind need the Sabbath rest, as that of night. Its physical benefits, moreover, which candid men universally admit, are best secured when it is most sacredly kept in accordance with its higher ends. As piety is conducive to morality, so is the spiritual Sabbath to the physical. The better we become acquainted with human nature, the more significant are the words, “the Sabbath was made for man”. We can accept the declaration in Genesis as meaning no less than that a weekly day of hallowed rest enters into the plan of creation. The idea of such a

day is shadowed forth in divine acts which, no matter when revealed, themselves are of universal interest and susceptible of a universal application.

"But what", asks Dr. Hessey, somewhat curtly, after quoting the sublime record, "But what does it amount to? It is merely an announcement of what God did, not a setting forth to man of what man should do" (p. 135). Why, we are constrained to ask in reply, was such an announcement made to man? Dr. H. supposes that these words were inserted with reference to a Sabbatical use to be made of them in the promulgation of the Fourth Commandment. How could they ever serve such a purpose, what sanctioning or motive power have they, unless the divine example is in some sense authoritative? Our author rests, in part, his argument for the obligation of the Lord's day upon the example of the Apostles. He does not claim an explicit command. He does not comment upon the record of Paul's preaching at Troas, on the first day of the week, when the disciples met together to break bread: "What does it amount to?" Obviously, the divine will may be revealed to men otherwise than by formal commandment. And what lower meaning can naturally be obtained from these words, "God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it", in the connection in which they stand, than this; that the divine example teaches men, all to whom it is revealed, that such a day is one on which it may be expected that Heaven's choicest favors will be bestowed, and grateful, holy worship will ascend in return? What less can be understood, than that it is a day incumbent upon man as a sanctified day? In what sense can God be said to bless the day, save that of blessing it to man; or to sanctify it, save that of setting it apart for hallowed and holy observances? Much of the religious instruction communicated to the old-world fathers (as Dr. Fairbairn has shown in a work* characterized by sound learning and good judgment, to which our author makes no allusion, we believe, among many inferior books cited) was in all probability made known by divine acts. The time for full

* Typology.

and formal legal institutes was not at the beginning. As we have already remarked, however, for our present purpose it is not necessary that we should be able to show, as matter of fact, the observance of a primeval Sabbath ; or the possession by men, before the days of Moses, of the facts he published respecting the creation. All that we claim is, that a declaration like that before us, incorporated into the creation-narrative, and exhibiting the divine example, indicates to man the divine will—the lesson that, in the natural and moral economy which the Creator has established, there is a necessity created, and a provision made, for a Sabbath. As Regeneration does not destroy man's original constitution, as Redemption is not antagonistic to Creation, so the Lord's day is not independent of, nor hostile to, the original Sabbatical idea. That, when sin had entered, and Elohim had revealed himself as Jehovah, and as the Author of a new and more glorious creation than that from the primæval chaos, such events should be made the special object of commemoration, and a day be designated in reference to them, does not impair the force of the original record ; but rather, by retaining its cycle, recognises and confirms its lasting authority.

To these views the chief objections urged by Dr. H. are, that Genesis was a revelation to Moses, not to Adam, and that the patriarchs kept no Sabbath. Such criticisms seem to us entirely aside of the mark, even if thoroughly substantiated. As great stress, however, is laid upon them, we desire carefully to examine their foundation.

The Hebrew word for Sabbath is not found in the texts we have been considering, neither is there any direct proof that it was ever on the lips of the patriarchs. As they may be said not to have known the name of Israel's covenant God, so may they be said not to have had the Sabbath. It does not follow that they had not the promises of Jehovah ; nor that they had no stated times of worship ; nor that, in some form, the substance of Moses' narrative of the creation, and of the Paradisaic state, may not have been in their possession. There is one fact which favors an affirmative de-

cision of such points. We refer to the fact of the early knowledge possessed by the worshippers of the true God, and by nations with whom they may be supposed to have come in contact, of a septenary division of time.* The manner in which this cycle is referred to, indicates that it was in familiar use long before the days of Moses. There is even a slight suggestion of it in the narrative of the offerings of Cain and Abel. How far and how early it spread over the earth, is involved in deep obscurity. Some have asserted that it was in use with every nation of antiquity. Others, that it was restricted to the Jews, and to the families from whom they claimed descent. Each of these positions is probably equally wide of the truth. The present opinion which, according to Arago,† “has obtained the greatest number of adherents”, is, that, besides the Jews, it was in use only among the ancient Chinese, Arabians, Chaldeans, and Egyptians. The question arises, how is the origin of this cycle to be explained? Several attempts have been made without reference to the facts of which we have knowledge through the Mosaic cosmogony. The most popular one, at present, is that which Dr. H., we are surprised to see, affirms that he accepts “*without hesitation*”. “The course of the moon”, he remarks, “and especially the appearance of the new moon or *νοῦμηνία*, would suggest a division, roughly stated, of twenty-eight days. This, perhaps, would be the first and most prevalent division. It certainly was all but a universal one, for it is found even where weeks were unknown, and where they are still unknown—among the aborigines of the New World” (pp. 141, 142). Having on the two preceding pages affirmed that “It is only in the East that anything like a septenary division is found to prevail”, and that “it is not true that it (a septenary division) was ever general in the heathen world”, our author, it will be noticed, proceeds to prove that the division of twenty-eight days was all but *universal*, because found where weeks were unknown! But letting this pass, what does the existence of the lunar di-

* Gen. iv. 3, 4 (?); vii. 4; viii. 10, 12; xxix. 27; i. 10; Ex. vii. 25.

† Arago's *Popular Astronomy*. Eng. Trans. vol. ii. p. 722.

vision *without* the weekly, and that down to the present day, show, if not this,—that the two are not necessarily, nor even easily, connected? This is evident upon other grounds. The present value of a synodic revolution is more than twenty-nine days and a half. The time between two new moons is not a number of days of which seven is a factor. The hebdomadal cycle is not a natural cycle, like that of years, or months, or days; it is artificial and arbitrary so far as our mere knowledge of natural laws carries us. “The object of the *natural divisions*”, says the distinguished astronomer before referred to, “has been to indicate with convenience and precision the dates of events . . . *The week indicates the regular succession of days of labor and rest*”. This is an established distinction, and we submit that it is much more philosophical to look for the origin of the week in the line of its idea, even if it constrains us to fall back upon divine revelation. It is evident that if, in any form, the fact recorded in Gen. ii, 2–3, was communicated to mankind at the beginning, the hebdomadal cycle recognised in the subsequent narrative, and also the seemingly symbolical use of the number seven, are facts easily and fully explained.

Our author, however, urges, “if the septenary division is found out of *Scripture*, without the Sabbath, why may it not occur in *Scripture* without it” (p. 141)? The possibility of this we concede. We are not anxious to show that the original idea of the week was always *preserved*. Once instituted, it might continue, although the world forgot the Creator, and lost all care for the hallowed rest. Dr. H. is at pains to convey the impression that the extension, among the nations, of the hebdomadal period, was not great. He does not seem to be aware that, in so doing, he limits the likelihood of this cycle’s having had the origin which he unhesitatingly accepts; nor that the fidelity with which the descendants of Shem adhered to this division, when other nations so easily lost it, favors the idea of its religious origin and associations. The more he succeeds in diminishing the evidence of its heathen use, the more closely does he link it with its scriptural explanation and character. That a day holy to the Lord should be

lost by those who forgot God altogether, is no marvel. "A highly spiritual ordinance like the Sabbath", Mr. Gladstone has recently well remarked, "was one little likely to survive the rude shocks and necessities of earthly life; while it could not, like sacrifice, derive a sustaining force from appearing to confer upon the gods an absolute gift profitable to them, and likely to draw down their favor in return".*

But if Noah and Abraham had a Sabbath, it is objected, they, or some of the old-world fathers, would have been noticed as keeping it (p. 135). We scarcely need remark how unsafe is such a process of reasoning. We may point, in illustration of its inconclusiveness, with the eminent scholar and statesman just quoted, to the designs upon the shield of Achilles, intended to represent the standing occasions of Hellenic life, yet giving no hint of religious observances. Or we may refer, with others, to the silence of the Scriptures respecting the rite of circumcision, from the time of the entrance of the Israelites into Canaan, down to the days of Jeremiah—a shorter period, indeed, yet all the more strong for our purpose, inasmuch as the records are so much more extensive and minute, thus, increasing, by a double ratio, the probabilities of allusion. Indeed, the case may be put more strongly, if the statement is correct that no account of the observance of this rite occurs from the days of Joshua to those of John the Baptist. A yet more conclusive reply is, that there is no mention whatsoever in the ante-Mosaic history, of any stated occasions of religious worship. Dr. H. refers approvingly to Hooker's remark that "Even nature has taught the heathen, first, that festival solemnities are a part of the exercises of religion; secondly, that praise, liberality, and rest are as natural elements whereof solemnities consist". Does he suppose, from the silence of Scripture, that the patriarchs had not as clear a knowledge of religion as the heathen? Does he suppose there were no days of praise, liberality, and rest, until the Jews gathered manna in the wilderness, especially when, according to the common interpretation, we are taught that, as early as

* Gladstone's *Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age*, vol. ii. p. 172.

the days of Enos, there began to be the formal observance of social worship ?

Further occasion for disconnecting the idea of a day of rest from that of the weekly cycle Dr. H. finds in the record of the giving of manna, in the sixteenth chapter of Exodus. Very different conclusions have been derived from this narrative by competent scholars, and these conflicting results may well suggest a less confident statement than our author gives. The facts in the case are undisputed ; their significance is often determined by previously adopted conclusions.

The facts upon which Hengstenberg, as quoted and endorsed by our author, relies in the attempt to derive from this chapter an account of the origination of a weekly day of religious rest, are : (1) The astonishment of the elders at the double portion of manna gathered on the sixth day ; (2) The disobedience of some of the people to the command to rest on the day which they had been told was a Sabbath ; (3) The absence of any reference by Moses to an existing Sabbatical ordinance. These considerations, it is claimed, leave "no doubt" that the Sabbath, not the Jewish Sabbath, but the sacred observance of the seventh day, was then first instituted. We will examine them in their order.

1. The perplexity of the elders. To render the argument from this fact conclusive, it must appear, that no other explanation of the perplexity can be given, save that of entire ignorance of a sacred septenary institution. So far is this from being the truth, that the narrative itself supplies another explanation. Astonishment and perplexity, it should be noticed, are words a little highly colored for the simple statement, *The rulers came and told Moses*. They came in doubt. They came for information. This they might well need. Explicit command had been given that a prescribed amount of manna should be gathered, and any attempt to preserve it from day to day had been prohibited. "And it came to pass, on the sixth day, they gathered twice as much bread, two omers for one man ; and all the rulers of the congregation came and told Moses." We may suppose them to have come either to inquire if the people had done wrong, or to know

what should be done with the surplus, or for both objects. The reply of Moses favors the supposition that they had some knowledge of the seventh-day rest: "This is that which the Lord hath said, To-morrow is the rest of a holy Sabbath unto the Lord: bake that which ye will bake", etc. There is no record of the communication to Moses of these words. It is possible the verse is to be divided differently from the manner in which it is punctuated by our translators. Moses then would say, "The fact you state has been divinely ordered. I was told there would be given a double portion on the sixth day (v. 5). The import of this miracle I will explain, and the use to be made of the double portion of the manna". We prefer, however, the common interpretation. Moses, then, is to be understood to communicate, as by divine authority, the fact that the next day was to be kept as a Sabbath. This implies a previously unsettled life; either that, as Philo was of opinion, the Sabbath fell into desuetude in Egypt; or that it was observed there as well as circumstances allowed, but not with entire rest. But what decisive, or even probable, evidence is there, that here is an account of the absolute institution of a day of worship? Not a word is said in explanation of the meaning of a Sabbath to the Lord. The term seems to have explained itself. New provisions, stricter regulations, were to be enforced. The *Jewish* Sabbath was to appear. But there is no evidence that these were wholly strange words to the elders—"The rest of a holy Sabbath unto the Lord; eat that to-day; for to-day is a Sabbath unto the Lord: to-day ye shall not find it in the field. Six days ye shall gather it; but on the seventh day, which is a Sabbath, there shall be none".

2. The disobedience of the people. This does not prove that the institution was a new one. Sabbath-breaking, we must believe, is not yet extinct, any more than the Sabbath. Notice, also, that some disobeyed the explicit command, "Let no man leave of it till the morning".

3. The silence of Moses respecting any existing ordinance. The fact may be pointed either way. It is at least offset, for our author's use, by Moses' equally striking silence respecting the nature of the remarkable day he is said here to institute.

The most probable explanation of both phenomena—the silence respecting a previously existing sacred day, and respecting the import of the words, the rest of a holy Sabbath—is, that the chapter gives us an account of the revival of a day which had somewhat lost its proper position, and which was to be invested with new guarantees, and enhanced importance. If we are still referred to the statement, “See, for that the Lord hath given you the Sabbath”, the reply is easy. This is not said to the elders, but to the people, through Moses, after the sin of those who transgressed. It refers to the preceding narrative, and follows its interpretation. That the words intrinsically and necessarily signify no more than the revival, or new and more impressive inculcation, of a custom previously known is clear from Neh. ix, 13, 14: “Thou camest down also upon Mount Sinai, and *madest known* unto them thy holy Sabbath”. Yet the day, in the theory of those who quote this and kindred passages, in proof of its exclusive Jewish origin, had been previously made known.

The lowest ground, therefore, which can be taken, consistently with truth, appears to us to be, that it cannot be shown that a *Sabbath* was not kept until the Israelites entered the wilderness; and, farther, that probabilities strongly favor its previous observance. This being the case, the use which we have made of Genesis ii, 2–3, is confirmed. We also claim that such an interpretation is legitimate upon grounds independent of the decision of the question of the actual observance of a primeval Sabbath. The passage in its bearings upon the obligation of consecrating one day in seven, cannot be dismissed with the remark: “What does it amount to”?

Equally below the universal interest and permanent authority of the record, is our author's treatment of Ex. xx, 8–11. He does not enter upon the important question of the true position and authority of the Decalogue in the system of revealed religion, and we shall restrict ourselves to a brief notice of the objections he advances to deriving any sanction for the Lord's day from the Fourth Commandment. These, so far as we are able to gather them, and so far as they have not been already virtually considered, are as follows:

1. The Jewish Sabbath was enjoined as a sign between God and his people. 2. It was a Positive Institution. 3. There is no possible expedient by which we can retain the seventh day Sabbath, and alter the time of its recurrence, or the manner of its celebration.

To the statements numbered (1) and (2), we have no objection to make. The Sabbath is expressly declared to be a sign. It was positively ordained. The fallacy we have to notice is, in assuming that its special end gives the whole idea, ground and object of the institution; in assuming also that for a positive institution there may not be reasons in their sphere as cogent and permanent as ethical laws. It is in this last respect, especially, we think, that confusion exists in discussions of this subject. The seventh and eighth commandments convey precepts of natural morality. There is still an obvious advantage in their utterance from Heaven with the voice of divine authority. The sense of obligation in the human heart is thus quickened and strengthened. The law of a Sabbath may be founded in reasons as universal and important as are the statutes respecting the marriage covenant and the rights of property. If these reasons are less upon the surface, there is the more occasion for the distinct promulgation of a divine law. That the observance of a Sabbath is thus founded in reasons permanent and general, may be properly inferred from two considerations. It was written by the finger of God upon one of those tables of stone all whose other contents have this character of universality and perpetuity. Each of these commands constitutes one of the laws the Spirit of Christ is to write upon the heart. We do not affirm that a positive institution is a moral law. But our argument is, that the circumstances accompanying the annunciation of the Fourth Commandment, and the position assigned to it, approve it as occupying in the mind of the divine Legislator a place of lasting consequence and authority. They who make it the foundation of a merely temporary institution do violence to the salient facts pertaining to it. The other consideration is, that with the law given upon Sinai, uttered by Jehovah himself (Moses, it would seem, receiving it as one of the people), and written upon the

tables of stone, as one of the Ten Commandments, is connected, either as reason or motive, an allusion of universal interest. No theory of the Sabbath as a merely Jewish institution, fairly embraces these words: "*Remember the Sabbath-day, to keep it holy . . . for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day; wherefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath-day and hallowed it.*"

Here we are met with the objection we have numbered for convenience (8). We find our reply in the admission made that the Sabbath is a positive institution, and in the conclusion we have shown to be authorized that it has a permanent foundation. As a positive institution, it is susceptible of change. As founded in permanent principles, it is not susceptible of abolition. Particularly should we expect to find it assuming, with changes of Dispensation, corresponding forms. If observed by Enos, it was not kept precisely as by David. What is the essential element is easily understood by its character and its expressed reason. It is essentially an ordinance of *time*. It cannot be spiritualized away from such a provision. Yet it does not restrict us to the seventh day Sabbath; and this for two reasons. The first is, that another day was observed by Apostles and designated for their followers. The second is, that the allusion, in the command, to the seventh day, is on the face of it a mutable and historical provision. The words "*Remember the Sabbath-day*", "*But the seventh day is a Sabbath*"—refer to an existing institution. They have an immediate historical application. They are precisely parallel, in this respect, with the allusion, in the promise attached to the Fifth Commandment, to the promised land. Yet this promise the Apostle Paul applies without hesitation to the children of Gentiles in an Epistle written to a church, or body of churches, having no lot in the land of Canaan.* And it is, in general, one of the most characteristic features of divine revelation that immutable principles are inculcated in connection with transient forms, that permanent truths are revealed in union with historical and temporary

* Eph. vi, 1-3.

conditions. Nowhere is this more evident than in the teachings of our Saviour and his Apostles. Nor is there any insuperable difficulty in the way of clearly and definitely ascertaining the truth intended to be conveyed. In the Fourth Commandment we find recognised the same idea of the week conveyed in the record of creation. It is a septenary period, having six days for labor and one for rest. It is the same period transmitted by the Apostles to the Christian Church. The table in which the Commandment in question appears, with the other table, is made up of permanent principles. The same reasons for its originally occupying an equally high place in authority with those commands associated with it, remain. We are referred in its very terms to a universal reason or motive for its observance. If we assign the Decalogue a place with other Mosaic legislation, and suppose it, as formal law, to have passed away, then the Sabbatical ordinance survives (as Archbishop Whately and others are careful to assert respecting the *other* commandments), not because it is a precept of the Mosaic Law, but because there is a cognizable reason for its perpetuity as cogent in its sphere as are those which uphold the perpetual authority of its fellows. If, with what we deem a better understanding of the subject, we accept the Decalogue as a brief but comprehensive summary of the permanent principles which lie at the foundation of all true religion and morality, we then obtain yet higher sanction for the perpetuity of a Sabbath. Nor are reasons such as these to be set aside by the conceded fact that the principles of the Decalogue, even in the instrument itself, may be seen to have had a temporary reference, and to have been suited to existing historical conditions. This results from the necessity of the case, and is only one illustration among many of that law of divine revelation which expresses the general in the particular, the permanent in transient forms.

As to the manner of keeping the day, this, within certain limits, must necessarily vary with the progress of the race—especially with advancing revelations of divine truth and its more extensive appropriation. The Christian Sabbath cannot be a Jewish Sabbath, any more than the risen Saviour is in

every respect what he was while under the Law. There is, in revealed religion, development; but not that sundering of the New from the Old so much in fashion now, in certain quarters.

The chief difficulties, however, to which Sabbatarian tenets have given rise, it is of some consequence to observe, have sprung from misconceptions of the Jewish Sabbath as a religious day. The Sabbath of the Fourth Commandment has been too much regarded as only a part of a system of Sabbaths, and in its connection with the civil and ceremonial law. It has also been interpreted in the light of Rabbinical and Pharisaic traditions, rather than in that of Holy Scripture. It should never be forgotten that our Saviour's example is a commentary on the Sabbath of the Decalogue. Were there space to spare, we should be glad to follow Dr. H. in his candid and interesting discussion of this branch of the subject. His conclusions evince the Jewish Sabbath to be so much more evangelical in its character than is commonly supposed, that he feels constrained to give reasons why it should have been abrogated. The solution of his difficulties he finds in the Pharisaic perversions of the day, and in its intimate connection with a temporary and imperfect system; very good reasons for the change Sabbatarianism claims was made, but not satisfactory as an explanation of a total abolition of a day which may well receive the encomium passed by the Creator upon his primal works, and which, in its Christian form, we believe will continue more and more to win the reverence and love of human hearts. Sufficient allowance has doubtless not always been made for the physical necessities of men in the use of such a day. Much has been said, also, contrary to Christian charity and to Christian liberty. Excesses inevitably lead to reactions. Yet the greatest danger lies at present in a sundering of gospel from law, of the New covenant from the Old, of Christianity from principles of righteousness which are the pillars of religion. It cannot be too often insisted, that Christian liberty is freedom in law, and has its fruit in holiness; and that restriction is still a schoolmaster indispensable in the spiritual training of the race.

ART. VI.—THE ORIGIN OF IDOLATRY.

WE propose in this Article to consider some questions concerning Idolatry, its origin, nature, objects, and history, as it is, on the one hand, described in the Holy Scriptures, and, on the other, in Rawlinson's *History of Herodotus* and in the works of various earlier writers on the subject.

In the notes, essays, and illustrations added by Mr. Rawlinson to his version of *Herodotus*, much new light is supposed, by the accomplished Editor and his associates, to be thrown upon this subject by their investigations of the inscriptions, the sculptures, and other relics recently exhumed from the ruins of Babylonia and Assyria; and by their criticism of the early Greek writers on the history and mythology of those countries. And, on the assumption that the popular theory of Idolatry which is presented in this great work, as in a host of Latin, French, and English works which preceded it, is the true theory, the Editor, it may be readily allowed, has, on some particulars, cast much light. But upon the main questions concerning the origin and the real objects of idolatrous homage; the animus, motives, purposes, date, circumstances of the first idolaters; the relations of the subject to the chronology, and above all to the *theology* of the Holy Scriptures; the relation of Idolatry at first to visible material images and to the after growth of Polytheism; and upon the moral, religious, and political aspects of this stupendous system of imposture, tyranny, and wickedness, this latest and most elaborate work affords, we apprehend, new contributions of uncertainty and mystery, rather than new and certain light.

If this be so, the reason of it undoubtedly is, that the long-prevalent theory upon the subject, and especially upon these main questions, is so erroneous, that no resort to Greek and Latin sources, or to the monuments and inscriptions of the earliest idolatrous nations, can serve to rectify it, or to reconcile it

with the only reliable criterion, the declarations and historical notices contained in the Word of God. Without a true theory of the nature, origin, and objects of Idolatry at the start, neither the sculptured images nor the long lost language of the inscriptions can be rightly construed. The Greek and Roman historians and mythologists had no conception of the primeval and true, if they had of any, theory on the subject; and practically—blinded and besotted by the system and its degrading forms—they knew only the childish, the debasing, and the cruel aspects, rites, and exactions of Polytheism.

Of the importance of the subject little need to be said. Idolatry, during all the ages since its institution, has been the bane, the curse and blight, temporally of the fairest portions of the earth, and spiritually of three fourths, or a larger proportion of the successive generations of the human race. If we suppose the average population of the globe since the age of Nimrod to have been seven hundred millions, ascribe to him the public institution of Idolatry after the deluge, allow thirty years for each generation of men, and suppose three fourths of each generation to have been idolaters, the aggregate number of souls sacrificed by this system, would now be more than seventy thousand millions. If instead of three fourths, nine tenths have been victims, the aggregate would be near ninety thousand millions. Yet, the origin, date, occasion, purpose, of this predominant evil, so far from having been satisfactorily explained or accounted for by any pagan or other class of writers, remains as profound a mystery as at any former period. The system is in itself so utterly debasing and abominable, so repugnant to reason and philosophy, and so abhorrent to the faith of revealed religion, that no sane mind can meditate upon it without being forced to exclaim,—Is it possible, that from a date long prior to that of any authentic secular history, this system can have reigned unto death and perdition over such a proportion of a race of intelligent beings created in the image, governed by the providence, and sustained on the bounty of the all-wise, all-powerful, all-beneficent God; and yet that it could have originated, established and perpetuated itself without a cause and occasion as stu-

pendous and as likely to be made public and to be transmitted from age to age, as the deluge, the confusion of tongues, and the dispersion of the primeval race of idolaters? Must there not be in it something far deeper as to its origin, its rationale, its object, its relations, than reason or philosophy can reach—something in the culpable depravity and judicial blindness of apostates and the workings of infernal malice, to account for the origin and history of the system?

If under the government of God idolatry is the greatest of crimes, a rebellion, a treason against the authority and the throne of Jehovah, and against his loyal subjects and true worshippers—if it is a denial of his supremacy, his perfections and his prerogatives—if it is a scheme of degradation, misery and destruction to men—if it is a system of antagonism and wickedness, involving every species of immorality and corruption (as described Rom. i) and every element of satanic malice and cruelty,—then it is no more to be believed that man devised and adopted it from necessity in his ignorance and helplessness, and without the means of knowing better, than that Adam fell from necessity, ignorant of his duty, and without the instigation of Satan. Nor can it be believed, that the primitive, continued, and unrepealable denunciations and inflictions of wrath and everlasting punishment upon all idolaters, are ascribed to infinite righteousness and truth otherwise than as the just penalty of guilt—the just punishment of idolaters for their wickedness in worshipping and serving another as God,—a pretender, an enemy, a rival. But concerning all this the ancient mythologies and histories, and the modern expositions of them, are silent. They treat the system,—which for four thousand years and more has engulfed the vast majority of the successive generations of men in darkness, misery, and despair,—as but one of the ancient institutions of the race, of uncertain origin and unknown date; as a device perhaps of demagogues and priests; as a product of primitive ignorance and barbarism so confirmed at length as to withstand the culture of Greece and Rome; as the spontaneous religion of nature prior to revelation, and more congenial to the heart in every age. They treat of its monuments as curious matters of art; of its conflicting nomenclatures, its

diverse pantheons, its mysterious symbols, its confused and irreconcilable chronologies, as matters of literature and criticism. But they teach us nothing concerning its origin, its date, its nature as a spiritual despotism, the secret of its power over the souls and bodies, lives and liberties of men, as an external system of degradation, tyranny and blood; as an abnegation of reason, a credence only of lies and impossibilities, a votive self-immolation to the jaws of Moloch. Of its remorseless grasp on all the individuals of successive generations born under its sway, the powerful and the weak, the learned and the ignorant; of the futility of all attempts of individuals at self-deliverance; of its effectual resistance to all but foreign and supernatural power and influence on the mind and heart, they tell us nothing. The system is left in the attitude of a mystery, an absurdity, a sport of human caprice and madness, a fathomless riddle of contradictions, an image of darkness, misery, and despair, involving from time immemorial the temporal and eternal destiny of three parts out of four of the human race, of which neither the three involved parts, nor the excepted Christian part, has any satisfactory theory or history, and to the nature, instigator, and object of which, unless it is to be found in the records of Inspiration, we have no clue.

Historically, this great system of tyranny and blood is the ground-work of the civil and social annals of a large portion of the race. It stands forth as the comprehensive organization and embodiment of antagonism and opposition to the true religion, and to virtue, truth, and righteousness. To counteract and prevent its universal success under the ancient dispensation it was necessary to institute a theocratic administration over a particular community of true worshippers to preserve and protect them, and for their defence and the vindication of the divine authority to inflict retributive and avenging judgments on the surrounding idolaters. Thus the destruction of Sodom, the plagues of Egypt, the extirpation of the Canaanites, the overthrow of other pagan nations from time to time, and the various subjections and captivities of the Israelites, when they apostatised to idol worship, were denounced

and executed in vindication of the true God and the true religion against the arrogance and treason of idolatry. Yet the hereditary, popular, and prevalent account of the origin, institution, and genius of this monstrous system, is, that during the infantile period of the race, men being without language and without revelation, and having to grope their way to one discovery after another, did their best when they invented idolatry as their religion; and being wholly ignorant of the true God, and feeling the most urgent necessity of some object of gratitude and homage for their daily blessings, concluded that the Sun had most to do towards the production of the fruits of the earth, and naturally began by addressing their sacrifices, thanks, and prayers, to that chief of visible objects. Next they assigned to each planet and star some particular good or bad influence over the affairs of men, and rendered homage to them as gods. Then as they acquired the use of language, and made progress in knowledge and in arts and sciences, their wants in the mean time being greatly multiplied, and their passions and vices stimulated, they showed their enlarged, refined, and appreciative gratitude to living and dead men who had served them as rulers, warriors and hierophants, and by degrees extended their veneration to all sorts of heroes and heroines, real and fabulous, and to dumb animals, reptiles, insects, vegetables, visions, passions, crimes, diseases, all the phenomena of nature, and all the objects of imagination. All this, indeed, turned out to be wholly contrary to the injunctions of Revelation, when the race was sufficiently advanced to receive divine instruction. But what better could be expected from the race in its helpless state of infancy and ignorance? How it happened that man, as he studied arts, science, and philosophy, did not grow wiser and better, and thrust away the putrid mass of childish and degrading superstitions and corruptions, neither the mythologists, the historians, nor the recent explorers of sculptures and inscriptions, afford us any explanation.

We trust that our readers will agree with us that it is time to call in question the theory of the pagan authors and their modern expositors on this subject — time to inquire whether the real author and god of idolatry was of no higher rank and

pretensions, of no more desperate aims and purposes, of no more unity and consistency in his malice towards man, and in his enmity, rivalry and opposition to God, than dead heroes and heroines as ignorant and powerless as their worshippers ; or whether Satan, the arch apostate, deceiver and tempter, assuming to be god of this fallen world, instigated this scheme of homage to himself as the means of enslaving the race he had seduced, of sustaining his revolt, upholding his kingdom, carrying out his antagonism against Jehovah, and accomplishing his ulterior designs.

The requisite limits of this article will allow far less of detail in the discussion than the subject deserves. Yet enough, perhaps, may be said to induce, on the part of our readers, a more extended examination both of the secular annals of idolatry, and of the teachings and implications of the Scripture records. As the results of a somewhat careful research of the principal writers on idolatry, and of the teachings of the Holy Scriptures, we present the following propositions, as an outline of what we take to be the theory contained in Scripture, and implied in the nature of the case, and in the moral and physical aspects and results of the idol system :

That Satan, the prince and leader of apostates, arrogating divine prerogatives and claiming to be god of this world, was the original instigator and object of idolatrous worship and service.

That this idolatry was the great treason and wickedness of the antediluvian period which demanded the extirpation of all but a single family of the race.

That for the reinstitution and establishment of the same worship and service after the deluge, the apostates under Nimrod erected the tower and temple of Bel for the worship of Satan, under that name, as the antagonist and rival of Jehovah.

That the idolatry primarily established at Babel was not polytheistic, but restricted to the one chief object of idolatrous homage, who arrogated to himself the sun (and subordinately solar and artificial light and heat) as his shekinah of visible glory, towards which the worshippers directed their adoration.

That polytheism was of subsequent adoption, and attended

by the use of images and symbols representative of the chief god, and of subordinate celestial intelligencies, and of deified heroes and heroines, as the system advanced in different nations.

That after the dispersion, at different periods, temples on the model and with the original objects of Babel, were erected by the idolaters of Assyria, Egypt, India, Mexico, and elsewhere.

That in each of the successive Pantheons, as described in the ancient inscriptions and reported by the historians,—as well those of the more barbarous nations as those of nations by whom arts and letters were cultivated,—the head of the list indicated the one universal object of idolatrous worship; and, at least generally, the head name in each instance appropriated to the god, was the name appropriated to the Sun, and also to the material image of the god.

That because the respective nations had each one and the same chief god of their idolatrous homage, they mutually acknowledged and at pleasure adopted each other's subordinate local and household deities.

That various arts, more or less of science, and the use of written language, were coëval with the earliest details of idolatry, as is evinced by historical traditions and testimonies concerning primeval architecture, the building of the ark, the making of brick, metallurgy, sculpture, painting, inscriptions, musical and other instruments, geometrical figures, astronomical observations, and the like.

That the modern explorers of the relics of Babylon, Ninevah, and Egypt,—fascinated by the novelty of their discoveries, and prepossessed by the pagan mythology,—have given to their interpretations an imposing air and aspect which cannot be considered otherwise than as, at least, greatly wanting in deference to the authority of the Holy Scriptures.

That the exhumed inscriptions are, in respect to their real meaning and their chronology, only to a very moderate extent entitled to any confidence; and that, in general, they are, on all hands, admitted to be mythical, and in proportion as they are ancient, undecipherable; the ancient Chaldean cuneiform characters of Babylonia, not having yet been mastered.

And that, under the names of paganism, mythology, superstition and idolatry, with scarcely any more thought of their significance than readers generally have of the significance of the terms Foochooism, Lamaism, Druidism, Fetichism, philosophers, theologians, historians, and critics have generally treated this subject merely as one of the senseless vagaries of ignorant and debased communities, duped by priests and rendered abject by fear; rather than as a vast, organized, and essentially homogeneous system of atheism, bondage, and terror, by which the nature and effects of man's apostacy, guilt, condemnation, and final perdition are exemplified to the view of the universe;—such a rebellion of moral, accountable free agents, as can be suppressed and ended only by the transcendent power and grace, or by the avenging justice of the Creator, Mediator, and Ruler of the world.

Idolatry is a rival system in opposition to that of the Jehovah. It is the worship of a rival, a competitor, an antagonist. It is in all points opposed to the true religion, and Satan as head and leader of rebellion and rivalry is the founder, instigator, and object of the rival worship. That he instituted this method of securing to himself the allegiance and homage of the fallen human race immediately after the apostacy of man and by means of it exerted his sway over the antediluvian population is strongly indicated in the Holy Scriptures, and is justly to be inferred from the nature of the case, the object of his revolt, and the use which he made of the system in the succeeding ages among the heathen, the apostate Jews, and in more recent times in the Romish church. In the Epistle to the Romans, chapter i, there is a brief statement of the wickedness of men from the earliest period of their defection from the worship of the true God. They are collectively declared to be inexcusable: "Because that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things"; and "changed the truth

of God into *a lie, and worshipped and served the creature* more [rather] than *the Creator*, who is blessed forever. Amen. . . . And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind." In the Epistle of Jude holy men are exhorted "to contend earnestly for the faith which was once delivered to the saints. For there are certain men crept in unawares, who were before of old ordained to this condemnation, ungodly men, turning the grace of our God into lasciviousness, and denying the only Lord God [Jehovah Elohim] and (*even*) our Lord Jesus Christ [Jehovah the Saviour, Messiah]. . . . And Enoch, also, the seventh from Adam, prophesied of these, saying, Behold the Lord [Jehovah] cometh with ten thousand of his saints to execute judgment", etc. With like reference to the primeval period, it is said, Gen. vi: "And God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually . . . The earth was corrupt before God and was filled with violence . . . And the Jehovah said, I will destroy man whom I have created from the face of the earth".

These passages, taken in connection with the early institution of idolatry after the deluge, as if it were on a plan already digested and well known, sufficiently indicate that the preceding ages had been characterised by the like worship, as they were by the degrading and brutal vices and abominations peculiar to idolaters. The same conclusion is demanded and justified by the very nature and object of the rebellion and antagonism of Satan, which identifies him personally as head and leader of the revolt, aiming to establish a rival kingdom, as prince of the fallen angels, and professedly as god of this world.

Without attempting to illustrate the above propositions separately by distinct citations of authority, we must restrict what we have room to say to the leading features of the outline. It may suffice as evidence that Nimrod and his party erected the tower of Babel as the temple for the worship of Bel, Belus, Baal, represented by the sun, his supposed shekinah and tabernacle (as well as for the subordinate purpose of stellar observations by the priests of that deified intelligence), to

observe, that the same structure, renovated and enlarged, perhaps, occasionally, continued to be appropriated to that purpose as long as the kingdom and government of the Chaldeans and of Babylon endured,—a period of about nineteen hundred years. There is ample and varied evidence of this, both in the Scriptures and in the pagan records. The date assigned to the first undertaking of Nimrod, about one hundred years after the egress of Noah from the ark, precludes the supposition of any earlier post-diluvian institution of Idolatry. Till then the whole population was of one speech. The confusion scattered the idolaters from this metropolitan centre to different countries, where, retaining their original form of worship, they erected temples in imitation of that in Babylon, and consecrated them to the same chief intelligence and object of idolatrous homage: and where, being given over to a reprobate mind, they added to the original institute the system, the orgies, and the brutish vices of polytheism.

Josephus (*Antiquities*, Book I, chapter 4), expressing probably the explanation current among the learned Jews of his time, and anxious, perhaps, not to offend his idolatrous neighbors by any distinct allusion to Satan, says the early descendants of Ham “were so ill instructed that they did not obey God: for which reason they fell into calamities, and were made sensible, by experience, of what sin they had been guilty. For when they flourished with a numerous youth, God admonished them to send out colonies; but they, imagining that the prosperity they enjoyed was not derived from the favor of God, but supposing that their own power was the proper cause of the plentiful condition they were in, did not obey him. Nay, they added to this their disobedience to the divine will, the suspicion that they were therefore ordered to send out separate colonies, that, being divided asunder, they might the more easily be oppressed. Now it was NIMROD who excited them to such an affront and contempt of God. He was the grandson of Ham, the son of Noah, a bold man, and of great strength of hand. He persuaded them not to ascribe it to God—as if it was through his means they were happy—but to believe that it was their own courage which procured that happiness. He also gradually changed the government into tyranny, seeing

no other way of turning men from the fear of God, but to bring them into a constant dependence on his own power. He also said he would be revenged on God, if he should have a mind to drown the world again, for that he would build a tower too high for the waters to be able to reach ; and that he would be avenged on God for destroying their forefathers.

“Now the multitude were very ready to follow the determination of Nimrod, and to esteem it a piece of cowardice to submit to God ; and they built a tower . . . When God saw that they acted so madly, he did not resolve to destroy them utterly, since they were not grown wiser by the destruction of the former sinners, but he caused a tumult among them, by producing in them divers languages, and causing that they should not be able to understand one another. The place wherein they built the tower is now called *Babylon* . . . After this they were dispersed abroad on account of their languages, and went out by colonies everywhere.” To confirm this account of the tower and the dispersion, to his heathen readers, Josephus quotes the good pagan authority, the *Sibyl*, as mentioning them. He then gives the original names of the countries or localities where the different colonies settled, many of which had since been changed and others substituted : but he adds, “Nimrod staid and tyrannised at Babylon.”

Now if tradition represented Nimrod as asserting, and as persuading his confederates to believe, that their prosperity and abundance should be ascribed not to God but to themselves ; and if to ascribe their blessings to God was such an affront as to induce both him and them to defy his power and threaten revenge by erecting a tower higher than any possible flood, then it is just to infer, either that this was a renewal of the views entertained by the antediluvians for which they had been destroyed and that Nimrod personally aspired to rivalry with God and victory over him ; or that Nimrod was but the factor and spokesman of Satan. The scheme was as impious as it was vast and bold. How Nimrod could so soon after the deluge, and in so brief a space of time, originate and mature it, and persuade a happy and well supplied people to join him in it at such expense of labor and in open defiance and opposition to the Jehovah to whom they ascribed the del-

uge as a punishment of rebellion against him, it is by no means easy to conceive. But since there was an arch enemy of God and man, who had seduced and ruined the human race, who assumed to rule an antagonist kingdom of rebels in opposition to the Jehovah, and who claimed the homage and service of his subjects, and aspired to absolute mastery over them, it is credible, and conformable to every aspect of his subtlety and malice, that he should devise the system of rival worship and be himself the first, and even the supreme object of idolatrous homage. There is nothing overstrained or inconsistent in supposing him, in view of the victory of the Jehovah over him by the deluge, to have been actuated by motives of revenge as personal and as desperate as when he entered into and instigated Judas Iscariot to betray the Second Adam. But under what pretence Nimrod could assume to avenge himself on God for the destruction of the antediluvians for their wickedness, is not conceivable.

The principal topics which require consideration, relate to the original date, place, founder, and object of idolatrous worship; to the question, whether the first god of the system continued after the dispersion of mankind and the rise of polytheism to be in the different countries the one chief object of homage under various names in different languages; and to the design of images as symbols and representatives of the invisible chief intelligence, and of the inferior demons and heroes, to whom, as intermediate instruments of homage, they were consecrated. The historical testimonies which relate to these several subjects are connected and involved with each other, and cannot well be referred to separately. It is of consequence first to show that the intelligence designated in the Scriptures and in the lexicons and histories by the terms Bel, Belus, Belial, Baal, Belzebub, was the chief of the apostate angels called Satan, the tempter, the devil, the prince of the devils, god of this world, and by other equivalent epithets; that he was the primary and chief object of idolatrous worship in the temple of Belus, was at the head of the Babylonian pantheon, and also, under the same or other names, at the head of the pantheons of Assyria, Egypt, Greece, Rome, and the other pagan countries.

The fact that Bel was the great God of Babylonian idolatry in the temple of Belus is universally admitted. That he was the same personality as Beelzebub, Satan, the Devil, the Prince of fallen angels, is clearly taught in Scripture, especially in the New Testament. His not being expressly mentioned under these designations by Moses does not impair the evidence of his personal identity. In Gen. iii, he is called the *Serpent*; and though concealed from human view by a fitting embodiment, he speaks, and is spoken to and dealt with, as an intelligent person. In Job i and ii, he is called Satan—(*adversary, antagonist*)—also, 1 Chron. xxi, 1, Psalm cix, 6, Zech. iii, 1, 2; Isaiah xlii, 1, he is called *Bel*—“Bel boweth down”; Jer. l, 2—“*Bel* is confounded”—his images are broken; and li, 44—“I will punish *Bel* in Babylon”. In Judges, and the ensuing historical books, he is often denominated *Baal*, and his altar is spoken of in contrast with that of the Jehovah.

It is often a surprise to find in the introductory narrative of the Hebrew Scriptures, names and events introduced abruptly or familiarly, as though the subjects of them were already known. And there is abundant ground to conclude, not only from the character and the faith of the patriarchs, but from the prophecy of Enoch, and various allusions in the New Testament to Abel, Noah, Abraham, Melchisedeck, and others, that there was a mass of revealed doctrines and historic facts handed down from the beginning to the exodus from Egypt; when, as preliminary to a new series of events and revelations, and for the future instruction of all nations, such particulars of the primeval period as the case required, were reduced to writing by the hand of Moses.

In such a writing, that it might be intelligible to the generation then living, and to those to be instructed by them, the names of persons and places would naturally, nay, of necessity, be recorded as they were already known and in current use. Now of no fact, probably, were the earliest people of the several nations of the earth more fully convinced, than of the fact that there was an evil being, an apostate angel, a Satan, a devil, who, though personally invisible to them, had a hand in causing their miseries, was disposed to deceive, tor-

ment, and ruin them, and therefore was justly an object of fear and terror. When at the confusion of tongues the people were dispersed to different parts of the earth, they carried this conviction with them, and everywhere gave it the highest prominence in their theories of religion and philosophy, and made the Serpent the chief symbol of it. They distinguished this evil being from the opposite, whom they called the good Being, by personal names and titles, regarded them as equal in power, and as perpetually antagonistic to each other. Their fatal error consisted in their choosing, fearing, and serving the evil, instead of the good Being. They were, by the aid of their already depraved affections and dominant passions, as effectually deceived as Eve had been. Instead of going into a particular elucidation of this statement, we can only refer to Prideaux's account of the origin of idolatry,—of the Sabeian and Magian sects, of the doctrines of Zoroaster, and of the Persian system; to the dualism of the Persian philosophers, and in general to all writers on the ancient systems of pagan idolatry and philosophy. In most of the systems, and especially in the more barbarous nations, either the intelligence known as the devil and Satan, has been directly worshipped under those designations; or under the figure of the Serpent as his natural and acknowledged emblem and symbol.

But we fear that modern orthodoxy floating on the full tide of classical pagan literature, upheld by rationalism and false science, may reluctant at this view of the subject; and we therefore appeal to lexicographers and historians.

BEL. A name by which the heathen, and particularly the Babylonians, called their arch idol. (*Parkhurst.*) "Bel, Bal, or Beal, was the name of the chief deity of the ancient Irish." (*Ibid.*) "*Bel, Belus*, the chief domestic god of the Babylonians, worshipped in the celebrated tower of Babylon." (*Genesis.*) *Herodotus*, Book I, chap. 181, describes a part of the tower of Babel as "the sacred precinct of *Jupiter Belus*". Being a Greek, he naturally added the name Jupiter to the Babylonian name of the same god. In a note on this passage, Sir H. C. Rawlinson observes that "The Babylonian worship

of *Bel* is well known to us from Scripture (Isaiah, etc.). There is little doubt that he was the recognised head of the Babylonian pantheon, and therefore properly identified by the Greeks with their Zeus or Jupiter. . . . In the inscriptions of Nebuchadnezzar, [the later, not the most ancient, which confessedly are not deciphered] the name of *Bel*, as a distinct divinity, hardly ever occurs. . . . In Assyrian inscriptions, however, *Bel* is associated with Babylon. Pul and Tiglath-Pileser both sacrificed to him in that city as the supreme local deity, and Sargon expressly calls Babylon 'the dwelling-place of *Bel*'. In a succeeding note he says—"The Chaldeans appear to have been a branch of the great Hamite race, *Akkad*, which inhabited Babylonia from the earliest times" [that is from the times of Nimrod]. "With this race originated . . . the institution of a religious system and the cultivation of all science, and of astronomy in particular." Herodotus in the next chapter says, "They—the Chaldeans—declare that the god comes down in person" into his temple; on which a note informs us that "This fable of the god coming personally into his temple was contrary to the *Egyptian* belief in the nature of the gods. It was only a figurative expression, similar to that of the Jews, who speak of God visiting and dwelling in his holy hill, and not intended to be taken literally." This is one of many instances in which the overpowering fascination of the recent discovery of Egyptian, Babylonian, and Assyrian relics and inscriptions, has induced a belief or impression that their testimony—though as yet as imperfectly understood, perhaps, as what the geologists call the "Testimony of the rocks"—is of higher antiquity, credibility, and authority, than the literal language and testimony of the Holy Scriptures.

BAAL. "The ruler. By this name the idolaters of several nations worshipped the *solar fire*—which is to sense and appearance the ruling principle in nature.—Sanchoniathon (or whoever was the author of the *Phœnician theology*, published in Greek by Philo Biblius) says, speaking of the Sun: 'This god the Phœnicians thought to be the only lord of heaven, calling him *Beel saman*, which in their language is Lord of

Heaven. *Plautus*, in the Carthaginian language, writes it *Bal samem*." Parkhurst—who goes on to observe "that *Baal* as an object of worship meant the solar fire—that the contest between *Elijah* and the prophets of *Baal* was to determine either the superiority of *Baal* or that of *Jehovah*—that at first the idolaters worshipped *Baal* in conjunction with *Jehovah*"—i. e. the image of *Baal* as if it represented the *Jehovah* or the intelligence whom they regarded as the true creator and ruler of the world. The absurdity of supposing that the contest between *Elijah* and the prophets of *Baal* was intended to determine whether or not the Sun, instead of an intelligence alleged to have the Sun for his shekinah, was superior to the *Jehovah*, is palpable.

Bel. Nebuchadnezzar out of the spoils of Jerusalem "did make that golden image to the honor of *Bel*, his god, which he did set up, and dedicate to him in the plain of *Dura*" (*Prideaux*, vol. i, 87). "Nebuchadnezzar put all the sacred vessels which he carried from Jerusalem into the house of his god at *Babylon*, that is, into this house or temple of *Bel*. For that was the name of the great god of the Babylonians. He is supposed to have been the same with *Nimrod*, and to have been called *Bel* from his *dominion*, and *Nimrod* from his rebellion. For *Bel*, or *Baal*, which is the same name, signifieth *Lord*, and *Nimrod* a *Rebel*, in the *Jewish* and *Chaldean* languages; the former was his *Babylonish* name, by reason of his empire in that place, and the latter his Scripture name by reason of his rebellion in revolting from God to follow his own wicked designs. This temple stood till the time of *Xerxes*" (*Prideaux*, vol. i, p. 100). See also the same volume, p. 177, where in his account of the first idolaters, he says that "Their notion of the sun, moon, and stars, being that they were the tabernacles or habitations of intelligences, which animated those orbs in the same manner as the soul of man animates his body . . . they thought these the properest beings to become mediators between God and them. . . . They first worshipped them by their tabernacles, and afterwards by images also. By these tabernacles they meant the orbs themselves, in which the in-

telligencies had their habitations. And therefore when they paid their devotions to any one of them, they directed their worship toward the planet in which they supposed he dwelt."

"*Baal*, among the Babylonians, was called in the Aramean manner, *Bel*, *Belus*. . . . The Greeks gave him the name of Hercules, and compared him with Jupiter." (*Gesenius*.)

"*Belial*, Satan." (*Ibid.*) Satan as being the head, father, representative of rebels. Hence the phrases "Certain children of Belial" (Deut. xiii, 13), "Certain sons of Belial" (Judges xix, 22). "Deliver us the men, the children of Belial" (Judges xx, 13), "Count not thy handmaid a daughter of Belial" (1 Sam. i, 16), "Now the sons of Eli were sons of Belial" (*ibid.* ii, 12). "The children of Belial said, How shall this man save us?" (*ibid.* x, 27). "He is such a son of Belial, that a man cannot speak to him" (*ibid.* xxv, 17), "Let not my lord regard this man of Belial" (*ibid.*), "What concord hath Christ with Belial?" (2 Cor. vi, 15). Also a variety of phrases of equivalent import: "The children of the wicked one—Cain who was of the wicked one—Ye are of your father the devil—Thou child of the devil." *Bel*, *Belus*, *Belial*, *Baal*, *Beelzebub*, are names of one and the same personality; who in the New Testament is styled *Prince* of this world; "*Prince* of the power of the air" (Eph. ii, 2); "*a god* of this world" (2 Cor. iv, 4). Christ himself repeatedly designates Satan as "the Prince of this world" (John xii, 31; xiv, 30; xvi, 11), "Prince of the devils"—"*Beelzebub*, adversary, enemy, tempter, father of apostate Jews, instigator of Judas to betray Him". He therefore was the original object of idolatrous worship by the Chaldeans in the temple at Babylon.

That Satan was the instigator and supreme object of idolatry, is evident from his being the great and persistent antagonist of the Jehovah, and from his worship being represented as in rivalry and opposition to the worship of the true God, and as being directed toward the Sun as his *Shekinah*, instead of towards the *Shekinah* of Jehovah in the tabernacle. And the children of Israel "found the Jehovah, and served—(to) or towards *Baal* and [(to) or towards] *Ashtaroth*" (Judges ii, 13).

"He that will plead for Baal, let him be put to death. . . . If he be a god (Elohim), let him plead for himself . . . Let the Baal plead against him "who hath thrown down his altar" (Judges vi, 31). "The children of Israel cried unto the Jehovah, saying, We have sinned against thee, both because we have forsaken our Elohe, and also served Baalim" (*Ibid.* x, 10). "Then the children of Israel did put away *the* Baalim and *the* Ashtaroth, and served the Jehovah only" (1 Sam. vii, 4). These names have the article in the Hebrew text; and the meaning is that the people ceased to address their worship to *the Baal*, the one chief and rival god represented by the sun; and also that which they addressed to the inferior intelligence represented by the moon as queen of heaven, and restricted their homage to the Jehovah as dwelling in his shekinah of glory within the ark of the covenant. "And they cried unto the Jehovah, and said, We have sinned, because we have forsaken the Jehovah, and have served *the* Baalim and *the* Ash-taroth: but now deliver us out of the hand of our enemies, and we will serve thee" (1 Sam. xii, 10). "And Ahab served *the* Baal, and worshipped him. And he reared up an altar for Baal in the house of *the* Baal which he had built in Samaria. And Ahab did more to provoke the Jehovah Elohim of Israel to anger than all the kings of Israel that were before him" (1 Kings xvi, 31.) "And Elijah said, How long halt ye between two opinions? If *the* Jehovah be *the* Elohim, follow him: but if the Baal, then follow him. . . . Call ye on the name of your god (Elohe), and I will call on the name of the Jehovah: and *the* Elohim that answereth by fire, let him be *the* Elohim. . . . And they called on the name of the Baal from morning even until noon, saying, O Baal, hear us. . . . And Elijah said, Cry aloud: for he is a god (Elohim): either he is talking, or he is pursuing, etc. . . . And Elijah said, . . . Hear me, O Jehovah, hear me, that this people may know that thou art Jehovah *the* Elohim. . . . And—the answer being vouchsafed—all the people said, The Jehovah, he is *the* Elohim; the Jehovah, he is the Elohim" (1 Kings xviii). Here the rival objects of homage are alike addressed as personal intelligencies, each supposed by his worshippers to be

able to hear and answer, and to vindicate himself. The simple question was: Which is the true Elohim, and which the pretender and usurper? Again (1 Kings xix, 18), the Jehovah said to Elijah: "I have left me seven thousand in Israel which have not bowed unto Baal". "Ahaziah served *the* Baal, and worshipped him, and provoked to anger the Jehovah Elohim of Israel" (*ibid* xxii, 54).

"Jehoram put away the image of the Baal that his father had made" (2 Kings iii, 2)—that is, the image of the invisible person called the Baal. "Jehu said, Search, and look that there be here with you none of the servants of the Jehovah, but the worshippers of *the* Baal only. . . . And they brake down the image of *the* Baal" (*ibid.* x, 23, 27). And all the people (under Jehoash) "went into the house of *the* Baal and brake it down; His altars and His images brake they in pieces" (*ibid.* xi, 13). "Josiah put down the idolatrous priests . . . that burned incense unto Baal, to the Sun, and to the Moon, and to the planets, and to all the host of heaven" (*ibid.* xxiii, 5). The particle (*Lamed*) in the Hebrew text which is prefixed to the words translated Baal, Sun, Moon, etc., signifies in such connections, *to, towards, unto*. (See Gesenius.) As in Psalm xcix, 15, "Worship *towards* his footstool"; that is, turning *towards* it. Isaiah li, 6, Lift up your eyes *towards* the heavens—*tropically* of a turning or direction of the mind *to, towards, upon, any person or thing*" (Gesenius). The above passage, therefore, may with propriety be rendered, 'that burned incense unto the Baal, turning towards the sun'; and with reference to the mediate subordinates and auxiliaries of Baal, 'turning towards the moon, and towards the planets', etc. So that a distinction between the sun and Baal as objects of worship is not intended. "They have built also the high places of Baal, to burn their sons with fire for burnt offerings unto Baal (Jer. xix, 5). "And the Chaldeans shall come and set fire on this city, and burn it with the houses; upon whose roofs they have offered incense unto Baal, and poured out drink offerings unto other (i. e. another) Elohim" (*ibid.* xxxii, 29). "And they built the high places of *the* Baal, which are in the valley of the son of Hinnom, to cause their sons and

their daughters to pass through the fire unto Moloch" (*ibid.* xxxii, 85). The fire, it is well known, through which the victims were supposed to pass to the deified intelligence called Bel, Baal, Moloch, etc., was within the hollow of the material visible image.

Without further comment on these several passages, it is presumed to be evident beyond question, that the object worshipped under the name Baal was the invisible person elsewhere denominated Beelzebub, and Satan, the prince of the devils, and god of this world, as represented by the material images. The references to him are always in the singular, though some of the designations employed, as *Baalim*, are, like *Elohim*, often construed as if plural.

On the main point the Scriptures are consistent. They distinguish the one chief object of idolatrous homage from all inferior objects called gods and goddesses. They teach, that in rendering homage to that chief intelligence, the worshippers turned their faces towards the Sun, or towards an image supposed to indicate his attributes and his visible investiture, tabernacle, or shekinah ; which practice being common to all the idolatrous nations, proves that they all worshipped the same chief god as head of their system. The ancient Greek travellers and historians, however, are by no means consistent with each other. For though in general they assert, or admit, that the chief god of the several nations was identical in attributes with that of Babylon, they also generally fail to regard the necessary inference as to the inferior attributes and place of the deified demons, heroic men, etc., and speak of them both collectively and individually, as though they were on a level in respect to attributes, and as though there was not a particular *One* who was the superior and prince of the rest, and who arrogated prerogatives not ascribed to them. In this our translators of the Hebrew Scriptures imitated the secular example by rendering epithets intended to designate the one personality named Baal, and sometimes *Elohim*, as if they were indefinite plurals and intended the whole genus of polytheism. Apparently, the confusion of the secular writers, even the best of them,

arose from their following the nomenclatures of successive pantheons founded on traditional legends and classified by reference to paintings and sculptured images, instead of being founded on the *attributes* ascribed in the inscriptions to the chief, and those ascribed to the inferior gods of the several pantheons. What the most ancient cuneiform inscriptions may contain on this subject no mortal can yet inform us; for the Greek historians do not tell, and the modern explorers and compilers are not yet able to read those records. And so far as the later Semitic type of inscriptions has been deciphered, they exhibit as compared with the inconsistent pantheons of the Greek historians, and as compared with each other, a profound confusion of mythical kings, of gods attended by goddesses, and of new names of places, rulers, and gods substituted by new and degenerate aspirants in the place and with the imputed attributes of their deified predecessors.

It would require more space than we can command to verify and illustrate these facts. But it is due to such believers in the holy Scriptures as Bryant and Faber, to observe, that finding no ground of confidence or satisfaction in the pagan theory, they by patient, persevering, and extraordinary labors, sought to construe the mythologies of the Greeks and others in such a way as to be consistent with the Mosaic narrative of events subsequent to the deluge. They therefore instead of relying on the heathen mythologies and legends, reasoned from the current traditions and monuments concerning the deluge, the building of Babel, the confusion of tongues, and the dispersion of mankind over all the earth, and traced the nomenclature of idolatry and polytheism back to Noah as the first deified hero of idolatrous worship; and as head of the subsequent pantheons. Back of him, however, they recognise no instigator or chief of the system. And they plainly seem to teach or imply, that the post-diluvians, out of gratitude and veneration, or from some other motive, were content to ascribe to him divine attributes and honors, and to worship him as the one chief god of their idolatry, and author of their blessings, in opposition to the Jehovah of the Old Testament Scriptures.

Considering then, that the names variously written Bel, Belus, etc., designated the first chief object of idolatrous homage in Babylon—that the tower of Babel was erected by Nimrod and his Hamite associates as the temple of that god, and that though refitted at different times by Nebuchadnezzar or others, it subsisted about nineteen hundred years till destroyed by Xerxes, about 470 B.C.—that in the course of this period, under different dynasties, other designations of this god were introduced and various modifications of the original name, as Bel-Samen, Bel-Merodach, which the later inscriptions have preserved—that the primitive name and various of its modifications and synonyms, as Baal, Moloch, Dagon, were adopted by the Canaanites and the Hebrews—that the worship of Baal was at first directed to the sun, as his shekinah, then to light and to fire, as emanations from the sun, without the intervention of *images*—that owing to the sun being out of sight about half the time, the worshippers substituted material visible images to supply the defect (see Prideaux i, 77)—that their first images were copies of the human form as the most obvious symbols of an invisible intelligence (and possibly having allusion to the theophanies of the Jehovah in that form) whom they called Baal and worshipped as their god—that polytheism grew up with the use of such images (see Calmet, Parkhurst, and others)—that when the moon and planets were named, the images formed to represent intelligences, demons, dead heroes, etc., as inhabiting them were named after them; we proceed to illustrate as concisely as we can the false theories which have prevailed and the inconsistencies and confusion of the nomenclatures, sculptures, and inscriptions lately brought to the notice of the public.

The principal writers on the subject, and probably all who have attained any considerable reputation, appear to agree in the opinion that post-diluvian idolatry was first instituted in Babylonia; that it consisted in the worship of one deified intelligence as supreme lord of the world; and that the same deity in chief was adopted by the succeeding nations and kingdoms as they arose. In general the same attributes are ascribed to the chief god of each of the nations, and the same

place assigned to them at the head of the successive pantheons. Polytheism was an aftergrowth. Beyond these facts the secular history and nomenclature of idolatry is in extreme confusion. Mr. Rawlinson observes, book 1, App., ch. 10, that "we have not yet acquired that mastery over the primitive language of Babylon—as distinguished from the later Semitic dialect of Assyria—which might enable us to verify the high pretensions of the Chaldeans in regard to natural religion, from modern materials. Of all the branches, indeed, of cuneiform inquiry, an explanation of the Babylonian mythology is undoubtedly the most difficult, not only from the extraordinary extent and complicated character of the subject—numerous independent objects of science being more or less closely connected with the Pantheon—but especially from the redundant nomenclature, each divinity having many distinct names by which he is indifferently designated, and being further indicated by an infinity of titles which may also be substituted at will for the proper name, according to the locality or attribute under which the god is worshipped. Of such titles there are at least forty or fifty appertaining to each deity; and in conning over, therefore, those mythological tablets in the British Museum, which contain lists of the gods or idols to be found in the different temples of the chief cities of Assyria and Babylonia, the student is bewildered by an endless variety of names, which, if they really indicated different deities, would render hopeless any attempt to dissect and tabulate the Pantheon." What is this but an express acknowledgment, after all, of the impossibility of determining anything whatever concerning the origin of idolatry from the monuments, the inscriptions, the language, the Pantheons, of the Egyptian, Assyrian, and Babylonian relics? What pertains to the remotest antiquity, the origin and the earliest ages of the idolatrous system, is as truly beyond their reach, as the time and manner of the creation, the true cosmogony of the earth, was to the ancient heathen and is to the modern geological and rationalistic philosophers. One cannot but wonder that, notwithstanding the confusion above described as arising from the modern date of the inscriptions as compared with the original

foundation of Babel, the author should still rely on these inconsistent and mythical authorities for the support of the prevalent theory concerning the origin and nature of idolatry, instead of taking as his guide the simple, intelligible, and far more ancient records and testimonies of the Holy Scriptures. During how many ages after the building of Babel the yet unmastered primitive language of Babylon prevailed prior to the intrusion of the less undecipherable dialect of Assyria, is not determined. But the author observes that, "so far as our present information reaches, it would seem as if Assyria during the long period of Chaldean supremacy had occupied a very inferior position in the political system of the East" (Rawlinson vol. i, p. 357). And yet in the arrangement of his list (see Sir H. Rawlinson's Essay i, p. 477) of the supreme idol deities of Babylon, Egypt, Assyria, Greece, Rome, etc., he gives precedence to that of Assyria, named *Aeshur*, assuming, apparently, that he was the son of Shem, and that the apotheosis was coëval with the origin of idolatry. Whereas to Bel, Belus, Baal, Beelzebub, whom the Scriptures designate as the first god of idolatrous worship, he assigns a later date. He says: "There can be little doubt that in his character and position he answers to the great father, Jupiter, of the Romans; and it is equally certain that the primary element of his name is *Bil*, the Lord". But following the inscriptions, and, of course, construing them in accordance with his theory, he is of opinion that this god, variously designated as Bil, Bel, Belus, cannot be the same with the Babylonian Belus of later times; because the latter, as he thinks, is the same as *Merodach*, of the times of Hezekiah and Nebuchadnezzar: because "the famous temple of Belus of Herodotus is the temple of Merodach in the inscriptions"; and because the genealogy of Belus is by a certain writer applied to Merodach, and the designation of the God is sometimes given as Bel-Merodach. From these premises, as if forgetful of the change of language, above referred to, the practice which grew up of adopting new designations, and adding suffixes to the simple terms originally employed, he arrives at the impotent and gratuitous conclusion that, "If Merodach then be the true Belus of his-

tory, it is evident that this earlier and more powerful god could not have had the same identical name" (*Ibid.* p. 484). But with what sense can it be pretended that the name *As-shur* survived the admitted changes of language and increase of designations, which would not equally justify the conclusion that the primitive names, Bel, Belus, etc., notwithstanding those changes, still maintained their position and their significance in the Pantheon?

The consideration of the further propositions must for the present be postponed.

ART. VII.—PASSAGLIA, GUIZOT, AND DÖLLINGER ON THE ROMAN QUESTION.

PRO CAUSA ITALICA AD EPISCOPOS CATHOLICOS. Actore Presbytero Catholico. Florentiae, 1861.

OBELIGO DEL VESCOVO ROMANO E PONTEFICE MASSIMO DI RISIEDERE IN ROMA, QUANTUNQUE METROPOLI DEL REGNO ITALICO. Per ERNESTO FILALETE. Firenze, 1861.

DELLA SCOMUNICA AVVERTENZE D'UN PRETE CATTOLICO. Firenze, 1861.

L'EGLISE ET LA SOCIÉTÉ CHRÉTIENNES EN 1861. Par M. GUIZOT. Troisième Édition. Paris, 1861.

KIRCHE UND KIRCHEN, PAPSTHUM UND KIRCHENSTAAT. Von Dr. JOHANN JOSEPH IGN. VON DÖLLINGER. München, 1861.

THE question of the continued union of the Church and the State is at the heart of European politics. Among the great nations of the earth, the United States alone have passed, in their religious and political history, beyond the difficulties and entanglements of this inquiry. But in all other countries it is the yet unsolved problem — the sphinx's riddle of European diplomacy, to which no answer has been found. Amid commotions it is pressing toward a solution. In all other parts of

Europe, excepting Rome, the question takes the form, How can the Church be relieved from the superior, local authority of the State? In Rome it takes the form, Shall the Church (i. e., the Papacy) be deprived of its temporal rule? Shall the Pope cease to be a secular prince, and confine himself to a spiritual jurisdiction? Is the temporal sovereignty necessary to the rightful independence and authority of the bishop of Rome, as the head of the Catholic communion?

The course of events has made this papal question to be the central question of current European affairs. Italy has aroused itself from its political apathy, stilled its domestic feuds, become united under the Subalpine monarchy, and is now demanding, that Rome be made the capital of the new kingdom. The Pope resists, the Emperor Napoleon hesitates; but the handwriting is upon the wall. It is apparently only a question of time; a few months may decide the future fate of Italy, and the destiny of the Papacy. For whatever may be said about it by those Roman Catholic and even Protestant writers, who think that the papacy will flourish as well, when deprived of its temporal authority, as it now does — it rather seems probable that the loss of its temporal sway will drag down the papacy itself. It will lose its prestige among the nations. Its power will no longer be courted or feared. It will become a stipendiary of some secular government; and this will expose it to the envy or hostility of other powers. And the fact is, that the waning of its spiritual vigor is the very reason why these assaults upon its temporal possessions are so feebly resisted. Once it was mighty, and could ask no boon which kings would refuse; now it is in its decrepitude, its anathemas disregarded, and its infallibility contemned. Despoil it of the States of the Church, and its decrees will become advice, its mandates will have no terrors. France and Germany were both once enlisted to sustain the papacy, because, for a thousand years, they have been striving to obtain dominion over the Italian peninsula; and the favor of the Pope was therefore necessary to both. But let that peninsula become free, let these ambitious projects be annulled, and there is little reason left why either France or Austria should

submit to the papal domination. The unity of Italy is the decline of the Papacy.

The history of Italy ever since the peace of 1815 and the formation of the Holy Alliance, has been tending in this direction. That Alliance left Austria supreme in the peninsula, and seemed to give the papacy a new lease of power. Dating from that period, the ultra-montane tendency became predominant. The liberal Catholicism of Southern Germany, and the old Gallican Liberties, were rebuked. A retrograde movement was urged on by the restored Jesuits. The Propaganda was reinvigorated. The Carbonari in Italy were crushed by France and Austria. Even Sardinia gave education into the hands of the Jesuits. The civil offices in Rome were filled by ecclesiastics. Rome in 1825 celebrated a Jubilee. Even the French Revolution of 1830 stayed this papal progress for only a brief period. The insurrection of Ancona was suppressed by Austrian arms, which reëstablished the temporal sovereignty of Rome. The revolution of 1848 drove Pius IX from his capital to Gaeta ; and even Ventura preached for a time political freedom. The Jesuits were again expelled from the States of the Church ; Rome became a republic. But France and Austria combined and crushed the republic and restored the Pope. Cardinal Antonelli became the ruling genius of another strong movement to confirm the papal authority and rights. New concordats were concluded with Tuscany, Spain, Austria, Holland and Wurtemberg, in which large concessions were made to the See of Rome. The dogma of the Immaculate Conception was declared to be an article of faith by papal infallibility ; and the idolatrous veneration of the Mother of our Lord was to add new zeal to the faithful, and deliver Rome out of all its distresses. The hierarchy was reëstablished in England, amid unavailing popular clamor. Oxford and extreme Lutheranism spake favorably of the "mother" church. Everything seemed to indicate a rapid progress of the papal power. But, meanwhile, men of thought, like Gioberti and Rosmini, were busy with schemes for the national regeneration. Gioberti, the philosopher and statesman, wrote vehemently against the Jesuits

(1846), and advocated an Italian confederacy, of which the Pope was to be the head, with liberal civil and social changes. Rosmini, too, in his famous work on the Five Wounds of the Church, contended for the virtual separation of the secular and the priestly power. Though his book was condemned, and he submitted to the decree, yet the influence of such speculations could not be prevented. Italy was full of projects for reorganization. And then came the hour of action. One kingdom had persistently refused to join in this reaction. Sardinia established a constitutional government. Victor Emanuel, king since 1849, resisted equally the threats and the blandishments of the priests. Under the patriotic and refined D'Azeglia, followed by the bold statesmanship of Cavour, ecclesiastical jurisdiction was abolished in civil and criminal cases; in 1855-6, convents and monasteries were confiscated on a large scale. The fulminations of the Vatican exploded harmlessly. The progress of events pointed to this kingdom as the true rallying point for the advocates of a national and united Italy. Mazzini's dreams of a republic faded away; Gioberti's scheme of a confederation under the papal presidency equally failed to satisfy the exigencies. A united Italy, under the royal house of Sardinia, with Rome as the capital, became the watchword and the rallying point. And the course of events has marvellously confirmed the wisdom of the plan, which the sagacious Cavour thought to be practicable, and which he pressed with such energy. To secure for Sardinia a place among the great European powers, he sent Sardinian troops to the Crimean campaign. Admitted to the diplomatic Congress of Paris, he introduced and pressed the Italian question, and procured a protest against the ecclesiastical misrule of the States of the Church. When Sardinia was fully prepared, Louis Napoleon in 1859 gave warning to Austria; and Lombardy was wrested from foreign rule by the campaign which ended in the battle of Solferino. Tuscany, Modena, and other states of Central Italy accepted with acclamation the rule of the house of Savoy. Napoleon could not prevent the union which he did not encourage. The next year the daring valor of Garibaldi wrested Sicily and Naples from the yoke of their

oppressors ; and Sardinia received a new kingdom, annexing also all the States of the Church up to the walls of Rome. Venetia and Rome still remain to be acquired ; Venetia, it may be, by arms ; and Rome by wrestling with the papal supremacy. At present, the presence of French troops in the Eternal City alone prevents the entrance of the Sardinian forces. The French Emperor is urging the Pope to yield, while concession is still possible. But in the correspondence recently published, Cardinal Antonelli writes that "no compact will ever be made with the spoilers of the Church. Any negotiation on this ground is impossible. The Sovereign Pontiff, as well as the Cardinals, before being nominated, bind themselves by oath never to cede any of the territory of the church. The Holy Father will therefore make no cession of that kind. Even a conclave of cardinals would have no right to do so, nor would a new Pope, nor any of his successors from century to century". Meanwhile popular demonstrations are reported as having recently taken place at Genoa and Milan, and in Rome itself, in favor of Victor Emanuel, and of Rome as the capital. At Milan the following protest was numerously signed : "Although respecting the Sovereign Pontiff of Rome as the head of the Church, we look upon Rome as the capital of Italy, with one king, Victor Emanuel". On Christmas last Rome was placarded all over with tri-colored handbills in favor of Italy. The streets were thronged with an enthusiastic multitude, crying : "United Italy forever ! Down with the Pope-King !" Baron Ricasoli, the straightforward successor of Cavour, has issued a circular, stating that the government is preparing to carry out the national wishes, and has made formal propositions about the mode of proceeding to Rome ; that the ministry will decide about these means ; and he deprecates all inconsiderate enthusiasm and clamorous manifestations.

Thus stands the Roman Question in the sphere of actual history. It offers the chief problem to be worked out in the onward course of European history. It appears to be approaching a solution favorable to the interests of civilization and the prosperity of religion. The old spiritual despotism,

which has so long ruled a large part of the world, must, it would seem, yield to the new spirit which is moving among the nations. Undoubtedly it is one of the turning points in the history of the Church. And hence the eagerness with which men listen to the words now spoken on this momentous theme by those who guide the thoughts, or indicate the tendencies, or seem to sway the destinies of mankind. Every enigmatic utterance from the Tuileries is made the theme of discussion. The chief interest centres, not in what the Pope says, but in what men say about the Pope. For it is felt that he is no longer the master of his own or others' fate. And among those who have recently spoken, the authors of the works we have put at the head of this article, occupy a conspicuous place. One of them represents the Italian theology; another is a French historian of wide philosophic views, Protestant antecedents, and conservative or compromising tendencies; the third stands at the head of the living German divines of the Roman Catholic faith. And their respective positions about the question enhance the interest awakened by their personal character and repute. The Italian, in the name of the Church, asks for the sundering of the temporal from the spiritual prerogatives of the Papacy; the French Protestant pleads in the name of Christianity, and as a check to infidelity, for the continuance of the present status of the See of Rome; the more speculative German boldly criticises the administration of justice in the States of the Church, clearly sees that the progress of events involves at least the suspension of the temporal sway of the Pope, but views all this as a transition stage to a better state of things, in which Rome shall repossess all its authority, and exercise it in a more spiritual and beneficent method. In Passaglia, Guizot and Döllinger, Italy, France and Germany, have uttered words which are worthy of being heard and heeded.

The significance of Passaglia's utterances is due in part to his eminent place among the Italian clergy. As a theologian he ranks with Perrone, even if he does not surpass him. As a member of the Society of the Jesuits, and a special confidant of Pius IX, he enjoyed unusual influence. His learning and ability are universally recognised. His various theological

productions are of a high order. In 1850 he published, at Rome, *Theological Commentaries*, in two parts, discussing the Trinity as represented in ancient symbols, the meaning of *essence* as applied to the Trinity, the right of the church to sanction formulas of faith, the nature of theology, and kindred topics. Another large work was a Commentary on the *Prerogatives of St. Peter, Chief of the Apostles, as proved by the Authority of the Divine Scriptures* (pp. 608). His *Lent Sermons* were issued at Rome in 1851. He is one of the editors of the new edition of the great work of Petavius, on *Theological Dogmas*. His *Commentaries on the Church of Christ* were published at Rome, in three vols. 1853-6. When the dogma of the Immaculate Conception was to be declared an article of faith, to him was assigned the office of drawing up the dogmatic definitions; and then he defended this article of faith by a huge collection of authorities and arguments in his *De Immaculato deiparae Semper Virginis Conceptu*, in 3 vols. 4to, Rome, 1854-5, pp. xiv, 2104. Among his minor writings is a treatise *De Aeternitate Pœnarum, deque Igne inferno*, 1856. He is one of the last men to be carried away by any enthusiasm about a novel opinion. Finding his views incompatible with the prevailing spirit of the Jesuit order, he obtained the Pope's approbation to leave it; yet he also received at the same time a fresh appointment as Professor of Philosophy in the Sapienza, or Roman University, where he was welcomed with applause by the students, partly on account of his rupture with the Jesuits. His influence was great and increasing. Apparently, in his personal traits he is a man to inspire confidence. One who has lately seen him, describes him as "a tall man, considerably above six feet high, with great breadth of shoulders, and flat chest; a spare, erect, imposing figure, with an easy, dignified, refined bearing; the most gentlemanly priest I ever beheld. His forehead is high, not massive, and rather slanting backward; the brow is sharp and prominent. He has a rich, glossy head of hair, slightly silvered all over. He may be fifty years old, certainly not more; and he complains that deep study and care have made him old before his time. He has regular,

deeply-chiselled features, with a remarkably wide, round, firm, but by no means heavy under-jaw. The eyes are deeply set, light brown, vivid, wakeful. The countenance is gifted with great mobility and sudden powers of expression. He is thin and pale, with deep furrows on the forehead and round the mouth. His habitual look is grave and thoughtful; but the face lightens up with occasional glimpses of great shrewdness and humor."

Nearly a year since, it was rumored that this eloquent and able divine was about to declare against the temporal rule as inconsistent with the present state of society, though allowable and useful in past days, taking the ground that the time had come for severing the diadem of royalty from the sceptre of the keys and the tiara of the priesthood. It was even declared, on no less an authority than that of the *Tablet*, that the Pope, amid his vacillations, allowed him to go to Turin on an embassy of conciliation, after the separation of the Romagna from the Roman States. At length, in September, appeared his now famous work *Pro Causa Italica*, which at once attracted the attention of Europe. Its positions were so bold and outspoken, that they portended a revolution. It was soon condemned by the Congregation of the Index, not by citing express passages, but for its general evil influence. Father Passaglia demanded a scrutiny of the Prefect of the Congregation. A Congregation of the Cardinals refused to admit his proffered defence. A papal Allocution of September 20th, inveighed in mediæval terms against the doctrines avowed in this work. The *Siccle* of Paris, said somewhat irreverently of this Allocution: "We find that addresses of this sort, in the different periods of the church, are very much alike, they always say that the enemies of the church are triumphing, that vice and crime are rampant, that hell has sent forth its monsters, that the faithful are exposed to terrific beasts; but that the Church in the end will surely triumph. The adversaries of the papacy are evermore rebels, robbers, and ruffians. . . . The last Allocution affirms that cursing, lying, murder, infamous journals, impunity for vice, prevail in Italy with the progress of such opinions". Father Passaglia was of course much sought

after by the Roman police; though his hostess, Madame Fulgens, proclaimed herself a British subject, yet her abode was searched. And meanwhile the defender of the Italian cause escaped in disguise; and had a triumphal journey to Turin, where he became the guest of a brother of late Minister Cavour. His name was erased from the list of Professors in the Roman University, and at once inscribed upon the list of the Professors of the University of Turin. At Rome his chair has been filled by the appointment of Abbé Pecci, also an ex-Jesuit, brother of the Cardinal Bishop of Perugia. In rapid succession Passaglia published the two other pamphlets cited at the head of this article, on the *Residence of the Pope in Rome*, and on *Excommunication*; and another pamphlet on *Schism, not a Threat of Revolutionists, but a well-founded Apprehension of Catholics*, which we have not seen. He is also one of the editors of a new religious journal, the *Mediatore*, published at Florence.*

We can only give a mere outline of the contents of these three works of Passaglia. The larger, and more important, is the plea to the Catholic Bishops for the Italian cause. In

* Others of the Italian clergy sympathise in this movement. Canon Pedimonte, Abbé Simonetti, Father Papi, the prelate Liverani, Cardinal Chiesa, Father Belli, abbot of the Florentine Benedictines, Canon Reali, etc. Liverani's work on the *Papacy, the Emperor, and the Kingdom of Italy*, fearlessly exposes the corruptions and mal-administration of the ecclesiastical rule at Rome. "The Roman atmosphere", he says, "is impregnated with the vice of corruption". His scheme for reconciling the rights of the papacy and the crown, is to have the Pope crown Victor Emanuel King of Italy, reviving a mediæval fiction, that the ruler of Italy, when chosen by the Roman people, was to have his Italian sway consecrated by a papal benediction. He thinks that the King of Sardinia can demand this of the Pope as a legal right, under the compact made between Leo XIII and Charlemagne. Cardinal d'Andrea has also resigned his post as Prefect of the Congregation of the Index. He has published two letters to Antonelli, assigning the reasons, which are, in substance, that in the controversy about traditionalism, between the Bishop of Bruges and the Professors of Louvain, the Congregation of the Index decided in favor of the professors by the unanimous votes of sixteen members present; but that two absent Jesuit members having protested against the decision, the Pope overruled it, and Antonelli declared that the Jesuits must have their way. Don Fernando de Castro, one of the Queen of Spain's private chaplains, recently surprised the court, when assembled in the Chapel Royal, Madrid, by declaring his adhesion to the doctrines of Father Passaglia, in regard to the temporal power of the Pope. He also strongly advocated the unity of Italy. The sermon, it is said, has created the liveliest sensation in Madrid.

flowing Latin, with many a definition and patristic citation, and much circumlocution, he opens and develops his theme. He has very much to say of unity, and very much to say of the authority and glories of the episcopacy, and no person can hold more confidently, that Rome is the centre of unity to all the faithful. But yet, after all, he says, that unless the papacy really unites the Church, unless it is a source of blessings to the faithful, it fails in doing its real work, and it ought to be rebuked and reformed. This sounds like good Christian common sense; and it is finely illustrated, if not proved, by the Professor's copious citations from Cyprian, Augustine, and many of the fathers. He then urges the fact, that in the present state of affairs, the attitude of Rome is a source of disorder, perplexity, and innumerable evils. Italy demands, what Rome refuses, the abolition of the temporal possessions of the Church. If the Pope continue to refuse, greater evils still will be likely to ensue; and the church ought not to be the mother of discord, but rather of peace. Consequently, the Pope ought to give up his temporal power, and restrict himself to his proper spiritual functions, and then all will be well. And the temporal authority is not at all necessary to the papacy; the latter existed for many centuries without the former, and can do so again. The imperative interests of modern civilization demand this; and the state of society which made the temporal sovereignty a need and a blessing, has passed away. If the Pope will only forego his secular power, the Catholic Church will shine forth more glorious than ever. It is needful in the interest of Catholicism as well as in that of civilization. Such is the substance of the argument of the treatise *Pro Causa Italica*. And it is clenched by the intimation, that if the Pope does not yield, Italy will still maintain its ground, and a schism is inevitable. Cavour's policy, "*A free Church in a free State*", is the watchword for Italy.

As Protestants, we can very well admit the force of Passaglia's reasoning against the temporal sovereignty, without conceding his conclusion, that the loss of the princely crown will be a gain to the spiritual power of the Papacy. We can well afford to have the experiment tried, and think that events

indicate that it will be. We welcome his testimony to positions which Protestantism has constantly urged, especially to the main principle of his reasonings, that the church is for the union and welfare of the people, and that if it fails to secure this, it loses one of its strongest claims to authority. He also quotes and approves the saying of Jerome about the original equality of presbyters and bishops, and the right of presbyters to speak even when the hierarchy is opposed. He puts the case very strongly. He shows that the Roman Catholic bishops in their recent pastoral epistles have virtually betrayed their highest trust, have become a scandal to the church. To create dissension is no part of their proper office. Their real ministry is in the sphere of morals and the faith, and not in deciding questions of temporal order and rights. "Who", he asks, "ever gave these bishops the right to judge the princes of the earth"? St. Bernard long since said: "I have read that the Apostles were brought up to judgment, but never, that they assumed the character of judges". And even though the Pope may have said he cannot give up the temporal power, and have vowed to maintain it—still, such assertions and vows are not obligatory and unchangeable, because they have no proper divine warrant and authority. He depicts in vivid language the evils of the present state of things.

"Who does not see that the Italian people are hastening to that unhappy situation in which there is imminent peril, not trifling, but very serious danger; that a vast number of Italians, either by open and corporeal, or by secret and spiritual separation, are removed from the paradise of the church, and leave the church itself despoiled of its most chosen sons? Already a great part of the clergy are in open discord with the majority of the laity: already almost all the shepherds are separated from their flocks, whilst the shepherd of the shepherds, the successor of Peter, the venerable vicar of Christ on earth, hurls against the kingdom of Italy, and against Italian society, the dread thunderbolt of his censures. One might be tempted to believe that of the double power to bind and to loose, our bishops now retain the first alone, such concord do they exhibit in condemning, repelling, execrating whatever the whole nation desires and is striving to obtain."

He is especially vehement against the wholesale anathemas which the Pope has launched against Italian states and peo-

ple. Referring to the rule of Augustine, that excommunication should be sparingly used, where multitudes are infected with disease, he asks :

“Has this rule of the Church been observed by the bishops of Italy? Has it been taken any account of by the Roman Pontiff in the course of the recent political transactions? Had not the persons against whom his anathemas were thundered a multitude of company with them? Were they but few and scanty, and was the majority dissentient, or is it now dissentient from them? Were they destitute or are they now destitute of partisans sufficient to promote a schism? Let the Italian bishops reflect well on these matters, and observe whether the multitude of these populations are in favor of the superior authority which has inflicted a reproof, or in favor of the culpable party who resists it. Let them see to it, lest when the minds of the Italians are thus disposed, the excommunication tend, not to correct them, but to exasperate—not to heal with painful surgery, but rather to inflict a mortal wound.”

Passaglia also discusses the question, whether political authority is necessary for the full and wise administration of the Pope's ecclesiastical power, concludes that the separation would not seriously impair his spiritual supremacy, and adds :

“And if there were former times in which the condition of human society was such as seemed to require that a civil principedom should be joined to the supreme Pontificate, the aspect both of public and private affairs is now so much altered, that nothing should appear to the Pope himself so desirable as a separation of the sceptre from the keys, and of the sacerdotal tiara from the regal diadem. Their separation is called for unanimously by those who are still subjected to the Papal reign, though unwilling and reluctant, by force of foreign arms; and it is called for unanimously by the populations of all Italy, which can no longer brook that the new kingdom should be deprived of Rome, its capital. It is called for unanimously by the most cultivated nations of Europe, who are convinced by the plainest reasons that nothing but loss and ruin can accrue to religion and to the Papacy from its retaining the temporal dominion. It is demanded by the approach of those dangers, both to the Church and to civil society, which cannot be averted unless the supreme Pontiff will incline his mind to counsels of peace and concord. It is demanded by his office, as the chief pastor, which should be wholly exercised for the benefit of the flock. It is demanded by every right, both human and divine.”

The second pamphlet of Passaglia, published under the name of Ernesto Filalete, gives the reasons why the Pope

should still have his residence in the city of Rome, even if it become the capital of the Italian kingdom. Only calamity would result, he says, from such an exile. The Italians would be alienated, and Protestants encouraged. The papal exile at Avignon shows what must be the deplorable consequences. Ever since the year 42, he alleges, Rome has been the seat and centre of ecclesiastical power. The ancient episcopal seat was at St. John Lateran, on the Coelian hill, the place which Constantine designated. At present it is only a cathedral church, ruled by a vicar; and the Pope is on the Vatican hill, near the supposed site of St. Peter's tomb. Here, according to many ancient decisions, is his appropriate earthly residence. And no pontiff ought to quit this consecrated place, unless forced to do so against his will.—The third tract of *Passaglia* examines the subject of excommunication in its ecclesiastical and civil aspects. He boldly asserts, citing the high authority of Innocent III, that persons may be excommunicated by the church, without being excommunicated by God. Count Cavour, he contends, may not have gone to perdition, even though he died under the ban; and this, too, in part, for the reason, that the bull of the Pope was not published in the Sardinian kingdom. And, besides, such a sentence is of proper effect only when it relates to spiritual matters, over which alone the church has jurisdiction; it is void, when it refers to secular affairs. In a still wider view of the subject, he proves by many authorities, that excommunications are of no effect, when they embrace large multitudes in a state of schism, because then they are detrimental to the church. This undoubtedly involves a serious drawback upon the papal authority; and it may be well enough as a transition theory. But it really undermines the power of the keys, and is undoubtedly inconsistent with the past claims and acts of the papacy. But if *Passaglia* can persuade Catholics to embrace this view of excommunication—so much the better.

The volume which M. Guizot has published upon the same question discusses the subject, as the title indicates, from a more general point of view. It is a grave and eloquent plea for an Italian confederacy; but it shows the lack of decision,

and the inability to appreciate a real historical crisis, which have always marked the thoughts and counsels of the great *doctrinaire*. His work was occasioned by the severe criticism which assailed the intimation of his views made April 20, 1861, in an address before the Society for Primary Instruction among Protestants. The chief Protestant thinker of France then declared in favor of the inviolability of the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, following the lead of Montalembert. The contrast between the timidity of the French Protestant and the boldness of the Italian Catholic is most marked. The statesman distrusts the people, liberty and the church; the theologian believes in truth and progress. In twenty-four chapters, Guizot reviews the present state of the European churches and of European society, throwing out many thoughtful and fruitful suggestions. The great evil of the day is infidelity; the great need of the day is to sustain the Christian Church. This can only be done safely, as the rights of all portions of that church are scrupulously maintained. By international law, the Pope has a right to the States of the Church. Consequently, that right must remain intact. In the growth of Sardinia he sees only a usurpation; in the Italian movement, he cannot discern any religious element; he fears the inroad of an unbridled democracy. In short, his position is this—to restrain infidelity and democracy, we must uphold the temporal sovereignty of Rome. He agrees with Professor Leo of Halle, and the ultra-Lutherans who last year had a conference with the Catholics, and adopted substantially the same position. And Hengstenberg applauds his views. But with these exceptions, the Protestant world has given unmistakable signs, that it has no sympathy with such theorisings. To confound the Roman Catholic church with Christianity is bad enough; but to make the temporal sovereignty necessary to the welfare of the church, and the subjugation of infidelity, is to sanction, in theory, the most extravagant and unchristian claims of the Papacy. In fact, history shows, that the great hindrance to the growth of the church, and one of the constant sources of infidelity, is found in the despotic claims and temporal sovereignty of the papal power.

But it is time for us to hear what the German professor has to say on this crisis. Dr. Döllinger is the foremost name among the living historians and divines of the Roman Catholics of Bavaria. He is known to English readers by Cox's translation of his *Church History to the Reformation*, in 4 vols. 1848. He has also written able works on the *Reformation* (2d ed. 2 vols. 1852); on *Luther* (1851), to whom in this sketch, and in his last work, he does more justice than most Catholics; on *Hippolytus and Callistus*, 1853; on *Heathenism and Judaism*, 1857, a very able work; on *Christianity and the Church in the Period of its Formation*, 1860; besides *Addresses* at the German Diet, 1846, and a *Plea for the Freedom of the Church*, 1849. In two lectures delivered last year at Munich, he expressed himself in such terms about the temporal sovereignty, that both Protestants and Catholics were taken by surprise. He was understood to counsel the abandonment, at least in the present state of things, of the States of the Church. But at the Catholic Association he protested that his views had been misunderstood, and took occasion, as Germans are very apt to do, to publish a work on the whole subject, printing his lectures *verbatim* in the Appendix.

This volume is the ablest, historically and theologically, that has recently appeared in this controversy. It is a review of the history of the Papacy in relation to the nations. His main position is this; the church for a large part of its history (at least seven centuries) got along very well without the temporal power, and it may do so again, if compelled to this by the course of providence. The present tendency of affairs is to this consummation. "So long as the present state of Europe exists, we can discover no other means of ensuring the liberty of the papal see, and therewith the general confidence." But such a state of things, he further argues, will only be temporary. The Papacy in better times may reassume all its prerogatives. But to save it in the present juncture, it may be necessary to give up, temporarily, its secular authority. Even if that authority should not be revived, still Providence, in ways unknown, may provide for the perpetuity and independence of the papal see. In connection with these positions, Dr. Döllinger also severely criticises the present govern-

ment of the States of the Church. "The priest is the last to be entrusted with the execution of law, for, by virtue of his office, he is the herald of mercy, while the law is the dispenser of justice." He cites among other things the Achilli case—of which no defence was ever allowed to be published in England or Rome. He condemns the use of ecclesiastics as a police, their direction of lotteries, which former popes condemned, and the like. He also animadverts strongly on an edict of the Inquisitor Airaldi in Ancona, 1856, which bound every one to denounce all offences against the church, under the severest penalties. The States of the Church, he says, ought to be the most moral, quiet and prosperous of all countries—but they are quite the reverse. Hence the necessity of a change. The work abounds in professions of faith in the papacy, and severe criticism of its present condition and prospects. It shows that liberal Catholicism still has a home in Bavaria.

One objection to the temporal power, which he strongly urges, is, that the Pope is only "an electoral prince"; and that all electoral kingdoms have no roots in the people. "From such considerations", he adds, "men, held by the church in the highest repute, like Bellarmine, came to the conclusion, that the Popes had better not occupy the twofold position of temporal prince and head of the church". "How should we in Germany put up with a bishop as governor of a province?" "Nothing arouses greater animosity than the use of political means to further religious ends."

In conclusion, he sums up the case, in five facts. 1. The Holy See existed for seven hundred years without temporal possessions, and then for seven hundred and fifty in disturbed possession of its States. The present mode of administration is really only forty-five years old. 2. Temporal Sovereignty is not necessary in itself, or at all times, to the dignity and freedom of the Pope. 3. The Italian people find in the States of the Church the great hindrance to national unity. 4. For the past forty years two large factions have labored to upset the government, and no part of the population of the States of the Church has shown real attachment to

the papal power. 5. Europe for a century has tended to a separation of the temporal from the spiritual power. In the States of the Church alone do ecclesiastics administer secular affairs. On the basis of these five facts, he proceeds to give five possibilities as to the future. 1. Austria may reconquer Lombardy, and restore the alienated States to the Church. But this would convulse the peninsula with revolutions. 2. A United Italy under Sardinia, and the secularization of the States of the Church. In this case, he thinks the Pope would be compelled to leave Rome at least for a time; but he has no faith in the permanency of the new kingdom, and thinks the result would be, that, if this contingency occurs, the Pope would after a time return to rule over a purified state. 3. A general Congress of the Catholic European powers, which might restore the States to the Church, and also purify its administration. 4. The Pope may be compelled to reside permanently in France, or some other state. 5. The States of the Church may be taken away from the papacy; and the Pope be placed under the protection and support of the Catholic powers. Towards this last solution, the arguments of Dr. Döllinger tend with great force. Amid all difficulties, however, he adds, "one thing is certain; one institution will remain erect; the Church of Christ will rise unimpaired out of the floods of revolution, because it is indestructible and immortal". And this last conclusion, interpreted of the real Church of Christ, is the best inference from this whole discussion.

Theological and Literary Intelligence.

BUNSEN doubted even the existence of the African Latin poet, Commodianus, who is usually assigned to about A.D. 270, and reported to be the author of some 80 moral precepts in verse, edited by Nic. Rigaltius, 1650. Routh defended Commodianus against Bunsen. In Pitra's *Spicilegium Solesmense* new materials are collected, and Bunsen's doubts exploded. The same collection publishes fragments of the writings of Verecundus, of whom little was previously known, excepting that he wrote in defence of the council of Chalcedon. Pitra gives his commentaries on ecclesiastical hymns, also hymns, and verses, and extracts on the Chalcedon council.

Of the first printed Bible, eighteen copies are now known to be in existence; four of which are printed on vellum. Two of these are in England; one being in the Grenville collection. One is in the Royal Library of Berlin, and one in the Royal Library of Paris. Of the fourteen remaining copies, ten are in England; there being a copy in Oxford, Edinburgh and London, and seven in the collections of different noblemen. The vellum copy has been sold as high as eight hundred dollars.

Tyndale's version of the Prophet Jonas has been discovered by Lord Arthur Hervey. It has been supposed that no copy was extant.

Traces of the Ancient Northmen. A communication from Professor Charles E. Rafn, of Copenhagen, Secretary of the Royal Society of Northern Antiquaries, to Rev. Abner Morse, of Boston, reports the discovery of ancient hearths in Denmark, like those on Cape Cod, lately reported by Mr. Morse as the work of Northmen; and adds, that it has been resolved to publish drawings of the former hearths, with descriptions of the latter, in the transactions of their society. Mr. Morse has since read a second paper before the H. G. S., describing traces of the Northmen on Nantucket and in Dedham; and also relics, not aboriginal, at different places on the natural route from Hudson to Ohio rivers; and as one class of these is identical with relics in Massachusetts, attributed to them, some evidence may exist that they removed to the West, where, seven hundred miles west of Lake Superior, "the polite and friendly Mandan Indians, with hazel, gray and blue eyes, and hair of various colors, and complexions as light as half-breeds", might, as late as 1888, have been their representatives!—*Boston Journal*.

Fac-simile of St. Matthew. The notorious Constantine Simonides has at length published this fac-simile, which he professes to have found in some papyri of Mr. Mayer's Museum in Liverpool, collected by Rev. H. Stobart. It is adorned with an authentic portrait of St. Matthew, "executed in the fifth century by Hierotheus of Thessalonica", "preserved among the frescoes of Athos". The past career of Simonides is of itself enough to throw

doubt upon any such alleged discoveries ; though he is out in his own defence in the London *Athenæum*, giving some curious details of his personal history. He claims to have a MS. of Sanchaniathen, ten books of Horus in hieroglyphics, a History of Armenia, from the times of Justinian, etc. He confidently reasserts the genuineness of the papyri of St. Matthew. Mr. Stobart also writes to the *Athenæum* expressing his astonishment at these remarkable discoveries.

G R E E C E .

The *Popular Songs* of modern Greek literature have been collected by Arn. Passow, and published by Teubner of Leipsic, in a volume of 650 pages. The work is said to be well executed, comprising historical, domestic, love, and pastoral songs. The chief object of the editor was, however, philological. Full indices, and a needed glossary, are included in the volume.

The third part of Philemon's *History of the Greek Revolution*, pp. 483, has appeared at Athens. The *Historical Sketches* of Spyridon Zampelios are edited by N. Dragumis. A *Biographical Sketch* of Rigas Pheraios of Thessaly has been published at Athens. A collection of the *Lyrics* of Karasontsas, pp. 199. Athens.

The Rev. J. T. Walters, of the Church Missionary Society, writes about Kalopathakes and his journal, *The Star of the East*, that the editor "received his education in America, and appears to be a man of knowledge and talent. His articles give no uncertain sound. The fanatical party among the Greeks are opposed to this paper, and so are the hierarchy, which he does not spare. But in spite of this opposition, the truth comes out boldly."

A novel in modern Greek by Stephanos T. Xenos, has been published in London, entitled, *The Heroine of the Greek Revolution*, or Scenes in Greece, from 1821 to 1828. The style approximates to the ancient Greek.

G E R M A N Y .

The *Studien und Kritiken*, 1862, No. 1, opens with a discussion by Dr. Bähr, of the universal priesthood (1 Pet. ii, 5, 9 ; Rev. i, 6) as the basis of the theory of church government. This was the view of Luther. Calvin, on the contrary, in discussing church government, starts from the idea of the church as the body of Christ (Ephes. iv, 4-16 : see Institutes III, 4, 1). Bähr argues acutely against the Lutheran view. Ullmann, in the second article, coincides with Bähr so far as this—that the universal priesthood cannot be made the organizing principle of church government, but contends that it must be used as a corrective, and to stimulate the activity of the laity. The third article, by Gumlich, is on the enigmas in the narrative of the Raising of Lazarus. Köster illustrates from classical writers various passages of Scripture. Krummacher, on Romans, seventh chapter, contends that Christians are the subject of the Apostle's description.

Ernest Frederick Zwirner died at Cologne on the 22d of September, aged sixty years. He was the architect under whose charge the great Cathedral of Cologne was slowly advancing to completion. He was one of the foremost architects of Europe.

The German papers have lately been publishing an inventory of all the

earthly possessions left behind him by Mozart, and of which his widow had to give account to his creditors. The list is a mournfully meagre one.

Hofrath Hantz is preparing a history of the University of Heidelberg. This University is one of the oldest in Germany. Founded in 1386, it only yields the palm of age to those of Prague and Vienna, founded 1348 and 1365 respectively.

Chevalier Bunsen's widow is preparing for publication *The Memoirs and Correspondence of her Husband*.

George William Frederic Freytag, the celebrated Oriental scholar, died on the 16th of November, at Dortendorf, near Bonn. He was the author of several Arabic works, the principal of which was his great *Lexicon Arabico-Latinum*, in four volumes.

Prof. Hagemann of Hildesheim, in the *Theologische Quartalschrift*, Heft 4, 1861, conceding that the Second Epistle of Clement of Rome is spurious, runs an interesting and new parallel between it and the Shepherd of Hermas, showing that they indicate the same general tendency. Agreeing with Uhlhorn, that the mass of the early Pseudo-Clementine literature had its origin in Syria, he finds in the above facts evidence that there was also a contemporary literature in Rome of a like character. Among the points of agreement between Hermas and the Second Epistle of Clement, is their ignoring the doctrine of the Logos, making Christ before the incarnation solely Spirit.

Ranke, in the third volume of his History of England in the 16th and 17th Centuries, does better justice to Cromwell's political sagacity and executive power than any preceding continental author. To realize the ideas of civil order and national independence, and to create a great Protestant commonwealth, were the main objects he had in view.

Among the works condemned by the Congregation of the Index, 17th August, 1861, are various dissertations of Ernest von Lasaulx on the Philosophy of History; the Theological Basis of all Systems; the Prophetic Power of the Human Soul; Life of Socrates, etc. The author, it is said, submitted to the decrees before his decease. His various works show learning and penetration, and are written in an animated and eloquent style.

HOLLAND AND BELGIUM.

The Library of Jesuit authors (Bibliothèque des Ecrivains de la Compagnie de Jesus), by Augustin and Alois de Backer, has reached its 7th volume. It contains an account of all works published by members of the Order, and of all the controversial works relating to the Jesuits. Each volume runs through the entire alphabet. It is intended to be one of the most complete of bibliographical works.

The veteran Professor, W. A. Van Hengel, has published on the *Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs*, subjecting the history of the work to a new examination. J. J. Van Osterzee has completed his *Christology, or Person and Work of Christ*. Rotterdam, pp. 504. J. J. de Geer has completed his *History of the Province of Utrecht*, in one volume, with maps. A second edition of Considerant's *History of the Revolution of the 16th Century in the Low Countries*, is published at Brussels, edited by Frédéric. H. G. Moke's *History of Ancient Belgium* is published in a second, enlarged edition.

The city of Dordrecht, the birthplace of Ary Scheffer, intends to erect a statue to the artist. A grand *fête* will be celebrated on the occasion, for which the poet Mynheer van den Bergh, at the Hague, has been invited to write a cantata.

SCANDINAVIA.

Among the recent works are *A History of the University of Lund*, by Ahnfelt, vol. i; the fifth and last fasciculus of the *Lexicon Posticum antiquæ Linguae Septentrionalis*, by Ergilssohn, for the Royal Society of Northern Antiquities; Helweg, *Danish Church History*; a new edition of *Livy*, by Madvig and Ussing; a new edition of Oehlenschläger's poems; a revision of Foersam and Wulf's *Translation of Shakespeare*, by Lembke.

Dr. Alexander Herzen, son of the Russian political refugee and author, is engaged on a work on the natural history of Iceland, embodying the observations of a recent exploration of that island.

RUSSIA.

The University of St. Petersburg has been dissolved; the universities at Moscow and Kazar have been closed.

There were published in St. Petersburg, during the year 1860, three hundred and ten journals, being an increase of nineteen over 1859. Of these, 230 were Russian, 28 German, 29 French, 2 Russian and French, 1 Russian, French, and English, and the rest Esthonian, Celtic, and Hebrew.

Catherine the Great, Empress of Russia, compiled a voluminous dictionary of the dialects of all nations. Professor Müller says, agreeably to her request, General Washington procured for the Empress a considerable number of specimens of the dialects of our Indian tribes.

Russian History is to be soon enriched with the second volume (treating of ethnography and statistics) of Schnitzler's "*L'Empire des Tsars*." The first volume was published some seven years ago.

FRANCE.

Among the recent works on theological subjects are B. Aubé, *Saint Justin, philosophe et martyr*, in one volume; J. Cohen, *Les Deicides*—an examination by a Jew, of the Divinity of Christ from the Jewish point of view; J. Collin de Plancy, *Collection of the Legends about the Old and New Testament*, and the *Commandments*, from all sources, in three volumes; F. Duilhé de St. Projet on *Religious Studies in France* in the 18th and 19th centuries; a second volume of Munk's translation of *Maimonides' Guide of the Wandering*, with the Arabic text; Abbé Flottes, *Études sur Saint Augustin*; Abbé Freppel, *Saint Irenée et l'Éloquence Chrétienne dans la Gaule*; Veuillot, *Le Parfum de Rome*, in two volumes, a eulogy of the saintly odor of the eternal city.

The first volume of a French translation of Herder's *Philosophy of History*, by Emile Tandel, is published by Didot.

M. Renan has been nominated for the professorship in the College of France, both by the College and by the Academy of Inscriptions. The chair is vacant by the death of Quatremère.

M. de Sauley has published a new examination of the Campaigns of Julius Cæsar in Gaul, which excites much interest.

From the 22 vols. of Vinet's works, and from 14 periodicals, Prof. Astié of Lausanne has collected the materials for his excellent *Esprit de Vinet*, in

2 vols. Chs. Secrétan has an able review of his work in the *Revue Chrét.* December, 1861.

The Count de Gasparin, author of the remarkable work on our country, has recently published at Geneva an essay on the Prospects of the Present Times, discussing Pantheism, Deism, and the new French and German school; and suggesting the remedies in a return to the simplicity and force of the old Gospel.

A son of George Sand, who accompanied Prince Napoleon to this country, has published, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, portions of his diary made during his visit to America. He writes warmly in favor of the Northern States.

Alfred Dubois, in his recent work on the Prophets of the Cevennes (*Les Prophètes Cévenols*, Strasburg, 1861), traces the remarkable phenomena exhibited by them to magnetic causes. They began about 1688-9, and continued at intervals to 1750.

Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire continues his translation of Aristotle by the publication of the *Physica*, in two vols., with notes. This is announced as the first French version.

The *Revue Chrétienne* for January contains an article by Pastor Fisch, whose visit to this country last year is so cordially remembered. He describes in plain terms the real character of our present struggle, as the conflict of freedom and slavery. He recognises the vast influence of the separation of Church and State upon the welfare of our churches. The article breathes the warmest sympathy for our institutions and churches.

M. de Pressensé has published the second portion of his History of the Early Christian Church, in 2 vols., comprising the struggle against paganism, and an account of the martyrs and apologists.

M. Foucher de Careil has added another work to his valuable series on Leibnitz, viz. the Jewish Philosophy or Cabala, containing the observations of Leibnitz on Maimonides' Doctor Perplexorum.

The *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, Oct., gives in full the preface to Theiner's work on the Temporal Power—a collection of documents which is to extend to six folio volumes. The first, published at Rome, gives the documents from A.D. 786 to 1384. The other chief collections are Lunig's *Codex Italise Diplomaticus*, Frankfort, 1726, 2 vols. (a Protestant work); Abbé Cenni's *Monumenta Dominationis Pontificie*, 2, 4to, Rome, 1760; and the *Annals of Baronius*, continued by Raynald. Theiner has made use of the Roman Registers.

ITALY.

Augusto Conti, Professor of Philosophy in the Lyceum at Lucca, has published a work in two volumes on the *Criteria of Philosophy*, particularly discussing its relations to faith. The introduction consists of a dialogue of about 200 pages, on Christian philosophy. The interlocutors are a physician, a geometrician, a jurist and a literary man, who hear the pleas of two philosophers, a traditionalist and an advocate of the spiritual school of Descartes and Kant. The aim of the book is to reconcile these two tendencies on the basis of the Christian system. Naville gives an account of it in the *Revue Chrétienne*, Nov. 1861. M. Debrit, in Oct. 1859, of the same periodical, had a sketch of the Italian philosophy.

The *Correspondance de Rome* announces fresh discoveries in the basilica of St. Clement, first opened in 1857. Among these is a fresco of St. Clem-

ent, surrounded by several figures, two of which bear the names of Sisinnus and Theodora. Another inscription gives the portraits and names of the earlier bishops of Rome in the following order: Linus, Petrus, Clemens, Cletus. These are probably from the 5th or 6th century.

It is stated that a manuscript of Galileo and an unpublished drama of Metastasio have lately been found in the Archives of Lucca, and will shortly be made public.

A pamphlet has been published containing a collection of original letters of Count Cavour, particularly during the Congress of Paris, which discuss the bases of the regeneration of Italy.

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

The Spanish Universities are divided into six Faculties, viz. 1. Philosophy and Literature; 2. The Exact and Natural Sciences; 3. Pharmacy; 4. Medicine; 5. Law; 6. Theology. A decree of the minister De Fomento, Sept. 25, 1858, gives a list of the text books prescribed in the different Faculties. We copy from Gersdorf's Repertory a part of the list in Theology: On the Basis of Religion and on Infidelity, the treatises of P. A. Vasseccchi, L. Bailly, and Perrone; on Theology proper, Opstraet's *Loci Theologici*, Perrone's *Institutiones Theologicæ*; on Moral Theology, Ant. a S. Josepho, Cuniliati, and Charmes; on Exegesis, Wonters, Ticinus, and Mentius; on Hermeneutics, Janssens, Lamy, Glaire, etc.

A volume of Essays written by the late King of Portugal, treating with a liberal spirit on political topics, will soon be published in Lisbon.

In the Memoirs of Stephen Grellet, a member of the Society of Friends, 2d ed. 1861, is an interesting account of a visit, in 1819, to the *Secret Library* of the Inquisition in Rome, not described by any other traveller. Here are preserved the books put on the Index, and the records of the Inquisition. Mr. Grellet spent some hours in examining this unique collection.

GREAT BRITAIN.

The British and Foreign Evangelical Review, Jan. 1862, is largely made up of articles reprinted from American periodicals. From the *American Theological Review* it has three articles: Prof. Lawrence on New England Theology; Rev. L. Whiting on the Old Testament in the New; and Dr. Stearns on The Moral Aspects of the Present Struggle in America. It says that it reproduces the latter article "merely to show how the American Secession is viewed and explained by an intelligent Northern writer". With such caution and reserve do some of the best men in Great Britain talk about our present condition. The attack of the *Princeton Review* on Dr. Hickok is also given, and introduced with the remark that his Rational Psychology "seems to be forming a school of American Rationalists!" We commend to the attention of the editors of the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, the article of Dr. Lewis in our January number, and that of Dr. Hickok in our present number. A criticism of Mansel, Maurice, Young, and Calderwood, strong and just against Mansel's theories, particularly showing the wide difference between his ethical theory and that of Bp. Butler; The Later Religious History of Scotland; The Protestant Church in Hungary; Discussions in France on the Supernatural (Bois and Réville); the

Pauline Doctrine of the Righteousness of Faith, interpreted as a real righteousness, viz. that of Christ in our stead; the Late Principal Cunningham—are the other articles of the number.

The British Quarterly Review for January discusses the Revision of the Liturgy, with an account of the ejection of 1662; Miss Knight's Autobiography; De Tocqueville's Memoirs; Goldwin Smith's Ireland, to which it awards the highest praise; the Fourfold Biography of the Gospels; Charles Dickens; Facts about Railways; Mormonism; the Free Churches of England. This last article shows, that while during the last fifty years the Church of England has fallen 70 per cent behind the growth of the population, Dissent has placed itself 303 per cent in advance—in the supply of church accommodations. The whole subject is fully discussed in Thos. Flint's Voluntaryism in England and Wales. The article on the Revision of the Liturgy says, that during the last twelvemonth some forty publications have appeared on this subject. One of the best of them is by John Fisher, Liturgical Purity our Rightful Inheritance.—The tone of English feeling toward America, even among the Independents, may be inferred from the following extract from the *Epilogue on Affairs*: "Remembering the past, we have no faith in the doctrine that the continuance of the colossal Union which has grown up over that vast territory is desirable. We feel convinced that some division, and perhaps more than one, would be favorable in many ways to the progress of international harmony, and of Christian civilization." Dread of the growing power of our republic is manifestly the deepest feeling that most Englishmen entertain toward us.

The Journal of Sacred Literature, Jan., has articles on the Mines and Metals of Antiquity; the Gospel of St. Matthew; Early Life of Bossuet; Remarks on Isaiah xviii, 1, 2; Hindu Philosophy and Indian Missions; Exegesis of Difficult Texts (John xix, 10, 11; Luke xii, 49-51; Ephes. i, 6, 22, 28—ii, 2, 21—iv, 16; Colos. ii, 19, etc.); Remarks on the Papal Canon Law—superficial; Of the Divine Nature, in relation to Christ; a translation of Hupfeld's Modern Theosophic Theology—a sharp attack on Kurtz, Hofmann, Delitzsch, etc.; the Apocalypse—advocating Desprez's view, that its prophecies were fulfilled in the Consummation of the Mosaic Economy and the Coming of the Son of Man. Dr. Hincks contributes a learned article on Arioch and Belshazzar—one of the earliest and the latest of the kings of Chaldea, both whose names he thinks are found in a cuneatic inscription, brought from the temple of *Shîn* in Mugheir, and now in the British Museum.

Mr. Stewart has published a beautiful fac-simile of the *Speculum Humanæ Salvationis* (Mirror of Man's Salvation), carefully reproduced and edited by M. Berjeau, who also edited the fac-similes of the *Biblia Pauperum* and of the *Cantica Canticorum*. The Mirror is the most ancient example of xylography and typography combined. The price is four guineas; only 155 copies are printed.

An Examination of the Principles of the Scooto-Oxonian Philosophy, by Timologus, Part I, Lond. 1861 (Chapman and Hall), urges against Mansel the same line of argument presented in this Review, Feb. 1860, pp. 18, 19, on the point that his positions annul the possibility of faith in, as well as a knowledge of, the Infinite and Absolute. He says that Mansel seems to have overlooked the fact, "that the conditions of consciousness" are applicable to belief, as much as to thought. "For, if that which is infinite cannot be apprehended by a finite faculty, it can neither be apprehended by a finite thought, nor by a finite belief. Our author, however, while teaching

that the Infinite Being can be apprehended by means of the organs of faith, does not pretend to assert that our faith or belief is itself infinite."

Thomas Tyler, in his work, *Jehovah the Redeemer God*, gives the future significance to Jehovah (Jahvah), "He who will be." He advocated this view in an article in the *Journal of Sacred Literature*, Jan. 1854, and complains of McWhorter and Macdonald (in his *Pentateuch*) for not acknowledging their obligations to him.

F. H. Scrivener, M.A., of Trinity College, Cambridge, is the author of a work of great value to students: *A Plain Introduction to the Criticism of the New Testament*. The first part gives a full account of the sources from which the various readings are derived—or the *External Evidence*; the second part investigates the principles on which the external evidence should be applied in the recension of the text; the third part examines all the passages on which authorities are at variance.

After an interval of six years, the second volume of Webster's and Wilkinson's *Greek Testament* is published, comprising the Epistles and the Apocalypse. It is not as critical as the work of Alford, nor is it as full in its references to English theological views as is Wordsworth; but it is a careful and laborious commentary, evangelical in spirit, and Calvinistic in doctrine.

The first volume of the writings of the late H. H. Wilson, edited by De Rost, contains a republication of his *Sketch of the Religions of the Hindus*, originally published in the *Asiatic Researches*, 1828 and 1832. A second volume of this division of his works will soon appear. Wilson was the worthy successor of Jones and Colebrooke. Forty-eight years ago he published the *Megadûta*. He was in the service of the East India Company until 1832; since then he has resided in England, pursuing his Sanskrit studies with indefatigable zeal. He died May 8, 1860.

Prof. Goldwin Smith, of Oxford, who has given such proof of his high ability by his Lectures on Ireland, which we elsewhere notice, has also come out with a work against Mansel, entitled *Rational Religion and the Rationalistic Objections of the Bampton Lectures for 1858*.—The 9th number of Tracts for Priests and People is on Dissent, by J. M. Ludlow, and on Creeds, by Rev. F. Garden.

The folio Shakspeare of 1623, first edition, is to be reprinted in fac-simile, in three parts, at 10s. 6d. each. The first part, containing the comedies, is out.

The author of the work on John Rogers, the Marian martyr, is an American gentleman, Joseph Lemuel Chester, who claims to be descended from the illustrious martyr, and visited England for the purpose of clearing up the genealogical connection.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A new and revised edition of Bp. McIlvaine's able work on Oxford Divinity is published by the Protestant Episcopal Book Society, under the title, *Righteousness by Faith*; or, *The Nature and Means of our Justification before God*.

Mr. Scribner will soon publish Stanley's *Eastern Church*, and *History of the Jewish Church*; Max Müller on the *Science of Language*, for \$1.25; J. W. Alexander, *Discourses on Faith*; J. Stuart Mill on *Representative Government*, and on *Liberty*.

The Rev. Henry Ruffner, D.D., died Dec. 17th, at his residence, in Kanawha county, Virginia, in the seventy-third year of his age. Dr. Ruffner was formerly President of Washington College, Virginia, and during his long life filled many positions of honor and usefulness. In 1850 he published the *Fathers of the Desert*, an account of Monasticism, in 2 vols. He also wrote against slavery.

President C. C. Felton, of Harvard College, died Feb. 26. He was born in 1807; became Professor of Greek Literature in Harvard, 1832. He translated Menzel's German Literature, and edited Homer, the Clouds and Birds of Aristophanes, the Panegyrics of Isocrates, the Agamemnon of Æschylus, and other works.

A new edition of *The Federalist* is in preparation by H. B. Dawson, Esq. It will be enriched by the private papers of Hamilton, which are placed at the disposal of the editor.

The Evangelical Review for January, 1862, has a translation by Prof. H. I. Schmidt, of Columbia College, of Mielziner's Essay on *Slavery Among the Hebrews*, which was also translated in our Review last year. This is an additional evidence of its value. The translator says that he offered some time since the translation to several publishing houses, but that they all declined it, from "dread of giving offence to the South". Times have changed.

Mr. Brownson, in his *Review* for January, announces that he is preparing Essays on the History of the Reformation, as a world-movement, under some new points of view. He puts the error of the Reformation in the sun-dering of the life of humanity from "the theandric life of Christ". His *Review* shows unmistakable marks of progress. An article on the Reunion of Christians, complains of the Catholic defenders of the faith for insisting so much on the external argument from authority. It also idealizes the Romish dogmas of the Church and its infallibility in a most remarkable manner, going beyond the positions of Möhler. "No salvation out of the Church", is interpreted as meaning substantially no salvation for those not united to Christ. Infallibility is put in the Church as a whole; and even after the Church has pronounced in favor of a dogma, there still remains the question of interpretation, which "the Church does not answer, save negatively". Thus he says: "Infallibility extends only to the ideal . . . in so far as represented by language, or what we call the word spoken. It does not extend to the evolution, the appropriation, or the actualization of the ideal, by the human mind. . . . For after the Church has proclaimed to us infallibly the infallible dogma, we must still ask, what are its contents? or, what does it mean? This question the Church does not answer by her infallible authority, save negatively. . . . Beyond this there remain freedom and scope for the activity of our own minds, and the right and necessity of examination." As to the general position of this *Review*, he says it is due to "the public generally to say, that some changes in the character of the *Review*, or rather in the mode of conducting it hereafter, will be made. . . . Indeed, an effort will be made to ascertain whether it will be possible to break down the wall which now separates the Protestant and Catholic reading publics, and to some extent unite them in one republic of Letters. Heretofore, on theological questions our articles have, for the most part, been submitted to theological revision and censorship before publication; hereafter they will not be so submitted. We shall write according to our own honest convictions, and publish our articles as we write them, simply holding ourselves responsible, after publication, to the proper authorities for any abuse we may make of the freedom of the press guaranteed to us by the constitution and laws of our country."

Literary and Critical Notices of Books.

T H E O L O G Y .

Aids to Faith; a Series of Theological Essays. By Several Writers. Edited by WILLIAM THOMSON, D.D., Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. London: Murray. 1861. 8vo, pp. 469. This long-expected volume discusses in a very able manner the main topics raised by the famous *Essays and Reviews*. Not in the form of a direct reply, it will be even more convincing from the impartial and elevated tone which breathes through almost all the essays. Its spirit is both reverential and scholarly. It shows that there are men in the English Church who can investigate these high themes with learning and ability, with faith in the divine revelation, yet not relying on mere dogmatic authority. While the subjects are of such a nature, that no single volume can adequately compass them; yet, within the assigned limits the work proposed has been well done. This is undoubtedly the most valuable and satisfactory volume which this prolific controversy has thus far brought forth. The first essay, by Dr. Mansel, is on *Miracles, as Evidences of Christianity*. It is a careful and thorough argument. Within the same limits, we do not know where to find a more philosophical and acute statement and vindication of this vital point. It disentangles it from the web of sophistry, and puts it in just the right position in the argument. The peculiarities of Mansel's general theory of knowledge, to which we have formerly objected, hardly appear in the course of the discussion. The confusion pervading Powell's plea about the absolute uniformity of nature is admirably analyzed. Careful distinctions and a true logical method run through the whole disquisition. The second essay, by Dr. Fitzgerald, Lord Bishop of Cork, is on the *Study of the Evidences of Christianity*. The author is chiefly known as a writer by his tracts in *Cautions for the Times*. He has something of the keen spirit, learning, and liberality of Archbishop Whately. He reviews the various phases in the history of the Evidences during the past three centuries, and makes weighty suggestions about the mode in which modern infidelity is to be opposed, calming exaggerated fears as to its real power. Dr. A. McCaul, Prof. of Hebrew in King's College, London, contributes two essays, on *Prophecy* and on the *Mosaic Record of Creation*. Dr. Williams and Mr. Goodwin are here taken in hand. The reality of prophecy is shown by an appeal to facts; and the Mosaic Cosmogony is vindicated, on the general ground that the six days are not meant to represent six geologic periods. Ideology and Subscription are discussed by Rev. F. C. Cook, Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen, in opposition to Mr. Wilson—ideology being used as equivalent to the system and method

of Strauss. Though not a very thorough examination of the German systems, this essay offers many excellent criticisms and points of view, and defends the practical position of the English Church, and the moral obligation of subscription. Professor George Rawlinson, on the Genuineness and Authenticity of the Pentateuch, shows ample historical knowledge and decided critical skill. Dr. E. H. Browne, Norrisian Professor of Divinity in Cambridge, investigates the subject of Inspiration in a candid, though not very acute way, advocating, without any distinctive theory, the fact that the Bible is "an *infallible* depository of *religious* truth". The Editor, Bishop Thomson, writes on the Death of Christ, giving the substance of his Bampton Lectures for 1853, with additional discussions. The Scripture Doctrine, and the Doctrine of the Church, are well reviewed; the theoretical part is less elaborately worked out. The concluding essay, by Ellicott, the commentator on Scripture and its Interpretation, is one of the best of the series. Each essay is introduced by an analysis of the main points. The whole work will be welcomed, for its learning, candor, and ability, as a timely contribution to our theological literature. One additional essay, on the general principles and bearings of the whole controversy, would have made it a very complete book of its class.

Replies to "Essays and Reviews." With a Preface by the Lord Bishop of Oxford, etc. Oxford and London: Parker. 1862. 8vo, pp. 513. This is a volume of much greater pretensions, and much less real ability than the "Aids to Faith," noticed above. Unlike the latter, it is in the form of a regular reply to each of the Essays in succession. The tone is that of the High Church. Church authority seems to be the last appeal. The preface by Bishop Wilberforce is a slight and hasty affair, strongly recommending ecclesiastical censure as the best resort. Dr. Goulbourn, Chaplain to the Queen, replies to Dr. Temple on the Education of the World; but in his own study of the philosophy of history he has not got beyond a translation of Lessing's Education of the Human Race. Dr. H. J. Rose is the antagonist of Dr. Williams and Bunsen, and handles Williams very well in his own style. Dr. Heurtley, Margaret Professor of Divinity in Oxford, writes on Miracles, against Powell—the best essay in the series, though far inferior to Mansel in the "Aids to Faith." He says, in a note, quite naively: "I am not acquainted with Coleridge's works". Dr. Grant, on the Idea of the National Church, gives a good account of the history of the Anglican Church; but his principles are of the loftiest type of churchmanship, and he is a strong panegyrist of the Tracts for the Times. Rev. G. Robison on the Creation Week, has collected considerable materials. Under the title Rationalism, Rev. A. W. Haddan incidentally corrects some of Mr. Pattison's statements about the English apologists of the last century; and he finds the cure for rationalism in rituals, liturgies, ordained clergy, etc. Canon Wordsworth, on the Interpretation of Scripture, writes as if he had a personal spite against Professor Jowett. In the Appendix are Letters from Rev. Robert Main, of the Radcliffe Observatory, Oxford, on Scripture and Astronomy, and from Prof. John Phillips, Reader in Geology, Oxford, on Geology and Scripture.

Tracts for Priests and People. By Various Writers. Boston: Walker, Wise & Co. 1862. Pp. 372. Of the English edition of these Tracts we gave some account in our last number. The Boston reprint is well got up, and makes a handsome volume. Occasioned by the *Essays and Reviews*, it represents in the main the Broad Church views upon several important questions. The Tracts are seven in number (still continued in England),

viz. 1. *Religio Laici*, by Thos. Hughes, frank and manly, as the author of *Tom Brown at Rugby* always is; 2. *The Mote and the Beam*—a Clergyman's Lessons from the Present Panic, by F. D. Maurice, insisting that a revival of living faith in God and Christ is the great need of the times; 3. *The Atonement as a Fact and as a Theory*, by Rev. F. Garden—advocating the life-theory; 4. *Miracles*, by Rev. J. L. Davies—defending them by spiritualising them; 5. *Terms of Communion*, by Rev. C. K. P. and J. N. Langley; 6. *Against the Bishop of Oxford*, by J. M. Ludlow and Maurice; 7. *Two Lay Dialogues*, by J. M. Ludlow—good against the positivists. The volume is interesting as illustrating one phase of English thought in the present theological ferment.

The Supernatural in Relation to the Natural. By Rev. JAMES MCCOSH, LL.D. New-York: Carters. 1862. Pp. 369. This work is divided into two Books, treating respectively of the Natural in Relation to the Supernatural, and of the Supernatural in Relation to the Natural. Incidentally it is intended to meet the objections raised by those that doubt or deny the possibility of supernatural intervention in the course of nature. The discussion is characterized by the author's well-known clearness and fluency of exposition, and natural, progressive method. The transitions and connections between the natural and supernatural are well stated. The most interesting chapter is that on the System in the Supernatural. Avoiding extreme positions, courteous in his treatment of objectors, confident in his statement of principles, and grasping the subject in many of its higher and wider aspects, Dr. McCosh will command the attention and secure the respect of thoughtful men, interested in these momentous themes. His aim is not so much to go into details, as to examine and decide the general principles involved in the controversy. Between extreme parties he occupies a cautious and tenable middle ground.

The History of the Religious Movement Called Methodism. By ABEL STEVENS, LL.D. Vol. III. From the Death of Wesley to the Centenary Jubilee. New-York: Carlton & Porter. Pp. 524. Dr. Stevens completes his proposed task with this volume, but we are glad to notice that he promises a supplement on the History of Methodism in this country. This volume is quite as able as the others, and quite as interesting. It abounds in details, biographical sketches, descriptions and incidents; but all these subserve the plan of the book, which is steadily kept in view. The labors and works of Bunting, Coke, Adam Clarke, Watson, Townley, Sutcliffe, Drew, Jackson, and many of lesser note pass in rapid, but clear review. Here is the true original of Adam Bede's Dinah, and here, too, Hester Ann Rogers is portrayed. The missionary labors and successes at home and abroad are faithfully narrated, as also the controversies and divisions, and the triumphant progress up to the Centenary Jubilee. Our ministers, and laymen too, should get and read the book. Some things they may not agree with; but in one thing they will be agreed, that it is an admirable exposition of a great religious revival.

The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Second Presbyterian Church, Newark, N. J. A Discourse by the Pastor, J. FEW SMITH, D.D. Newark. 1861. Pp. 75. This valuable commemorative sermon gives the history of a church which has had unusual prosperity and spiritual privileges under the successive ministries of Rev. Hooper Cumming; Dr. Griffin, who had been previously settled over the First Church; Dr. Hay; Rev. Eben. Cheever; Dr. Condit, now of Auburn Seminary; Dr. Prentiss for a brief period associated with Dr. Condit; and its present able and faithful pastor. It is an interesting contribution to our local church histories.

BIBLICAL LITERATURE.

The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry. By ISAAC TAYLOR. With a Biographical Introduction by WILLIAM ADAMS, D.D. New-York: Carleton. 1862. 8vo, pp. 886. In this new work, Isaac Taylor appears in a new field of religious literature. Here, too, he writes with his accustomed vigor, thoughtfulness, and originality. The aim of the work is rather theological than literary—but yet, theological in the sense of Biblical Theology, as distinguished from scientific. The difference of the two, he says (p. 54), is this: that while “Scientific Theology professes to regard the Divine Nature and attributes as the centre”, Biblical Theology has for its “central area”, “the human spirit in its actual condition, its original powers, its necessary limitations, its ever varying consciousness, its lapses, its sorrows, its perils, its hopes, and its fears”. Hebrew poetry is here viewed in respect to its specific religious use; and under this aspect it is vindicated against modern criticism. An incidental object of the work is the refutation of infidel, of pantheistic objections. The language of the Bible on divine subjects, he contends, must be figurative throughout. Hence, so large a part of the Bible is in poetry. There are both divine and human elements—the divine being the source of, and giving unity to the human. Inspiration is vindicated in a somewhat qualified sense, as compared with the mechanical theory. Under these general aspects, the subject is worked out with much ability. On every page, weighty thoughts arrest the attention. Hebrew poetry is traced from its beginning in Paradise to the prophetic consummation of the end of the world, and its contrast with all other literature is vividly portrayed. On this last point he says (p. 812): “It is not so much that we might not find in the Greek writers—Plato, for instance, or Æschylus—the rudiments of a theology, true and great as far as it goes; but in no Greek writer, in none anterior to the diffusion of the Gospel, are there to be found any rudiments whatever—any mere fragments, however small—of that LIFE OF THE SOUL TOWARD GOD, and of that DIVINE CORRESPONDENCE WITH MAN, which, in every Psalm, in every page of the Prophets, shines, burns, rules, with force—overrides Poetry—drives from its area the feeble resources of human art, and brings down upon earth those powers and those profound emotions which bespeak the nearness of the Infinite and the Eternal, when God holds communion with those that seek to live in the light of his favor.” The work will be a most welcome one, not only to ministers, but also to laymen of intelligence and culture. It belongs to the elevating and not to the ephemeral class of religious publications. Dr. Adams has enriched it with an excellent account of the author and his various productions, giving many new facts from authentic sources. This edition is published by agreement with Mr. Taylor; and he is to have a handsome compensation from the liberality of the American publishers. We see that a cheap, rival edition is announced, but hope that it will find no encouragement, as it is printed with a full knowledge of the agreement made with Mr. Carleton. Mr. Carleton has published his edition in superior style, so as to make an attractive library volume.

A Commentary, Critical and Grammatical, on St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians. With a revised Translation. By C. J. ELLICOTT, B.D. Andover: Draper. 1862. 8vo. Dr. Ellicott's commentaries offer many decided advantages to the student. They are concise, perspicuous, and well-arranged. They indicate familiarity with the literature of the subject, English, German, and patristic. One useful characteristic is his frequent references to the

treatises of English divines. The discussion of the text is sufficient for all ordinary purposes, though not so ample as Alford. The present volume has constant citations from nine ancient versions. The spirit of the commentary is at once scholarly, reverential, and orthodox. In doubtful cases it gives sufficient materials for a decision. The addition of the revised translation is a very welcome aid. Harless on the Ephesians, is undoubtedly the best extant commentary; and Dr. Ellicott has made good, though independent, use of his labors. His work is a compressed manual, and as such, one of the best helps to the student. On the important passage, ii, 4, his conclusion is, that while "it must fairly be said the unemphatic position of *φύσει* renders it doubtful whether there is any special contrast to *χάριτι*, or any *direct* assertion of the doctrine of Original Sin", yet "that the clause contains an *indirect*, and therefore even more convincing assertion of that profound truth, it seems impossible to deny".

A Translation of the Syriac Peshito Version of the Psalms of David: With Notes critical and explanatory. By Rev. ANDREW OLIVER, M.A. Boston: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1861. Pp. 331. The antiquity of the Syriac version of the Old Testament, dating probably from the second century, and the affinities of the Syriac language with the Hebrew, give a high value to this translation, the first in the English language. The translator carefully notes the deviations of the Syriac from the Hebrew, and its agreement with the Septuagint. He wisely follows, as closely as is possible, the authorized version. The Syriac division of the Psalms into Books and Grades, and the Syriac titles or contents, are also retained. Among all the ancient versions, the Syriac Peshito takes the front rank for its freedom from glosses; hence it is called the *Peshito* or the *simple*. That it was made by a Christian is evident, not merely from the titles, which might have been added, but from internal doctrinal evidence, e. g.: Psalm cx, 3: "I have begotten thee, O youth, from the beginning." Mr. Oliver deserves the thanks of Biblical students for his careful labors. They give new evidence of American zeal in exegetical studies. The volume is beautifully printed, at the Riverside press. It is for sale in New-York by John Wiley.

A Commentary on Ecclesiastes. By MOSES STUART. Edited and revised by Prof. R. D. C. ROBBINS. Andover: Draper. 1862. Pp. 346. One of the best of Prof. Stuart's commentaries is here carefully revised, with additional matter, by Prof. Robbins, who does all his work in a scholarly way. What is lost in freshness is more than made up in increased accuracy. No English commentary on the book is so good as this. It ought to be in the libraries of our pastors and students.

PRACTICAL RELIGIOUS LITERATURE.

Christian Worship, Services for the Church; with Order of Vespers and Hymns. New York: Jas. Miller, 1862. Pp. 260, 108. As might be anticipated from the learning and culture of the authors, Dr. Osgood and Dr. Farley, this manual of public worship for Unitarian Congregations is prepared with a careful selection and adaptation of materials from a great variety of sources. It is a new evidence of the growth of the liturgical sentiment among the modern Unitarians. It also indicates a tendency to re-establish public worship in all its parts, so that the sermon shall not seem to

be the main thing. Free use has been made of the Liturgy of the King's Chapel, Boston. In the old formulas of the church, alterations have of course been made, some of which grate upon the ear. Instead of the simple majestic form, "Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost", we have: "Glory be to the Father, Almighty God, through Jesus Christ our Lord". Many of these alterations will rather suggest than displace the originals. In such cases, we think it would be better to make new forms, than merely to imitate, and yet change, the old hallowed words. The Vesper service is the most original portion of the work. Forms of prayer and service for all the different Ministerial acts are included. The Psalms are arranged with simplicity and accuracy for Responses. The selection of hymns is very good. We hear that Dr. Farley's church have refused to use this service; it is too much in advance of their old habits of thought. The volume is beautifully printed and bound.

Deutsches Gesangbuch. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. Pp. 620. This German Hymn Book was prepared by Dr. Schaff, for the German Reformed Church, and it is a most excellent selection, of 500 hymns, from the best sources, and exceedingly well arranged. We do not know of a better collection, and cordially commend it. It would be a good work for service in our German regiments. The only objection is the cost; but the smaller edition can be had bound for about 50 cents a copy, in quantities. It has received the highest commendations from such men as Knapp, Dörner, Krummacher, Bethmann-Hollweg, etc. The Synod of New York and New Jersey recommend it for the German congregations under their care.

Katechismus für Sonntags-Schulen. Von Dr. PHILIPP SCHAFF, Chambersburg. Pp. 80. Dr. Schaff's Catechism for Sunday Schools is a clear, simple, valuable manual. It hits the right medium between a merely historical and a merely doctrinal Catechism. It is also carefully arranged. It would be well to have a similar book prepared for the Presbyterian and Congregational Churches.

Hymns of Faith and Hope. Second Series. By H. BONAR, D.D. New York: Carters. Pp. 804. Dr. Bonar's hymns are of unequal merit. Some have the true melody and spirit of sacred song, while now and then there is one that seems to struggle hopelessly with hard and unmusical language. This collection, as a whole, is quite equal to his previous volume. Many of the hymns are of great beauty, and there is a large variety in them, both as to subjects and metre. The volume is beautifully printed and bound.

God's Way of Peace. By H. BONAR, D.D. New York: Carters, 1862. Pp. 200. To give salutary directions to an inquirer after life, is one of the most difficult tasks of a Christian pastor. He must wisely steer between too great discouragement, and encouragements upon an unreal basis. This volume of Dr. Bonar will be found a valuable help in such cases. The guilt of man, and the righteousness by grace, the obligation to immediate repentance, and the prime necessity of faith, are clearly and earnestly set forth. It is thoroughly evangelical in doctrine and spirit.

Practical Christianity. By JOHN S. C. ABBOTT. New York: Harpers. 18mo, pp. 302. This Treatise, especially designed for young men, is dedicated to the Volunteers of our National Army, and is well adapted to impress their minds, in the midst of the perils and temptations of the camp, with the serious and urgent claims of religion. It would be a good book for Chaplains to distribute.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

A Dictionary of English Etymology. By HENSLEIGH WEDGWOOD, M.A., late Fellow of Chr. Col., Cam. Vol. I, A—D. *With Notes and Additions.* By GEORGE P. MARSH. New York: Sheldon & Co., 1862. Royal octavo, double columns, pp. 247. \$3. English Etymology is yet in its rudiments, as a science, and hardly emancipated from the plausible, but insufficient theories of Horne Tooke, whom Richardson chiefly follows. It has been cultivated rather as a part of our general lexicons than as a distinct branch of investigation. The great merit of Mr. Wedgwood's learned and painstaking work, is in confining himself strictly to the derivations of words, so far as these can be traced. Its peculiarity is found in carrying out more fully than any previous writer, the theory, that language to a considerable extent starts from an imitation or representation of natural sounds—*onomatopœia*. This he illustrates in his preface by a great variety of unexpected instances, and by many transformations and changes from one language to another. The work is absolutely necessary to the philologist to fill the gaps, and quite as often to correct the errors, of our current lexicographers. The additions of Mr. Marsh, made to about two hundred and fifty words, greatly increase the value of the volume; and they are all the more valuable because derived, in most cases, from a direct reading of the earlier writers, not relying on second-hand compilations. Fine specimens of his minute and curious learning are seen in his additions to the words, *Abet*, *Anneal*, *Average*, *Awning*, *Baggage*, *Ballast*, *Canoe*, *Ceiling*, *Cheese*, etc. We notice that he discredits the connection between *atone* and *sühne*, which Coleridge favored. Theologians may be instructed by these derivations and changes of meaning. Thus the word *able*—Latin, *habilis*—meant, in the earlier usage, *convenient*, *fit*; in the later usage, it is restricted to the general sense of efficiency. To *enable* a person to do a thing, or to *disable* him, means, in old English, to render him fit or unfit for doing it. That is, it does not refer to natural capacity, but to specific adaptation. A whole controversy lies in this difference. Chaucer says: "God tokeneth and assigneth the times, *abling* hem to her proper offices". Wycliffe translates Rom. ix, 22: "That if God, willing to schewe his wrathe, and to make his power knowne, hath sufferid in grete pacience vessels of wrathe *able* unto death". The work is printed in the best style, on laid paper, tinted, from long primer types. Two more volumes will, probably, complete it. This hardly seems the time for issuing so expensive a work, which necessarily appeals to a comparatively small class: but it is one which libraries and scholars must and will have.

Permanent Documents of the Society for the Promotion of Collegiate and Theological Education at the West. 3 vols. 8vo. New York. This excellent Society, during the past eighteen years, has done a noble work in rendering needed aid to thirteen colleges in our Western States, and on the Pacific Coast. To a rare extent, it has secured the confidence of the Christian public. This has been owing, in no slight measure, to the indefatigable labors, wise counsels, and prudent management of its Secretary, Rev. Theron Baldwin, who is one of the chief benefactors of our day to the cause of a thorough Christian education. All the Colleges he has aided are monuments to his fidelity. His sixteen Annual Reports contain valuable discussions of all the leading questions connected with this great work. Each Report presents the subject under some new aspect or relation. Besides these Reports, the three volumes of Permanent Documents embrace discourses or addresses, averaging two for each year, by many of the wisest

and best ministers of the Congregational and Presbyterian Churches. In no work devoted to education, are combined more broad and philosophic views, wise suggestions, pertinent facts, and eloquent appeals, upon the true nature, methods and aims of collegiate education, under Christian auspices, in a republican country. The volumes are invaluable. They ought to be found in every public library, especially those in our Theological Seminaries and Colleges. They are well entitled *Permanent Documents*. As an indication of their value, we give a list of some of the more prominent addresses. Albert Barnes, Plea in behalf of Western Colleges—an admirable analysis of Western character and needs; Dr. Beman on Education at the West—a forcible inculcation of anti-Jesuit policy; Dr. Todd, Plain Letters on the theme, Colleges essential to the Church of God; Dr. Bacon, a comprehensive sketch of the relation of Christianity and Learning; Prof. Haddock, Collegiate Education; Dr. Condit, Education at the West in its claims on the Church; Prof. Porter, Plea for Libraries, and on the Educational System of the Puritans and Jesuits compared—a premium essay; Dr. Cox was in one of his best moods, when he gave his Address, which hardly admits of being labelled with a title; Dr. Edward Beecher, The Question at Issue; Prof. Park, The Utility of Collegiate and Professional Schools—one of his most finished productions; Dr. T. H. Skinner, Education and Evangelism; Dr. Peters, Colleges, Religious Institutions; President Hopkins—an admirable address on the idea and aims of college culture; Dr. Hall, Colleges essential to Home Missions; Addresses by President Sturtevant, Rev. J. F. Tuttle, Rev. H. Towne, Dr. Eddy, Rev. Lyman Whiting, H. W. Beecher, Prof. Tyler, H. B. Smith, Dr. Thompson; Discourses by Dr. Storrs, Dr. Kirk, Dr. Stearns, etc. We have not space to characterize all these as they fitly deserve; they present the best thoughts of some of our ablest thinkers, on a vital subject, intimately connected with the highest welfare of the American people. In reading them, we have been forcibly impressed with the fact, that there is so little of repetition, though the discourses are so numerous. This illustrates both the greatness of the theme and the ability of the men.

Ethical and Physiological Inquiries, chiefly relating to Subjects of Popular Interest. By A. H. DANA. New York: Scribner, 1862. Pp. 308. The essays contained in this thoughtful volume discuss many profitable themes. They exhibit the fruits of much reading, and of independent reflection. Topics of current interest are handled in a simple, and often forcible manner. The title might well have taken a wider range. The work belongs to that part of literature which ever has strong attractions for persons of meditative habits. Ministers, physicians, politicians, men of business, and students, will here find materials for investigation, and fruitful hints and principles to guide them in their inquiries. There is a singular freedom from one-sided and partial views, and merely theoretic schemes. Among the subjects handled in a suggestive manner are, Races of Men, Compensations of Life, Identity, Hereditary Character, Narcotic Stimulants, War, Seminaries of Learning, The Supernatural, Probation of Life, Neuromathy, Nemesis, etc.

A Strange Story. A Novel, By Sir E. BULWER LYTTON. With Illustrations. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1862. 25 cents. A fascinating, as well as strange story, wrought out with all the literary skill of Bulwer, and illustrating many wonderful facts on the "dark side" of human experience, in the mysterious realms of somnambulism and mesmerism. Learning, fancy, imagination, and all the resources of the novelist, are put in requisition, in the construction of the plot, and though a sharp key-note is struck

*at first, yet the interest is kept up unflagging to the end. As a work of art, it is among the very best of the prolific author.

Pilgrims of Fashion. A Novel, By KINAHAN CORNWALLIS. New York: Harper & Brother. Pp. xvi, 337. \$1.

MISCELLANY.

Some of the Providential Lessons of 1861. How to meet the Events of 1862. Two Discourses, by Rev. GEORGE L. PRENTISS, D.D. New York, W. H. Bidwell. These two thoughtful and eloquent discourses are published by request of Dr. Prentiss's congregation, and contain Christian reflections and lessons, admirably adapted to the present juncture of our national affairs.

The Relations of Religion to the War. A Sermon, by Rev. HUGH SMITH CARPENTER. New York. This Discourse, preached in the Westminster Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn, is full of vivid descriptions and earnest appeals, suggested by the crisis into which slavery has brought the republic.

"*He thanked God and took Courage.*" A Sermon for Thanksgiving Day, 1861. By Rev. MATSON MEIER SMITH, Bridgeport, Conn. The elements of the present struggle, and its high moral and religious lessons, are forcibly set forth in this patriotic discourse, delivered in the North Congregational Church, of Bridgeport, Conn.

President Tappan's Message to the Law Congress of the University of Michigan. Delivered Jan. 18, 1862. Ann Arbor. Dr. Tappan here ably reviews the constitutional questions and projects now so largely discussed, coming to the simple conclusion, that our great work at present is not to settle questions about slaves and slaveholders, but "to press on this war to its conclusion, with the utmost might and vigor".

The Habeas Corpus Act and Martial Law. By ROBERT L. BRECK. Cincinnati, 1862. This essay, severely criticising the course of the President, in respect to the points named in the title, was prepared for the Danville Quarterly Review, but excluded from it, as tending to embarrass the action of the Government.

Young Benjamin Franklin. By HENRY MAYHEW. With Illustrations by John Gilbert. New York: Harpers, 1862. 18mo, pp. 561. Mr. Mayhew, so well known for his works on social topics, here instructs the boys how to get along in life, by the example of our Franklin, supposed to be taught by his uncle, about sports, books, events, science, morals and manners. Some of the disquisitions are rather prolix, but much useful knowledge is crowded into these pages, and the incidents are varied and instructive.

Health: Five Lay Sermons to Working People. By JOHN BROWN, M.D. New York: Carters, 1862. We advise everybody, ministers and laymen, men and women, boys and girls, to read these capital lay sermons. They are full of sense and wit—good, plain talk on every-day matters, so as to interest all, with a double vein of humor and piety running through the discourse.

Statistics and News of Churches and Missions.

PRUSSIA.—*Romanism and Protestantism in Prussia.*—During the nine years from 1849 to 1858, churches and clergymen in the Evangelical and in the Roman Catholic churches of Prussia have increased in the following proportions. Not including the Dissenters, and exclusive of the little Principality of Hohenzollern and the Rhine district, the Evangelical population numbered, in 1849, 10,006,798 souls, who congregated in 5,208 mother-churches, 2,956 filial-churches, and 806 other buildings, devoted to divine service; on the whole, 8,976 places of worship. Divine service was held by 6,139 ordained clergymen. Up to the year 1858 the number of places of worship had increased by 330; and the number of ministers of the church by 281. This increase, however, stands in no proportion with the growth of the Evangelical population, which, during the indicated period, had augmented from every 1,000 to 1,084. In the Roman Catholic Church, the number of places for divine worship had also grown by 320 during the same time, and the number of the clergy by 561; the increase of the Romanist population, however, was not the same as the Protestant; it grew only from every 1,000 to 1,078. In the year 1849, there was one church to every 1,114 souls, in the Protestant provinces, and one clergyman to every 1,628 souls; while with the Romanists, there was one church to every 840

souls, and one priest to every 1,082 souls. In the year 1858 there was one church for every 1,164 Evangelical inhabitants, and one clergyman for 1,689; with the Roman Catholics in 1858 there was one church for every 867 persons, and for every 1,065 souls one priest.

SWITZERLAND.—According to the last census taken in Switzerland, the total population of the confederation in December last was 2,584,422 souls, of whom 2,204,280 were Swiss citizens, and the rest foreigners. In religion, 1,483,296 of the total were Protestants, 1,040,469 Catholics, the rest "Separatists," Jews, etc.

BULGARIA.—*Romanism in Bulgaria.*—The attempted Romish movement in Bulgaria has come to a very ridiculous termination. The bishops who promoted this movement now protest that they had been deceived. The Bishop, who was received at Rome with so much *éclat*, has recanted, and declared that he was imposed upon. Boré, the great instigator of this movement, has been banished to Cochin China in consequence of his blunder. Thus terminates the boasted conversion of a nation of some millions, which the Pope said had solaced him so much in the midst of his misfortunes.

ALGERIA.—Freedom of worship is guaranteed by the French government: congregations of 250 members

are officially recognised. When thus recognised the pastors receive from the government 2,400 francs stipend, and 1,000 francs for a dwelling. There are now in Algeria 14 evangelical clergy—7 Lutheran and 7 Reformed; 11 churches are organized—scattered through the provinces of Algiers, Oran and Constantine. Schools are also at work in connection with these churches. An orphan-house in Dely-Ibrahim has 128 orphans.—*Neue Evang. Kirchenzeitung.*

A Secluded Missionary Station.—A letter in the *Delhi Gazette* describes a remote and almost unknown settlement of Moravian missionaries in a valley called Le Howl, about seventeen marches from Simla, and surrounded by snowy mountains more than twenty thousand feet in height. Four years ago the Moravians took up their abode among the inhabitants of this secluded spot, and the only communication they maintain with the civilised world is to send one of their number once a year to Simla, to lay in provision for a twelvemonth. They have derived their knowledge of the language from a vocabulary and a grammar published by a German, who has never been near Le Howl, and who lives in St. Petersburg.

ASIA.—Missions among the Shans.—Authentic information, says the *Rangoon Times*, has been received in town of a large emigration of Shans into British territory. They have come, it is said, from one of the adjacent states, which was nominally subject to the government of Burmah. For some reason, it appears, a Burmese force was sent against these people, probably to enforce the payment of revenue, when they attempted to resist, and coercion being employed, they abandoned their houses and lands, and fled for protection into Pegu. They are reported to number some ten thousand

souls of all ages. A *Tsaubwa*, or hereditary chief, is in company with them.

For the forty-nine years, during which missions have been in operation in the Burman empire, the Shans were wholly overlooked. Nothing was done for their moral or intellectual improvement. Just at the time, however, when the hands of the persecuting Burmese are raised against them for their oppression, the American Baptists have been adopting measures to send them the light of the Gospel by the hands of a missionary of the cross.

MADAGASCAR.—Radama II had transmitted a communication to the Governor of Mauritius, inviting a free intercourse, and the Legislative Council had dispatched a mission to congratulate his Majesty, and thank him for proposing facilities to commerce and trade. The Mauritius Society of Arts and Sciences also sent an address, soliciting the King to promote a display of some of the rich products of Madagascar at the Great International Exhibition of 1862. The King is reported to have proclaimed commercial liberty throughout his territory, with equitable customs regulations at every port, and at the same time to have intimated that he is not disposed to accept the protectorate of France or of any other Power, although he will readily listen to any friendly suggestions of the Emperor Napoleon. Meanwhile he has appointed an Englishman—Mr. Lambert, long a faithful adherent—as his Chief Minister, and has commissioned him to proceed as Ambassador to France and England, to procure a recognition of his Majesty, under the style of Radamah II, King of the Hovas. Madagascar is larger than Great Britain and Ireland; has rich mines of metals and coal; the soil is wonderfully productive, yielding valuable timber, dyewoods, and vegetable substances in endless variety; and the climate,

though bad on the coast, is healthy in the interior. Many persons, it is inferred, will settle when protection is afforded to Europeans.

Religious Liberty in EGYPT.—Some time in July last, a Syrian employé, or book-selling agent of the American Presbyterian missionaries, was cruelly bastinadoed and otherwise ill-treated by the *cadi* and other high Mohammedan functionaries of Siout, in Upper Egypt. As Siout is some hundreds of miles up the Nile, toleration has generally been thought to be out of the question there. Mr. Thayer, the consul-general of the United States at Alexandria, saw no reason for this, however, in the nature of things, and accordingly took the case up and fought it with vigor, perseverance, and success. He succeeded in having the *cadi* deposed, and thirteen of the other offenders, the wealthiest and most arrogant residents of Siout, imprisoned for one year, and ordered to pay a fine of \$5000 to Faris, the missionary agent, the amount being divided among them according to their respective degrees of culpability, and the money deposited in gold at the consulate. This is said to be the first time that religious toleration has been vindicated in Upper Egypt, and the missionaries and Christian residents are overjoyed, declaring that if the same vigorous treatment had been applied by foreign consuls at the beginning of the outrages in Syria, the massacres of Jeddah and Damascus would never have occurred.

The Samoan Mission.—Among the most remarkably successful missions of modern times, is that of the London Missionary Society to the Samoan Islands. The missionaries had the language to learn and reduce to writing, and the whole work of preparing books and of education to do. Their printing press arrived in 1839,

so recently did their work begin. In 1846 the translation of the New Testament was printed and in circulation, and in 1855 the Old Testament was finished. Attention was devoted from the first to the education of native helpers, and there are now, under the direction of the ten European missionaries, no less than 210 native preachers and other helpers. Population 84,000; churches 305; church members 2,600. They have sent home sometimes no less than \$3,000 a year to the treasury of the Society. They have bought books to the amount of more than \$10,000.

NEW SOUTH WALES has now a population of 350,553, against 251,884 for 1856, being an increase in five years of 98,719. The number of immigrants since 1851 is 147,661, of whom 71,849 were introduced at the public, and 76,012 at their own expense.

The Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa.—The South African *Advertiser* contains an account of what the Dutch Reformed Church has done in South Africa. It enumerates twenty-five churches, and about as many parsonages, beside several schools that have been built. Beside, the *Advertiser* says, "it has instituted a Theological Seminary, endowed with extensive buildings for residence of professors and accommodation of students, and a fund amounting already to at least £17,500, which continues to be swelled with additional liberal contributions. It has continued to spend at least £2,500 per annum for the education of its theological students in Europe. It has contributed for missions last year £900. It has raised a fund, already amounting to about £13,000, to provide for the widows of its clergy. It has lately contributed £1,740 for the deputation of one of its clergy, Dr. Robertson, to Europe to procure clergymen,

missionaries, and schoolmasters; and already, by that means, there have been engaged nine clergymen, two missionaries, and four schoolmasters."

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC WORLD.—The *Pontifical Calendar* for 1862 has just been published. It declares that there are 988 dioceses in the Catholic world, and that 75 episcopal sees, most of them Italian, are now vacant. It designates Cardinal Milesi as being still Legate at Bologna, and Mgr. Lasagni as being Legate at Forli; every thing is retained as if the Legations, the Marches, the Umbria, were still governed by the Holy See.

SCOTLAND.—The Presbyterian ministry of Scotland comprises, in the Established Church, 1,178; in the Free Church, 790; in the United Presbyterian Church, 526. The last of these denominations (the United Presbyterian) is in a flourishing state. The Presbytery of Edinburgh alone has fifty-four congregations, with a membership of 24,288. Three new congregations were organised in this Presbytery during the past year, and 2,776 persons were added to the membership of the churches. Besides laboring in Scotland, this Church has successful missions in the foreign field, and is exerting itself much to extend Presbyterianism in England. Rev. Drs. King and Macfarlane, well-known and able ministers, have left large and deeply attached charges in Glasgow, and accepted calls to new and promising congregations in London.

RELIGIOUS STATISTICS OF AUSTRIA.—The following religious statistics relative to Austria are extracted from a recent official return: The secular clergy consists of 55,870 members;

and among them are 1 patriarch, 4 primates, 11 archbishops, and 58 bishops. The number of monasteries is 720, and in them are 59 abbots, 45 provincials, 6,754 regular priests, 645 other priests, 240 novices, and 1,917 lay brethren. In the total, the Jesuits possess 17 houses, 2 provincials, and 188 priests. The number of convents is 298, and in them are 5,198 nuns. Of the total, 85 houses belong to Sisters of Charity, and they are occupied by 104 sisters. The revenue of ecclesiastical benefices is 8,772,984 florins, and the capital of them 99,186,000 florins. The convents have an income of 50,607,376 florins; the churches one of 6,083,281 florins, and a capital of 34,326,276 florins. The revenue of the schools is 329,252 florins, and their capital 152,233 florins; and charitable establishments have revenues of 12,083.

PROGRESS OF THE GOSPEL IN FRANCE.

—A late number of the *Archives du Christianisme* gives the following view of the progress of the Gospel in France: In 1819 the Lutheran and Reformed churches had in Paris, six pastors and three places of worship. Now there are forty-eight pastors of different denominations, and thirty-one places of worship. The first Protestant Sunday-school was opened at Paris, in 1822, with from fifteen to twenty scholars. The number of Protestant Sunday-schools in Paris is now from twenty-five to thirty, with from 2,500 to 3,000 scholars. In 1807, there were, in the whole of France, 227 pastors of the Reformed Church. In 1861, the number of Reformed Church pastors amounted to 658, and of Lutheran, and other Protestant denominations, 405—making altogether, 1,058 Protestant pastors, against 451 in 1807.

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ART. I.—PSYCHOLOGY AND SKEPTICISM.

By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D.D., Acting President of Union College.

IN the last number of this Quarterly, Art. I, there was an allusion to Art. I, Oct. 1861, of the *Princeton Repertory*, which was a Review of the new edition of Dr. Hickok's *Rational Psychology*. In that article it was said of the Review, "The only answer that is practicable would be that for which there is not a sufficient inducement, viz. the pointing out item by item the perpetual failures to attain the rational meaning of the work which the Reviewer has taken in hand."

It has since been understood, that thus declining to take up the points made in that Review, *seriatim*, and show their mistakes and fallacies, has been assumed by the author and his friends as a virtual admission that no valid reply can be made, and that the Review is really unanswerable. It may be that others adopt the same conclusion for the same reason; on this account, and because also there may be an occasion for showing the general bearing of the *Psychology* upon the

conflict with Skepticism, there is now found the motive to notice the Review sufficiently to show that it fails to make any point in direct issue with the method and meaning of the *Psychology*, and then occupy the remaining space afforded to us in considering the general bearing of the *Psychology* upon the different forms of Skepticism.

This proceeding item by item will admit of a classification, by arranging those of a similar kind into distinct paragraphs, and putting kindred mistakes and perversions into appropriate divisions.

The Introduction to the *Psychology* is almost wholly a statement of the methods and modes of argumentation by which the different forms of skepticism are induced and maintained. These are followed through the different intellectual processes of attaining knowledge in the Sense, the Understanding, and the Reason respectively. The skepticism thus brought out in its methods and conclusions is, in each function of knowing, specifically stated as demanding another method and mode of argument which the *Psychology* is to supply. In these statements of the arguments leading to and supporting skepticism there occur the following forms of expression. "The problem which philosophy has felt herself called upon to solve is this, How may the Intellect know that which is out of and at a distance from itself?"—"It is the testimony in the convictions of universal consciousness, that we perceive immediately the external objects themselves", etc.—"When the unexamined convictions of consciousness as direct for the immediate perception of an outer world are brought to the test of philosophical investigation—the demonstration comes out full, sound, and clear, that all such immediate knowledge is impossible." These declarations, with all others in connection with them, are the skeptic's mode of argumentation, and for the truth and validity of which the author of the *Psychology* is no otherwise responsible than that they should give a fair representation of the skeptical process. They are not his method, his arguments, nor his conclusions, and are given expressly to show the necessity

that he should meet them by an altogether different process ; they can furnish no data for deducing any possible conclusions in refutation of his philosophy.

But this Reviewer assumes them to be the veritable logic of the author of the *Psychology*, and in various ways refutes, and turns to absurdity and ridicule, the processes of the *Psychology* itself, by making it responsible for what belongs solely to the skeptic. Under this head, among others, come the following items :

“ ‘The problem which philosophy has felt herself called upon to solve’, says Dr. Hickok, ‘is this : How may the Intellect know that which is out of and at a distance from itself?’ This abstract question will be better comprehended by an example. I hold in my hand a cane. So it seems ; but perhaps my senses deceive me. It may be an elephant. It may be a whale.” (Princ. Rev. p. 578.)

Again :

“Dr. Hickok admits this common and inevitable conviction of consciousness in all mankind. He says, ‘It is the testimony in the convictions of universal consciousness, that we perceive immediately the external objects themselves. Every man is convinced that it is the outer object, and not some representation of it which he perceives’, etc.—“But is this necessary and universal testimony of consciousness in all men true? No ; but utterly false in the estimation of Dr. Hickok. He adds immediately, ‘When the unexamined convictions of consciousness as direct for the immediate perception of an outer world are brought to the test of philosophical investigation—the demonstration comes out full, sound, and clear, that all such immediate knowledge is impossible. The very sensation through which the knowledge is given is wholly mental’, etc.” (pp. 579, 580).

Again, after having stated that the Method of the *Psychology* requires the Subjective Idea of the Intellect to be first attained, the Reviewer proceeds to say :

“It might seem that a Rational Psychology is completed. No : it is but half done. We must now find, empirically, minds actually existing and working after the manner of this subjective idea. It should seem then that this part of the work would be somewhat troublesome, since we must find what is sought in the use of that same consciousness whose inevitable witness in all men reason” [as used by the skeptic but not by Dr. Hickok] “has demonstrated to be utter falsehood” (p. 582).

And again, giving very erroneously what he says is Dr. Hickok's doctrine of perception, that "sensation being given which has neither shape, color, or anything resembling any material property—the understanding, thereupon, takes the dumb, shapeless sensation and forms an image of its outward cause" (Dr. Hickok's "Understanding" never forms "images"), we have the following :

"Dr. Hickok declares it to be the full, sound, clear demonstration of reason that all immediate knowledge in consciousness of external things is impossible.—Mental affections have no resemblance to outward things; the understanding has neither seen the outward thing nor any resemblance of it, save in the image which she herself has drawn. How does the understanding know that her image is *like* the outward thing? It is plainly impossible to form a judgment of resemblance, unless one first knows the things between which the resemblance holds. But this the *Psychology* affirms" [not the *Psychology*, but the *Psychology* states that the skeptic affirms] "the understanding cannot know; she knows no outward thing, save through the images which are not given in sense, but which she herself has drawn. *It is, therefore, upon the system of the Rational Psychology, plainly impossible to know an outward object unless we know it before we know it*" (pp. 587, 588).

Once more only :

"The *Psychology* speaks of 'reason's demonstration' as 'full, sound, and clear', that all such direct knowledge of outward things is impossible. But the demonstration of the transcendental reason has no steps, no argument, no process. It is not a discursive faculty. What it sees, it sees by direct and immediate insight, or not at all. We need not therefore be troubled by the word 'demonstration'; nor are we to look for reason's reasoning to find its full, clear, and sound demonstration. The alleged demonstration we shall find to be simply its dogma, which is certainly 'full' enough; whether it be certainly sound and clear, we now call in question" (p. 588).

In all the above, among other cases of the like kind, the mistake of the Reviewer in putting Dr. Hickok's statement of the skeptic's processes of argumentation for the logic of Dr. Hickok himself, has made the *Psychology* in his view very erroneous, absurd, and ridiculous.

The *Psychology* anticipates that, in order to any knowledge in sense, organs of sense must be possessed and that these or-

gans must in some way be affected and induce a sensation. No organ, or an organ vacant of all content of sensation, and there can be no perception. The organ and its content in sensation being anticipated, the Subjective Idea of all Intelligence in the sense is then attained by determining that this content of sensation in the organ must be *distinguished* from all but itself in order to the knowing of its peculiar *quality*, and must also be completely *defined*, or constructed within limits, in order to the knowing of its total *quantity*. The necessary elements of these intellectual operations of distinguishing and of defining are found, and in these is the Idea of perception given. So far as the law for distinguishing and defining can be carried out, so far and no further can a distinct and definite perception be attained.

And now, not solely these necessary operations of distinguishing and defining the content in the organ is taken by the Reviewer as essential to the Subjective Idea, but he assumes it to be incumbent upon the *Psychology* to expound every question that can be raised about the sense, and even the whole subject of spiritual agency. By emphasizing "the Idea of *all* Intelligence", and "the whole ground of *possibility* for bringing a content in the sensibility within the light of consciousness", he assumes the *Psychology* attempts to explain all that mind can do. He mistakes the necessity and the attempt in the *Psychology* to show some things that are conditional for all perception, as if it were necessary and was attempted to show all that there is in perception, and even all that spiritual intelligence can and cannot do. Not the operations of *distinction* and *limitation*, which is all the *Psychology* needs or proposes, but how the content gets into the sense, how we think, how we remember, etc., must all be expounded. By this mistake of his, the *Psychology* comes to be very irreverently and very ludicrously presumptuous.

The following are among the particular items of this egregious mistake about the *Psychology* :

"Now this Idea or plan must include all the plans, methods, and means within the limits of Divine wisdom to devise and of Infinite power to execute. The Lord God must not be able to go beyond. If he can, then

'the Subjective Idea of *all* Intelligence'—and of course a Rational Psychology—is impossible" (p. 585).

"But so far is the human reason from being competent to give the Idea of *all* Intelligence, that it is unable, even with all the aids of experience, to give the idea of any intelligence at all, in the sense here intended. It can never comprehend how the knowledge of outward things reaches the mind through any one of the few senses which the Creator has given us. All is to us inexplicable. What is true of outward objects, is true of all knowledge of things within. How we think; how we remember—no man can explain. No man could tell *à priori* that minds could be made so as to be able to remember anything. Tell us, Dr. Hickok, *how* are so many things laid up in the storehouse of memory? Tell us the *à priori* idea of constituting a mind so as to remember anything? How the knowledge of anything reaches the mind through any of our senses, no man can explain. No man could have been the counsellor of the Lord in these things, so as to have given him the *à priori* subjective idea of any intelligence" (p. 585).

This mistake also affords occasion for very interesting facetiousness:

"Now if Dr. Hickok could have reasoned out *à priori* the whole apparatus of our five senses, he could not even then have given us the idea of any intelligence. But our few senses may give us knowledge only of a few of the properties of material objects. An Oyster may know external objects by properties which none of our senses enable us to discover" (p. 586).

"But now instead of an Oyster, or a man, take Voltaire's Micromegas from the Dog-star with his thousand senses; or the inhabitant of Saturn with his seventy-two senses; each sense making its possessor cognizant of external things by means of properties and sensations to us unknown and inconceivable. *What* is the content in the sensory from each of these? *How* is the sensation accomplished? *How* does the sensation reach the mind? Unless Dr. Hickok can tell us all this, and tell us also, whether more senses and properties are possible, and what, and how many are possible, he is entirely incompetent to give the Subjective Idea of *all* Intelligence" (p. 587).

The *Psychology* finds no occasion for telling, and makes no attempt to explain how the organic sensibility of an oyster may be affected, nor how Voltaire's Littlegreat, with his thousand senses from the Dog-star, nor Saturn's inhabitant with seventy-two senses, may receive their organic content. All that is needed is the anticipation of an organ of sense, and an affection of the organ for each perception, whether less or

more, and then the idea of *all* intelligence in the sense is found in this, namely, a clear conception of the intellectual process of distinguishing and defining this content. Both an oyster and a dweller in the stars must have organs, and these affected so as to contain a sensation, if they have any perception, and we need not inquire *how*, nor *what*, nor how *various*; all too must be intellectually *distinguished* and *defined*, and the exact determining of these intellectual processes is the attained idea of *all* perception, for so far as these processes can be carried out, and no further, can we perceive anything distinctly and definitely.

The *Psychology* speaks of "finding the idea", "finding the reason", "finding the absolute", etc., meaning by this "finding", that we attain to so clear and complete a conception of the thing in the thought, that we can apprehend its intrinsic peculiarities, and see how its distinctive ends may be attained by it.

The Reviewer mistakes this "finding" for the knowing them as existing and acting realities, and deems that, until "found", they neither act nor are. This gross mistake appears in divers forms and places, and the consequences derived from it afford him, manifestly, some of his most satisfactory hits at the *Psychology*.

"All this must be done ere we can know that such a faculty as the reason exists or is possible. Reason must find sense and understanding, and establish their idea and law; then reason must find herself, by establishing her own idea and law. Until she has done this, we know not that there are any facts, or world, or understanding, or science, or reason, or anything. All this must stand in abeyance until the reason is found and verified. If this search after the reason fails, then all has failed, and we know not anything. Such is the *Rational Psychology*. Such is the method by which she proposes to solve the problem (p. 582).

"In the view of the *Rational Psychology*, we know not yet that we have any faculty of the reason, nor whether such a faculty is possible. We have not yet an idea of what it is, or what it must be. Not knowing that we have any reason, we must now set reason to form an idea of what reason must be, and then to find itself as actually existing" (p. 589).

"Now 'the reason as faculty' must find the absolute, not through 'the things that are made', but by her own 'insight'; and that, while it is alto-

gether uncertain that such a faculty as reason either is or can be, she must first find the absolute as an *a priori* position for finding herself. Till this is done reason cannot be found. And now farewell sense; farewell understanding; farewell worlds! None of you can help us in the transcendental flight which we are now to take on the wings of reason, to find whether reason is or can be" (p. 591).

"On the system of the *Rational Psychology* we are not yet allowed to know that there are any facts, or any physical system. It is true, that reason has professed to verify sense and understanding, and has set forth Ontological Demonstrations of the validity of their object. But the reason itself is not yet found, and her Demonstrations go as yet for nothing. She alone as yet vouches for sense and understanding. It is therefore impossible for us, at present, to know that there are any facts, or anything physical. If reason now fails, sense fails, understanding fails, Ontological Demonstrations fail, the *Rational Psychology* fails, and goes beyond redemption to *Limbus Patrum*, or to the *Ivory Gate*, whence dreams and unrealities alone come forth to the upper world" (p. 607).

Once more only :

"Could the *Psychology* survive at this point, its destiny awaits it a little further on; for its all-comprehending agency, the reason, must comprehend universal nature in its 'consummation'. And it must wait to prove its idea by *facts*. Till it finds these it cannot find the reason. But the final chorus of glory at the consummation of the world cannot be found as a fact without waiting till the period comes. The finding of the reason must therefore be adjourned till the end of the world. Sense, understanding, and physical facts must also wait. On the principles of the *Rational Psychology*, therefore, while the world stands, it is impossible for man to know anything" (p. 608).

The *Psychology* demands, and assumes to have found, the clear conception of what reason is, as distinct from physical causality, or animal sensibility, and can thus use its conception in the investigation of all rational topics, but it does not suppose reason itself not to be, nor not to be active in this very search to find itself. And so of the Absolute. The *Psychology* "finds" the clear conception of what the absolute is, as distinct from all dependent and conditioned being, and can thus use its conception in all theological investigations intelligibly, but does not suppose that until such conception is "found", that God is not, and is not acting, nor that he may not be very acceptably worshipped and served even

by multitudes who have never yet "found" this clear philosophical idea of him.

Philosophically to "find" the human eye would be to attain a clear conception of its structure, its adaptations to the light, and its conformity with all optical laws; nor can any man intelligibly talk about the facts of vision without such a philosophical conception of the eye; but this does not subject the philosopher to any deep mortification, because some officious critic does not see how, until the eye be "found", there can be anything but utter darkness. A philosophical investigation of consciousness must first "find" a clear conception of consciousness, but that would not be a very philosophical laugh, nor exactly at the philosopher's expense, which should be raised by him who deemed that till he had so "found" his consciousness, the philosopher must himself be in utter unconsciousness.

The *Psychology* proceeds upon the assumption that there are rational principles, true in themselves, unchangeable and forever; not so made and might have been otherwise made, but antecedent to and controlling all making that is righteous and wise. It supposes that all action without the guidance of such principle is irrational, and all action against such principle is wrong. That God, who is absolute reason, guides his omnipotence by such rational principle, and could in no other manner be holy or wise. That these principles are given in the absolute reason, and are not thus out of God, but because God is, so they are, and therefore his ends of action are ever found within himself, and all he does is for his glory, or for his name's sake. These principles may be either ethical, mathematical, or physical, and wherever our finite reason can catch any apprehension of them, so far we can learn the holiness and wisdom of the Deity, and determine wherein it behooved him to put forth his power in creating and governing, and there can be neither moral, mathematical, nor physical science, in any rational acceptance, without the recognition of these eternal principles.

This ground of procedure in the *Psychology* is deemed by

the Reviewer to be in all ways derogatory to God ; that it restricts his action to the ideas in the human reason, takes from him all power to plan, and thus all design and wisdom, and destroys his capability to choose, and thereby deprives him of all free agency. This view of what is derogatory to God is partly in his mistaken and faulty apprehension of the *Psychology*, but more in an entirely sophistical process of logical thinking.

“The reason, therefore, seeing, prior to all experience, how minds *must* be constituted, and how they *must* have a knowledge of outward things, if ever they have such knowledge ; and seeing this by a ‘Principle’ which God did not establish, neither can he evade or alter it ; seeing it is ‘eternal’, ‘necessary’, ‘unmade’, and consequently is not conditioned by power, but must condition all power, and so must condition even the power of God ; the reason seeing this principle by her own insight, determines ‘THE SUBJECTIVE IDEA OF ALL INTELLIGENCE’. If God makes an intelligent being, he must make it after this plan. No other can be made. If God can deviate from this subjective Idea, in making intelligent beings, then, by the fundamental condition of the *Rational Psychology*, all Rational Psychology is impossible ; for that eternal, necessary, and unmade principle, which conditions all power, need not be followed after all, and the *Psychology* may be wholly at fault” (p. 581).

We notice in this extract here, only so much as is made to seem to limit God by the idea of human reason. The human reason is supposed to find the eternal principle, and then God must conform to this principle which man has found, and by which has been determined his “subjective idea of all intelligence”. The only answer that is needed to this is, that the idea in God and man is the same, and is in truth only the Divine idea which the finite mind has been able to apprehend, as alike in kind though less complete in degree. Should it be alleged that human and divine ideas cannot be the same, we should reply, then God’s righteousness and God’s wisdom cannot be like human righteousness and human wisdom in kind ; and there must be one kind of morality, and mathematics, and science, for God, and another kind for man. If, then, the principle and the idea be the same in kind, and really the divine principle and idea, there can be no disparagement to God that he should guide his power by it.

But the Reviewer has a further and a deeper difficulty, namely, that God's wisdom and adaptive intelligence or power to plan, are annihilated by the assumption of such eternal principle and determined idea.

"It used to be thought that the astronomical arrangements of the universe manifest in a wonderful manner the wisdom and knowledge of God. But Dr. Hickok has corrected this mistake; they manifest only the 'unmade principle' which 'conditions all power'" (p. 596).

"Unmade principles 'condition all power' and determine the rest, whether God will or not. On this latter supposition the Creator is not God; nor could it with any propriety be said, 'O Lord, how manifold are thy works; in *wisdom* hast thou made them all'. Their designs, adaptations, forms, organizations, were not from him, nor was there any wisdom in the case; nor had the Creator any power to exercise wisdom in what has hitherto seemed the result of design, wisdom, knowledge, and skill."—"No conception of God can possibly originate in this scheme. He is unnecessary. The designs of order, harmony, adaptive intelligence, are none of his; nor do they lead to him; they lead only to the unmade, eternal, and necessary principle" (p. 601).

The sophistry of all this is found in the false conception that God can be, and yet be abstracted from all possession of unmade principles and eternal ideas. God cannot be without power, the Reviewer would doubtless admit. Very well; God is omnipotent; but is naked Omnipotence God? He has not, we will suppose, created as yet, he stands alone, he has all power; but he has no principle, no idea, he is mere blind power. Is there any wisdom here? No, he must have principles to guide his power, or he can be neither right nor wise. Shall his power make his principles? There must be a guide in thus making principles as much as in making any thing, otherwise the mere blind power making principles any way will do, and one way just as well as another. There must then be principle and idea before making anything, and that brings out "unmade principle", "eternal principle", "necessary principle" conditioning the highest power.

The Reviewer in other connections has precluded himself from his own logic, for he has admitted these immutable unmade principles. In an article in the *American Presbyterian* he, with much spirit, repels the natural conclusion of Dr.

Lewis, in an Article on The Two Philosophies in a former number of this REVIEW, that from the above forms of expression he must resolve all morality into prudence and can have no immutable right. He affirms the doctrine of immutable morality, and that Omnipotence cannot be conceived to change the distinctions of right and wrong. In this Review of the *Psychology* we have also the same admission of immutable principles. "Experience may show us that so far as we can observe, two straight lines never *do* enclose a space; it is reason that tells they never *can*. So far as we can observe in experience nothing ever *does* begin without a cause. We see directly by reason that nothing ever *can* so begin. The child and the savage do not wait to learn by experience that the whole is ever equal to the sum of all its parts; they see intuitively by the reason that it *must* be so" (p. 609). Is not here the whole matter? If God would enclose a space by material lines, who made the principle that he must at least take three lines to do it? Is not here an unmade principle conditioning all power, and controlling in physics as immutably as he admits and claims the eternal right controls in morals? Might he not also add, reason sees that stronger forces must overcome the weaker? if one force take the position of another, it must remove this other? and that action and reaction must be opposite and equal? And may not such physical principles lead to a broad field of physical truths which must condition all power and be as truly unmade as any ethical or mathematical principles? Does it exclude wisdom to follow the guide of such principles? Can that power be wise which is not so guided? Can there be the conception of the true God, no matter how much power, abstracted from the eternal possession of such eternal principles? Could God, or any being, plan or have "adaptive intelligence", if he had not prior to his plan the unmade principles determining the arrangement, and testing the wisdom of the plan only as it had been conditioned by them? Wisdom is not therefore lost in the presence of unmade eternal principles, it cannot possibly be but in their presence.

But there is still a stranger sophistry. The Reviewer in-

sists that with the presence of these unmade principles God cannot choose; he is by them deprived of free agency:

"There are two suppositions possible on this subject, and only two. The first is, that God *had some choice*, and exercised some *design* in forming the astronomical and cosmical arrangements of the universe. The second supposition is, that God *could not choose*; but that eternal and unmade principle was above him, which was 'conditioned by no power', but which 'must itself condition all power'. On the former supposition, no created reason can ascend *a priori* to the necessary laws of the universe; for by the supposition they are neither necessary, unmade, nor eternal. They stand in no eternal necessity, but depend on the free choice, design, and wisdom of God; who may ordain and establish them as he pleases, in endless variety of choice."—"Take now the second supposition, viz. that God is conditioned by eternal, unmade, necessary, physical principles, which condition all power, and which consequently control the cosmical arrangements of his creation, if he creates; while he has neither option, power, or wisdom, other than simply to put his acts in counteraction, and take the necessary results" (pp. 599, 600).

The amount of this is, where there are no unmade eternal principles God can choose, where there are such principles God cannot choose. In morals and in mathematics he has expressly claimed and asserted, as above shown, that there are such principles; we might thus in these two fields, at least, leave the Reviewer to reconcile his own doctrines with his logic. But it is easy to expose the sophistry. It involves the power of "contrary choice" with a vengeance. Not merely does it involve the doctrine of "power to the opposite" when the strongest motive in greatest happiness is applied, but power to the opposite in God when the claim of principle in his own glory and dignity is applied; and because such principle is a necessary one in God's own being, the power to the opposite cannot be, and therefore God cannot choose. Whether now the Reviewer intentionally adopts the doctrine of "contrary choice" or "power to the opposite" or not, the statement involves it, and the sophistry lies in supposing that the alternatives are excluded by the necessity of the principle and not by the perfections of the divine Agent. An unmade, necessary principle may admit of the alternative of its violation and the power of the disobedient agent may

refuse to be conditioned by it, but the perfections of God forbid that there can ever come the tempting occasion for him to violate it. He is absolute Reason, and the supposition of his violation would at once make him to become Unreason. The principle lies in the very essence of his own being; he can get nothing but dishonor, or the loss of his own glory, in any conceivable way by violating the necessary principle. His perfections secure that what might admit of violation in itself, yet will never admit of the actual fact of violation, from the impossibility that there should ever arise an occasion for it. God will ever choose to stand by his own glory. "He abideth faithful, he cannot deny himself." The unmade principle must, thus, condition Omnipotence, and he must choose to have it, or his power stains his own glory for no possible motive. Nothing out of him can condition him, only that which is from within himself, and it is precisely this peculiarity and prerogative of Deity that makes him absolute; it absolves him from all possible dependence, or subjection to any conditioning from beyond himself.

The last paragraph we shall need in this matter, we fill out by saying—That the *Psychology* supposes universal material nature to be the perpetual product of the Creator's continued agency, and that a central action constructs and guides the material universe. That when material nature is prepared for it, vegetable and sentient life, in their several species of being, have their successive introduction by new creative acts, and that lastly, Man as sentient and rational is made. As nature in material being is a perpetuated product from the beginning, and constructed into form by God's central working, securing the gravitating, chemical, and crystallizing forces in their order, so the vital force is a perpetual product of his hand, and has its central salient point from which it works out in all ways to complete and sustain the body it vitalizes. The plant sends its "root downward and bears fruit upward," and the animal begins its embryo pulsations from a central heart, which ultimately works out the mature body, and both plant and animal have one life in every part, and that one life works

on according to its rudimental law through all the successive generations of the species. Nothing is fragmentary, but all has its central bond of unity.

The Reviewer does not comprehend this, but ignores it wholly, and counts it all to be a dreaming conceit and folly. With him nature is as the senses give it, phenomenon after phenomenon, singly and separate except as placed in juxtaposition, and God creates particle by particle, and puts together bit by bit, as men build their structures with hammer and trowel, fitting and laying one material upon another. That the whole should grow into unity from one central agency, and have one energizing connection through and in every element, is to him inconceivable. Such a substantial force distinct from its qualities, and itself inducing its qualities through our organs of sensation, is the "Nothing" of which President Edwards said, "The sleeping rocks do dream of" (p. 592).

"*Pure acts, or pure activity*, is supposed. But the conception of these involves neither thought, nor knowledge, nor will,—nor anything save pure activity. The only thing left us to account for is, how these pure acts can come into counteraction. No design or will is necessary for this. They must act somehow; they may as well come into counteraction as to act in any other way. Or being constantly and necessarily active, these acts may *chance* to come in counteraction; and then a world is made quite as surely and as well, as though the counteraction were designed. If a world is not the necessary result, even upon such chance counteraction, then the 'un-made principle' fails, and the *Rational Psychology* is, on its own showing, an impossibility" (p. 602).

The meaning of this is, that if the central agency constitutes forces which continuously build up the universe of material worlds according to a determinate law of its own working, then all wisdom or will is unnecessary, a personal God is quite superfluous, and chance is fully competent to accomplish the whole. If brick by brick is not put together by outside agency, and if one central force makes every element grow into a living Temple, then a God is unnecessary. Such an intelligent agent is needed for the first, but chance without plan or wisdom is quite adequate to the last. The tree may be put together with tenon and mortise, and such carpentry

may put successive trees together, each part only *joined to* other parts, and each successive tree independent of all its predecessors, and this will need a workman of plan, and wisdom, and free-will; but if one salient force *live in* and make *concrete* every part, and still work on in unbroken agency down through every successor, according to some determined idea by an unmade principle, then we can get along quite as well without any rational intelligence, and chance will answer every purpose. If chance, and such a chance must surely be a chance, after having possession of this unmade principle, and having put the precise idea as the determining law for the particular species of tree, should then start this central action in accordance with the idea, and the tree should not grow and propagate other trees after its kind interminably, why "then the unmade principle fails, and the *Rational Psychology* is, on its own showing, an impossibility!"

We have now, most patiently and honestly followed out item by item the points attempted to be made against the *Rational Psychology* in the aforesaid Review, and if other items remain, of even less significance, they have not been overlooked but duly noted in our own reading, and we say in plain sincerity, there is not a single point there which is not a sophism or a blunder. The *Psychology* was designed to meet skepticism in fields which the Reviewer has not traversed, and which has its bearings against both philosophy and religion in threatening directions which he has not apprehended, and in his honest zeal for what in all sincerity he believes to be the good cause, he has been induced to intermeddle in a contest, when he neither knows the significance of it nor the necessity for it.

A few general remarks may, perhaps, profitably here be made of the bearing of Psychology upon the Skeptical theories of the age, and the only philosophical and conclusive methods of meeting them.

Skepticism is legitimate and praiseworthy when it doubts from want of light, and waits that ultimate conviction may

be intelligent and valid. Dogmatic skepticism is simply an arbitrary perverseness and deserves no regard. No matter what the light from logic or reason, it merely repeats its *non credo* without being able to say why to itself or others. But skepticism, to be of any danger as a foe or to be of any respect as an antagonist, must have its intelligible reasons for its doubting, and stand on grounds that will admit the opportunity of direct assault and at least of a well-meant defence. If at length in the conflict it be found that the assailant stands on the same ground really with the skeptic, then certainly it can further be of little avail for the former to press upon the latter the weight of authority, or considerations of expediency; he must perforce change his position or he cannot make any conquest. The real ground of the skeptic must be fairly apprehended and the whole method and manner of his defences, and then some position must be attained which fully controls his entrenchments, and in such a state of the parties the conflict can neither be long nor doubtful.

For this reason the Introduction to the *Psychology* is mainly occupied in a comprehensive summary of the methods and arguments of the skeptic in their wide varieties. The argument is sometimes conducted as if taking the skeptic's place and carrying it out in his own person, but it must be a careless or incompetent reader who shall be in danger of mistaking the Psychologist for the Skeptic, since everywhere the argument given is made the very reason for the rational psychological investigation. With the whole field of skepticism before us we are prepared to take our stand and measures intelligibly.

Skepticism must be met rationally and not empirically. Its whole life and root is in the illusions of sense, or the taking of mental constructions for the perceivings of sense, or the alleged necessary limitation of the cognitions by sense and the denial that we can know anything beyond sense and the judgments induced and upheld by it. It claims that all experience is in sense, or in the mental positing of objects taken for sense, or that no faculty of the human mind can carry its knowledge beyond the elements given in experience; and with such data it is well prepared to establish its doubts that

experience can have anything but subjective validity, that an objective world can have any reality, or that man can possibly know anything beyond this subjective world taken as nature and rise to any communion with the supernatural. The battle for a real nature and a real supernatural on the ground of experience, or any deductions from the facts given in experience, will never terminate in the defeat of the skeptic and the establishment of science, for the very conflict is ultimately in the question whether experience itself can be trusted? and the testimony of experience in its own favor will not satisfy the doubting. If we are not competent truly to examine experience itself, and find a higher light to reveal it than that which it gives to reveal its own phenomena, then surely science is a long way from the time when she shall put off her harness; and yet it may be as well put off as on, for philosophy in such restrictions has no power to use it. Both philosophy and the Bible assume man to be rational, with higher powers than sense and mere judgments according to sense, which is so far experience and all of experience, and with such powers he can philosophize about experience itself and prove its revealings, and with such powers he can also clearly see in the things that are made a supernatural "power and Godhead." The man, who stands on the same restricted ground of experience as the skeptic, may as well at once save his labor and mortification by declining all contest with the skeptic.

But how shall we avail ourselves of this higher light to convince and cure the skeptic? His eye takes in nothing and exercises its vision in no way but through the medium of experience, and hence his skepticism. We answer: his very skeptical arguings evince either the want or the fear of something beyond experience, and the strugglings, at least, to find or to flee the revealings of this higher light of reason, and which, if once attained, prepares him to admit the validity of the still higher testimony of Divine Revelation, in which alone are the heavenly doctrines that save the soul. Put then this light of reason before him; state clearly as your own conceptions enable you, the *a priori* truths that lie at the basis of ex-

perience and without which experience could not be; they are clear in their own light to him whose rational eye is open; it may be that he will see, it will be that some will see, though it is also true that many will not see, the clear idea that determines and expounds experience so far as to establish the objective validity of the things given in experience, and also so far as to clear the conviction that there is a personal God above and encompassing the whole world of experience.

But why go this roundabout with the skeptic, through the difficult paths of philosophy? Why not go at once to the highest of all testimony in divine Revelation? We answer, well; best of all; if so be the skeptic will take Heaven's testimony and be wise by what is written. But in most cases, in all matured cases, the skeptic has shut the Bible as a book of infallible teaching. The man who doubts an Objective world, or a personal God who made and governs it, is not in a state where it is to be expected that he shall read the Bible profitably and believingly. If he should, he would still need the rational teaching, as above, if not for his own sake, at least for many remaining skeptics who will not otherwise follow biblical teaching as he did. This skepticism is everywhere growing around us. The Christian, especially the Christian Minister, needs to know how rationally to meet it. He is destined to many a painful rebuff and mortifying defeat, if he find he can only stand on the skeptic's ground, and have turned back on him his own logic with nothing left but denunciation, and decrying philosophy, and railing at reason.

There are three functions for knowing, and in all these there is an occasion for three forms of skepticism in reference to the objects attained in each, and thus also a necessity for meeting skepticism through a rational psychological investigation, separately, of these three functions, the Sense, the Understanding, and the Reason.

The skepticism occasioned in the Sense is less extensive and of less importance than in the others, but still of so much import that on its own account it requires a refutation, beside

that it is a necessary preliminary in both the appreciating and the refuting of the skepticism in the two others. The psychology of the Sense shows that in order to true perception of phenomena there must be organs, and these organs affected by some impression which shall induce sensation in the organ. This sensation as simply contained in the organ is a content of the sense, and this furnishes all the organic conditions for a perception. This organic content must be brought into phenomenal completeness by a purely mental operation in two ways, one of which shall *distinguish* the content from all others, and thus give the perception of its *peculiar Quality*, and the other shall *define* it by constructing its limits and thus give the perception of its *total Quantity*. This gives a distinct and definite perception.

If then nervous, or abnormal, or morbid affections be given, and the mental operations of distinction and conjunction bring out their Quality and Quantity, there may be seeming appearances which are not true phenomena. Such are the hallucinations of a brain-fever or a fit of *delirium tremens*, such the organic illusions of a roaring or ringing in the ears, or of spots in the eye, and of dreams, etc. Hence may arise ground for skepticism of all phenomena. Is not the whole matter of sense hallucination and dream? Our psychology enables us to see from the laws of the sense what is a legitimate use of the functions of the Sense, and we can give attention directly to the signs which prove the organ to have a real impression and affection, and thus a true content and a truly distinguished and defined phenomenon. These test signs may be found in noting that the organ is affected only in peculiar conditions; such as that it is opened, or put in a certain direction, and that in only the one direction it can be, and in that direction and condition it cannot but be, affected, and that two or more different organs conspire in their affections in that one condition. In such ways we may wholly exclude all doubt, and know that the perceiving is not a fantasy and delusion, but a genuine sensation which is known as a true phenomenon. This can, however, reach only to the phenomenal; what the affection has come from, and what

that thing is in itself, the clearest perception must leave in doubt.

The phenomena of the sense are all thoroughly subjective and belong in each case only to the one person whose organs have been affected. Each man's bitter, or cold, or color, is a phenomenon for himself only, and it is impossible for one man to say what the same given name actually expresses in another man. Every one has his own phenomena, and no other man can come in communion with him in the *same*, and only in supposed *similar* phenomena. As the phenomena are subjective, so are their respective spaces and times subjective. The red color in one man's organic perception fills so much space, and continues so long a period to him, and with nothing but the sense-phenomenon, as he could not commune with another in the phenomenon itself, so he could not commune with another in its spaces and times. It would be as exclusively *his* space and time for the real phenomenon as for his dreams. With nothing but the knowledge the sense gives, there could be no determination of any one common space and common time. Every man's phenomena would be respectively each in his own space and his own time.

The *Psychology* reveals how the phenomena in sense can, and how only it can, be connected in judgments in the understanding in one common space and one common time for all percipients. It can only be as the phenomena stand connected in a permanent substance and a continual causal source for all, so that the subjective phenomena in each shall have a common substance and common cause as objective for all. The common substance will determine the common space, and the common cause will determine the common period for all.

The skepticism here is, that as the phenomena are all subjective, and all men's phenomenal places and successions are only in each man's own spaces and times, so all the experiences of sense may be only subjective, each man for himself in waking as in dreaming or musing meditation. His own mental action may make his whole experience, and as the German Egoist

will show, one absolute thought-process will give all the possible experiences of both man and the Deity.

Now the necessary principle of the common space and time determination found in the *Psychology* is an effectual, and the only possible way of destroying the skeptical argument against the validity of an objective world. All men have a knowledge of phenomenal objects as in one common space and common time for all. The Berkleian Sensationalist, the German Egoist, cannot give such common space and time; only a permanently substantial and perpetually causal nature of things can possibly effect this.

When the permanently substantial and perpetually causal nature of things is truly found and validly proved, then, so far as the judgments of the understanding can reach, the substances permanently stand and the causes perpetually work, and the one substantial universe is successively passing through its changing stages. We can never think, only as we connect the thoughts in their notional subjects and efficiencies. We can only predicate qualities of substances and passing events of causes. We can run up and down the whole range of an enduring but still changing universe; we can never by these logical processes of judging get out of it. We truly know the natural, but we can neither know nor conceive what is the supernatural. Our functions of knowing, so far, give us truly the finite and the conditioned; the Infinite and the Absolute are, to these functions, as inconceivable as they are unknowable.

Here then is the deepest and the direst skepticism, and the whole force of the Scottish Common Sense and the German Transcendentalism can no more deliver itself from its bonds than the bald naturalism of Hume and of Comte. They all run radically in one track; they lay down only the conditioned course of the logical understanding; and the first is concluded in and confirms the skepticism as thoroughly though not as ostentatiously as the last. And here is the frequent and exhaustless source of the ever-changing phases of skepticism, running out in fatalism and positivism on the material side, and up into primitive beliefs and abstract

thought-processes on the spiritual side, but all as surely passing into Pantheism as the one perpetually linked process of the same logical function can carry them. The thinking world is full of skepticism, it is restrained and concealed far more by the spontaneous working of the reason and the conscience than by any intellectual demonstrations, and discountenanced more from religious feeling and regard to divine Revelation than from any convictions of its philosophical error. Indeed the philosophies of Christendom are mainly on its side and in its favor, and many a Theist defends his creed, illogically or by naked divine authority, when the whole basis and superstructure of his philosophy, if fairly examined, will be found standing on the common domain of the large family of skeptics.

Psychology discloses a clear and complete conception of the function of the Reason, as distinct in its order of working from the logical Understanding as that is distinct from the conjoining Sense, and which reveals as fairly to the knowledge how substance can begin and how cause can be guided, as how phenomena can be defined and events connected. The knowing by the reason is found in its determined law, as fully as the knowing in sense or in the logical understanding.

With this function for knowing, there is not the necessity, as with the logical understanding, for a perpetual return to subject and cause as the media of discursive connection in the thought, but the essential elements which separate person from thing are found, and a spiritual agent, spontaneous and yet guided by his own law in himself, is plainly competent to originate acts which do not, like physical effects, always demand to be a production of what already exists in another form.

An Absolute Spirit; not such absolute as might vainly be sought in sense, viz. a thing as entire and yet beyond limits; or in the understanding, viz. a thing beyond any outer conditions, like a Cause which is no effect from a previous cause; but absolute, inasmuch as absolved and free from all outer and other conditions than such as are seen and known in himself, and thus self-governed and a Cause in Liberty.

Such an Absolute Spirit is at once known as free from nature ; above nature ; the Supernatural ; and thus competent to make nature, to guide nature, to introduce new substances and causes into nature, or to annihilate nature at his will. With such a function of knowing fully apprehended, we are no longer shut hopelessly within nature, but we rise above it and comprehend it in its known personal God and Creator. This is the only true conception of a Deity, and gives a philosophy and a Theology which stands out distinct from pantheism and polytheism, and excludes all atheism and skepticism. Nor is it possible philosophically to be a Theist but within the conclusions of such a psychology. A Theist, and a spiritual worshipper of God, on the faith of Revelation, many a man may be without any philosophy ; yea, with a philosophy that would logically exclude the very God he worships ; but an intelligent Theist must have a philosophy that can find its way to the supernatural, and recognize Jehovah in his absolute Personality ; and such a philosophy excludes and corrects all Skepticism. "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord, which is, and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty."

ART. II.—COMPARATIVE GRAMMAR.

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DEUTSCHE GRAMMATIK. VON DR. JACOB GRIMM, Kurhess. Bibliothekar, etc. Göttingen, 1822-40.

GRAMMATIK DER ROMANISCHEN SPRACHEN. VON FREDERICK DIEZ. Zweite, neuverfasste Ausgabe. Bonn, 1856-60.

THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, PAST AND PRESENT. By RICHARD CHENEVIX TRENCH, D.D., etc. New Edition. Blakeman & Mason. 1859.

THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN ITS ELEMENTS AND FORMS, WITH A HISTORY OF ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT. By WILLIAM C. FOWLER, LL.D. Harper and Brothers. 1855.

We do not intend to review the books which we have placed at the head of this article, but they will keep us in countenance in an attempt to show how abundant the contri-

butions are which modern philology has made to the illustration of the English language, and to its scientific grammar.

Grimm and Diez are the great representatives of the science of Comparative Grammar, in its application to the modern languages nearest akin to our own. We find in them investigations of the laws which presided at the birth of our language, and of those which express the relations between it and its sister tongues. Especially do we refer to Diez, when we take a word from the French, to learn the exact laws according to which all the letters in the French word correspond to the several letters of its Latin original, to learn how the various inflectional forms originated, and to what they are analogous in other tongues. We look to Grimm for similar laws regulating the Anglo-Saxon part of our language, and the whole machinery of speech for which we are indebted to our Anglo-Saxon ancestors. Trench is a representative of those literary cultivators of linguistic study, who seek to find in the history of words records of striking facts in the history of nations, and illustrations of their character, habits, and manners; a pursuit which Lord Bacon notes as a worthy division of philosophical grammar, and illustrates by some acute remarks on the character of the Romans, Greeks, and Hebrews.* While Fowler's English Language is a store-house of good things from many sources, and most accessible of all text-books to the American scholar who wishes to know the elements and forms of our mother-tongue.

Our intention is to take a scene of Shakspeare, and note the words and phrases in it which suggest such remarks as are found in these late grammarians; and we begin with the dialogue between Brutus and Cassius, in the second scene of the first act of *Julius Cæsar*. The first sentence is the following:

Will you go see the order of the course?

Will go, our grammars call a future tense of the verb *go*. They inflect, *I shall go, thou wilt go, he will go; we shall go, you will go, they will go*. This contrivance of ours for expressing future time has given rise to much interesting discus-

* De Augmentis Scientiarum. Lib. 6, cap. 1.

sion. Professor De Morgan denies the right of grammar to collect these different forms into one tense. We suppose because, as Latham says, they offer "a logical, not an etymological sequence".*

But surely it is the business of the grammarian to tell how future time is expressed, just as much when the different persons are expressed by different auxiliaries, as when they are expressed by different forms of the same auxiliary, or by different inflection endings.

But now, how can we explain this use of *shall* for one person, and *will* for the others? Since words, as Bacon says, are "the footsteps and prints of reason", can this use be explained from a general analogy between words and reason, or is it based in some peculiar trait of the English character, or some particular fact in the history of the English speech? We must look at other languages to see how they express future time, before it will be safe for us to venture an answer to this question. Many ancient languages have no future tense, or, rather, have but one form for the present and future. Such are the Hebrew, the Celtic, the Mæse-Gothic, and other old Teutonic dialects. We still retain some phrases which illustrate this use, *I go to-morrow*, for example. The Sanskrit, Latin, and Greek, have special forms for the future, the characteristic letter of which is, *s* or *b*. These represent the substantive verb, *s* being the root-letter common to the Indo-European languages, which appears in the English *is*, and *b* that which appears in the English *be*; so that, for example, the Latin *ibo*, *I shall go*, is made up of *i*, meaning to *go*, and *bo*, meaning *I am*. Our English phrases, *I am to go*, and *I am going to-morrow*, are therefore illustrative of the future of Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin.†

The modern descendants of the Latin lost the old Latin future and formed a new one by combining the verb *have* with the infinitive.‡ The French *irai*, *I shall go*, for example,

* Philological Society Proceedings, Vol. 4, p. 186. Latham, *English Language*, 4th Edition, V. 2, 405.

† Bopp, *Vergleichende Gram.* §§ 646-662.

‡ Diez, *Gram. der Rom. Sprachen*, 2, 110. Second Edition.

is made up of *ir*, meaning *to go*, and *ai*, meaning *I have*. Our English phrase, *I have to go*, is therefore illustrative of the future, in French, Spanish, and the sister Romanic tongues.

The modern Greek expresses the future by an auxiliary verb *θέλω*, which means *I will*. The German and other Teutonic languages gradually acquired the power of expressing a future, by using verbs signifying *have* (Goth. *haban*, *aigan*), *mean* (Goth. *munan*), *ought* (Goth. *skulan*, Ang.-Sax. *sceal*, Eng. *shall*), *will* (Goth. *viljan*), *am*, *become* (Ger. *werden*), with an infinitive, making phrases etymologically equivalent to *I have to go*, *I mean to go*, *I ought to go*, *I will to go*, *I am to go*.* The English, *I shall go*, means, *I ought to go*; *shall* has ceased to be used alone, but in Chaucer we find it meaning *owe*.

"For by the faithe I *shall* to God."—Court of Love."

From this survey of languages, which is but a part of the thorough and comprehensive one made by Grimm, and Diez, and Bopp, we find ground enough for the statement, that the expression of future time by coupling words like *shall* and *will* with an infinitive, is according to a general analogy between language and reason; future actions naturally present themselves to us for expression as acts that *ought* to be done, or that are *willed* to be done.

But we find that no language but the English uses *shall* for the first person, and *will* for the second and third; still less does any language agree with the English in all its uses of these two words. For it is to be observed that *shall* and *will* did not originally, either of them, express simple future time; they become future signs in certain phrases by the loss of a shade of their proper signification. In many cases they are not simple future signs, but still have their proper sense, and we may often with propriety use one or the other in a given connection, according to the shade of idea or feeling which we wish to express. An Englishman might correctly say, "*I will* drown, nobody *shall* help me", only he would mean a very different thing from the despairing cry of the

* Grimm, Deutsche Gram. 4, 176.

Irishman, in whose mouth tradition puts it, and would not be using the future tense. A man's character may show itself in his habit of using oftener the more absolute *shall*, or the more courteous *will*. So may the character of a people. The Scots and Irish, and their descendants in America, do not succeed in mastering these niceties of English speech. The Edinburgh Reviewers abuse this "unlearnable system of speaking" as "one of the most capricious and inconsistent of all imaginary irregularities".

The older English Grammarians had not much to say for themselves, but the later scholars have given us quite a literature of the subject. Archdeacon Hare opened the discussion by some remarks in the *Cambridge Philological Museum*. He says: "There is an awful, impressive, and almost instinctive consciousness of the uncertainty of the future, and of our own powerlessness over it, which in all cultivated languages has silently and imperceptibly modified the modes of expression with regard to it; and from a double kind of *litotes*, the one belonging to human nature generally, the other imposed by good breeding, on the individual, and urging him to veil the manifestations of his will, we are induced to frame all sorts of shifts for the sake of speaking with becoming modesty. . . . When speaking in the first person, we speak submissively; when speaking to or of another, we speak courteously. In our older writers, for instance in our translation of the Bible, *shall* is applied to all three persons; we had not then reached that stage of politeness which shrinks from the appearance even of speaking compulsorily of another. On the other hand, the Scotch use *will* in the first person; that is, as a nation, they have not acquired that particular shade of good breeding which shrinks from thrusting itself forward."*

Few students of the Bible can have failed to notice the effect of the pervading *shall*, especially on the narration. It gives an impressive air of solemnity to its descriptions, since it distinctly exhibits all events as moving under the control of a superintending providence, ordering them according to a

* Cambridge Philological Museum, 2, 218.

rule of duty in its most righteous pleasure. "But in those days, after that tribulation, the sun shall be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light, and the stars of heaven shall fall, and the powers that are in heaven shall be shaken; and then shall he send his angels and shall gather together his elect from the four winds, from the uttermost part of the earth, to the uttermost part of heaven."

Professor De Morgan says: "Archdeacon Hare's *usus ethicus* is taken from the brighter side of human nature. 'When speaking in the first person, we speak submissively; when speaking to or of another, we speak courteously.' This explains *I shall, thou wilt*, but I cannot think it explains *I will, thou shalt*. The present explanation is taken from the darker side, and it is to be feared that the *à priori* probabilities are in its favor. . . . The *ego*, with reference to the *non-ego*, is apt, thinking of himself, to propound the alternative, 'Shall I compel, or shall I leave him to do as he likes'; so that, thinking of the other, the alternative is: 'Shall he be restrained, or shall he be left to his own will?' Accordingly, the express introduction of his own will is likely to have reference to compulsion in case of opposition; the express introduction of the will of another is likely to mean no more than gracious permission of the *ego* to let *non-ego* do as he likes. Correlatively, the suppression of reference to his own will, and the adoption of a simply predictive form on the part of the *ego*, is likely to be the mode with which, when the person is changed, he will associate the idea of another having his own way; while the suppression of reference to the will of the *non-ego* is likely to infer restraint, produced by the predominant will of the *ego*."* Mr. Guest had before stated and illustrated the facts.† He says: "The use of *shall* to denote future time may be traced to a remote antiquity in our language; that of *will* is of much later origin, and prevailed chiefly in our northern dialects". "As a man has power to will for himself only, it was only in the first person that the verb *will* could be used with this signification; and in the other persons it was left free to take that latitude of

* Philological Society Proceedings, 4, 186.

† Philological Society Proceedings, 2, 228.

meaning which popular usage had given to it. Again, the power which overrides the will to impose a duty, must proceed from some external agency ; and consequently *shall* could not be used to denote such power in the first person. In the first person, therefore, it was left free to follow the popular meaning, but in the other two was tied to its original and more precise signification. These distinctions still continue a shibboleth for the natives of the two sister kingdoms. Walter Scott, as is well known to his readers, could never thoroughly master the difficulty." Mr. Hensleigh Wedgwood, partly in the form of a rejoinder to Professor De Morgan, expands and enforces the doctrine of Mr. Guest.* Dr. Latham also has an interesting article in the last edition of his *English Language*, in which he maintains a larger freedom in the use of *shall* or *will*, according to the state of mind of the speaker, than other English grammarians have sanctioned.† And, finally, Sir Edmund W. Head has published a book of one hundred and twenty-four pages, all upon "shall and will", going over the whole ground in a right scholarly fashion, and deserving to reach, as it has, a second edition.

Upon the question whether courtesy or assumption controls the *usus loquendi*, Grimm says that it is from courtesy that the speaker says *shall* of himself, but *will* of others.‡ The English use *shall* more than the Irish or Scots. They obtrude less their own personality and that of others. The Englishman is content to ask for, and state plain facts and truths as such, and save his *will you* and *I will* for solemn occasions and sacred pledges.

The people of New England and their descendants are perhaps the only Americans to whom the distinctive English *shall* and *will* are living idiom, instinctively used by the uneducated. The South use *will* too much, whether this is because they are a more courteous people, or a more wilful people, we will not undertake to say. If the objurgations of

* Philological Society Proceedings, 6, 1.

† *English Language*, 4th Edition, 2, 405-414.

‡ *Geschichte der Deutschen Sprache*, 2, 630. 2d Edition.

the Edinburgh Reviewer against this "unlearnable system of capricious irregularities" are to be regarded, we might conjecture that people living in the isolation of plantation-life, might have so far failed to remember the mother-tongue. But the Southerners are not generally careless of their speech, and in vigorous races the more a people learn to speak from their fathers and mothers, and the less from professed grammarians, the more stable will be their idiom. The fact is probably to be chiefly referred to the greater proportion of Scottish and Irish settlers in the early population.

But we return to our text. Cassius says to Brutus, *Will you go see the order of the course?*

Since the meaning of an interrogative clause waits upon that of its expected answer, and *I will go* is not a simple statement of a future act, but the expression of a determination or promise, it seems from our analysis, that *will you go* is not a future form. We should therefore parse *will* separately, and *go* as an infinitive after it. In questions like this, *will* more usually asks for a promise, as for example, *will you marry me?* while the colder *shall* asks merely for information, *shall you be at home to-morrow?* as though nobody cared for the wishes or choice of the person addressed. But here Cassius neither means to ask for a promise, nor does he use *will* exactly in its etymological sense of *wish*; this *will* is eminently a *will* of courtesy; *please you, go see the order of the course.*

So much for *will*. A few words now about *you*. It is from the Saxon *ewu, iow*, the dative and accusative plural of the second pronoun; originally, therefore, it was the objective case of the nominative *ye*. In old English, *Yee* is used regularly as a nominative, *you* as an objective. "Methinketh yee have nigh your fill; it were pitie to doe you any more harme, for yee are but a meane knight; therefore I give you leave for to goe where as yee list."*

It is singular that at one time *ye* and *you* seemed about to exchange places.

* Mort d' Arthure, II, 185.

"Sir, take me thi son, he said,
And *you* hold *ye* ful well pay'd."
The Seuyn Sages, 72.

"I do beseech *ye*, if *you* bear me hard."
Julius Cæsar III, 1

"As I have made *ye* one Lord's, one remain,
So I grow stronger, *you* more honor gain."
H. VIII, 4, 2.

"What gain *you* by forbidding it to teaze *ye*,
It can now neither trouble *ye* nor please *ye*."
Dryden.*

You has now displaced *ye*. It also has a peculiar use as a plural of courtesy in addressing a single person, the *pronomén reverentiæ*, and as such has also displaced *thou*.

Fowler has these remarks :† "In England *thou* was in current use until, perhaps, near the commencement of the seventeenth Century, though it was getting to be regarded as somewhat disrespectful. At Walter Raleigh's trial, Coke, when argument and evidence failed him, insulted the defendant by applying to him the term *thou*. 'All that Lord Cobham did', he cried, 'was at thy instigation, *thou* viper ! for I *thou* thee, thou traitor !' When Sir Toby Belch is urging Sir Andrew Aguecheek to send a challenge to Viola, he says : 'If thou thouest him some thrice, it shall not be amiss'. 'In the languages of modern Europe, divers expedients have been adopted to supersede the pronoun of the second person singular ; and only among certain classes, or in particular cases, is it thought allowable, nowadays, to address any one by his rightful appellation—*thou*. This is commonly supposed to be dictated by a desire of showing honor to him whom we are addressing. But the further question arises, Why is it esteemed a mark of honor to turn an individual into a multitude ? The secret motive which lies at the bottom of these conventions is a reluctance, in the one case, to obtrude one's

* Guest. Phil. Soc. I, 286.

† English Language, 284.

own personality by the use of *I*, and in the other to intrude on the personality of another by the use of *thou*."

"There is a tribe of writers who are fond of merging their individuality in a multitudinous *we*. They think they may pass themselves off unnoticed, like the Irishman's bad guinea in a handful of half-pence. In ordinary books, except when the author can be reasonably conceived to be speaking, not merely in his own person, but as the organ of a body, or when he can fairly assume that his readers are going along with him, his using the plural *we* impresses one with much such feeling as a man's being afraid to look one in the face. In simpler times, before our self-consciousness became so sensitive, men were not afraid to say *I*, and they never dreamed that their doing so could be any offence to their neighbors. But now men are ready to become *he, she, it, they*, anything rather than *I*. Even Dr. Chalmers, speaking of *himself*, says: '*We formerly thought differently, but have now changed our mind.*'"*

This idea might be still further illustrated by Chavée's view of the natural significancy of the pronominal letters *m* and *th* (—d —t), which appear in *me* and *thou*. The articulation of *m*, he says, by closing the lips, drives back the voice into the cavities of the mouth, and turns it, as it were, towards the speaker, so that it is analogous to the gesture of the hand by which one naturally designates himself. In pronouncing *th* (—t —d), on the contrary, the voice is thrown out in a manner analogous to the glance of the eye, and the pointing of the finger, by which we designate an external object of attention.†

Hence we find this sound in the second personal pronoun, Sansk. *tvam*, Lat. *tu*, Ger. *du*, English *thou*, etc. Since then it appears that *thou*-ing a man is like shaking your finger in his face, we could easily believe that we say *you* to avoid singling him out in so obtrusive a manner. But the history of the growth of this courteous plural, or "fawning plural" (höfischen pluralformen) as given by Grimm seems rather to indicate an intention to heap positive honors on the person ad-

* Guesses at Truth. First Series, 143.

† Chavée Lexiologie Indo-Européenne, pp. 52, 54.

dressed. Some of the Oriental languages have their *pronomina reverentia*. The Sanskrit *bhavat* (excellens, præclarus) is used as such in the place of the second personal pronoun.* This is plainly a word of positive praise.

The Gothic and old high German use the simple singular pronouns, and Grimm traces the use of plurals in their stead to the Byzantine Emperors, and Latin writers of the middle ages. With the Emperors also it was a style of positive majesty, and as such it spread from the courts and courtiers to the people.†

The plural force of *you* is however now so little felt, that *you was* is becoming frequent for *you were* among the unlearned, and some of the grammarians give *you* as a pronoun in the singular number. In the Swedish and Danish the plural pronoun of reverence takes regularly a singular verb, and in the Italian and French, though a plural verb is used, an adjective or participle takes the singular. In these languages the number of the pronoun might be questioned, but in ours it seems to be a plain plural, at any rate, it was so in the time of Shakspeare, as one may see in the first scene of the play of *Julius Cæsar*, where the tribunes addressing the people collectively say *you*, but addressing one person say *thou*, or vary from *you* to *thou*, according to the *usus ethicus*.

Cassius then is full of courtesy when he says, *Will you go see the order of the course?* It may be further noticed that the same deference is shown by using the interrogative form of invitation rather than the imperative, *Let us go see*, or *Go with me to see*. For since the imperative demands a response in acts, and an interrogative in words, the former takes the briefest and most urgent expression, the latter ventures to suggest as a query, to enter upon talk.

A few words now on the syntax of *go see*. Is it *go to see* or *go and see*? The preposition *to* expresses purpose or result; the conjunction *and* couples coördinate clauses. We find many phrases in which *and* is used where the logical relation of the verbs would seem to require *to*; for example, *Go and tell*

* Bopp, Glossarium Sans. 244.

† Grimm, Deutsche Gram. 4, 298.

John ; come and see me ; come and dine with me ; will you come and see me ? I will go and see him ; I ought to go and tell him. In phrases like these, wherever the latter verb is the same, whether *to* or *and* is used, we find that sometimes *to* is used, sometimes *and*, and sometimes neither.* *Will you go and see, will you go to see, and will you go see* are all good English. In Shakspeare the use of the latter form is carried so far as to suggest the statement that *go* and *come* are quasi-auxiliaries in analogy with *do* ; *go sleep, go send, go tell, go fetch, go brew, go dress, I'll go buy, will you go hunt*, and the like fill up the columns of the concordance. It has been thought that these are phrases remaining from the Anglo-Saxon period, when the infinitive did not take *to* before it, and that they have been filled up in later times by *and* through want of knowledge of the habit of the Saxon infinitive. Without remarking upon the obvious defects of such an explanation, it may be observed that most of these examples are phrases of command or courtesy, and that as expressions of feeling they do not naturally take with them logical clauses of explanation. How much more natural and truthful is the impassioned question of the guilty King in Hamlet, "Can one be pardoned and retain the offence?" than "Can one be pardoned while he retains the offence?" The first moves on from feeling to feeling, the other runs down from feeling to explaining. Imperatives and interrogatives of feeling like independence, and will take *and* between their clauses, whatever logical relation might be discovered between them.

But we must forbear further remarks of this kind. It is already plain that, so far from going through this whole scene between Brutus and Cassius, we shall not be able within the limits of this article to examine even the first sentence. Further suggestions as to the etymology, the syntax, the prosody, the synonyms, the relations of the different meanings of the words both now and in former times threaten us with long pages which we must shun.

We will close this paper with some remarks on the letter

* See Mulligan's Grammar, p. 467.

changes in the remaining words, *the order of the course*. Grimm's law is well known. A letter in Latin is found not to correspond to the same letter in German, or Anglo-Saxon, but to another letter of the same organ. The smooth lingual *t* of the second personal pronoun *tu* in Latin corresponds to the middle lingual *d* of the German *du* and to the rough lingual *th* of the English *thou*. The table shows the circle of such correspondences.

	Lat. & Greek, smooth.	German middle.	Goth. & Eng. rough.	Lat. & Greek, middle.	German, rough.	Goth. & Eng. smooth.	Lat. & Greek, rough.	German, smooth.	Goth. & Eng. middle.
Linguals,	T = D		Th	D = Th		T	Th = T		D
Palatals,	K = G		Ch (H)	G = Ch		K	Ch = K		G
Labials,	P = B (V)		Ph (F)	B = Ph		P	Ph = P		B

We find in this table that rough mutes in English correspond to smooth in Latin and Greek and to middle in German. The rough lingual *th* in *the* is the smooth lingual *t* of the Greek article *το* and the middle lingual *d* of the German *die*. In each language the article is an unemphatic proclitic form of the demonstrative pronoun, in English *this, that*; so the French article *le* is the Latin demonstrative *ille*.

Order is from the Latin *ordo*, through the French. But why not *ordo* in English? Words which were taken into the vernacular by the people directly by ear from the spoken Latin do not often have the form of the nominative case, as they do when introduced by scholars. A stranger hearing Romans talk would hear not only the nominative case but all the other cases; nor would the nominative have any special prominence. On the contrary, the oblique cases are not only numerous, but individually perhaps used oftener than the nominative; since there is but one subject in a sentence, but many objects. For once then that the stranger would hear *ordo*, he would hear *ordinis, ordini, ordinem, ordine, ordines, ordinum, or ordinibus*, one or the other of them a dozen times. If he did not know the meaning of the different terminations he would not be likely to remember or repeat them, but that part of the word which is heard the same in all the different

cases would fix itself in his mind, and be the word to him. For instance, in the Latin *virgo*, *virgin-is*, *virgin-i*, *virgin-em*, *virgin-e*, etc., the part common to all the oblique cases being *virgin*, *virgin* is our word, not *virgo*; so from *margo*, *margin-is*, etc., we have *mârgin*, from *sermo*, *sermon-is*, we have *sermon*. So that we should not expect the nominative *ordo* to become an English word. But according to analogy our word should be *ordin*, not *order*. Why *order*? The Italian is *ordine*, the Spanish *orden*, the French *ordre*. We take our word from the French. Diez will tell us the laws for changing Latin into French. After an accented syllable the syncope of the next vowel, especially *i* or *u*, is a frequent and important phenomenon in all the Romanic languages.* So the Latin *calidus* becomes *caldo*; *opera* becomes *opra*, and the like. The explanation of this law so far as it has peculiar force in these languages, is, we think, to be found in that different mode of articulation of the modern languages which is revealed to us by a comparison of the prosody of the classic languages with that of the modern languages. They measure their verse by quantity and we measure ours by accent. The dactyle of Homer is made up of a long and two short syllables, that of Longfellow by an accented and two unaccented syllables. They pronounced the long and short syllables with care, their ear attending to time. We fix the attention on the accented syllable, and speak it with more energy; naturally the unaccented syllables are left in comparative obscurity, and when originally weak, like *i* and *u*, die out altogether. Our *ordin* then becomes *ordn*. But from Diez again we find that when through syncope of a vowel, an *l* or *n* is brought in contact with a preceding mute, it is changed for euphony to the liquid *r*;† for example, the Latin *cophin-us*, becoming *cophin*, then, by syncope *cophn*, is for euphony changed to *cophre*, the French *coffre*, English *coffer*; so the Latin *pampinus*, *pampin*, *pampn*, *pampre*; and the Latin *ordo*, *ordinis*, *ordin*, *ordn* becomes the French *ordre*, which all readers of the discussions of Noah Webster's spelling know is pretty re-

* Diez, Gram. Rom. Sprachen, 1, 164. † Diez, Gram. Rom. Sprachen 1, 439.

gularly represented by the English *order*, in spite of centre (center) and theatre (theater) and the like questionable shapes.

One more example will further illustrate the thoroughness with which the laws of letter change are applied in modern grammar. The last word in our sentence is *course*. It is from the Latin *cursus*, say all our dictionaries; but how? We find this law in Diez: the Latin *u* becomes the French *ou* before two consonants, or a double consonant except before *m* or *n* nasal, and except in connection with a French *i*.* Drop now the termination, and *cursus* becomes the French *cours*, which an etymologist of the old school would certainly think near enough to *course*; not so the modern philologist. Whence comes the final *e* in *course*? Not from *cursus* as the dictionaries imply, but from a low Latin *cursa*, from which are derived the Italian and Spanish *corsa*. We find that the Latin *a* changes to the French *e*,† and we have the word *course* complete.

Thus does Comparative Philology teach us that a silent *e* is no accidental excrescence or blind blunder, but a kind of rudimental organ which exhibits to the eye that can see, an assurance of other tongues in which it had an active part to play,—a great system of affiliated languages; and which may perhaps preserve the pedigree of a speech and of a great people.

* Diez, Gram. Rom. Sprachen, 1, 155.

† Diez, Gram. Rom. Sprachen, 1, 179.

ART. III.—THE ORIGIN OF IDOLATRY.

(Continued from page 352.)

THE theory adopted by some of the principal modern writers on the mythology, polytheism, and pantheons of the ancient pagans, as Bryant, Faber, Moor, and others, was not adequate to a solution of the chief difficulties of the subject. That theory provided for certain conclusions as to the primeval objects of idolatrous homage, by tracing the history and nomenclature of the pantheons of different countries, India, Egypt, Asia, etc., up through their resemblances in names, symbols, and legends, to the epoch of Noah. It directed the attention to names, figures, paintings, traditions, which are construed as referring to the Ark and to Noah, and as justifying the assumption that Noah, or Ham (Amon—Egyptian *Ammon*), the son of Noah, was the first object of idolatry. Now, that the names, symbols, and traditions in question may, to a considerable extent, have been conveyed, cherished and propagated by those who, at the dispersion, were scattered to the different countries, may readily be allowed. But this would constitute no conclusive or even plausible ground of inference as to the original institution of idolatrous worship, or as to the apotheosis of the first object of idolatry. For, in the nature of the case, if idolatry was established at that epoch, and its rites were carried with them by those who were dispersed, then it existed before the dispersion, and was in practice by the builders of Babel as its temple, who were revolvers from the religion of Noah, and by no means likely to deify and worship him two or three hundred years before his death, or so to represent him to their descendants as to secure to him his place at the head of the different pantheons in subsequent ages. Moreover, the idolatrous builders of the temple were of the family of Ham, who

may well be supposed to have been less inclined to do reverence to the Patriarch than either of the other branches of his family. But it is evident, from what is said of Terah (Joshua xxiv, 2), that idolatry was in practice prior to the death of Noah, and within little more than a century after the dispersion; for the latter event took place B.C. 2234. Terah was born 2126, and Noah died 2043.

In the progress of intercourse between Western Asia, Egypt, and India, the names of the chief god of Babylonia, Egypt, Phenicia, etc., were transferred from the former countries to the latter. Jupiter was thus made synonymous with Vishnu.

"The theogony of the Brahmans, as deduced by them from their sacred works, taught that one great and incomprehensible Being has alone existed from eternity. Every thing we behold, and we ourselves, are portions of him. That great Being is not the object of worship; he is named *Brahm*. The first created beings were the persons of the Hindu Triad, namely, *Brahma*, *Vishnu*, and *Iwara*. The name of the first signifies *to expand*; to him was assigned the task of creation. The name of *Vishnu* signifies *to penetrate or pervade*; the world after its creation was intrusted to him to preserve. The word *Iwara* signifies *powerful*. He is the power of destruction, renovation, or mutation of form, which implies the destruction of that which precedes. (Then follows the polytheistic designation of goddesses, heroes, etc.) Vishnu, as preserver of the world, descends upon earth in a mortal form." (See *Edinburgh Rev.* on Moor's *Hindu Pantheon*, vol. xvii. 370.)

Supposing the above to be a correct abstract from the Brahman records, it would be easy to comment on several particulars of it, as having been derived by tradition from revelations current prior to the dispersion. But we have not space for such digression. To one point, however, which involves with the ancient mythologies the doctrine of incarnations, we briefly refer, as accounting satisfactorily for the confusion of names and dates in the pantheons. We mean the practice of monarchs and heroes of successive dynasties appropriating their own names to the most ancient object of idolatrous homage, under color of the incarnation of that deified object in the person of the new fledged aspirant. This practice solves a thousand riddles of nomenclature and chronology, and confutes the hitherto current theory of idol apotheosis worship.

For that practice implies the theory taught in Scripture, namely, that at first, and ever after, the head and chief object of idolatrous homage was, the invisible personality called in Hebrew *Satan*, in Chaldee, *Bel*, in Egyptian *Osiris*, to whom divine attributes and a tabernacle or Shekinah (the *Sun*, light, fire), were ascribed as if he were god of this world. That personality was never, in any of the pantheons, confounded with deified heroes, or other inferior objects, any more than in ancient astronomy the planets, satellites, and stars were confounded with the central luminary and source of light and heat. But that personality the idolaters believed could be locally present, as if incarnate in living men and in material images, and be represented by them and by men, as well after as before their death or migration from their visible, earthly state of existence. Accordingly, while *the Sun* was at first and always in every country the primary visible image and representative of that deified personality, molten or other material images, with characteristics supposed to symbolize his attributes, were devised to represent the god when the Sun was out of sight. To these the original name of the deified chief, and of the Sun as his original image and representative, was given, in the respective languages. Thus *Bel* (and its cognates Baal, Belus, etc.) was the proper name, in Chaldee, of *Satan*, of the *Sun*, and of the material images consecrated to this chief object of idolatrous worship, and made to represent him.

But as besides the superior and unrivalled orb of day, there were planets, satellites, and stars, so Satan had his hosts of subordinate angels and of apostate men; and the doctrine of the Metempsychosis being a familiar and important part of the whole system of diabolic imposture, the inauguration and progress of polytheism, in connection with astronomical and astrological observations, to which the first temples and the idolatrous priests were in part devoted, was easy and rapid. If the Sun was the tabernacle of Satan, as head and leader of fallen angels and men, each particular star might, with the aid of astrology, be specially appropriated to some particular angel as a demi-god subordinate to the chief, or to the soul of a

dead monarch or hero, as his tabernacle, by transmigration from his earthly body, and to each it would be obvious to ascribe the required attributes and functions. *Bel* signified the *Sun* as king and lord of the day, and of the celestial firmament, and represented Satan as king and lord of the world. The Moon being next in visible splendor, and the consort of the Sun, was naturally queen of the starry heaven, and fitted to represent one who shared in the regal honors—a goddess—Astarte, *alias* Juno, *alias* Urania, etc. The original appropriation of particular planets and stars to particular demons or demonized celebrities, was of course open to whatever changes the metempsychosis, astrology, and political exigency might prescribe and permit; and to whatever emblematic devices of imagery, to represent particular attributes and functions, the priests and the craftsmen might think fit. On this plan there was no inherent or prescribed limit to the multiplication of the objects of idolatrous regard—*gods*—that is, subordinate, intermediate, local, household, personal, demi-gods, like the *Mary* and the canonized hero-saints of the Romish hierarchy.

According to Humboldt (*Researches in Mexico*), "there is no proof that the existence of man is much more recent in America than in the other continent." Among the Mexican manuscripts, he says: "One is a cosmogony, which contains a tradition of the mother of mankind having fallen from her first state of happiness and innocence; and she is generally represented as accompanied by a serpent. We find also the idea of a great inundation overwhelming the earth, from which a single family escaped on a raft. There is a history of a pyramidal edifice raised by the pride of men, and destroyed by the anger of the gods." The author (without referring to Gen. xi, or to any other part of Scripture) is of opinion, that since the Hindus are known to have similar traditions, and since the first settlers of America were probably from Eastern Asia, "we have no need to recur to the western part of Asia" to account for the Mexican version of them. After speaking of their astronomical observations, and of a representation of "their calendar, sculptured on a stone of great size", he says: "In the centre of the stone is sculptured the hieroglyphic of

the SUN. . . The *god* (image) *Tonatih* is figured opening his large mouth, armed with teeth, which reminds us of the figure of a divinity in Hindustan, the image of Kala". This strongly indicates that the two had a common primitive origin, and that the real author and object of primeval idolatry did not scruple to select visible symbols which should plainly indicate who he was. In corroboration of this view, it may be worth the while to observe, that we learn from Prescott's *History of Mexico*, that the idol temples of the Mexicans were copied architecturally from the ancient temple of Belus. When Cortez visited the great temple of Mexico, with Montezuma, he saw the colossal image of the god of the Aztecs. "His countenance was distorted into hideous lineaments of symbolic import. The huge folds of a serpent, consisting of pearls and precious stones, were coiled round his waist. A chain of gold and silver hearts, alternate, was suspended round his neck, and three human hearts, newly offered, lay smoking on the altar before him. . . . The capacious mouth and throat of an idol (that is, the image) were filled with instruments of sacrifice and abominations, which led the spectators to regard it as the figure of hell. The rooms were so clotted with blood as to be insupportably offensive and hideous. The walls round the temple were ornamented with figures of serpents, a common emblem, as in Egypt in their sacred sculpture. The priests, in black robes covered with human blood, seemed the very ministers of Satan. Cortez and his companions beheld in the symbolic features of the idols, the very lineaments of Satan." Here Satan, unrestrained by any rival system of doctrine or worship, openly displayed his terrific and bloody flag. According to the great German naturalist, the Mexicans learned their system from the eastern Asiatics; and he would seem to have been of the opinion that the origin and nature of idolatry were sufficiently accounted for by tracing it to eastern Asia, instead of referring it to that part of Asia where, from the creation, and from the days of Noah, the doctrines of inspiration and the worship of the true God were known.

Mr. Prescott, in that part of his *History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella* in which he relates the return of Columbus

from his second voyage, and describes the curiosities which he brought home (vol. ii, p. 461), quotes from Bernaldez, an ecclesiastic with whom Columbus passed some days, who, he says, "dwells with much satisfaction on the remarkable appearance of the Indian chiefs following in the admiral's train, gorgeously decorated with golden collars and coronets, and various barbaric ornaments. Among these he particularly notices certain 'belts and masks of cotton and of wood, with figures of the devil embroidered and carved thereon, sometimes in his own proper likeness, and at others in that of a cat or an owl. There is much reason', he infers, 'to believe that he appears to the islanders in this guise, and that they are all idolaters, having Satan for their lord'."

Whether the primitive inhabitants of the Western continent derived their idolatry from Chaldea at the dispersion, or from Eastern Asia at a later period, the above references sufficiently indicate that their system taught the worship of Satan as the chief, and probably, under a variety of symbolie images, the sole object of their homage.

The review of Moor's *Hindu Pantheon*, above quoted, thus epitomizes the Hindu dogmata (excepting the doctrine of the metempsychosis): "1st. The existence of one God, from whom all things proceed, and to whom all must return. 2d. A tripartite division of the good principle, for the purposes of creation, preservation, and renovation. 3d. The necessary existence of an evil principle, occupied in counteracting the benevolent purposes of the first in their execution by the subordinate genii, to whom is intrusted the control over the various operations of nature". Of course the pantheistic nature and basis of their system precluded the Hindus from calling the Creator or any creature a *person*, and therefore involved no restraint on their imposing new names on principles, forces, attributes, previously distinguished by other terms in the same or in more ancient languages. This able writer, who regards the Hindu as the most ancient system and exemplification of idolatry and mythology, thus concludes:

"We now take leave of a study which, notwithstanding the wonderful elucidations it affords of the primeval traditions of the human race, we

have never considered in any other light than as an innocent and rational amusement. (What theology the writer was of, he saith not.) Those elucidations are not confined to one people. Hindu mythology illustrates the little that is extant, and suggests some part of what is lost in that of all the nations of antiquity. The opinions of the celebrated philosophers of Greece, the founders of schools, have reached us in some detail. The system of popular belief which influenced the mass of the community, has irrecoverably perished. The fragments of Sanconiathon, the Theogony of Hesiod, the Fasti of Ovid, Plutarch's treatise on Osiris and Isis, and some passages of Diodorus the Sicilian, comprise all the information on the subject, derived from ancient writers, that is not purely incidental. A very superficial view of the system, such as it has reached us, is sufficient to demonstrate that we possess only detached fragments, and that in order to fit it, even for popular belief at Athens or Memphis, explanations must have been afforded, and currently received, that are now wanting. To select one instance only. Could the most superstitious and ignorant of mortals believe that the father of gods and men was himself the son of Saturn, King of Crete, and of his wife Rhea? The contexture seems so inartificial, and the absurdity so manifest, that we are constrained to conclude that some mystery was revealed by the priests to reconcile it to the common sense of mankind. The same observation is applicable to Osiris, at whose birth, according to Plutarch, a voice was heard, announcing that the lord of all was come to the world. But this greatest of the Egyptian divinities was himself the son of Saturn and Rhea, according to the Greeks, who have not transmitted the Egyptian names of his progenitors, but only those of their Grecian representatives. The Hindu mythology suggests the explanation which this obvious incongruity must have received before it could become a part of the popular belief." (P. 323.)

This extract, and the entire article, indeed, confirms what we have heretofore observed, namely, that any attempt to discuss the subject in question, without the true theory of its origin, its nature, and its object, which is not attainable elsewhere than from the Holy Scriptures, is futile, and is endurable only as matter of curiosity and amusement. In this the writer of the article under consideration is even more deficient than several authors of extended works who have succeeded him. Whether it were from pantheistic, or from some other form of skepticism, concerning the divine revelation, he does not so much as once allude to the teachings, or even to the existence of the Holy Scriptures. His state of mind, and his

object in this literary excursus, may be gathered from the introductory sentences of his article :

"The work before us, we think, on the whole, an amusing one; and if the subject were popular, might possibly become a popular one. That, however, is not likely soon to be the case. Our reasons for thinking so are, like Mr. Vellum's, manifold. But, lest our readers should be in as great a hurry as the gentleman to whom he was speaking, we shall not give them quite so many as six. Some, however, they shall have. First, then, the few gentlemen qualified to throw light on the obscure subject of Hindu Mythology, have not been pleased to communicate their ideas to the public. Secondly, others, not so qualified, have been pleased to communicate theirs. Thirdly, of the chosen few first mentioned, some have been pleased to publish extremely crude and hasty conjectures, and afterward to retract them as hastily, with circumstances but little calculated to inspire confidence; lastly, and perhaps this reason might have sufficed, nobody here cares at all about the matter."

Again, as specimens of his theory and opinions :

"The religion of India is probably the most ancient of the idolatrous systems, and continues at this day the popular belief of many more than fifty millions of human beings. We accordingly find the Indian Olympus more plentifully stocked with inhabitants than any other goddery on record. . . . The Hindus are divided into two great sects. If the first be considered as the orthodox, Osiris or Bacchus will be the chief divinity of the Indians, and the whole system correspond with such parts of the Egyptian tenets as have been preserved to us by Diodorus and Plutarch. On the other hand, if we shall adopt the opinions of their opponents, Jupiter will assume the supremacy, and the Indian doctrines approximate to the popular opinions of the Greeks. . . . The most ancient worship of which any trace is left in Hindustan, is that of Osiris or Bacchus, whose Indian names are Iswara and Baghesa. In him, and in the gods of his family or lineage, we recognise the divinities adored by the ancient Egyptians. That Osiris and (the original) Bacchus were the same divinity, is attested by the unanimous suffrage of all the writers of antiquity. . . . It is an indisputable fact, that the worship of Osiris, distinguished by the same attributes and emblems, has continued in India from the earliest ages to this day, under the appellation of Iswara."

Here, from lack of the true theory, if indeed the writer had any fixed theory at all, he seems to be confused and inconsistent. For if the religion of India was the most ancient of the idolatrous systems, and Iswara the earliest object of idol-

atrous homage, it would seem inconsistent to suppose that the Indians would adopt as the head of their pantheon the god of another and more recent nation. Had Egypt been the first, and India a later seat of idolatry, the adoption would be matter of no surprise, especially if the original and the adopted name signified the same object. But could Iswara be the original name of the object of the most ancient idolatry in the world, and yet be the Indian name of Osiris the Egyptian, and not the most ancient god of idolatry? If, on the contrary, idolatry originated before the dispersion, and not in India nor in Egypt, but in Babylon, and the name of the idolized intelligence, in the original tongue of Chaldea, was *Bel*; in the changed dialect of those dispersed to India, *Iswara*; in that of those who settled in Egypt, *Osiris*, and an equivalent in the altered tongue of each of the other countries to which colonies were dispersed; then, since the several terms thus primarily applied signified the same personality, and the same celestial luminary, there is no difficulty in believing that, as social relations and intercourse took place between different nations, by conquest, commerce, and immigration, they mutually adopted each other's designations of the supreme object of their idolatrous homage. Neither can there be any difficulty in believing, that in each nation, in process of time, as the vocabulary was in other respects enlarged, new terms, synonymous with the original names, were employed to designate the same idolized personality: nor that, at length, aspiring monarchs and heroic monsters should appropriate to themselves those conspicuous names and designations. The whole question of mythology and of idolatry, as to its origin and nature, depends on the theory on which the historical events proceeded, and by which they should be construed. As well might one attempt to deduce, from an inspection of the separate letters of the alphabets of different languages, the philosophical and theological doctrines which, by a certain arrangement and combination, they might be made to express, as to attempt to infer, from the sculptured relics of Babylon, Nineveh, Egypt, or India, the rationale and origin of idolatry. He must begin without a clue; like a man at the interior extreme of a pitch-dark

labyrinth, attempting to describe exactly the process of emergence; like a man born deaf and blind attempting to illustrate the laws of acoustics and of vision.*

There is much in Herodotus, and in later writers, concerning Egypt, to justify the belief that the early Egyptian records were far less mythical than those of later date, from which the antiquarians of the present day endeavor to deduce the chronology of fabulous ages and dynasties. It is sufficiently evident that Egypt was originally peopled by a migration from Asia; and from the progress they had made in arts, government, and idolatry, prior to the bondage of the children of Israel, or about five hundred years after "the dispersion", it is likely that they formed a colony of the dispersed, and carried with them their religious system, and a language not widely differing from that inherited by the Hebrews from the Chaldeans. For when Abraham visited Egypt, about four hundred and thirty years after the dispersion, the language of the King and his own appears to have been mutually intelligible.

Now, Herodotus and others generally teach: (1) that the primitive object of idolatrous homage to whom the ancient Egyptians ascribed *divine attributes*, was called *Osiris*; (2) that they did not ascribe those attributes to human heroes or human beings of any class; (3) that they regarded animals, crocodiles, vegetables, carved and molten images, only as representative of particular attributes which they ascribed to their supreme deity; (4) that when the Egyptians built a new city and created a new temple, they designated Osiris—the Bel of Babylon—by a different Egyptian epithet, as Ra, Rhea, Am, Ammon, or Ham, by which also, as by Osiris, they designated the *Sun*; (5) that at a later period in Ethiopia and Lybia, and also in Egypt, they adopted the Grecian name Bacchus—Bar-chus,—Ham the Son of Cush; and also Jupiter

* The Reviewer proceeds to "prove the identity of the Egyptian, Grecian, and Indian divinity" (chief god), not by the analogy of the names and their sounds, but by "the unity of the *attributes* denoted by those names which it is impossible should be accidental", and to illustrate the institution and growth of polytheism by the Indian doctrine of incarnations applied to deified heroes. ●

and other foreign names. On the other hand, when heroines were deified by the Chaldeans, Assyrians, Canaanites and others, they adopted the foreign, or equivalent native designations as identifying the chief—Astarte, Urania, Juno, Isis, etc.; each alike signifying the *Moon*, and the intelligence supposed to inhabit that satellite.

It is the appropriation of these designations successively at different times and places, that occasions the real confusion in the view of successive writers and commentators, according as they are governed by the later nomenclatures, or by the ascription of attributes as the obvious and natural rule. Thus Herodotus, Book 2, p. 65, says: "The Egyptians do not all worship the same gods, excepting Isis and Osiris, the latter of whom they say is the Grecian Bacchus". On which Mr. Rawlinson says, in his note: "All, it is true, worshipped Osiris, as well as his sister Isis, for as he was judge of the dead, all were equally amenable to his tribunal; but it cannot be said that he and Isis were the only deities worshipped throughout Egypt, since Amun, Pthah, and the other great gods, and many also of the second, as well as of the third order, were universally venerated". "Osiris", says Diodorus, "has been considered the same as Serapis, Bacchus, Pluto, or Ammon; others have thought him Jupiter, many Pan"; and he (Diodorus) endeavors to identify him with the Sun, and Isis with the Moon. These notions were owing to similarities being traced in the *attributes* of certain gods of the Greek and Egyptian pantheons.

In a word, it is quite clear that when the idolaters, dispersed to different countries, set up their idol-worship, and from time to time afterward in their chief cities, they gave to the one, original, chief god a local or foreign name at pleasure, ascribing to him the *divine attributes* by which he was identified at Babel. To them he was familiarly known by his local name; to foreigners by the attributes ascribed to him. The worship of that chief god was not confounded with polytheism.

Herodotus says, referring to the earliest periods: "Egypt had gods for its *rulers*, who dwelt upon the earth with man,

ONE being always supreme above the rest" (Book 2d, chap. 144). This One, under the primitive Egyptian name Osiris, is represented as suffering and dying, as rising again, as triumphing over his brother or counterpart and rival, Typhon, the personification of *evil*. "The sufferings and death of Osiris were the great mystery of the Egyptian religion; and some traces of it are perceptible among other people of antiquity. His being the divine goodness and the abstract idea of 'good', his manifestation upon earth (like an Indian god), his death and resurrection, and his office as judge of the dead in a future state, look like the early revelation of a future manifestation of the Deity converted into a mythological fable. As Osiris signified 'good', Typhon was 'evil'; and the remarkable notion of good and evil being brothers, is abundantly illustrated in the early sculptures." (Rawlinson's note, vol. ii, p. 219.)

In these, and in all instances in which, apart from the classical and the modern theory of idolatry, the argument is founded simply on the ancient inscriptions and sculptures, it is not by verbal designations, but by *attributes* that the identity of the chief god, and that of particular subordinates is determined. Thus concerning "the queen of heaven", the intelligence supposed to have the moon for her tabernacle, and by the Phenicians and Jews called *Astarte*, and by the Assyrians, Egyptians, and others, *Mylitta*, *Isis*, *Urania*, *Diana*, etc., etc., Mr. Rawlinson says, Vol. ii, Essay 1, p. 444: "She was the same deity worshipped in many countries under various denominations; and nowhere, perhaps, do we see more clearly how the same ONE, from some slight variation of attribute or office, was made into several different *deities*, and how many may be brought back to the original One".

Had this view been adhered to in treating of that god of idolatry which, under various names, the different nations worshipped as supreme, most of the mystery and confusion which now obscures the subject would have been avoided. Substantially, in respect to the verbal designations of the Supreme object of worship, the same thing happened in the nomenclatures of the pantheons of different nations, as happens unavoidably in the translation of the Hebrew Scriptures into different lan-

guages; vernacular words are substituted for the original sacred names; the reference is determined by the ascription of attributes and acts.

Having bestowed upon the Reviewer above quoted a portion of our space, greater, perhaps, than he deserves, it is but fair to put in contrast with his manner of treating the subject of Hinduism, that of Mr. Ward, the Baptist missionary, in his *View of the History, Literature, and Religion of the Hindoos*, published about the same time, in London; after he had, as a missionary, passed some eleven or twelve years in familiar intercourse with the natives of Bengal.* Perhaps the strongest impression produced by his detailed exposure of the vile passions and practices which the sacred writings of the Hindus ascribe to their gods — deified heroes and heroines — and not only sanction and encourage, but enjoin as duties, on the part of priests and people, is, that satanic malice and cruelty must have devised the system and imposed it on the miserable subjects of its sway. Mr. Ward observes that the doctrine of a plurality of deified men and women as gods, and of their intrigues, criminal amours, quarrels, and stratagems to counteract each other, has produced the most fatal effects on the minds of men, and he asks: Can we expect a people to be better than their gods? After quoting from their books a long list of the vilest and most monstrous acts and practices, which are affirmed of particular gods by name, he says: "It is worthy of inquiry, how the world is governed by these gods, more wicked than men. Let us open the Hindu sacred writings; here we see the Creator and Preserver perpetually counteracting each other. Sometimes the Preserver is destroying, and at other times the Destroyer is preserving. Brahma is often represented as bestowing a blessing, to remove the effects of which Vishnoo is obliged to become incarnate; nay, these effects have not, in some cases, been removed, till all the gods have been dispossessed of their thrones, and obliged to go a-begging; till all human affairs have been thrown into confusion, and all the elements seized and turned against the Creator, the Preserver, and the Reproducer. . . Things too abominable

to enter the ears of man, and impossible to be revealed to a Christian public, are contained in the directions of the Shastrus. The learned Brahmin who opened to me these abominations, made several efforts—paused, and began again—before he could mention the shocking indecencies prescribed by his own Shastrus.” With such sanction and prescription, the system, descending from bad to worse, at length embraced every senseless, brutal, vile and monstrous object, quality and passion, which the foulest imagination could conceive, till the objects pretended to be worshipped were said to number three hundred and thirty millions; with every one of which some quality of cruelty or of sensuality, falsehood, or vice, was associated; and the highest attainments proposed to the devotee by the most exalted of them, were manifested by self-inflicted bodily tortures, or by death enforced under the wheels of Jugernaut, or by being burned or buried alive.

It is just to infer, from this brief representation, that the founders of idolatry in India had no higher conception of the attributes and character of the intelligences which they worshipped as gods, than they had of the most depraved, corrupt, beastly, and cruel of men. If they professedly had some notion of the existence of One Supreme Being, they ascribed to him neither moral attributes or qualities, nor any agency in the government of the world. At most he was the impersonal god of pantheism. The priests of their idolatrous system were, in the depravities and vices of their character, as near resemblances of their gods as possible; and the universal corruptions and miseries of the people could be compared only to those of the infernal regions.

Now it is impossible that this should have been the primeval type of idolatry. The system comprised not a single element on which to found, or from which to educe, the more intellectual characteristics of the Babylonian, or of the Egyptian system—*atheistic* personality and unity, and *polytheistic* subordinates. The Indian system of polytheism may have been derived from the most degraded form of Chaldean, Assyrian, or Egyptian polytheism, with the added cloak of the grossest pantheism, and the imposture of the metempsychosis.

It may have been a wholesale reproduction of the grossest form of antediluvian idolatry, wickedness, and cruelty, transmitted through Ham and the colony dispersed from Babel to the plains of India, but not adventured by the rest of the confederates of Nimrod at the erection of their temple and the inauguration of their system, or afterward by those dispersed to other countries. But it could no more have been the parent of the Babylonian, Grecian, or Roman system and mythology, than the most vile and bestial corruption could be the parent of decency and refinement. Among the evidences of the utter and irretrievable debasement of the Indian system, it may be observed, that while the Chaldean and other worshippers of the personality called Baal, as being represented by the Sun, manifested on all occasions no small degree of outward reverence and respect towards him, the priests and people of India, as a familiar and general custom, treated the deified objects of their homage with listless and contemptuous disrespect. As particular exemplifications of this habit, Mr. Ward relates that during a heavy rain, a woman of respectable caste frequently says: "Let the gods perish! my clothes are all wet". A man of low caste says: "These rascally gods are sending more rain." Conformably to the monstrous theogony of this diabolic system, was the relentless tyranny, mental and physical, of the laws of *Caste*.

Dr. Gillies, in his *History of the World*, concludes that the original Babylon and the Temple of Belus were constructed under Nimrod about 2000 B.C.; that about one hundred years later, *Asshur* built the first Nineveh, on the eastern bank of the Tigris, three hundred miles above Babylon, which continued till 1230 B.C., when Ninus founded a second Nineveh, between the Tigris and Euphrates, about fifty miles from Babylon, and there established the Assyrian Monarchy over Babylonia and Babylon; and that about 606 B.C., Belesis destroyed this latter city, and transferred the power back to Babylon. Of course he must have construed Gen. x, 11, as Mr. Rawlinson does, and as our version reads. And probably he construed what the Greeks — Herodotus about 450; Berosus 330; Diodorus 44; Strabo 30 B.C. — had gathered from those who had

access to the then extant Semitic inscriptions, as though they were of coincident import and authority with the then and yet undeciphered ancient Chaldean cuneiform language. From the recent examinations of these later inscriptions, it is held to be extremely doubtful whether there ever was, if it is not clearly shown to be certain that there was not, any such personality as Ninus; and what purports to be historical is, at least, enormously surcharged and overlaid by what is purely fabulous and mythical.

Of the Pagan Mythologies, as exhibited by the ancient historians, poets, and theologists of Greece and Rome, and as retraced by modern researches into the inscriptions and sculptures of Egypt and Assyria, we may safely say that they constitute an effete mass of inconsistencies and contradictions, and that they cannot be reconciled or so construed as to determine any one of the leading questions to which they relate. The most that can be said for them is (1) that they show on a vast scale the nature, workings, and effects of man's apostasy and willing subserviency to the arch-apostate; and (2) that, mythical and unintelligible as they are in other respects, they involve traditions of primeval facts concerning the antediluvian period, the ark, the deluge, the confusion of tongues, the dispersion of mankind, and the general prevalence of idolatry.

Concerning the Greeks, who after all, in what relates to the more ancient pagan nations, are the principal teachers of the learned in Western Europe, no one now needs to be told that their own pretended ancient history is wholly fabulous. They derived their mythology from Egypt, Phenicia, and the countries further East; but such was their excessive vanity, and such their partiality for their own, and aversion to other languages, that in transferring and appropriating it, they variously changed the nomenclature and arrogated the history as part and parcel of their own. The Romans derived their system from the Greeks, subjecting it to such changes of names and arrangement as suited their views. We condense the following observations from the *Edinburgh Encyclopædia*. "We find that the same deity was worshipped by various nations under

different names; the Sun was worshipped under the names of Adonis, Attis, Osiris, Horus, and Liber; and Bacchus, Osiris, Phanax, Dionisius, Liber, and Adoneus, were one and the same deity. It would appear, in short, that the whole mythology of the ancients was originally derived from one common superstition, diversified by the genius and fancy of different nations. The earliest annals of the most ancient nations contained a rude system of cosmogony and theogony. Of these, however, if we except the writings of the sacred historian, Moses, but few, and these very imperfect fragments, have been preserved. The theogony and cosmogony of the Egyptians were pretty nearly the same with those of the Phenicians; and both were evidently from the same source. Osiris and Isis (the Sun and Moon) were the original divinities of that ancient people. The ancient Persians, as we learn from Herodotus and others, worshipped the Sun under the name of *Mithras*, and also fire as representing the Sun. They also acknowledge the good and bad principle. The most remarkable article in the Peruvian religion is the worship of the Sun, and the pretended extraction of their first Inca from that luminary. Lok was the evil genius or devil of the northern nations, resembling the Typhon of the Egyptians. In a fragment of Berosus upon the Chaldean theogony, we are told that a monster, half man and half fish, rose from the Red Sea, and made his appearance near Babylon. He abode with men by day, without food, and taught them letters and sciences, and whatever could contribute to civilize their manners. At sunset he withdrew into the sea, and spent the night in the waters. This monster, Oannes, is said to have written a book about the origin of things, in which he taught that there was a time when all was water and darkness, and that all animals were of a monstrous make, like the representations of them in the temple of Belus. It was added that a woman, named Omarosa (probably the sea), was mistress of the universe, and that Belus clove her asunder, formed earth of the one part, and heaven of the other, and put all those monsters to death. Then this god divided the darkness, separated earth from hea-

ven, and ranged the universe in order; and seeing the world desolate, he ordered one of the gods to cut off his head, to mix with earth the blood that flowed from the wound, and of it to form men and animals; after which he framed the stars and planets, and thus finished the production of all beings. This gross system of cosmogony may be traced, we think, to some corrupted tradition respecting the Noachic deluge, and the Mosaic account of the Creation. In other traditions of the Chaldeans, we have an enumeration of the first ten generations, and an account of the deluge, which, in many particulars, coincides wonderfully with that given by Moses.*

According to Herodotus, Book III, 8: "The Arabians had but two gods (meaning no doubt chief gods), namely, Bacchus and Urania". These Mr. Rawlinson regards as representing the Sun and Moon. See his note where the name of Bacchus, the Sun, is shown to be the equivalent of the Hebrew El and the Arabic Allah. We proceed to notice more particularly the work of Mr. Rawlinson and his coadjutors.

It is unfortunate that the explorers of the long-buried ruins of Babylon and Nineveh, in consequence, no doubt, of the fixed opinions induced by their previous study of the Greek and Roman classics, mythology and cosmogony, seem to have entered on their archaeological researches under the expectation of finding confirmation of their foregone conclusions, rather than with the hope or desire of attaining any new light concerning the popular theory of idolatry. As matter of course, they proceed on the hereditary and prevalent notion that the doctrines, forms, and practice of idolatry originated with man long prior to the records and institutions of Divine Revelation; and hence, when comparing the sculptures and inscriptions of idolatry with the teachings of the sacred writers, they are easily led to suppose that those later inculcations were suggested by the supposed earlier system and its details,

* In Mr. G. Rawlinson's *Historical Evidences of the Truth of the Scripture Records*, Lecture 2d, this myth is given, with some variations. Belus [i. e., Satan], to whom the creation is ascribed, is said to have cut off his own head. The first man whom he created was a Chaldean. In the tenth generation, as in the Mosaic account, the Deluge occurred.

and in many particulars were merely copies of them. They seem, at least practically, to assume that the earliest divine revelations to the world were those vouchsafed to Moses, and recorded by him two thousand five hundred years after the creation, when all but a single community—an enslaved, barbarous, and despised community—of the human race were idolaters, and had civil governments, learning, arts, civilization, wealth and refinement. Accordingly, whether they have recourse to the history of Herodotus, to the fragments of Berosus and Sanchoniathon, to the monuments of Egypt, Assyria, and Babylon, or to the legends, mythologies, and histories of Greece and Rome, they construe each and all in one and the same direction. And though the sacred history is by far more ancient than any of the secular histories, and is written in a far more intelligible language than any of the exhumed inscriptions; and further, though the deciphered sculptures and tablets are not of the earliest, but confessedly of the middle and later periods of the Assyrian and Babylonian empires, they yet construe them as authorities in respect to the antiquity, the origin, and the designations of idolatry, and of the gods of the several pantheons. Of the changes of language, of pronunciation, of orthography, of the innovations of successive conquerors and dynasties, of the modifications consequent on the constant encroachments of polytheism on the primitive institution and nomenclature, they make little account, except as they embarrass their studies and interfere with their adopted theory.

In the Appendix to the first Book of Rawlinson's *History of Herodotus*, Essay Tenth, "On the religion of the Babylonians and Assyrians", the author proceeds on the assumption that Nineveh, as the capital of the Assyrian empire, was founded prior to Babel, or Babylon, as the capital of the empire of Babylonia, and thence infers that the supreme idol god of Assyria, named *Asshur* (a deification, as he supposes, of the third son of Shem, whose name was Asshur), was entitled to precedence and preëminence in the pantheon, over Baal, the supreme object of idolatrous worship to Nimrod (the third son of Ham),

and his associates, who founded Babylon and erected the tower of Bab-El for the purpose of idolatrous worship. But there is very ample evidence, from the Assyrian inscriptions, as reported by him, that the primeval history of the Assyrian, as distinguished from the Babylonian empire, is all but wholly mythical and fabulous; that the Assyrian was an offshoot from the Babylonian empire; and that the Assyrians had, from that circumstance, inducement to pretend to priority of date and precedence in respect to the rank of their idol deity.

In the Sixth Essay of the same appendix, "On the early history of Babylonia", "the commencement of the great Chaldean empire" (Babylonia inclusive, originally of Assyria) is fixed by the exhumed inscriptions at the date 2234 B.C., which exactly corresponds with the date "obtained by Callisthenes from the Chaldeans at Babylon for the commencement of their stellar observations, which would naturally be coeval with the empire; and the same also which was computed for their commencement by Pliny, adapting the numbers of Berossus to the conventional chronology of the Greeks."*

Now, according to the received chronology of the Old Testament, the deluge occurred A.M. 1656; B.C. 2348. One hundred and fourteen years later the dispersion occurred, A.M. 1770; B.C. 2234. It was therefore within this period of one hundred and fourteen years that Nimrod began his career by founding the city and empire of Babylon, and it is neither probable in itself, nor to be conjectured on any other than mythological legends, that Asshur, a son of Shem, should have founded Nineveh and the Assyrian empire, and arranged a pantheon of idolatry, and least of all that he should have headed the list with his own name, as a dead, deified hero,

* Callisthenes, the philosopher, who attended Alexander the Great to Babylon, B.C. 331, found that the Chaldeans "had"—says Prideaux—"astronomical observations for 1903 years backward from that time, which carrieth the account as high as the 115th year after the flood, which was within fifteen years after the tower of Babel was built. For the confusion of tongues which followed immediately after the building of that tower, happened in the year wherein Peleg was born, which was an hundred and one years after the flood; and fourteen years after that those observations began. This account Callisthenes sent from Babylon into Greece, to his master Aristotle." Book II, part 1.

prior to the founding of Babylon by Nimrod, a son of Ham, and the inauguration of Ba-El as his god and head of his pantheon.

A determination of this question is, however, not conclusive of the main point. Nothing can be more probable, on supposition that prior to the deluge, Satan, the supreme god of idolatry, usurped the name EL, and was distinguished and known by that designation, than that after the confusion of tongues he should be distinguished, in the speech of different nations, by a variety of different epithets, signifying in the respective tongues one and the same invisible intelligence, and ascribing to him the same attributes. Thus EL, Ba-El, Bel, Belzebub, are by all parties defined as signifying *lord of the world*, as the Sun is lord of the day, lord of the universe, creator, supreme ruler, etc. And according to Rawlinson, *Asshur* is defined as signifying "the great lord", "the king of all the gods", "the father of the gods", etc. It is to be observed that the Babylonian and the Assyrian inscriptions on tablets of clay and brick, indicate not only the names of the chief objects of idolatrous homage, but also synonyms of those names, and also the names of long lists of inferior tutelary and local deities. Moreover, successive dynasties and kings would seem to have enlarged those lists from time to time. The confusion thus introduced can scarcely be imagined; and in order to any satisfactory conclusion, it is necessary to consider the exhumed inscriptions in connection with the records of secular history, and with those of the text of the sacred Scriptures. The important point is to ascertain who was the invisible intelligence to whom idolatrous homage and service were, after the deluge, first addressed. This being settled, it might be desirable, but is by no means essential, to determine whether after the dispersion, any of the nations or their kings ascribed supreme divine attributes to more than one, or to any other than the one chief god of the earliest pantheon.

Now any attempt to settle the main question must depend on the theory of idolatry held by him who makes the attempt. If idolatry was simply a device, a desperate alternative of man in his original, infantile, helpless, barbarous state, without light,

without revelation, yearning for some kind of religion prior to any inspired communication from the Creator, or any intelligible manifestation of the Divine will, as many learned and excellent men have supposed and taught, then it might be supposed that the earliest kings and philosophers would, out of compassion to their more ignorant people, deify the departed spirits of their predecessors, and recommend a costly and perhaps a bloody ritual of worship and service as the means of conciliating their favor. In that case, however, it must be assumed that even in the supposed infantile and helpless state of society, the kings and philosophers had sufficient power of spiritual intuition and self-evolution, to discover that men had souls which survived their bodies, and were immortal, and had both power and disposition in their invisible state, to hear the prayers and supply the wants of the millions of suffering and despairing mortals whom they had left behind; nay, that they were the creators, preservers, benefactors of men, and had an original, natural, and just claim to the abject and unquestioning homage and service of men even unto death, on pain, in case of default, of condign and hopeless punishment.

This theory not only assumes that men were left, in the earliest ages, to grope their way to the discovery of some kind of religion without any knowledge whatever of the true God; but also that, when divine revelations of the true system were at length vouchsafed, the sacred writers adopted the symbols, the rites, sacrifices, and offerings, and to a large extent the doctrines, and the notions of inspiration, of their religious predecessors, the idolatrous Egyptians, Phenicians, Moabites, Chaldeans and others. Thus the cherubic forms, the ark, altars, bloody sacrifices, the representation of invisible agents by visible images, the burning of incense, the burning of lamps and tapers, are supposed by those who hold this theory to have been copied from the heathen to assist in the institution of revealed religion. Confirmation of this statement might be cited from the writings of learned men of different ages, countries, and professions, down to the present day. Indeed it is safe to say that such has been the opinion of the learned generally. Even Dean Prideaux, treating of the origin and

nature of idolatry (*Connection*, Book 3d, part I), assigns as the origin of idolatry the sense men felt of a "Mediator, by whose means only they could make any address to the Supreme Governor of all things, and by whose intercession alone any of their petitions could be accepted. But no clear revelation being then made of the Mediator whom God had appointed, because as yet he had not been manifested unto the world, they took upon them to address unto him by mediators of their own choosing"; that is, intelligences whom they fancied to reside in the Sun, Moon, and Stars as their tabernacle.

Mr. Layard in his abridged account of *Discoveries at Nineveh*, Chap. 12th, speaks of "the resemblance between the symbolical figures pictured on the walls and those seen by Ezekiel in his vision", and observes that "as the prophet had beheld the Assyrian palaces with their mysterious images and gorgeous decorations, it is highly probable that, when seeking to typify certain divine attributes, and to describe the divine glory, he chose forms that were not only familiar to him but to the people whom he addressed, captives like himself in the land of Assyria. He chose the four living creatures, with four faces, *four wings, and the hands of a man under their wings on the four sides*, the faces being those of a man, a lion, an ox, and an eagle—the four creatures continually introduced on the sculptured walls; and by them was a wheel, the appearance of which 'was as a wheel in the middle of a wheel'. May not this wheel have been the winged circle, or globe, which hovering above the head of the kings, typifies the Supreme Deity of the Assyrian Nation?"—which appears to amount to this: that the inspired prophet, in his search for some means of representing the attributes and glory of the true God to the captives who were exiled for their idolatry, and to all nations in all future time, resorts to, and selects for his purpose the symbolic emblems and imagery of the heathen which were already familiar to himself and to his fellow-exiles, as if the best that he in his "prophetic vision" could do in the case, was to indorse what they already knew of the established, original, and dominant pagan religion; tell them

as a true prophet, that the god of paganism, Baal, the god of idolatry, was after all the true God.

The following are among the observations of Mr. Rawlinson concerning *Asshur*: "This god belongs exclusively to the pantheon of Assyria. His usual titles are 'the great Lord', 'the King of all the gods', 'he who rules supreme over the gods', and sometimes 'the father of the gods', although that title more properly appertains to the second deity of the governing triad. His special attributes are those of sovereignty and power: he is thus called 'the giver of the sceptre and crown', 'he who establishes empire'. . . . The Assyrian kings from the earliest times evidently regarded *Asshur* as their special tutelary divinity . . . the laws of the empire were the laws of *Asshur* . . . he was all and everything as far as Assyrian nationality was concerned; but he was strictly a local deity, and his name was almost unknown beyond the limits of Assyria proper. . . . It is hardly permissible to doubt that *Asshur* must be the deified patriarch of Gen. x, 11, the son of Shem, who went forth from Shinar and founded the Assyrian empire." (Vol. i, p. 477, 478.)

On this let it be observed, that the limits of Assyria proper were the limits of that part of original Babylonia where Nineveh was built, and which at length became a kingdom in distinction from that of Babylon. That on Assyria becoming a rival kingdom, the rulers and priests of Nineveh, who during the preceding period of Chaldean supremacy had adhered to the pantheon of Babylon, should change the name of their chief god from Bel to Asshur, was natural and politic, and they might be expected in their later inscriptions to associate the most pompous titles with the newly adopted name. But that Mr. Rawlinson, swayed by the later and more intelligible Assyrian inscriptions, and without having mastered the more ancient cuneiform language of Babylonia, should yield to the ambitious Ninevites what they claimed, and place the name Asshur at the head of the oldest pantheon, is justly matter of surprise; especially in view of the chronological and critical difficulties which are involved. For his theory requires us to suppose that Nineveh was built by Asshur, the second son

of Shem; that he inaugurated idolatry, and was himself the first object, or gave his name to the first object of idolatrous homage. But if he did not build Nineveh, the theory is without foundation; and the only evidence for the supposition that he was the builder is our English version of Gen. x, 11, which is rejected by the critics generally. We need but to cite the following from Robinson's edition of *Calmet*: "The empire of Assyria, is generally supposed to have been founded by Asshur, son of Shem, who was driven from Shinar by Nimrod [his nephew], Gen. x, 11. Bochart, however, adopts the marginal reading of the passage—'out of that land he (Nimrod) went forth into Assur, or Assyria, and builded Nineveh'—in which he has been followed by Faber, Hyde, Marsham, Wells, Hales, Rosenmueller, Gesenius, and others. This opinion is supported too by the Targums of Onkelos and Jerusalem, by Theophilus of Antioch, and by Jerome. Nimrod, then, may be considered as the founder of Nineveh". Mr. Rawlinson does not refer to the views of these writers nor support the received translation by any new evidence. But finding that the Assyrian mythologists claimed a higher antiquity than that of Babylon and a hero god a generation or two earlier than Nimrod, good-naturedly concedes their claim, contradicted as it is by the names, dates, and implications of the rest of his work.

Independently of the cuneiform inscriptions recently brought to light, Mr. Rawlinson, like the earlier writers and compilers, Calmet, Prideaux, Bryant, Moor, Faber, and others, could rely only on the pagan historians, and chiefly on Herodotus, Berosus, and Manetho, who doubtless reported as facts what they received as such. But Herodotus, the most reliable of these, born about 484 B.C., had knowledge only of his native Greek. Berosus, about a century and a half later, a Chaldean and priest of Belus, and contemporary with Alexander, passed the latter and greater part of his life in Greece, and wrote his history in Greek. Manetho, a Phœnician and contemporary of Berosus, wrote his history of Egypt in Greek. Now it is not to be supposed that either of these writers had immediate personal access to original Babylonian or Assyrian inscriptions,

or was able, if he had, to read the more ancient cuneiform tablets of Babylonia. Nor, on the other hand, is it to be imagined, that they had not access to Greek translations of Chaldean and other historical documents. The points in which they agree respecting particular events, their order of succession, and the names of the actors, and those in which they differ respecting chronology, the names of men and places, the nomenclature of idolatry, and the like, equally demand this supposition. Writing as they did without personal intercourse or concert with each other, it is incredible that each separately should have attained the facts, names, and circumstances in which they agree from popular traditions, and by oral communications from individuals widely separated from each other in time and place, and of various degrees of intelligence, professing to relate what they had heard concerning ages and generations long past, and of which they had no certain test by which to distinguish the literal from the purely fabulous and mythical. Berosus, indeed, and the Greeks of his and later times, may have read Herodotus and been aided by him. But to Herodotus himself the aid of records of earlier date than that of his travels must have been indispensable; and that there were many such likely to have been known to his informants, and even a considerable number in Greek which may have been read by him, is evident; for the names of several such are quoted by Mr. Rawlinson, who also refers to fragments of them as copied or alluded to by later writers, and observes (vol. i, p. 29) that "it seems certain that a considerable store of written historical information existed in the native language of Herodotus at the time when he commenced his history". It is, indeed, notorious that not only the Jewish, but other ancient monarchies kept regular chronicles and annals—the Persian (see Esther ii, 23; vi, 1)—the Babylonian (see the report of Callisthenes to Aristotle)—the Egyptians, in their alphabetic and hieroglyphic records; and there is ample evidence that prior to the conquests of Alexander, there were innumerable books or rolls extant in different languages of Western Asia. The Library collected by the Ptolemies comprised seven hundred thousand volumes, consisting of copies

— originals, or Greek translations — of works in foreign languages. After a fire had destroyed four hundred thousand of those volumes, an equal or a larger number were procured in their place. The existence of these vast collections implies that the then known world was comparatively filled with books, the product of many ages, and inclusive doubtless of many Persian, Semitic, and Chaldean originals. (See *Pri-deaux*.)

But supposing such means of information to have been accessible to Herodotus, it must be considered that the authors both of extant originals and of Greek translations, were liable to similar misconstructions and inconsistencies with later interpreters. For even if those authors were able to read the most ancient cuneiform characters, there was, these later writers think, still back of the oldest original records an unknown abyss of myth and fable under the influence of which the oldest writings, mythologies, and pantheons, must have been planned and executed. Certain it is, that there are insurmountable discrepancies between the Hebrew Scriptures and the history of Herodotus, that of Ctesius, who succeeded and controverted Herodotus, and other works both of contemporary and of earlier date. We are therefore entitled to conclude, that if the Hebrew Scriptures are not taken as ultimate authority on all disputed questions, nothing final or satisfactory can be attained by appealing to Herodotus and the Greeks of earlier or later date, or to the doubtful, unintelligible and contradictory inscriptions which have recently been brought to the notice of the learned world.

If the building of Babel as the beginning of the Babylonian Empire by Nimrod, about one hundred to one hundred and fourteen years after the deluge,—as related Gen. x,—does not absolutely preclude the supposition that there was, or possibly could have been, a prior Assyrian Empire which included the Babylonian with an idolatry and a pantheon more ancient than that of Babel, then the inspiration of the Scripture statement, and both the sacred and the pagan chronology, from that date forward, must be rejected: and the simple question that remains is, whether as mere matter of theory and specu-

lation, the Scripture authority or that of the yet undeciphered inscriptions of Babylon shall be received and relied on. The question is in very much the same state as that between the Mosaic narrative of the Creation and the modern geological cosmogony and chronology.

It must be distinctly understood that Mr. Rawlinson labored to exhibit an account of the origin and progress of idolatry from his study and construction of the ancient inscriptions and sculptures, and of the Greek historians, independently of the Holy Scriptures, or at least as affording more ancient, more ample, and more intelligible or certain continuous and satisfactory details than the Scriptures afford. Being no doubt honest and sincere in his intentions as a scholar and critic, but having embarked with great zeal and confidence in this undertaking, our readers must not be surprised to learn from our references to his *Notes and Essays*, that inconsistencies and paradoxes were of little account as obstacles in his way. And as preliminary to our quotations, let it be further understood that his theory required that Nineveh and its nomenclature of idolatry should precede Babylon and its pantheon. We shall endeavor to confute this theory by quotations from his own pages; and thereby to confirm what we believe to be the doctrine of Scripture,—that Satan under the name of *Bel* was the founder and first god of the system of idol worship.

He says, vol. i, p. 353:

“In the Biblical genealogies Cush and Miraim are brothers, while from the former sprang Nimrod, the eponym of the Chaldean race.”

Now the Chaldean race continued at Babylon until its destruction by Xerxes. Babylon was its capital, the seat of its original institutions of government, religion, arts, astronomical observations, language, records, inscriptions, sculptures, mythology, history. This might well be thought sufficient to show that Nineveh did not precede, and transfer these institutions to the Chaldean metropolis, with *Asshur* as the first object of idolatrous homage and head of a pantheon more an-

cient than that headed by Belus. Accordingly we have, at p. 344, vol. i, the author's express testimony to this effect:

"It is now certain, whatever may have been the condition of Babylonia in the pre-historic ages, that at the first establishment of an empire in that part of Asia, the seat of government was fixed in Lower Chaldea, and that Nineveh did not rise to metropolitan consequence till long afterwards."

But Mr. Rawlinson's theory, founded not on the most ancient cuneiform inscriptions of the Chaldeans, which are not yet mastered,—and which are likely enough to be largely fabulous and mythical,—but on the later Semitic records and monuments of Assyria, implies that there had been ages of untold myth and fable before the building and history of Babylon commenced, during which interval Nineveh may have had precedence under *Asshur* and exalted him as god of their idolatry. Thus, treating of the sources of historical information, he says (vol. i, p. 45):

"The foreign countries whose history Herodotus embraced in his general scheme, present in regard to their monumental records all possible varieties, from entire defect to the most copious abundance. Egypt, Babylonia, and Persia, the most important of them, possessed in their inscriptions upon rocks, temples, palaces, papyrus-rolls, bricks, and cylinders, a series of contemporary documents, extending, in the case of the last mentioned, to the foundation of the monarchy, and in the other two going back to a far higher actual date, though not to a period so early as the lives of the nations. The recent discoveries in Mesopotamia, which have so completely authenticated the historical scheme of Berosus, both in its outline and its details, prove that to the Babylonians the history of their country as written upon its monuments was open, and could be traced back with accuracy for two thousand years before it merged into mere myth and fable. In Egypt a still earlier date is said to have been reached, and—whatever may be thought of the historical character of the more ancient kings—at least from the time of the eighteenth dynasty, which is anterior to the exodus of the Jews, the monuments contained contemporary records of the several monarchs, and abundant materials for an exact and copious history."

Now if the recent discoveries actually disclose a true history of Babylonia extending two thousand years back from the latest date that can be assigned to any of them; if the Egyptian annals of exact history reached a still earlier epoch,

and if those nations had existed during a previous period of myth and fable; then the Mosaic account of the creation, the deluge, and the confusion of tongues and dispersion of mankind, must be summarily rejected. For if we take the Babylonian inscriptions, monuments, etc., to have ceased as they naturally must at the conquest by Cyrus, and the instalment of the foreign, hostile, and triumphant dynasty of the Medo-Persians, 538 B.C., then a series of authentic and accurate annals extending back two thousand years, that is to 2538 B.C., would reach to a date one hundred and ninety-four years anterior to the deluge. And if the subjected Babylonians continued to make national inscriptions and to erect monuments in the face of the Medes and Persians during one hundred and ninety years after the conquest by Cyrus, viz. down to about the date of the conquest by Alexander, then two thousand years back would reach the year of the deluge; and in either case there would be no room left for any period, long or short, of preceding myth and fable. And if, whatever we may think of the kings who preceded the eighteenth dynasty before the Jewish Exodus, the Egyptian records reached a still earlier date than the Babylonian, it is still worse for the supposed mythical and fabulous period. But if, rejecting the fabulous ages and the records of mythology, we adhere to the Mosaic narrative, there is no occasion of chronological uncertainty or difficulty. For that narrative teaches that the deluge occurred 2348 B.C., the confusion of tongues 2234, the conquest by Alexander 331, leaving nineteen hundred and three years between the last two dates; and making, with the antediluvian period, four thousand and four years. Thus, from the creation to the deluge, sixteen hundred and fifty-six—to the dispersion, one hundred and fourteen—to Alexander, nineteen hundred and three—to the Advent, three hundred and thirty-one; total, four thousand and four.

Very much of the confusion attending the endeavors of Mr. Rawlinson and other able and laborious writers, to reconcile the pantheons, nomenclatures, chronologies, and mythologies of pagan antiquity, arises, we are fully convinced, from their having no higher notion of the nature and attributes of any

of the idol gods, than they had of the leading human personages indicated by the names so variously written and tabulated in the early and the later pantheons. Even those who trace the later designations of *one* as chief god of different ages and countries, up in connection with monuments and traditions of the deluge, the ark, the confusion of tongues, and the dispersion, to Noah, as, at least, subjectively, the first deified object of idolatry, do not rise above the level of this notion: still less, do those who stop at Asshur, or those who stop at Nimrod,—critically transformed into Bacchus—Bacchus, *i. e.* the son of Cush. Had these authors, one and all, recognised Satan, in the audacious and ceaseless prosecution of his antagonist scheme and purpose, as the original instigator and object, and thereafter in all countries the chief god of the idolatrous system, they might perhaps have threaded the mazes of mythology and the vagaries of polytheism; and by adhering to the chronology of the Scriptures, might have stripped of their importance in respect to dates and apparent connections, the changes of language, of nomenclature, of sculptures, and of symbols, introduced by successive monarchs, conquerors, and dynasties, each ambitious to signalize his own achievements or pretensions, and to personate the god as a Bacchus, a Jupiter, a Hercules, or such other name, foreign or domestic, as best suited the occasion. In this line of retrospection it would, very likely, be found, that such changes when introduced by political rulers, were not immediately acquiesced in and sanctioned in public or private records by the priestly caste, the fastidious and jealous scribes and secret custodians and functionaries of idolatrous rites; or if acquiesced in by some, they might be disregarded by others; and if by those of one nation, they might be declined by those of other nations. A difference of nomenclature might thus be exhibited even in contemporary pantheons; and the utmost confusion of arrangement and succession might arise in the records and symbols of different nations.

In the line of research pursued by Mr. Rawlinson, he was led to take *Asshur*, head of the Assyrian pantheon, as the original supreme god of idolatry. This obliged him to sup-

pose the Assyrian empire and its capital, Nineveh, to be more ancient than Babylonia and its capital, Babylon. We might cite from his own pages many passages, in addition to those already quoted, in demonstration of the absurdity of this supposition, and of its inconsistency not only with the teachings of the Holy Scriptures, but also with other parts of his own work. But let us rather see how in his formal Essay upon the subject (Essay X, vol. i, p. 475), he approaches and arrives at this preposterous and paradoxical conclusion. We shall interpose such obvious remarks as his text seems specially to demand,—beginning with the first sentence of his Essay, entitled, “On the religion of the Babylonians and Assyrians.”—[H. C. R.]

“The ancient religion of Babylonia and Assyria—whatever may have been its esoteric character—bore the appearance outwardly of a very gross polytheism.”—But elsewhere, he constantly maintains, and it is essential to his theory that he should maintain, that the *most ancient* religion of Babylonia is shrouded in the impenetrable darkness of mysticism, and fable; and that which succeeded the unknown period of myth, and which may with sense and propriety be called *ancient*, is effectually concealed from modern scrutiny by that species of cuneiform writing which has not yet been mastered or deciphered, so as to enable any one to say with any certainty or ground of confidence, that, during the period (probably about thirteen centuries) in which that species of cuneiform writing continued, viz. down to that change of dynasty when the Semitic character was adopted,—the religion was outwardly a *gross polytheism*. How could he possibly know, or on what ground could he think himself justified in saying, that during the alleged mythical period, idolatrous worship was not addressed to one and but one invisible intelligence? or what means of information could he have on which to found the assertion, that the religion of Babylonia was a gross polytheism during the continuance of the undecipherable cuneiform writing?—Surely its appearing to be a gross polytheism at a later period in Assyria, as represented in the less unintelligible Semitic inscriptions, is no sufficient

ground for the sweeping and confident assertion which he makes. But let us recur to his own process of induction :

"We may infer from the statements of Berosus [about 330 B.C.]—that it —[the ancient religion of Babylonia and Assyria]—did involve in its origin ideas sufficiently recondite with respect to the cosmogony and the generative functions of nature, and we further know, that many of the most celebrated sages of Greece, such as Thales, Pythagoras, and Democritus, borrowed largely from Babylonian sources in the formation of their respective systems of philosophy."

What then does this signify ? What means had Berosus or the Grecian sages of knowing anything whatever of the religion of the mythic or of the most ancient cuneiform ages, more than is open to the modern explorers and critics of the long-buried sculptures and inscriptions of Babylonia ? Let the author himself answer in the last clause of the sentence last above quoted :

"But we have not yet acquired that mastery over the primitive language of Babylon [the ancient cuneiform]—as distinguished from the later Semitic dialect of Assyria—which might enable us to verify the high pretensions of the Chaldeans in regard to natural religion, from modern materials."

That is to say : We admit that the recently exhumed inscriptions and sculptures of Babylonia teach us nothing of the ancient religion of Babylonia and Assyria, for they are in a language which we have not mastered and do not understand. We cannot on the ground of anything we learn from them, decide that the pretensions of the Chaldeans to a higher antiquity in respect to religion — *natural* religion, gross polytheism—than the Assyrians, are valid ; therefore, what ? Why, we decide that the Assyrian religion preceded the Babylonian, because we read of it in the later Semitic dialect which we think we have mastered, and because it pretends to a far higher antiquity than it allows to the Babylonians. This may be as good reasoning for scientific archæologists, as that of the scientific geologists concerning the Noachic deluge ; who say, there may have been a local deluge in the days of Noah, for there are local deluges occasionally in modern times ; but it is unscientific to suppose any greater deluge in ancient than oc-

curs in recent times ; and therefore the deluge of Noah could not have been universal. But in both cases the teachings, testimonies, and claims of the Holy Scriptures must be wholly set aside.

But to proceed with Mr. Rawlinson. "Of all the branches, indeed, of cuneiform inquiry, an explanation of the Babylonian mythology is undoubtedly the most difficult." Omitting here the rest of this apologetic paragraph, having quoted it elsewhere, we cannot but ask, why a man of sense and a scholar, should refer to the cuneiform records which he confessedly did not understand, as explanatory of a mythology of which all that is known, is learned independently of them ? The mythology which is known is of course of later date than the ancient undeciphered cuneiform writing, and how an explanation of it could be expected from an inquiry into that writing, is by no means apparent. If the authors of the mythology read the cuneiform records—then if what they wrote is intelligible, it ought to explain itself.

"On examining the mythology of the Babylonians, the first point which attracts attention is the apparent similarity of the system with that which afterwards prevailed in Greece and Rome."

But is it not notorious that the mythology of the Babylonians to which the author refers is precisely that which the Greek and Roman writers copied and adopted from the discordant Semitic records of the latter times of Babylon and Nineveh ? What wonder then that the originals and the copies should be similar ! How could the Greeks and Romans contrive and render prevalent a Babylonian mythology independently of Babylonian sources ? And how could the originals fail to be as various as the changes of language, nomenclature, inscriptions, and monuments ?

"The same general grouping is to be recognised ; the same genealogical succession is not unfrequently to be traced ; and in some cases even the familiar names and titles of classical deities can be explained from Babylonian sources."

How very natural is this, if the whole was copied from Babylonian sources, including the names or synonyms of dei-

ties called classical ; but how preposterous if, as the author evidently thinks, the Babylonian mythology of which he speaks was that of the most ancient period of Babylonia, and if the system of the Greeks and Romans was original with them ! The author, however, conceives a way in which this might have happened.

"It seems, indeed, to be highly probable that among the primitive tribes who dwelt on the Tigris and Euphrates when the cuneiform alphabet was invented, by reducing figures to phonetic signs, and when such writing was first applied to the purposes of religion, a Scythic or Scytho-Arian race must have existed, who subsequently migrated to Europe, and brought with them those mythical traditions which, as objects of popular belief, had been mixed up in the nascent literature of their native country ; so that we are at present able in some cases to explain obscurities both of Greek and Roman mythological nomenclature, not simply from the languages of Assyria and Babylonia, but even from the peculiar, and often fantastic, devices of the cuneiform system of writing."

This is so decidedly curious, that we are content wholly to waive the question, whether it was a Scythic, or a Scytho-Arian race who brought to Europe the names of Babylonian gods adapted to assist the Greeks and Romans in their construction of a classical mythology similar to the Babylonian ; and so made way for a native and independent Assyrian pantheon of more ancient date than that of Babylonia. We, however, cannot entirely conceal our regret that the author, when the matter was in hand, had not briefly informed us what time it was in the mythic period after the deluge when those primitive tribes dwelt in Babylonia, for then we should have known the date of the original cuneiform alphabet as well as the manner of its invention ; and how long it was before the close of the mythic period that the Scyths migrated and gave place to the Chaldean race under Nimrod, for then we could have formed some conjecture as to when the Babylonian mythology and the accurate records of their two thousand years of history commenced ; and that he had not further told us what part of Europe it was that the emigrants with the pre-Chaldaic traditions came to, so long before the origin of Greece and Rome, and how, or by what people, the mythical

portions of their nascent literature were preserved in the mean time till the classical writers appeared and had occasion for them in so arranging their mythological nomenclature, that students of the nineteenth century might explain its obscurities by means of the peculiar and fantastic devices of the original cuneiform system of writing (now undecipherable), without being tied down to the languages of Assyria and Babylon, *i. e.* to the later Semitic discordant and irreconcilable inscriptions. All this must have been clear to his view, —or else we must conclude that the age of myth is not yet closed; and we must be permitted to doubt whether the Ninevites had a career and a pantheon of higher antiquity than the Babylonians; and must adhere to the belief that Babylon was the metropolis of Babylonia and the seat of idolatry long before Nineveh rose to eminence or had any separate mythology or pantheon; and that Bel, not Asshur, was the first and ever the great god of idolatry.

These mythic Scyths, however, were just what the author's theory needed, and smoothed the way for his next paragraph, which constitutes the second stage of his demonstration.

"The pantheons of Babylon and Nineveh ought in strictness to be considered separately, for in many respects they are dissimilar, deities which are prominent in one mythology being unknown in the other, and each system moreover having originally possessed an independent nomenclature."

By this rule each of the successive pantheons of Babylon and Nineveh ought in strictness to be considered separately; for in some respect they are dissimilar. But unless he here refers merely to the Greek and Roman copies, how is his argument helped by saying that each system had *originally* an independent nomenclature? How did he arrive at that conclusion? If of the two systems, that of Nineveh, as he supposes, is of the highest antiquity; if all that is extant and intelligible concerning that system, is in the later Semitic dialect and the Greek and Roman copies; and if the pantheons of Babylon as distinguished from those of Nineveh are in the ancient cuneiform and as yet undecipherable language, to what purpose, logical or critical, is it said, that

each possessed originally an independent nomenclature? Suppose they did, to what effect can they be considered separately, since the nomenclature of one of the systems is not understood? And how, in respect to things in which the two systems are dissimilar, could the author know that the cuneiform nomenclature of the pantheons of Babylon was not originally copied from the earlier system of Nineveh, if indeed Nineveh was more ancient than Babylon; or on the other hand, that the Assyrian nomenclature was not copied from the earlier Babylonian, and interlarded by later Semitic changes, transpositions, and new deifications and designations? This apparent difficulty is adroitly disposed of in his next sentence:

“In the present state of our knowledge, however, critical distinctions cannot be attempted. We must be content then with a brief enumeration of the deities, and an indication of the relative positions which they occupy in their respective systems.”

We are of the same opinion; and are content, so far as critical distinctions founded on the present state of our knowledge, or rather ignorance, of the ancient cuneiform language are concerned. But our author's *theory* of idolatry, mythology, and chronology, we believe to be erroneous, inconsistent with the Holy Scriptures, and of evil tendency in relation both to literature and to theology; and we think it demands rebuke as well as criticism. If we have not exposed its erroneousness and the inconsistencies involved in its defence, it is not because there are not in his volumes abundant materials wherewith to overthrow it. We quote two or three additional sentences which precede his classification of the deities.

“It is quite clear that the mythology originated in Babylonia, at a time when several distinct languages were spoken by the people using the cuneiform character.”

In proof of this latter assertion he refers to the Assyrian Semitic inscriptions preserved on tablets in the British Museum. But is it just to confound those later inscriptions with the cuneiform originals of Babylonian mythology? Is it just to confound the original Babylonian with what, on the author's theory, was the more ancient mythology of Nineveh?

That *the mythology* of the Babylonians originated in Babylonia is not to be doubted. But did Babylonia then include and precede Assyria, and Babylon precede Nineveh as the seat of idolatry? If so, and if the Babylonian mythology—*i. e.* the Babylonian system of fabulous opinions and doctrines respecting their idol deities—commenced with the Chaldean race, who “used the cuneiform character”, whose history began shortly after the deluge, and continued nineteen centuries unbroken, then how can it be said that at the commencement of that mythology several distinct languages were spoken by the people—*i. e.* the Chaldeans? Or was the world, and the plain of Shinar in particular, then so stocked with Scythic or Scytho-Arian, pre-Chaldean, and other peoples, tongues, and nations of diverse and distinct languages, that they must of course have infused their several dialects into the original mythology of Babylon?

Being now prepared to introduce his readers to the first god of the Assyrian, as if that were the earliest pantheon of idolatry, the author proceeds:

“In most, but not all, of the invocations which preface the historical inscriptions of the Assyrian kings [whether the mythical, or the literal who used the Semitic dialect, he saith not]—we find the gods of the pantheon classified in distinct groups. There is firstly *Asshur*, the supreme god who was replaced in Babylonia by a distinct deity, *Il* [*El*]. . . . This god [Asshur] belongs exclusively to the pantheon of Assyria. His usual titles are, ‘the great Lord’, ‘the King of all the gods’, ‘He who rules supreme over the gods,’ etc.

This brings us at once down from the mythic pre-Chaldean ages, and the undecipherable cuneiform period of the Chaldeans, to the Semitic times of Ninevite ascendancy; when the new-fledged monarchs, heroes, and hierophants chose to glorify themselves by appropriating to themselves, in their changeful and heterogeneous dialect, all that pleased them from the ancients—the Chaldeans and Babylonians—and all of the then present which seemed likely to give them prestige. Assuming a higher antiquity than Nimrod and Babylon, they named their supreme god *Asshur*. But they had the prudence to allot to the now subjected Babylon the next place

after the now triumphant Nineveh; and so far to respect the chief Chaldean deity, Bel, Belus, Baal, by calling him Il (*i. e.* El)—his titles being the same with those which they bestowed on Asshur. Mr. Rawlinson complacently observes that “this god [*Bel, Baal, etc., of the Babylonians*] is more particularly known as the deity from which Babylon derived its name. Bab-il, as the cuneiform name is written, signifies “the gate of Il, and is the Semitic translation of a Hamite term, which must have been the original title of the place.” That may or may not be so. Since reading Mr. Rawlinson, we have increased confidence in the text of the Hebrew Scriptures; but eschew and repudiate all pretence of confidence in any *quasi* or modern critical explanation of the primitive meaning of the cuneiform inscriptions, dissolved, diluted, and remodelled, to prove that Nineveh and its pantheon was of higher antiquity than Bab-el and Babylon. And believing that our conclusion in this respect is in accordance with the chronology and the text of Scripture, we reject, and cannot but reject the whole of his theory.

Nor is this conclusion founded solely on the confutation furnished in his own pages to his theory concerning *Asshur* and the antiquity of Nineveh. The two main questions involved in this theory relate to the original foundation of Nineveh as compared with that of Babylon; and to the nature and extent of the information hitherto attained concerning the inscriptions, the pantheons, and the idolatry and polytheism of ancient Babylonia and Assyria. We think that the Hebrew Scriptures clearly teach the priority of Babylon over Nineveh, and of Bel over Asshur; and that the first god of idolatrous worship was from his character, his objects, and the very nature and relations of the system, the chief god of Babylon, Nineveh, Greece, Rome, and all other pagan nations: and accordingly we are of opinion that the popular theory of idolatry and polytheism is false, and in derogation of the Scriptures, and is not sustained by anything yet learned from the ancient cuneiform inscriptions, nor even from those of the later Assyrian or Semitic type. In this conclusion we are confirmed by the frank and unsophisticated statements of Mr. Layard *On*

Nineveh and its Remains — being a narrative of his own explorations in Assyria, nearly contemporary with those of Sir H. C. Rawlinson, though published a few years earlier. He begins his introduction with "a slight sketch of what had been done in the field of Assyrian antiquities, previous to the recent discoveries on the site of Nineveh. A few fragments scattered among ancient authors, and a list of kings of more than doubtful authenticity, are all that remain of a *History of Assyria* by Ctesias; while of that attributed to Herodotus not a trace has been preserved. Of later writers who have touched upon Assyrian history, Diodorus Siculus, a mere compiler, is the principal. In *Eusebius*, and the Armenian historians, such as Moses of Chorene, may be found a few valuable details and hints, derived, in some instances, from original sources not altogether devoid of authenticity. It is remarkable that in profane history we meet with only three Assyrian monarchs of whose deeds we have any account,—Ninus, Semiramis, and Sardanapalus. Ninus and his queen, like all the heroes of primitive nations, appear to have become mythic characters, TO WHOM ALL GREAT DEEDS AND NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS WERE ASSIGNED. Although originally historical personages, they were subsequently invested to some extent WITH DIVINE ATTRIBUTES, and were interwoven with the theology of the race of which they were the first, or among the earliest chiefs. . . . Of modern historians who have attempted to reconcile the discrepancies of Assyrian chronology, and to restore to some extent, from the fragments to which I have alluded, a history of the Assyrian empire, I scarcely know whom to point out. From such contradictory materials, it is not surprising that each writer should have formed a system of his own; and we may, without incurring the charge of skepticism, treat all their efforts as little better than ingenious speculations. In the date alone to be assigned to the commencement of the Assyrian empire, they differ nearly a thousand years; and even when they treat of events which approach the epoch of authentic history,—such as the death of Sardanapalus, the invasion of the Medes, and the fall of the empire,—there is nearly the same comparative discrepancy.

... The Assyrians, like the Egyptians, possessed at a later period a cursive writing, which was probably used for written documents, while the cuneiform was reserved for monumental purposes. There is this great difference between the two forms of writing, which appears to point to a distinct origin,—the cuneiform runs always from left to right, the cursive from right to left. The cuneiform under various modifications, the letters being differently formed in different countries, prevailed over the greater part of Western Asia to the time of the overthrow of the Persian empire by Alexander the Great. It is to this circumstance that we mainly owe the progress which has been made in deciphering the Assyrian inscriptions, and the hope that we shall ultimately be able to ascertain, WITH SOME DEGREE OF CERTAINTY, their contents. The Persian kings ruled over all the nations that used this peculiar form of writing.”—After observing that the Persians made versions of the diversified Assyrian cuneiform inscriptions of the nations referred to, into a peculiar Persian cuneiform character; and that it was this Persian version only that had been so learnt as to be understood, he goes on to say: “Owing, however, to the very large number of distinct characters in the Assyrian inscriptions, there being nearly four hundred different signs, while in the Persian there are but thirty-nine or forty, and the great apparent laxity in the use of letters and the grammar, the process of deciphering is one of considerable difficulty.” Even with the aid of the Persian version, the most important inscriptions that had been mastered were of no higher date than the reigns of Darius and Xerxes.

The actual state (he adds) of our knowledge of the cuneiform character will enable us to ascertain the general contents of an inscription, although probably no one can yet give a literal translation OF ANY ONE RECORD, or the definite sound of many words.”

It is plain from this intelligible and evidently candid statement, that nothing entitled to the slightest consideration was previously known, and that nothing has yet been learned from the inscriptions recently examined, that throws any light whatever on the question concerning Nineveh and its pan-

theon headed by Asshur, being more ancient than Babylon, and Bel as the primitive god of idolatry. The theory of Mr. Rawlinson has no other support but acknowledged myth and fable, except his version of Gen. x, 11, concerning *Asshur* the son of Shem. And the doctrine that Satan is the primeval, persistent, and ever chief antagonist, competitor, and rival of the Jehovah, is not invalidated, but is at least tacitly and indirectly sanctioned and supported by all that has yet been ascertained from the exhumed relics and monuments of Assyria and Babylonia. Even Mr. Rawlinson, honest and sincere, no one can doubt, but misled and bewildered by a hereditary, classical, and popular theory,—yet, when his theory is not immediately in view, often spontaneously gives such utterances as the following: “Concerning the origin of Assyrian independence, nothing can be said to be known. We seem to have evidence of the inclusion of Assyria in the dominions of the early Babylonian kings, but the time when she shook off this yoke and became a free country is quite uncertain, and can only be very roughly conjectured. . . . It is at any rate clear, that about the year 1273 B.C. Assyria, which had previously been a comparatively unimportant country, became one of the leading states of the East. . . . The seat of government at this early time appears to have been at *Asshur*. . . . At this place have been found the bricks and fragments of vases bearing the names and titles of (apparently) the earliest known Assyrian kings, as well as bricks and pottery inscribed with the names of satraps, who seem to have ruled the country during the time of Babylonian ascendancy. . . . With regard to the first kings it is necessary to discard altogether the fables of Ctesias and his followers. Ninus, the mythic founder of the empire, and his wife Semiramis, are not to be regarded as real historical personages, nor indeed as belonging to Assyrian tradition at all, but as inventions of the Greek writers. The Babylonian historians, as we are told by Abydenus, ignored altogether the existence of any such monarchs. The earliest known king of Assyria is a certain Bel-lush” [the same, we think, as Bel-ial and Bel-zebub]. Vol. I, “*Rise of the Assyrian Empire, Essay 7th.*” What a falling off is here from the

theory that the kingdom of Nineveh was more ancient than that of Babylon, and its god *Asshur* more ancient than Bel? —We might multiply quotations of like import; but we must forbear, having exceeded the space we can claim, and trusting that we have shown the erroneousness of Mr. Rawlinson's system. We must omit what we purposed to say concerning images, oracles, and some other parts of the general subject. For the present we conclude—that Nimrod built the temple of Belus before Nineveh was built; that BEL was in that temple the first god of idolatrous worship after the deluge; that Satan was the original instigator and, ever after, the supreme god of that idolatry; and that the inspired records,—their chronology and their history,—their account of the apostasy of Satan, his angels, and the human race, and of the predicted antagonism between him and the Creator and Redeemer of man, is true: and the polytheistic mythologies, pantheons, and legends of paganism, are but miserable fabrications, impostures, and delusions. Intrinsically, the mythologies involve all possible absurdities. Historically, they furnish no evidence that any pagan community ever worshipped more than one idol god *as supreme*; nor that they did not all worship the same *one* god. So far as they clearly teach anything, either by their nomenclature or by their ascription of attributes, they teach that all worshipped the one deified chief: a fact more incredible than the metempsychosis, if Satan was not that chief. And if we believe that under pretence of being god and ruler of this world he challenged the homage of the Second Adam, as he had sought and attained the homage of the first, we may with safety believe, and are necessitated by the nature of his undertaking, by the nature of paganism, and by the whole current of Scripture to believe, that he claimed and received the idolatrous homage of the apostate nations — and in that aspect as the arch rebel and antagonist of Jehovah, that he will at length be effectually subdued and punished.

E. L.

ART. IV.—THE TEMPTATION OF CHRIST.

By Rev. J. AMBROSE WRIGHT, Chicago, Illinois.

Matthew iv, 1-11. Mark i, 12, 13. Luke iv, 1-13.

THE common reader, sitting down to the perusal of the Gospel story, finds perhaps no passage more difficult to reconcile with his accustomed views of things than that which so briefly recounts the Saviour's temptation in the wilderness. As literally read, it seems unlike any other part of the Gospel narrative, either as a detail of purely spiritual transactions, or as a fact of external history. It is, in truth, a mixture of the two; and this is the source of the difficulty; for the brief account given does not clearly discriminate as to the lines where the earthly and the spiritual meet, nor show us precisely how much is of one, and how much of the other.

The reader is beset by such facts as these. Here is a malignant being, Satan, meeting the Saviour, and holding a conversation with him, as if he were in bodily presence, and leaving that inference, though he is not elsewhere so represented. And as Satan has no *apprehended* presence with us, it is wholly unlike any recognised experience of ours.

Then, in the second place, this Satan proposes to the Saviour, things perfectly unlike anything seemingly possible to us, and which we are never solicited in like manner to do.

There is besides something of difficulty in perceiving the wrong involved in the things proposed to Christ, even when their fitness to the nature and character of the Saviour, looking from the world's standpoint, is recognised; although our commentators of late have divested this point for the most part of its objections.

In view of these difficulties, the reader is inclined to regard the passage as a piece of purely spiritual history, intended to

throw light upon the character of Jesus as a spiritual being alone; and not as a record of practical import to us.

It becomes therefore a prime inquiry, what the true aim of the account may be. Is it, to increase our knowledge of the nature and character of the divine Son, for its own sake? or, is the aim to teach us, as a primal lesson of our religious life, *the source and the nature of temptation; and to instruct us how to resist it, under the guidance and power of his great example?*

The answer to this question must modify materially our interpretation of the story. Doubtless the temptation itself was a part of the Saviour's spiritual work, a grapple between the forces, in the persons of the chiefs of the two kingdoms of light and of darkness, and having important relations to that perennial struggle in which the whole universe is so vitally interested.

But the written account of it must also have been intended to afford us direct practical lessons, distinct in their character, and which, whether primary or secondary in importance, deserve to be carefully studied. In this latter light we propose to look at the case at present. With this view, our aim will be, to bring it as near as possible to the experiences of human life; and in order to this, to suppose no more of the supernatural in it than the story itself necessitates. For, while it is both impossible and undesirable to divest the Scriptures of the supernatural, as the rationalists have done, it is surely right to allow no more of the supernatural than they actually contain.

We will endeavor, therefore, to read this temptation scene, so as, without doing violence to the text, or the acknowledged claims of our faith, to make it intelligible, as far as possible, to our common experiences, and thus to furnish us a pattern in our Christian life.

In this endeavor two things need to be settled in advance. One is, to regard strictly the integrity of the Scripture account; for though the story is brief, it is still complete in itself. And whatever is added, must be in the explanation of the text itself, and not as an addition to the material or

incidents of the story. The question is simply one of interpretation. The other thing is, to hold whatever of explanation or theory we adopt simply as an *hypothesis*, to help us in the understanding of the narrative. To the use of some hypothesis or other we are driven, whatever view we take of it; and the question is therefore which, or what, it shall be.

There are several questions belonging to the account which we shall not raise, as not coming within the purview of our aim.

The first point to be considered may be put under the head of *outward conditions of the Temptation*. Jesus was now about thirty years of age, and soon to enter upon his public Messianic ministry. He had been baptized of John, and publicly pointed out by him as the expected One. The Holy Ghost had also descended upon him, and became, in some sense, a guiding power with him; for by this Spirit he is "led into the wilderness *to be tempted of the Devil*". Here he fasted forty days and forty nights, eating nothing; spending his time, as several Biblical writers infer, in meditating upon the work he was about to assume, and in preparing himself for it. Absorbed in this great subject, he would seem to have been superior to the demands of hunger. But with the expiration of the fast, return the claims of the appetites; and with the return of these, comes the Tempter.

And here we are brought to the edge of another field of examination, viz. *The interior conditions of the Temptation*. And within this field lie the principal difficulties of the narrative, most of them being about the nature and character of Christ himself.

One question of a preliminary kind is, How could Christ, being holy, be subject to temptation? Another, coming close along with it, though distinct, is, What were his relations to the Holy Ghost, and how is he dependent upon, or subject to, the ministrations or guidance of this divine agent?

The first of these questions relates to something more than the mere innocence of Christ, such as that with which Adam met the tempter; for Christ is not merely human, but divine. And if divine, and divinely holy, how can he be tempted?

How can temptation be made to touch him, as a divine being, repelling by virtue of his innate moral purity, all that looks toward sin? And how can it escape the scrutiny of the Divine perception in him, so as even to get consideration in his mind? Nor is all the difficulty contained in the mere fact, that Christ himself is the second person in the Trinity, but he is aided by the presence of the third; so that the temptation seems to assail the Son and, in a manner, the Holy Ghost both. Does it? Does it in fact assail either? In other words, to whom is the temptation addressed; to Christ *the Son of God*, or Christ *the Son of Man*—to the divine or to the human nature?

Plainly to the human, and to that alone. But if directed to the human, how far does that have aid from the divine? Why does not the divine nature so illumine the perceptions of the Saviour, that he shall understand the whole case at a glance—divining the *approach* of the Tempter; knowing all his aims; all his plans to secure them; and searching through the whole attempt from beginning to end? But if the Christ who was tempted saw all this from the first, then how could it be a *temptation* to him? much more, how could it be a temptation in any sense in which we are said to be tempted?

We fall back therefore on our hypothesis, claiming as the key by which the case is unlocked, the declaration of Paul, that Christ “was tempted in all points like as we are”, with the single difference, “*yet without sin*”; understanding this likeness to relate to manner and form, as well as to substance.

Christ then had all the bodily and mental conditions of susceptibility to temptation as truly as any of us. His difference from us is, that he was not in the same moral condition. He was susceptible to hunger and thirst; and his mere appetite, no more than ours, excepting as better schooled, told him when to begin or when to cease its indulgence. It would as truly claim gratification as would ours, except as under the control of a holy will and holy affections. And when the Tempter said, “Make this stone bread”, appetite said also: Make it to be bread. But the pure moral nature said: No, it

must remain a stone. And so the dart glances off, by the interposition of the moral shield.

So, too, Christ had in him the susceptibility to approbation which we have; and this susceptibility in itself might have prompted him to throw himself from the temple's pinnacle, that the expectations of the Jews might be met. He had also, like us, the love of possession and of power, which, if unchecked, would not stop short of the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them. All these susceptibilities in the event were checked by those higher moral sentiments which should also be lodged in every man's soul.

What we mean to say is, that these higher moral sentiments of the Saviour, which triumphed in this temptation, belonged, not to his divine, but to his human nature. Christ, therefore, not only bore the temptation on his human side, but triumphed also on the same side. The victory was the victory of the man Christ Jesus.

Let us consider, then, the relations of this *man* to the divinity with which he was associated in the transaction.

He is said to have been led into the wilderness by the Holy Spirit, *to be tempted of the devil*. One question, as here suggested, is, whether this declaration, "*to be tempted*", expresses the purpose of Jesus, or the purpose of God. Was it the aim of Jesus to be tempted, or the purpose of God that he should be tempted? If he be our example in temptation, the question is easily answered. For, to seek temptation, or even to run recklessly into it, is itself a sin to any of us; and why would it not have been as truly so on the part of Jesus? But if Jesus knew beforehand all the trial that was to come upon him, and even went up to the desert that it might take place, then in this he could not be strictly an example to us. But it is perfectly natural to say, that it was God's intention that he should undergo the trial, as it is that any of us be tried in any particular manner, according to the divine purpose. Yet if Jesus were ignorant of the coming events, it is surely the human, and not the divine nature, which is thus ignorant.

And this view of the case accords accurately with the de-

claration, that he was "led of the Spirit". Does any one ask, What Spirit? his own divine Spirit, or the Holy Ghost, the third person of the Trinity? Plainly the latter; for this is that which "descended upon him, and abode" at his baptism. With this was he now filled, and by this "led", as asserted. But we cannot conceive that this Spirit was needed to lead or enlighten the divine soul of the Saviour in the temptation or elsewhere; while we can conceive, as the most natural of things in the domain of God's kingdom in this world, that it should be present to aid and enlighten the human soul of Christ in the trial he was to undergo. We therefore conclude, that the man Christ Jesus, as a man, was led to the desert to be tempted; that the Holy Spirit led him, and continued with him as with any servant of God; and that this man endured the temptation, and by the aid of the same Spirit repelled it.

But where, then, was the divine nature of Christ itself in all this transaction? and how could Jesus, being himself divine, need the aid of the Holy Ghost? The Scriptures do not enter into explanations of this kind; and yet some hypothesis is needed to enable us to answer the question which we most naturally raise, viz.: If Christ were divine, well might he endure this trial; but what am I to do when thus beset, who am not divine, but a weak and fallible mortal?

We have already said, that Christ, as man, endured the temptation. Nor did his divinity shield him from it; nor make him superior to it; nor, as we conceive, conduct him through it. This brings us to look at the relation of the divine and the human natures in the person of the Saviour. We cannot, of course, say definitely what that relation was. But with a view to practical ends, we may give utterance to our conception of it. We conceive them, then, to be two distinct natures; each complete in itself, as though the other were not present; and not mingled together in any such way as to make but one soul, half human, half divine. Both natures are united in the one person. The divine dwells, so to speak, above the human; sees through it all, and uses it, so far as it pleases; irradiates it with its own intelligence, so far as it pleases; shows its own counsels, affords its own strength,

so far as it pleases; and no further than it pleases. For some purposes, we may conceive the divine to shed down through the human soul a full intelligence; so that, in regard to that subject, the man Christ Jesus shall be fully informed; while as to other subjects, the divine affords no irradiation, conveys no thought, affords no strength; leaving the human to go on in its own light and lean upon its own strength. Is this mere hypothesis? Does not Christ, at times, exhibit a divine knowledge and a divine strength? Does he not at other times, and in regard to other matters, confess to a mere human ignorance, and exhibit only a human weakness? Of some things he says: "Of these knoweth no man, *neither the Son*, but the Father." And so does he cry out: "My God, my God",—not now, my *Father*, but my *God*,—"why hast thou forsaken me?" Nothing is plainer than that Christ was illumined with an intelligence on some subjects and at some times, which he did not exhibit on other subjects and at other times. We are not called upon to run any boundary lines between these orders of time and subject. All we can do is to examine each case by itself, and see, if possible, what the fact is in that particular instance. We would not be understood to represent the divine and human natures of Christ as two *persons*; but rather to state the case strongly, in order to aid the apprehension in regard to these two classes of facts in his life. The case may be illustrated by the union of our own mental and bodily natures, where each is the actor in specific cases, as if distinct; yet where the mental nature is ever the superior, while both constitute but a single person.

We come, therefore, to the conclusion, that the divine nature did not illumine the human, nor afford it strength, nor interpose any shield in any such way as to take the case out of the sphere of Christ's humanity; but left that humanity as it were alone, to meet the tempter, to depend on its own intelligence to understand, and its sinlessness to refuse, the infernal propositions; aided, however, and morally strengthened and enlightened, by the Holy Spirit, as all other men may be in the like cases. And here is the chief significance of the

saying, that he was led up of the Spirit to be tempted. And thus was Christ tempted, as we are.

Nor are these suppositions at all at war, but on the contrary, in full agreement with the facts in the whole history of the Saviour on earth. There is the evident presence of the divinity with him; but it does not obliterate, or overshadow, or overbear the human in Christ. He is as truly man as if not divine. And it is the most evident of things, that the divine *uses* the human, but the human does not use the divine, except in certain directions, and as permitted. The two natures are in harmony; one is superior. The Son of God works miracles, and forgives sins; but the Son of Man suffers hunger and fatigue, and sweats in the garden, and dies on the cross, and his sonship avails him nothing to prevent it. Are we wrong, then, in putting the temptation in this latter category, among the things that belong to his proper humanity?

But is Christ, in no respect, superior to us in this temptation? He is superior in that respect which the Apostle mentions: *he is without sin*. He both goes into and comes out of the trial without it. His perception of the nature of sin is keener, his power of resistance is greater. The Holy Ghost affords him also a more efficient aid; since the same measure of the Spirit was a greater aid to him than to us, from the fact, that he was in a condition more susceptible to his influences. The effect of sin is to dull *our* natures to the operation of the divine presence. Christ being without sin, responded, in all his faculties, to the illuminating and sustaining energy of the Holy Ghost.

We are thus prepared to consider *the form in which the Tempter came to him*. Was it a human form? Was it a visible form? Was it in any form at all? Did the Saviour know of his presence? If he came in visible form, of course the question is answered. There are those who think such to be the fact, but that his appearance was as "an angel of light"; and hence that he was not recognised, though seen. This hypothesis proceeds on the same basis, in regard to the conditions of the Saviour's person, as those which we have carried along with us hitherto. But for ourselves we prefer

the theory that the Tempter came in this case, as he comes to us, really and in person, but formless, viewless, impalpable; and that he plied his infernal arts in the manner he does with us, by suggestion simply. The same arch enemy is supposed to have been present with Christ in the garden, and at the cross. He was invisible then, why not now? Besides, it seems to be implied that Christ did not recognise the tempter's presence, except as he detected it in the suggestions he advanced. And this detection was by virtue of the moral character of the suggestions themselves. And if he, Christ, were tempted on the side of his humanity, and his own divine nature gave him no aid, and Satan came invisibly, then is it plainly natural that he would be unrecognised, till he had in the way supposed revealed himself. Besides, if the divine nature did not operate ordinarily to relieve him of hunger, and fatigue, and pain, neither showing him how to avoid them, nor coming in to bear him above them, when induced, is it not quite as rational, and, *pari passu*, probable, that it gave him nothing of prescience as to the presence of his enemy now?

We must all the time bear in mind, as a fact underlying this whole case, that, as God is revealed to man by Christ, so Christ is revealed to us, chiefly through his human nature. That is, the human nature is not communicated to us through the divine, but the divine through the human. And, as God is revealed in Christ with more or less of fulness, as suits the occasion or the case, so Christ, the Son of God, is revealed in the Son of Man, with more or less of *his* fulness, as the special case may render appropriate.

Thus, as we are left to discern the sources of our temptations, in multitudes of cases, by their moral quality alone, having no other means of deciding whether a given suggestion be from the spirit of Satan, or from the Holy Spirit, Christ becomes our example here as elsewhere, in the fullest sense, by being left to the same resource. This is the point, indeed, where most of all we need the power of Christ's example to sustain us. If here it be carried over our heads by the inter-

position of the divinity in Christ, the whole case is removed from the analogy of our experiences.

We have dwelt so long on these preliminary points, that we must be more concise in the discussion of what remains. And indeed we may well be so, since the commentators have so fully given the special philosophy of the several points of the temptation itself.

The respective parties then and there meet; Jesus, now left to feel the exhaustion of his forty days of abstinence; Satan, a person, but invisible, ready to act in the infusion, at the right moment, of the appropriate suggestion. What is now the real aim of Satan? The answer to this is to be gathered in part from his known character and designs, and in part from the shape which his attacks take, as disclosed in the narration.

The moral history of the world reveals two turning points, or crises in its destiny. One is, when Adam was put to the test of his obedience in Eden. The other is, when Christ was to repair the ruin of the fall. Satan had prevailed to ruin the race. The question for him now is, Can he keep the race in ruin? Not unless he can prevent the work of the Saviour; for if he prevails, then the ruin of Eden is in a manner repaired, and a great multitude will after all come home to Paradise, and heaven will be full of such joy, as it would never have known if man had never sinned. Satan succeeded with the first Adam; why may he not with the second? Could he be induced to commit one sin, even the least, the race is still ruined.

When we come to the particulars of the account, we are met with the fact of a slight variation in the order of events, as narrated in the several Gospels. Matthew gives us one order, and Luke another; Luke putting as the third of the trials the one which Matthew gives as the second, and the second as the third. Which of these has preserved the real order? It is commonly agreed that this belongs to Matthew. Dr. Robinson is so sure of it, that in his *Harmony of the Gospels*, he has reversed Luke's order in his own narrative, and made it to correspond with that of Matthew. There are obvious reasons for the general verdict as thus expressed.

Matthew's order is the natural one. It is the order of climax. His first appeal, as with Eve, is to a physical appetite. This failing, he next assails him through the love of approbation; when foiled here, he attacks the Saviour through the highest of all mere human sentiments and desires, those of possession, power, dignity, and honor. Thus appetite, desire of approbation or applause, and the love of dominion are severally appealed to in their own order. Olshausen ranks them as appeals to the "lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life".

We must pass by several other questions—as to the manner in which Christ "was taken" to the several points, as narrated; and as to the question whether it was in body, or in vision that these transitions were made; and also as to how much of the world was shown in "all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them"—since the settlement of these matters has no direct bearing on the object we have in view. It may be sufficient to assume, that in being "taken", he was induced to go, no matter how; and that whether present upon the mountain, and upon the temple, in body or in spirit, he was really at those places, in such a way that all the power of inducement was brought to bear upon him, as if there in the body.

We come then to the proposals themselves, in the order of Matthew's narration. Weak from his abstinence, and prostrated under the reaction overtaking him from that high energy of devotion and enjoyment which he had so long experienced, the sensation of hunger comes upon him. He is left to his normal reliance on his own powers and faculties, except as sustained by the Holy Spirit, and feels the results of their past suspension, in faintness of body, and doubtless in depression of mind. Now is the time for the Tempter. "You are the Messiah, about to enter on your ministry, a part of which will be to work miracles. That power is now yours. Use it; make this stone to be bread, and save your life, for you are in the desert, and may perish before you can obtain food."

Where is the harm of it? Are not its averments true, natural, imperative? But Christ's sinless nature, with the stimulus of light and integrity imparted by the Holy Spirit, was able to decide on the instant that it would be unbecoming in the Saviour of mankind to commence his miraculous work by a miracle for himself, and for his physical being. No; Providence has thus far sustained him, even through a fast of forty days, and on Providence shall be his reliance still; since man lives not only by bread, but by obedience to the word of God in all its parts.

The attack is now changed. Since the Saviour will not offend for the sake of a physical appetite, even under such pressure, there must be a trial of his susceptibility to those passions of the soul which are so controlling with men. Jesus must be susceptible to the love of approval. The Jews expect their Messiah from heaven; here is a point of the temple—the very place where he would be expected to descend—near seven hundred feet, as some say, from the earth. In broad day, in the eyes of all Jerusalem, may he leap from this pinnacle and land safely, borne up by the shining cohorts, and thus show that he is the expected One, and be welcomed by the nation.

Christ detected the wrong in this, by its uselessness, its imprudence, and the love of display which it would involve. It was to tempt God. The Holy Spirit made luminous that Scripture of Moses forbidding such personal exposure, relying on God's special interposition in a matter not commanded of him. He will not yield to the lust of the eyes. Vanity cannot be relied on to lead him into sin.

Up to this point, what is there in the nature of the case itself, or in the demands of the Gospel story, to necessitate any sensible or other appearance of the Tempter, or even to lead to the supposition that Christ had recognised him? The time consumed in the history, as thus far given, is not determined. The suggestions are such as would be natural to our minds in the circumstances. These were appeals to his imagination, doubtless somewhat excited, and an aroused imagination more or less confuses the reason for the time being. If, therefore, he

was hurried from one suggestion to another, by the malignant spirit in whose shadow he was, so as to give hardly time for reflection, as would seem the natural manner of the temptation, and getting color from Luke's expression, "in a moment of time," he may have suspected, at this point, the presence of his enemy, but not as yet have gone any further than suspicion.

In this attitude of the case we may suppose the third attack to have been made. This is based upon a higher sentiment than either of the preceding. Man was created a monarch, and this world given him for empire. Though he has lost the domain, he has not lost the sentiment which leads him to seek for possession and power. It is a normal attribute of his soul, and the Scriptures appeal to it by their promises of rewards to well-doing, symbolized in crowns, thrones, and kingdoms. And the promises of spiritual empire, as thus given, are analogous to the promises of power and possession made to the nations which, in this world, serve God. Christian nations are authorized to believe themselves the inheritors of the earth, and actually reach the dominion of the world. In short, the idea of righteousness is coupled habitually in the Scriptures with sovereignty, according to the capacity of the righteous party.

Through this innate love of power shall then be the next attack. And we find Jesus upon a high mountain, surveying the kingdoms of the world, and their glory. The proposition, as related in the Gospels is: "All this will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me".

This is the only one of the three propositions of the Tempter, which offers in itself any difficulty of moment as to its interpretation. The difficulty here is readily apprehended. It consists in the manifest incongruity of such a being as Satan gravely proposing to a sinless one like Christ, "to fall down and worship him". A literal proposition of this kind must be thrown out of the account as utterly inconceivable; and we are forced, therefore, to ask, What is the real solution of the case? What did Satan literally propose?

And first, as to the *proposal of terms* to be submitted to on the part of Christ. What was he actually to do? And then, as to the *proffered reward*, what was he to receive? The proposal is in the words *ἐὰν πεσὼν προσκυνήσῃς μοι*. A textual examination of these words affords us no relief. The idea of the phrase is, religious homage and service, as expressed in the Saviour's reply. The only question is, as to the *manner* of the service; was it to be bodily, or a worship of the spirit, and a *service of the life*? If our hypothesis be correct, that Satan is not present in any visible, or even apprehended presence, the bodily or formal worship is out of the question, on physical grounds. And if the Saviour has not yet distinctly detected his presence, then is the supposition of any formal worship an absurdity. All the considerations of the case, physical and moral, drive us from any interpretation which supposes a formal or an apprehended worship of Satan as a person on the part of the Saviour.

What then is Christ actually to do? The answer to this is found in the proffered reward: "All this shall be thine". Christ is solicited to become a temporal king, and content himself with a worldly empire. To do this, is to renounce his spiritual kingdom, because the two are inconsistent, and really to accept of Satan for his sovereign, he being "the Prince of this world". The worship, therefore, was the worship of the spirit; the opposite in quality, but the same in nature, with that which Christ declares to be alone valuable, as rendered to the Father, even that of the Spirit. To serve the world is to serve the devil; such is it to us, such would it have been to him. The design doubtless was to conceal from him all of wrong that was involved in the offer. But Christ detected and rejected it at once.

The proffer was thus a real temptation to Christ's humanity. By it he would escape the poverty, ignominy and suffering of the spiritual kingdom, and obtain the comfort, dignity, wealth, and power of an empire, which might easily be conceived as the mightiest the world has ever seen. As a man, Christ was qualified to take and to govern such an empire. In this guise it was a great proffer to a great mind. How would

it loom up in the human imagination, if but held before it for a little time. And would not all good beings, who knew what was going on, hold their breath till the turn of the scale indicated the decision? Well might the angels throng about the triumphant Redeemer, as soon as the battle is won!

If this hypothesis as to this latter transaction be the true one, all the difficulties which seem to beset it readily vanish. No real significance attaches to the difference of form in which this proposal is made, from that of the others; such as, "All this will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me"; instead of, "Command this stone to become bread". This personality gives freshness to the narrative, while it indicates its true nature and source. To repeat all the account in detail, as it actually occurred, might occupy more space in the gospels than inspiration desired them to have. Some mode of condensation might therefore be a necessity.

Yet, after all, there may be the silent thought that this is putting the account to more strain than it ought to bear. We may therefore mention for its relief, that the whole Gospel story, to say nothing of the prophetic books, is filled with figurative forms of narration. Parables, metaphors, and illustrations, are the staple of Christ's teachings. These enigmatic forms take all shapes, and vary from each other without end. Sometimes the Saviour explains them, and sometimes he does not; but no one supposes that those which he did not explain are, on that account, without explanation. He often purposely leaves his words unexplained, and with the knowledge that some will misunderstand him. His words, nevertheless, in all cases inclose his meaning, though they may not convey it of necessity to all who hear him.

It is not therefore necessary to find any passage exactly and in all points parallel with this, as thus interpreted. Cases like it, in essentials, are abundant; cases in which he puts spiritual facts in sensible forms. When, for instance, he says: "Destroy this Temple, and in three days I will build it"; while he really says one thing, he seems to say another. In the case of Dives and Lazarus, the imagery is manifestly more or less merely such, while the true sense of the story must be carefully kept.

When he speaks of eating his flesh and drinking his blood, the thing is as baldly impossible, as a literal act, as that he should formally worship the devil. He who believes in him eats his flesh and drinks his blood. The nature of this proposal, so widely different from that ministry, upon which Christ had doubtless been meditating for the past forty days, and the details of which he had prospectively settled upon, revealed itself at once to his sinless soul. He understood the scheme and its author. His reply is, *Begone, Satan!* and thus the trial closes.

ART. V.—BRITISH SYMPATHY WITH AMERICA.

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THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: RESURRECTION THROUGH DISSOLUTION.

WAR tries and reveals the strongest elements of national character, developing in an accelerated ratio the physical and moral resources of a people. In itself an evil and a scourge, it may become the means of purifying and exalting the popular spirit and of bringing a nation to the fullest consciousness of its historic destiny. It may likewise become an international touchstone, revealing the sympathies or antipathies of other nations. The sentiments that are cloaked in times of peace are often evoked with unmistakable significance when a nation is struggling for its very life. We find out who are our real friends, and who they are that wish us ill, when engaged in a contest that absorbs all our energies. Especially must this be the case, when a nation, like our own, is involved in an intestine conflict, striving to uphold its national unity in the face of a formidable revolt. At such a crisis the broad human and Christian sympathies of other nations will be clearly expressed, if not by the proffer of material aid, yet in the way of moral support, of cordial cheer and good-will.

Such magnanimous and unbought sympathy, uttered in the

junction and crisis of a nation's destiny, has a priceless worth; it is the noblest boon which one people can give another. It cannot be extorted by menace, nor is it the offspring of mere prudence, but rather a spontaneous tribute, revealing the subtlest and deepest moral unison in the great ends and objects of national life. It indicates where lie the springs of action. As with an electric touch it kindles the souls of those engaged in the battle, for it assures them that the hearts of a vast and eager assembly are beating for them, quick to mourn their reverses and to hail their success. And, if such sympathy really exist, it will be shown most clearly whenever moral right and human rights are essential elements in the conflict. War, then, in Bacon's phrase becomes, "the highest trial of Right". And a nation contending for order against anarchy, for civilization against barbarism, for freedom against oppression, has some right to expect that the friends of order, of civilization, and of liberty will cheer it in its struggles and sacrifices. If it is itself willing to risk all, even its very life, for the sake of its vital interests, it may surely hope that those who share in its general principles and aims will pronounce judgment in its favor in clear and welcome words. And rarely, at such a juncture, can it be mistaken about the sentiments and sympathies of others. The nerves are in tension, and quick to feel. Love, hate or indifference is rapidly detected when the soul is strained to its highest pitch of sensibility.

The United States of America are now involved in a desperate conflict, which, to all human seeming, indicates a crisis in its history. It is passing through a death-struggle, resisting even unto blood the domination of the slave power in its national affairs, the arbitrary and self-destructive theory of secession as a constitutional right, and the armed hosts of a widespread rebellion, fomented in the interests of a slaveholding minority, and having for its object the establishment of a rival republic based on the right of human bondage as its distinguishing political principle. The leaders in this rebellion are conspirators, traitors and rebels against the General Government; none the less so even though the political right of secession be conceded. For they took forcible possession

of forts, public buildings, and lands owned by the United States; they attacked posts rightly held by national troops; they subjected to systematic persecution and confiscation all loyal persons within the boundaries of the so-called Confederate States; they annulled the laws of the land; they attempted to overrun and hold States which had never seceded; they threatened to take and destroy the national Capitol. All this is not mere secession; but open and flagrant insurrection against the power and rights of the General Government. And that this rebellion was inaugurated in the service of slavery, for the sake of founding a slave-republic on this continent, and brought about chiefly because the progress of the North threatened to expel the domination of the slave-power from our national councils, is as palpable to all who can read the signs of the times, and as susceptible of the clearest historic and moral demonstration, as any fact in the course and progress of human history. Here is the inmost sense of the strife. The central question in our politics for more than forty years has been, Shall freedom or slavery rule in our national policy? The question now is, Shall a republic, based on the principle of slavery, be allowed to consolidate its power on the soil of this republic? And the question in its final issue is, Shall this continent, south of the Canadian frontier, be controlled by the generous and inspiring principle of free labor, or by the selfish and barbarising policy of slavery? For in the end there can probably be but one government in the heart of this continent, stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Secession could only end in attempts at reconstruction. If a slave-republic were now formed as an independent power, it would never cease its ambitious projects until it brought the whole country under its sway. The physical characteristics of the country, the laws of commerce, the historic laws guiding the growth of states, the common bonds of language, literature, and society, and the general interests of this country in relation to foreign powers, all point to national unity as the only feasible end. Here it is eminently true, that

“ They struggle vainly to preserve a part,
Who have not courage to contend for all”.

One country, one constitution, one destiny is sharply inscribed upon the past annals of our nation, and prognosticated in the signs of the future. Whether the vast power of this republic shall be wielded in the interests of freedom or of slavery, of an aristocracy or of the people, whether unrighteous caste shall here be perpetuated or here be abolished, is the vital and substantive question at the root of our present conflict.

Animated by such convictions the United States entered into the war which the rebellion forced upon it, with the fullest consciousness of its significancy, perils, and possible issues. It saw that its national life was in danger of extinction, and it nerved and strained itself to call out all its resources for self-preservation. It was suddenly summoned to a new and untried career—from the *acta in toga* to the *gesta in armis*. It knew that the conflict would be desperate; and that the sacrifices must be in proportion to the danger and the stake. It knew that if it failed, republicanism itself would be pronounced a failure, and the onward career of this country be checked in its noon-tide. It also knew that if it succeeded, the progress of the slave-power would be arrested, the majesty of rightful government vindicated, the practical vigor of republicanism demonstrated, and its progress accelerated. On the one side was an armed revolt, assuming the style of Confederate States, organized to expel the national government from its soil, and to ensure the undisturbed supremacy of the debasing political maxim, that human bondage is needful and right. On the other hand was the National Government, legally elected, simply exercising its constitutional functions, foully betrayed by those entrusted with power, aiming only to uphold in the revolted States the authority and rights to which those States were solemnly pledged, menaced and warred upon because the national supremacy of the free spirit of the North seemed insured by the election of President Lincoln, long reluctant to believe that all hope of compromise and pacification must be abandoned, itself at first well-nigh non-resistant, while staggering and deadly blows were dealt by armed, wary, and unscrupulous foes, and at last aroused to open resistance only

when a handful of its troops, beleaguered in Fort Sumter, were compelled to surrender their post after a fierce bombardment. Now the Union must fight or die. And thus our war began.

Up to this time the tone of the foreign, especially of the English press and periodicals, had been favorable to the United States government. The North was encouraged; the South was blamed. England had freed its colonial slaves, and boasted of its love and sacrifices for human freedom. For a quarter of a century it had been assailing this country chiefly because it was the only Christian power that tolerated slavery at home. British Christians catechised all our ministers upon this question, and refused the right hand of fellowship to such as could not clear themselves of the suspicion of looking upon the slave system with leniency or indifference. All Europe understood that the last presidential election turned upon the question of the prohibition of slavery in the territories—in fact, upon the question, whether the slave interest should be national or local. Abroad the election of Mr. Lincoln was well nigh universally hailed as an indication that the power of slavery was broken, and that the free North would exercise in our national councils the supremacy to which it was entitled by its numerical superiority, and by its devotion to free labor, free speech, and human rights. The Great Republic was greeted as disenthralled from the fatal spell that had so long held it in bondage to a system, which sacrificed the general welfare to the exorbitant demands of a slaveholding minority and oligarchy.

But no sooner was the rebellion fairly inaugurated by the Confederate States, than all this applause was suddenly changed into doubt, reproach, or denunciation. The disruption of the Republic seemed to be assumed as a foregone conclusion. Apologies were invented for the South, and calumnies for the North. The war was “deplored” (the pet word) as a terrible struggle for a chimerical and undesirable result. The lust of conquest was stigmatised as the moving spring of the North, and the love of independence applauded as the passion of the South. The right of Secession was violently maintained by journalists that had evidently never seen our

Constitution. Slavery, it was squarely asserted, had really nothing to do with the strife. It was even gravely maintained that if Englishmen wanted to see the slave-trade abolished, and emancipation made sure and easy, they must sympathise with the Confederate States. The vaunted British sympathy, more often extolled than tested, for the weaker and oppressed party, was invoked in favor of the persecuted Southern States, who only wanted to secure their independence. Besides, if the South succeeded, republicanism was surely a failure, as sagacious Englishmen had always said it must be. Also, if the South succeeded, it would have free trade with England, and free trade is a very great blessing—for England, which has so many manufactured goods to sell in the dearest markets, and raw goods to buy in the cheapest. And would it not after all be better to have the new slave republic succeed (especially as it had prohibited the slave-trade), than to have the Great Republic subdue it; for in the latter case, the power of republicanism would be proved mightier than that of any other form of government; whereas, if the South established its independence, it would certainly need a stronger government than before, possibly an aristocracy in form as well as in fact—and this would go to show that aristocracy is conducive to the well-being of states. Even if it were a slave republic, that would not make any Englishman love slavery more; whereas, if the United States triumphed, and all the States were reunited as one free republic, this would give greater warrant and license than ever before to the insolent radical faction under “our venerable constitution” who have been trying to prove by Western example, that the masses may wisely be entrusted with a greater share of that political power, which all conservatives hold should be administered, not by the people, but for them. Some ulterior consequences about Canada, the British West Indies, commercial supremacy, naval power, and kindred matters were also incidentally suggested to reflecting minds. The net result of the whole calculation was thus very clearly made out to be something like this: if the South succeed, England will be a gainer in divers ways (even though, parenthetically, hu-

manity be the loser); but if the North succeed, nobody can tell what may happen, though it is quite probable that the British Isles will not receive any immediate benefit. Serious-minded philanthropists were also prompted to inquire whether, after all, humanity would suffer so very much from the triumph of the South? There are surely men, and gentlemen and Christians (as well as cotton), there in abundance, in spite of their horrible system of slavery; and if they can only be brought into intimate fellowship with the British people, and bound to it by ties of gratitude—may it not reasonably be expected in the course of time that they would be persuaded to treat their poor slaves a little better? Moreover, may there not have been some gross exaggerations about this matter of slavery? The North is very jealous of the South; and it is plainly the interest of the planters to treat their chattels well, or else they could not produce so many bales of cotton of such a long and fine staple. Thoughtful English philanthropists and traders deeply pondered such obvious considerations. De Tocqueville is acknowledged to have written the best book on American Democracy; the same shrewd critic in his *Memoirs* also tells us: "In the eyes of an Englishman a cause is just, if it be the interest of England that it should succeed. A man or a government that is useful to England has every kind of merit, and one that does England harm every sort of fault." He also adds, that it is "the conviction of all nations that England considers them only with reference to her own greatness, that she never notices what passes among foreigners, what they think, feel, suffer, or do—but with relation to the use which England can make of their actions, their sufferings, their feelings and their thoughts; and that when she seems most to care for them, she really cares only for herself".*

This severe judgment of a philosophical observer seems to be confirmed by the course of the British people, as represented by the leading organs of public opinion, in relation to the present crisis in our national affairs. By the closest ties of descent, language, and commerce, by traditional regard for

* De Tocqueville, *Memoir, Letters, and Remains* (Boston edition), ii, 393.

the authority of constitutions and by the inborn love of human rights, as well as by treaties of amity, they were allied to our General Government. When the rebellion broke out, the whole North felt and said, England will surely give us its moral support. And this on two grounds, if on no other; first, the maintenance of the rightful authority of a constitutional government against the assaults of perjured conspirators and traitors; and, secondly, in the interest of human freedom as against the retrograde tendencies and inherent selfishness, if not barbarity, of the slave power.* Here we supposed were fixed facts as to the side to which England would gravitate in its political and moral sympathies. But it was soon found that we were imposed upon by the delusions of a dream. As with one consent, the leading journals representing the aristocratic, the commercial, and also the religious opinions of Great Britain, began to show the most inexplicable dislike of the United States, and to pour out upon it a torrent of abusive misrepresentation and perversion of principles and facts, almost unequalled in the fiercest excitement even of a local, political debate. The amount of stupid prejudice and obstinate ignorance about our affairs shown by these journals is well-nigh incredible. All the old scores of the past fifty years were raked up to inflame popular prejudice. Our institutions, history, morals, manners, and government were disparaged and vilified, as if no public or private virtue were left on this side of the ocean. Whatever the South said for itself or against the North was credulously believed; and all that the North said was ignored or denied. The tone of the British government itself was cold and diplomatic, and tended to favor the South alone. According to all recognised principles of international law, the

* Another reason might have been found in the Protestant sympathies of England, and the desirableness of upholding this Union unimpaired in the interests of our common Protestant civilization and power. If this country were dismembered, England would be the only first-rate Protestant nation. It requires but a slight knowledge of past history and of the probabilities of the future, to see that the conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism has not yet been decided; and that precisely on account of its Protestantism, the strongest European powers may yet seek to cripple the might of England.

only lawful army and navy which England had any right to see within our boundaries was that called out by the United States. But the British government at the very outset, even before the minister of our government could arrive in England, issued a proclamation, conceding belligerent rights to the revolted as much as to the loyal States. It assumed a position of neutrality between a lawful government and its rebellious citizens. It put the privateers of the latter on the same footing with our men-of-war. The Nashville wantonly destroyed the Harvey Birch by fire, and then found refuge and comfort in British ports: Earl Russell said it was a Confederate "vessel of war". Spain and Turkey have been more just than England. *The Times*, *The Morning Herald*, and *The Post*, followed by nearly all the leading journals (excepting *The Daily News* and *The Star*) have bitterly and constantly denounced the policy, the aims, the power and the right of our Government in the prosecution of the war. In the affair of the Trent, England ignored its old policy and claims, that it might put us in the wrong. The news of the seizure of that ship was followed by a furious outburst of indignation and hostility from Johnny Groat's to Land's End. The wildest surmises were current and credited about our intent and policy; as, the manufactured lie, that the government at Washington was under the dictation of a mob; or, the gross absurdity, that the North, hopeless of subduing the South, had put a deliberate insult upon England, that it might in its extremity embroil itself in another war, and so have a decent pretext for making peace with the rebels! The British lion could not have sprung to its feet with more instant rage even in the event of a French invasion; only it was in menace of a foe supposed to be powerless, and not in panic before an empire known to be strong. In hot haste a virtual ultimatum was despatched across the Atlantic, containing no hint of possible diplomatic negotiations even on points of international law plainly involved and not yet settled. To aid diplomacy, large reënforcements were at once shipped to Canada. In the extremity of our Republic, before we had completed our preparations for coping with the rebellion, ere we had

gained a single great victory, England sent us an ultimatum, and sent a large force to our borders in menace, while the whole British press poured out a volley of anathemas. Mr. Seward's note to Lord Lyons, indicating a pacific solution of the difficulty, was in the hands of the ministers of the crown, and its contents were carefully suppressed. And only the good sense of our government, and the moderation of our "mob", kept Old England from the unspeakable shame of making war upon a free Republic in the interests of a slaveholding confederacy. Then, of course, there came a lull in the storm, but still no concession to the justice or rights of our cause: there was silence, but no favor:

Turpiter obtineuit, sublato jure nocendi.

Of this attitude and public policy of England in respect to our struggle there is one, and only one possible solution, in consonance with all the facts of the case. The preëminence of Great Britain is the historical ideal of British statesmanship. This may spring from the latent conviction that English supremacy is for the greatest good of mankind; it is at any rate sufficiently powerful to absorb all minor morals and objects. The peculiarity of the British power, as compared with that of all other great historic nations, is seen in the fact that it is the only island which has ever ruled continents. The marvellous energy, pluck, good sense, and pertinacity of the British people have given it unequalled success in the planting and holding of colonies. It has also been able at home to combine the most diverse interests in one orderly and wonderful state. Monarchy, aristocracy, representative government, commerce, and manufactures are wrought into one system, making one power as never before. To support all these interests, to remain a great and growing power, it must have great colonies, and a proportionate maritime and commercial superiority. It lives and thrives through and by its possessions abroad. It is by necessity ambitious for foreign conquest and rule. Some of its interests, especially those of the aristocratic, the manufacturing, and the commercial classes, seem endangered by the example, or by the growing power,

of our Republic. Dread of this power, and of its future growth, controls the words and policy of many of England's greatest and best men. Our democracy is disliked by their aristocracy; our manufactures rival theirs; our commerce threatens at many points to supplant theirs. We are in dangerous proximity to some of their best colonies. They can hardly replace the drain we make upon their people by the superior advantages our land holds out to their more destitute population. In this state of things, what was more natural than that, in such a crisis as ours, all these threatened interests should rise up against us? Our hour had come; it was our time of rupture and of weakness; this Republic seemed rent asunder. Now, if ever, was the opportunity, without infringing on the letter of the public law, to make use of all practicable means for giving aid and comfort to the cause of secession, thus hastening the dissolution of the Union. In many ways this would be for the advantage of England. The United States would cease to be a first-rate power. Southern cotton could be directly exchanged for English manufactures. The need of a strong force in Canada and the West Indies would be curtailed; and the Monroe doctrine would become a dead letter. It would also be proved, that Republics tend to subdivision. Thus the material and commercial prosperity of Great Britain might be enhanced, and its aristocracy have a new lease of power, both in church and state.

Two considerations, as we have already stated, stood in the way of all this. One was the regard which one nation should have for another struggling for national existence. The other was, that the rebellious States were slaveholding, and England was committed to abolitionism. Here were the moral principles of the contest; this was its other, higher, and eternal side. Could England afford to throw these out of the account? Should it suppress the moral instincts, and give heed only to political and mercenary aspirations? Would this redound to its permanent benefit? Here was certainly a grave dilemma. And the leading British statesmen and writers extricated themselves from it by a very simple plan and plea. With one consent, they took the ground, that neither of these considerations was

to enter into their estimate of the case in hand. It was quietly assumed, as inevitable and irrefragable—that there was no one national life, no national unity here, and that there ought not to be—that the South and the North were already two nations; and that the only possible issue of the contest was on this basis. And it was also as roundly asserted and claimed—in direct contradiction of the most notorious facts—that slavery had nothing to do with the real merits of the case; that freedom, in fact, would rather lose than gain with the triumph of the North. And so, the English hatred of slavery was even paraded as a reason for sympathising with the South rather than the North. Earl Russell, echoed by Mr. Gladstone, summed up the whole matter in the noted saying—“that the contest was, on the part of the North, for supremacy, and on the part of the South for independence”. Thus were the only two reasons on the ground of which the United States entered into the conflict ruled out of the case in England.

Yet not wholly ruled out by all. A seeming consistency must still be attempted. Hence we were told, again and again, that if we would put the war on direct anti-slavery grounds, and proclaim universal emancipation, all England would rise in virtuous acclamation. That is to say, we will and can have no sympathy with you in your struggle for national being, for we can only sympathise with a universal human interest. We will not sympathise with you, if you conduct your war on the same principles and for the same objects with all the most defensible and lauded wars in history, but only as you make it a moral crusade, and propagate freedom at the point of the bayonet. Suppose we had done this; would not the cry of fanaticism, of the horrors of extermination, of the impracticability of such a daring venture, have rung through Europe? Would not France and England have been exhorted to interfere on the score of humanity itself? And, besides, if England is so virtuous that it can only sympathise with a war for moral ends, what must it say of its own wars, in India, in the Crimea, in Canada? Were these for freedom or for empire? Let it also be considered, that,

from the nature of the case, the legal and political form and statement of the contest must be, the necessity of preserving the constitution and the government. It is the only possible mode of putting the case in political ethics, as a national cause. The war, as an appeal to arms, was forced upon us by an armed revolt and rebellion against our government. The momentum was indeed given on the one side by slavery, on the other by freedom. But the only direct and formal object of the war on the part of the Union is, of course, to restore its own authority. Slavery as a predominant power in our national politics will doubtless receive its death-blow in the contest; but this must be, not through the war alone and directly, but also through many another agency.

Now we do not doubt that many Englishmen truly believed that we had no right to contend for national existence, and that they could not sympathise with us unless we adopted their visionary scheme of emancipation. They really thought that we were engaged in an unrighteous war of subjugation alone. But may this not have been in part because they wished to believe it? *Populus vult decipi, et decipietur*. The wish was father to the thought. They did not want to find that the North was in the right. They did not wish to feel obliged to sympathise with us on the score of good government and of anti-slavery feeling. It was much more convenient to set these moral aspects of the case aside, that the prudential and commercial reasons might have full vent and verge. For, whatever may be said about English justice and sympathy, there is and can be no question (with a few exceptions), that on neither of those two main points of our controversy have we had the slightest expression of good-will from the leading organs of British opinion. Mr. Mill, in his very able article in *Fraser's Magazine*, confesses that there is too much plausibility to the accusation that the English people have felt and spoken "almost solely against the party in the right"; and that there is "no denying the charge, that our moral attitude towards the contending parties" has favored the slave interest. They have called the struggle deplorable: but only to add, that they wished we would make peace with and recognise the South, so

that they might again get cotton and send goods in abundance. On the two main points they have had no sympathy with us, because they have denied both of them as real factors in the contest. They even taunt us with asking for their sympathy, as if it was none of their business. We do not complain of it; we suppose they could not help it. It is not their lack of charity that we impugn, so much as their falsification of facts; it is not their want of sympathy, but their reasons for it. They did not, and would not see the immortal issues of the strife. We simply say, that it reveals to us fully, what are English policy and statesmanship, English hopes and fears, in the midst of such momentous contests. But we also insist upon it, that they have no right to call prudence virtue, and to dignify mercantile calculations with the sacred name of justice. If England in this matter is content with its position, and vindicates its wisdom, so be it. Only let it be fully understood, that it finds its honor in what is for its own advantage, and its wisdom in that which will most profit its own power and commerce. But as yet we cannot see that mercantile morality is the highest form of national ethics; we cannot see that England has any sense or reason or justice on its side; in utterly disregarding all that the United States of America declare with unanimous conviction to be the inmost sense of the real issues of this terrible war—perhaps the most vast in its proportions, and momentous in its results, of any single war that was ever waged on any continent, having respect to the maintenance of good government and of just and equal laws. And England's very lack of sympathy for us has made us stronger. It has disclosed to us still more clearly, that here we stand well-nigh alone, fighting a battle for mankind.

That those esteemed the best and worthiest of English statesmen held and favored such views, adverse to our national unity, and resolutely refusing to admit the slavery question into the discussion, is seen most clearly in the utterances of leading members of the British Cabinet. From Lord Palmerston no one, we suppose, expected much favor; he has spoken no good word for America, though he lately said, that "he should be ashamed, when events of such high importance

were going on in *Italy*, if Englishmen had remained silent, and expressed no feeling, no wishes and no sympathy as to the result." Mr. Milner Gibson uttered a few words at the outset in favor of the North. Her Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs has been identified with the progress of reform; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer is, undoubtedly, a man of the highest general culture. The former openly said, in his place in the House of Lords, in the very height of our conflict: "I trust that whatever may be their military successes and naval victories, the North will at last consent to the *peaceable separation of two States*, which might both be mighty, of two States inhabited by persons of very different education and of very different nature, perhaps, but respecting each other, and each going on in a course of peace and prosperity, which will not only benefit that great country in the present day, but will secure its position for centuries to come." From Earl Russell's point of view, all this may have seemed very fair and conclusive; and many Englishmen praise its moderation and justice; but suppose our Secretary of State had said the same thing about England and Canada, or England and India, while these countries were in rebellion against the British power. Or, suppose Ireland should revolt, and Mr. Seward should utter a like wish. Mr. Seward, the most philosophical of our statesmen, has been represented in England as the chief of our demagogues, on the basis of notoriously false reports of his sayings as to Canada. But the South is held to us by closer ties, and is more needful to our national unity than Canada can be to England. Mr. Gladstone not only endorses the general position of Earl Russell, but he is still more explicit in the avowal, that the English policy was dictated by a desire to conciliate the South, in the belief that it would finally succeed. In his speech before the Chamber of Commerce at Manchester he repelled "the American demand for sympathy", asking what was "practically the meaning of that desire and demand? It was this, that we should take such a course by our language and by our public acts as would place the ten millions of men of the South in permanent hostility with us". He goes on to say, that though opposed to slavery, "that is no

reason for adopting a course of conduct that is to lay the foundations of alienation, of bad feeling, and of permanent hostility between ourselves and those who may hereafter be a great nation claiming to enter into peaceful relations with us".* This is certainly very frankly said. And, making all due allowance, is not such a statement as this a melancholy commentary on the British statesmanship of the nineteenth century? Why has it been left to Mr. Bright, the noble Quaker, and to Mr. Mill, the reflecting political economist, to utter the only words which indicated any tolerable appreciation of the real magnitude and issues of this contest? The whole tone of Mr. Gladstone's Manchester speech is unmistakably in favor of the Southern cause. On the question of slavery in general, the Chancellor is very sound; but he says he has "no faith in the propagation of free institutions at the point of the sword". Why did he not state it just the other way—that he has no faith in the propagation of slavery, at the point of the sword? for that was the beginning of the strife. And between the two—for this is the question—which would he elect? When slavery rises against a free government, how can either government or freedom be preserved but by the sword? The whole amount of his argument is, the South will probably succeed, and therefore we must keep on good terms with her. Has British statesmanship, then, ceased to be a training in the high rules of political justice, and in a sacred jealousy for whatever may mar human freedom and human rights, and become debased into a mercantile morality, a caculation of profit and loss? Well might the rulers of the Southern Confederacy rejoice when they read such words. If they could only succeed, they would be sure there would be no "alienation or bad feeling" among England's ruling minds. Whatever might be their crimes against the United States, and whatever their "domestic institutions", the chief opponent of slavery in

* The tone of Mr. Gladstone's Manchester speech is very different from that of the one he delivered some time since at Leith, in which he said that "not only had England nothing to fear from the growth of the United States of America, but so far as we had a selfish interest at all in the matter, it was that the American Union should continue undisturbed". Whence this marked difference?

the old world would be most happy to enter into "peaceful relations" with them at the earliest opportunity. It is not alone the heart of the North which is indignant at such avowals and such policy; but the voice of England's "dead, yet sceptred sovereigns," in the name of its dearest and mightiest memories, equally rebukes these sordid calculations, based on the prospective calamities of a people sprung from England's loins, and inheriting her old spirit.

"Milton! thou should'st be living at this hour:
England hath need of thee."

Might not even a merely prudential statesmanship have also asked, whether, even if the South succeeded, it would not be prudent for England to retain its moral hold of the great Northern Republic, which would still remain indestructible? * Might it not be as well to conciliate twenty-two millions of freemen as four millions of a slaveholding population? England had a great opportunity of riveting this Republic to it by the strongest bonds. We did not ask its intervention in our behalf; we merely asked, that it might not stimulate the hope of intervention in favor of the South. Every one knows that this hope has been the chief reliance of the South in continuing the contest. Mr. Seward long since wrote to Mr. Pike, Minister at the Netherlands, and has often repeated, that "this domestic war would come to an end to-morrow if the European States should clearly announce, that — expectations of favor from them must be abandoned". And what statesman, on either side of the Atlantic, doubts, that, if the North had not shown an unparalleled energy, and been successful under a favoring Providence beyond precedent, intervention by this time would have been ensured, to our discomfiture and the triumph of the Confederate States? Such an intervention would have been in palpable violation of all international law

* Mr. Bright warned his countrymen in vain on this point: "It is worth our while, on all moral grounds, and on grounds of self-interest, that we should in all our transactions acknowledge our alliance and kinship with such a nation, and not leave behind an ineradicable and undying sting, which it would take many years, perhaps a generation or two, to remove".

and right, and yet it has been seriously advocated, on the most frivolous pretexts. It has been discussed as if this country were a second-rate or enfeebled power, at the mercy of the great European States; it has been urged for the sake of humanity, as though we were half-civilized; it was suggested for the absurd reason, that, to aid our blockade, we sunk old hulks in the harbor of Charleston; and it has been demanded, in the name of the suffering operatives of Lancashire, as though all regard for our national dignity and rights were to be made subservient to the interests of British operatives. Mr. Gladstone congratulates the English nation on this non-intervention, saying, "that there never was an occasion in which the civilized nations of the world bore, and had been content to bear, so much real misery, resulting from a civil and municipal quarrel in another State, without interference". But what principle of international ethics allows intervention in such cases of incidental suffering from war? There can be no great war which is not inconvenient to the non-combatants. If they can on that account justly interfere, there could not be any war between two great powers without leading to universal war. The assumed right of intervention is preposterous. But not more so than it is for Englishmen to extol their magnanimity for not committing so gross an injustice. They have called their neutrality dignified, and enlogised their indifference to a conflict which is to decide whether this continent be the home of freedom or the land of bondage! When Dante was on the verge of the infernal regions, he heard a sad wail, and turned and asked, who were these. To whom it was replied, that they were the shades of those who were indifferent to good and evil, and deserved neither praise nor blame, and therefore were their cries mingled with those of the rebel angels. The boasted neutrality of England mingles accordant with the fierce war-cry of the rebel hosts of America, bent on our destruction.

In all this, we say, England has let slip a great opportunity of showing itself faithful to its loudly proclaimed principles. It has been tried and found wanting. It may be, that like us, it was, though unconsciously, passing through a moral crisis.

It may be, that its own hour of danger is not distant, when it will look in vain for the sympathy from us it would otherwise have surely had. The change of feeling in this country has been rapid, strong, and well-nigh universal. Those have changed the most who were England's firmest friends. It is the reflecting, conservative, and religious men of the North who are now most distrustful of her whom we have always called our mother country. The Anti-British feeling has hitherto been strongest among the democrats, seeking the votes of the immigrant Irish population. Now, the estrangement is most marked among the most sober men of all political parties and religious denominations. It is not hatred or fear; but a deep-seated moral distrust. Our best men are amazed at England's indifference, if not apostasy, to the moral bearings of this conflict. They doubted whether it could be so, until the evidence became irresistible. We found ourselves traduced by those who ought to have uttered words of cheer; we listened in vain to hear any one great name among England's ruling statesmen, and even among the clergy of Presbyterian Scotland, pronounce boldly in our favor. Arthur, Bright and Mill, are the only three men of note who have really worked with vigor in our behalf. Of Mr. Cobden, once our eulogist, all that we have heard is, that he was perpetually asking, on free-trade grounds, why we could not let the Southern States go in peace. Bulwer, the reflecting novelist and statesman, early prophesied our inevitable ruin as a united people. And even Lord Brougham, whose speech is just received in this country, abstaining from an expression of opinion in favor of either party, describes this war as the "frantic rage of a whole people, filled with a thirst for vengeance, only to be slaked by each other's slaughter"; manifestly thinking that, not regular armies, but a whole population is fighting hand to hand like savage tribes. And this venerable apostle of freedom, and of the diffusion of knowledge, "improves" the occasion to depict the terrors of democracy, in which the government is overborne by the mob, and likens the government to Pontius Pilate, and the people to the mob that demanded the death of Jesus. Such a

speech confounds and amazes us; for it shows the utter ignorance of the most intelligent foreigners as to the real character and working of democratic institutions. Everybody here knows that these representations are utterly false; and we tell our English friends so, and they do not give the slightest heed to our testimony. How different the tone of the more thoughtful and less prejudiced Frenchmen. De Gasparin and Laboulaye have spoken manfully in our favor; but there has been no Scotch De Gasparin, and few English Laboulayes. Archbishop Dupanloup published a pastoral against slavery;* what English prelate has done the like? Hengstenberg hates a democracy so cordially, that we are not surprised to find him exulting in our division, and in his joy forgetting to rebuke the sin of rebellion; but from Dr. Guthrie we did not look for revilings at our institutions and insulting denial of our anti-slavery professions. In days past large public meetings have been held in England in favor of Italy striving for unity, and of Hungary contending its nationality. But America must fight for unity and nationality alone, without the encouragement of any such spontaneous assemblage. We may have had many secret friends; silent, reflecting, and Christian men may have been with us; but the feeling has not been strong enough, and the men have not been strong enough to be outspoken. We have seen private letters from those eminent in literature or

* Mgr. Dupanloup, archbishop of Orleans, is an ardent advocate of the rights of the papacy, but he does not forget the rights of man. In his recent address to his clergy, he says: "I am told that the North merits little more of sympathy than the South; that questions of commercial tariffs or of political predominance have had more influence than the question of slavery on the secession out of which civil war has issued." . . . "It is said, that if the Union be reconstructed, the emancipation of the slaves is not certain, and if the separation become complete, that emancipation is not impossible." . . . "All this I do not know . . . but what I do know is, that the horrors of civil war have been let loose by this fearful question. . . . And what I am more happy to know is, that by a recent and important act, a message of March 8, sent to Congress by the President of the United States and adopted by a great majority — measures prudent, equitable, peaceful, have been proposed to put an end to slavery, and passed. . . . For the first time in sixty years the central government takes part, and commits the whole nation to a vigorous effort against the evil." Suppose the lord bishop of Oxford had uttered such words in the English Parliament!

for philanthropy, breathing a cordial sympathy with us; and these were doubly grateful just because they were in such strong contrast with almost all the public manifestoes. Prince Albert, we do not forget, was reckoned as our friend at the time when war seemed imminent. Several religious bodies, too, petitioned for peace; these, however, were all non-conformist, excepting the Evangelical Alliance, and Lord Shaftesbury himself protested against the action of the latter. But all this had to do, not with our internal struggle, but with adding to it a contest with England. So far as we can see or judge, from any public avowals, the simple matter of fact is, that the whole ruling class in England, in church and state, have prophesied and welcomed this American Crisis as the downfall of our Republic; and they were perfectly willing to see us lose our place among the nations of the earth.

But what, after all, if this Republic shall be successful, and be reunited, and have freedom and free labor for its ruling national character! Were there no Englishmen, of large thought and heart, to contemplate this possibility? Few, if any; and yet it was worthy of meditation.* It was well worth asking whether, in view of that contingency, England could afford to do outrage to the strongest patriotic instincts of a power that would at once be the strongest on this side of the Atlantic, and that would soon become second to no earthly power? But the great men of England have resolutely shut their eyes to any such possibility. They have not allowed this thought to influence their words. It is well for us that they are neither the

* The *Morning Post*, one of our most bitter assailants, lately said: "If the government of the United States should succeed in reënnexing them (the Confederate States) to its still extensive dominions, Democracy will have achieved its grandest triumph since the world began. All that for fifty years its worshippers have declaimed and sung would be but dull prose to the peans which would thenceforth ascend in its praise. It would be said, and not unjustly said, that it not only reared an empire as if by magic, but that when that empire was riven in twain — when an enemy, numbering its hosts by hundreds of thousands, was within sight of its Capitol, it was a question only of a little time, less bloodshed, and some money, to rebuild that empire by conquering nine millions of a united people, and a country of a million square miles."

Truth is sometimes couched in satire; ironical prophecies may have a fulfilment.

prophets nor the providence of history. Neither English hopes nor English fears will control our destiny as a nation. It is ruled by a higher power. Nor is it, as we joyfully and solemnly believe, in our own hands, or at any human disposal. No mere human will or wisdom were sufficient for such a boundless opportunity as will then stretch out before us. He alone who gives the opportunity can give the courage, wisdom, and strength needed for this unrivalled task. Were not the triumph of our Republic in the line of progress of human rights, human welfare, and also, above all, of Christ's own Gospel, we might well be more overawed at the prospect of victory, than at the prospect of dissolution or defeat. Even if defeated, we also know, that in some way, to us inscrutable, our reverse will subserve the behests of a higher power. But no fear of ultimate defeat now troubles our vision of the future. Never did a people gird itself for an almost superhuman task, with more of calmness, with more of self-sacrifice, with greater willingness, and even eagerness, to give up gold and life and all present earthly good, for the sake of man, for the sake of civilisation, and in obedience to the clearest indications and guidance of Providence. An inspiration of patriotism and unity, for the sake of freedom and humanity, seized as by a spontaneous energy upon the whole teeming population of the mighty and youthful Northern States. Such voluntary enlistments were never before known in a peaceful and civilized nation. The flower of our land, numbering hundreds of thousands, possessed by a mighty and uncontrollable impulse, have gone to battle as if it were a festal day. Disaster has given them fresh courage, and now the shouts of victory are heard all over the sea and land. The ranks, thinned by death, are still eagerly filled up. Six hundred thousand are now in the field; and before this nation will permit itself to be destroyed, another half million will gladly rush to the conflict. It may be "a chimera"; it may be fanaticism; but it is such a chimera as makes history; it is by such fanaticism that the world is subdued. Let us rather humbly call it a providential impulse, such as defies and enlightens the sagacity of the statesmen, traders and good men, who think everything

unaccountable that does not help their private gain, or square with their contracted horoscope of the future.

The strength and wide diffusion of this British feeling against the United States are still more manifest and inexplicable, as revealed in the great literary and religious organs of the country, where we naturally expect to find a more deliberate and matured expression of the real opinions of the thoughtful part of the nation. We care not to notice the persistent and venomous assaults, the malicious and almost frantic ravings of heartless if not mercenary journals, which have fomented ill-will against us by intolerable perversions and patent falsehoods; nor even such studied and flippant caricatures as the *Saturday Review* every week presents with infinite exaggeration and dexterous as well as sinister intent. But from the religious, and especially the quarterly journals, we might have expected more hesitancy and discrimination of denunciation. Yet with the single exception of the *London Review*, published by the Wesleyans, these periodicals are unanimous against the cause of the North, echoing the partial and perverted theories of Mr. James Spence, the Liverpool advocate of secession, in his work, *The American Union*, which has already reached a fourth edition.* The Rev. Wm. Arthur† deserves a testimonial from America for his noble deeds and words. But what shall we say of the pragmatic Dr. Campbell, of the *Standard*, who snubs our American divines in such a magisterial style, gravely assuring them that he knows a great deal more about our affairs than they possibly can; that "mist and darkness" have fallen upon all our eyes; and that "no power

* We see that a reply to it is announced by Mr. Charles E. Rawlins: *American Disunion: Constitutional or Unconstitutional?* Mr. Thos. Hughes is also one of the few Englishmen who have spoken the truth in a manful way. He writes: "Be sure that the issues are appreciated here, and while we see the awfulness of the task you have in hand, we have faith in you; we believe that if it can be done, you will do it, and we wish you, from the bottom of our hearts, God speed!" This has the old English ring in it. Mr. Hughes has also written on the *Struggle for Kansas*, in Mr. J. M. Ludlow's recent *History of the United States*. Mr. Cairns, of Glasgow, it is stated, is preparing a work on *The Slave Power*, with reference to American affairs.

† In the *London Review*, Oct. 1861, Jan. 1862.

on earth can alter his views". If he could only have a momentary vision of his characteristic arrogance, self-sufficiency, and dogmatic ignorance! Is it possible that he is a specimen of the average intelligence and sense of British Christians? Perhaps not; but then there is Dr. Vaughan, the leader of the Independents, the editor of the *British Quarterly Review*, the organ of Nonconformity, representing that body of English Christians most akin to us in religious and political sympathies; and he tells us that "remembering the past, we have no faith in the doctrine that the continuance of the colossal Union which has grown up over that vast territory is desirable. We feel convinced that some division, and perhaps more than one, would be favorable in many ways to the progress of international harmony and of Christian civilisation".*

The venerable *Christian Observer*, so long known and honored as the earnest advocate of evangelical Christianity and anti-slavery views, has also thrown the whole weight of its influence in the same direction. Its "first feeling" on hearing of the separation of the Slave States was one "of unmingled pleasure". It accused the North of being the cause of the war by "the invasion of Virginia". It advised England to have "a day of humiliation" on account of the "frenzy" of its "infuriate kinsmen" in the Northern States. The free States, it declared, "are losing their sense of justice and love of freedom". In one article it said, that England might have sympathized with the North if it had declared all the negroes free; in another article it averred that "manumission" would be like "an earthquake". It has professed neutrality, praised the Southern chivalry, applauded Lord Kinnaird's remark that "both parties were equally insincere", and summed up the matter by saying that "on both sides there is senseless and wicked slaughter". And such has been the burden of the pious *Observer's* notes on our affairs every month since the war began.

The *National Review* advocates liberal Christianity so-called, and is anti-slavery in its professions. In two articles (July 1861, and April 1862) it argues in favor of our disruption, describing us as "greedy, grasping, and overbearing"; accusing

* *British Quarterly Review*, Jan. 1862, p. 236.

us of "gigantic egotism", "self-worship and self-seeking"; asserting that "England finds itself unable to sympathize heartily with either rival", that she "cannot regret the disruption"; and that "as far as the mere policy of self-interest is concerned, it is the general wish in Europe that the Union shall *not* be restored". The *Westminster Review* is very impartial: "without nicely balancing the virtues of the contending sections, Englishmen cannot help believing that moderation, justice, and national honor, will find ample developments in a divided republic". The *Christian Remembrancer** stands for the High Church party, and of course says: "After long consideration and an attentive study of the bearings of the controversy, we assume the responsibility of saying, that the cause on whose side the *substantial justice* of the struggle preponderates, and that for whose success, in the interests of religion and also of our communion", [the Church of England!], "we ought as Englishmen to wish, is the cause of the Confederate States". It finds the justifying cause of secession in "the Navigation laws" and "sordid protectionism of the North"; and says that "if Slavery had been the one real grievance, the South need not and would not have seceded"! This simple ignorance just reverses the facts of the case; it indicates a refreshing willingness to believe anything a Southerner may say, by way of securing English sympathy. The same Review also assures us, that the South, the instant the "Northern blister was taken off, apparently cast off bunkum and exaggeration, spread-eagle and mendacity"! This was after reading Jeff. Davis's pious message, written on purpose to test the English gullibility; it seems to have worked like a charm. *Blackwood's Magazine* for April, which uses the terms "rascaldom" and "democracy" as synonyms, naturally says, that "the continuance of the Union is not to be desired, either for the sake of the Americans, or for our own". Were it not for its inborn aristocratic prejudices, it might be considered wilfully unkind, when it goes on and talks about "the tattered and insolent guise in which republicanism appears in America". After writing, in terms a little less than fair, that "only

* Jan. 1862, p. 234.

the grossest impudence could pretend to claim our sympathy for the North on the pretence that its people are making war against Slavery", it suddenly comes athwart President Lincoln's Emancipation message, but nothing daunted, it declares that this is only "a weak and impracticable attempt" "to secure the sympathy of foreign States by the pretence of a wish to make emancipation a part of the Federal policy". There is undoubtedly "gross impudence" somewhere in this matter; and we think that the writer has made it very plain just where it lies. Even the rival of *Blackwood*, the *Edinburgh Review*, avers that "the restoration of the Union has from the first been regarded in Europe as a chimera"; and that "in the public relations of States there is no room for sympathy or aversion". Is there, then, no such thing as national and international law and right? Are not States moral bodies? Cannot a community be just or unjust? If there may be justice or injustice, right or wrong, in State constitutions and State laws, then there is surely room for "sympathy or aversion" to all who are not deaf or dead to the voice of public conscience? Mr. Mill, in his work on *Representative Government* (p. 342), says of England, that "it has attained to more of conscience and moral principle in its dealings with foreigners than any other great nation seems even to conceive possible or recognise as desirable"; but this latest development of British policy, these unqualified statements of prominent reviews, that only interest and not conscience has a voice in international affairs, seem to indicate that the great utilitarian's theory has far outrun the facts.

The old *Quarterly Review** is instinctively faithful to its aversion to democratic government, and makes out a strong prophecy against our country. "We deplore", it says, "the war that is raging between the Federal and the Confederate States, but we doubt whether it is for the real interest of either that the whole of the North American continent, south of the frontier of Canada, should be held under one democratic government". Our "lust of territorial aggrandizement" has become so great as to threaten constant "collision with the na-

* On the American Crisis, Jan. 1862.

tions of Europe, which have interests on the other side of the Atlantic too great to be sacrificed to the ambition of one overweening power". It kindly suggests, that there is room enough here for "two or three or more powerful republics", which of course would keep one another in check. It reiterates the favorite British formula for our war, that "the contest on the part of the North now is undisguisedly for empire. The question of slavery is thrown to the winds". It is likewise confident that "the conquest of the South is a hopeless dream, and the reünion of the States in one all-powerful Republic an impossibility". This being borne in mind gives a zest to its kindly assurance that "no stronger proof could be given of the earnestness of our good-will towards America, than the desire so uniformly expressed in this country that the fratricidal war between the North and South should cease". That is to say, their good-will to us is shown in the fact, that they earnestly desire that we should be rent in twain. If Ireland should revolt from England, and the two countries should go to war, and we should say, that we thoroughly believed that the only result of the conflict must be the independence of Ireland, and that with this in view, we earnestly desired that the deplorable war might cease; we should thus be giving the most unmistakable evidence of our good-will towards—England. Does anybody imagine that such a thin veil of benevolence can hide unmitigated selfishness? A writer that can plume himself upon it must be badly off for matters of self-complacency. On a par with the benevolence of the venerable *Quarterly*, is also the sagacity of its theory as to the object of the North in continuing the contest. It is fighting "only to retrieve Bull Run"; when that is done "there will be peace and separation"; though it doubts whether even as much as that can be accomplished, judging by the way in which "the Confederate forces have been handled". But that was written six months ago. It has of course the usual rhetorical flourishes about "the cruel and vindictive destruction of Charleston harbor", which it declares is almost enough to tempt England to depart from its neutrality; it exhorts the European governments to "accelerate the recognition" of the Southern States "as the

readiest means of putting an end to a useless and cruel war"; it assures its readers that the blockade might be broken "without any violation of the Law of Nations"; and when the time for recognition has come, it is confident that England "will not delay an hour out of regard to all the menaces which the disappointed party may fulminate against us". Where in all this is there any trace of the boasted generosity and justice of English statesmanship? What fellow-feeling remains between that country, as represented by such writers, and our own? Malevolence itself could say and wish for nothing more, and still retain the thin semblance of a decent regard to the public justice of mankind. The swift undercurrent of the whole is the dread, if not the hate, of our Republic. The hardly suppressed joy gleaming through the whole is the rejoicing that our hour of weakness has come, and that our dissolution is drawing on apace. The policy recommended to England is that of taking advantage of our sore troubles to enhance its own power. Delay and non-interference are counselled because the end will be surely reached without the aid of foreign powers. Englishmen, from whom we have drawn the current of our life-blood, whose language we speak, whose laws and customs we inherit, whose free institutions are at the root of our own, gaze with indifference, if not with exultation, at the sad and terrible spectacle of a mighty nation, until now prosperous and beneficent to all its citizens beyond example, apparently tottering to its very base. They gather around the mighty fabric, and scan the fierce strife, and their shouts of cheer favor only the insurgents, while to us, in our extremity, they speak in tones of menace and of scorn. They see the traitorous hosts arrayed for our overthrow in violation of all their plighted faith, and seeking our destruction chiefly because this Republic has at length declared that it will not be the minister of slavery, but of freedom; and seeing this, they invent excuses and facts and arguments for the slaveholder, and reserve their anathemas, their threats, and their calumnies for the hosts of the free. And is this the voice of Old England, whom we venerated, as we venerated no other people, and from whose loins it was our boast that we sprung? Is England's heart turned to hate

against us, and has it no public conscience left? We cannot believe it. It is not the heart of England's people that thus speaks; but it is the heart, it is the voice of the class that now rules in state, in church, and in society. Below these there is another class, as yet heard only indistinctly; but whose voice when it breaks forth will be as the rushing of mighty waters. And that voice, the voice of the people, will be in unison with our own.

The general argument of the *Quarterly Review* against this country is based on the work of Spence, and is the same as that which we shall soon notice more fully. That slavery is not the cause of the war, that secession is justifiable, and that there is no hope of the restitution of the Union, are the main points. It knows so much about our Constitution, that it is "surprised" at the ignorance of Story and Curtis. It is very sure that the North was more ready to make and rivet the chains of the slaves, when the South seceded, than it ever was before; and consequently, that the secession was owing chiefly to geography, and to the fact that we were already two nations. Besides this, it sums up all the old grievances of England against this country, so as to inflame anew the popular prejudice, beginning with the war of 1812, and ending with the Trent case. In doing this it seems to outrun discretion, as well as historic justice; for the object of its argument is to show, that in all the cases alleged, the United States have come out in triumph, to the humiliation of England. The cases cited are, the war of 1812-15; the Ashburton treaty, 1842—calumniating Webster about the noted map, though it is well known that Sir Robert Peel declared him free from blame; the Oregon dispute, 1845-6; the Mosquito affair, 1856; the San Juan discussion, 1859; the Crimean enlistments, in which it grants that Crampton was "unwise"; and finally the affair of the Trent. As to the latter, it repeats the old story about the pressure of "the mob"—a pure fiction of transatlantic invention. Englishmen seem to think, because some of their most important discussions, as on Catholic emancipation, free trade and Chartism, were so strongly stimulated by the pressure of the rude democracy, that the same must

be the case in the national legislation of this country. How can we convince them that they are laboring under a profound delusion? In the history of our national Congress there is not a single instance of the kind, from the beginning until now. One of the noblest triumphs and vindications republicanism ever gained was in the yielding of this whole people to the deliberate determination of the General Government in the case of Mason and Slidell. That alone was proof enough of the capacity of a people for self-government. And throughout the whole of this war, the bearing of the people has been beyond all praise and all example. There never was such a trial of the power and safety of free institutions; and there never was such a triumph. The vast work we were called to do has been emphatically done by the people; the Government has been their executor. We firmly believe that no monarchy and no empire could have accomplished the work we are now carrying to its consummation. Republicanism has shown itself to be the strongest and the safest form of earthly power — the best able to meet a terrible crisis, to rally on the very verge of destruction, to concentrate men and means for the most arduous of conflicts, and to carry on the plans of a campaign, unequalled in vastness and difficulty, with a united, conscious, definite, and irresistible purpose. Other tests and trials are still before us; but the experience of the past year has given the best ground to believe, that, if the work be not superhuman, it can and will be accomplished; and this because it is a work involving the essential principles of government and of humanity, of human rights and righteous laws, and therefore appealing, as nothing else can, to the heart and conscience of every free-man, giving to each a personal interest in its successful issue. To sustain and build up a great and free Republic is a work for all, and to be done by all, and consequently it calls out the energy and wisdom of all, as nothing else may or can. Here is the secret of our past success, and an auspicious omen for the future. None but a universal human interest could have so united a whole people, and given it such conscious strength. England is incredulous as to our success, because it does not know the power of a Christian republic in a just cause. We

feel and know that we have only just begun to develop our real resources and unfold our real strength. We never knew it before. This year we are passing from the youth to the manhood of our nation's life. Now we are better able to understand our real historic destiny. In the fervor of conflict we have tested our thews and sinews. And, better than this, we have leaped to the full consciousness of our national unity and our national life. The soul of the nation has been kindled with a new fire upon the altar of sacrifice. This year of conflict has abounded in national blessings.

The most inexplicable instance of British apostasy in respect to our American crisis is, however, to be found in the *North British Review*, for February, 1862, in its article entitled, *The American Republic; Resurrection through Dissolution*. We might have foreseen the taunts of *Blackwood*, and the misrepresentations of the *Quarterly Review*; but we were totally unprepared to find in the organ of the Free Church of Scotland the most elaborate vindication of the cause of the seceded States, and the most calumnious and virulent attack upon the whole character, position, and policy of the American Union. We were surprised that no word of encouragement came to us from Scotland; we were still more astonished at the reports of the violent addresses of Dr. Guthrie and Dr. Hanna; but all this did not prepare us for the total change in the tone and temper of the *North British Review*. The *perfidium ingenium Scotorum* here expends itself in unqualified abuse of our people, government, and institutions. Its article is greeted with the warmest applause by the strongest slaveholders of America. There is something in this which we confess we cannot fully comprehend. Scotchmen doubt whether it is still possible to bring back the South into the Union; it would be to us no greater marvel than this Scotch manifesto upon the American Union and American slavery. The arguments of oppression are retailed by the mouths of abolitionists. They strike the freemen of the North with weapons forged by the deadliest enemies of human freedom. Two years since Scotchmen would hardly give a brother's hand to any minister from

a slaveholding State; and now they reiterate the arguments, endorse the policy, defend the rebellion, and speak soft words about "the peculiar institution" of these self-same States. We ask, in wonder, what has wrought so marvellous a change? Of course they do not defend slavery in the abstract; they only defend the policy which traitors and rebels have adopted in order to extend and perpetuate human bondage. Of course they do not defend the wholesale plundering of government property, the unequalled perjury and the violent measures of the South, in the outset of the rebellion; they even say that this foul conspiracy was carried with "insolent haste and indecorum"! Indecorum, indeed! the very climax of rebuke. Of course, the *North British* does not disapprove of freedom and of free institutions in theory; it only labors to prove that the Union has been the strength of slavery, and that the sole hope of rearing free republics on this side of the Atlantic, is in allowing a slave republic to be founded, to divide with us the continent. It declares in plain, round terms, that "*it solemnly rejoices in the dismemberment of the Union*". But its whole argument, considering its source and character, is worthy of more particular consideration.*

The *North British* states its case. "Most Englishmen . . . after some observation and much reflection, have arrived at the conclusion, not only that the secessionists will succeed in their enterprise, but that this success will eventually be of the most signal service to humanity, to civilization, and to the cause of universal and enduring peace." And again: "We see no grounds on which the continuance of that Union should

* The *North British* for May, 1861, has an able article on Secession, written, we know, by one who had studied the matter, and entirely different in tone and spirit from the article of February, 1862. It says of the Confederacy: "We cannot see any attribute of the righteous Ruler of the universe which can be exercised in favor of an empire founded upon a repudiation of the very essence of the Divine law, and the adoption of the barbarous and demoralizing institution of slavery as its central and controlling influence". It says of the Union: "It cannot be that the latest born of mighty Protestant nations, the most enlightened, the richest in the heritage of all priceless things, which sages, and martyrs, and patriots have bequeathed to the world, shall fail to fulfil her destiny". How changed is this *Review* in nine short months

be desired by any wise or good [*sic*] man, and we view its termination with the most sanguine hopes of advantage to Europe, to Africa, to America itself, and to the highest interests of humanity at large". There is nothing like making a good opening—putting the case on the broadest and highest grounds. The Southern States, in their rebellion, it seems, are really engaged in a great philanthropic, almost a missionary work. In breaking up this Union they are laboring for freedom and humanity at large. No power in the world is really just now doing as much for the highest welfare of mankind, as that band of conspirators, traitors and slaveholders, led by Jeff. Davis, Floyd, Toombs, Cobb, and Twiggs. Unfortunately for us, brother Scotchmen, we know these men somewhat better than you do. If they are really working for the highest good of mankind, it can only be as they may perchance be fulfilling the secret will of Jehovah. His revealed will, so far as we understand it, is, that we should subdue and seize these rebels and conspirators as soon as we can, and inflict upon them the dread penalty of outraged public justice. Every man of them is a perjured traitor and conspirator against a government that never injured or oppressed any one of them. It is of such men that you are pleading the cause, with these high-sounding generalizations, as if you saw the whole of future history, and knew the counsels of the Most High. And they also enlisted in this revolt for the avowed object of building up a slave Republic on this continent. It would manifestly require a good deal of "overruling" on the part of divine Providence, to make this subserve "the highest interests of humanity at large". We, too, doubt not that the revolt will issue in this; not by its success, however, but by its defeat. The expatriation or virtual extinction of the leaders in this foul conspiracy seems to us the most direct and feasible mode of making the slaveholders' rebellion do "signal service to humanity, civilisation and the cause of universal and enduring peace". Homer of old gave expression to the deep religious and moral instincts of mankind in view of perjury and treason:

"Whoe'er involved us in this dire debate,
Oh! give that author of the war to fate".
" 'Tis not for us, but guilty Troy to dread,
Whose crimes sit heavy on her perjured head."

The *North British* is somewhat concerned about the way in which we may receive its utterances and prophecies. It thinks it must be "mortifying" to us; it will "startle and wound us", if it speaks "the plain truth"; it must "be a bitter draught to those whose whole national life, from the cradle to the present hour, has been one unbroken dream of self-worship and self-delusion". And we are "mortified" and even "startled"; but not at all on our own account. It has not in the least changed our views about our own country; though it has considerably modified our opinion of the good sense and good feeling of some Scotchmen. It is their "delusion" which we sincerely deplore. And we wish to tell them with equal frankness and plainness of speech, that in our view, they have in this matter been made the dupes and mouthpieces of the most reckless and profligate set of political conspirators that were ever banded together against the most beneficent government, and in favor of the most barbarous system of bondage this world has known. No such corruption and proscription, no such violence to free speech and civil rights, no such wholesale murder or expatriation of those opposed to them, have been witnessed in any Christian nation since the Reformation, as are now found in the Southern Confederate States. It has been a reign of violence and of terror, with hardly a parallel. It was initiated to uphold a system, the most debasing even to the material well-being of a state, that can well be conceived; a system which oppresses a whole class of human beings, that their owners may reap fifty per cent of profit. And the organ of the Free Church of Scotland has been "humbugged" (*sic venia verbo*) into the advocacy of this inhuman Confederacy. How it can "exonerate its Scotch conscience", we know not. Had it been thus imposed upon in behalf of some pretended scheme of philanthropy, we might have fathomed the matter; but to us at present we confess that it is past finding out.

To justify its apparent change of attitude towards the slave power, there was needed some strong putting of the case; and that we have in the body of the article. The "argument" consists in first asserting that all discussion about the right of secession is "puerile"; then in reciting the causes that led to secession, saying nothing of slavery; next, in presenting evidence that the United States have totally failed in all the ends of good government, this country now being a moral wreck among the nations; all of which ruin, it is further asserted, is owing to the existence of a colossal Union, inflated and "grandiose"; so that, in fine, the breaking up of the Union will probably lead to the most beneficial results—among which will be the more speedy amelioration, if not abolition of slavery. "In the continuance of the Union we *feel sure* there was no hope for the slave; in its disruption we believe there is much." Such is the rationale of "the American Crisis—Resurrection through Dissolution".

It hardly tends to awaken any high expectations about the political morality of the article, when we find it averring at the outset, that all discussion of the "constitutional right of secession is purely idle and irrelevant"; that it is "simply childish" to enforce loyalty "in the name of a written parchment". Is this good Scotch ethics? Is there no such thing as the obligation to be loyal? Have "written parchments" ceased to have binding force? Be it also remembered, that all the State officers of the revolted States had sworn to uphold the government of the United States. Is there no sanctity in such oaths? Has the word perjury any sense? The *Review* adds, that to make any such demand of loyalty involves "an arrogant and unreasonable inconsistency" with the fundamental principle of the political creed of the United States, which is said to be this—"the right of every man to live under any government he pleases, to make his own laws and choose his own rulers". Did ever a writer on political ethics state an essential principle more clumsily? Who holds that "every man" can "make his own laws" and "choose his own rulers"? Who does not hold, that every citizen is bound to obey the laws and rulers of the state under which he lives,

whether he chose them or not—unless willing to incur the hazards of revolution by force? The *Review* utterly confounds two entirely distinct things—the fictitious right of secession, and the inherent right of revolution against an intolerable and oppressive government. The latter right must be conceded; but, then, those that claim it also know, that they must make good their right in open conflict with the government they renounce. The alleged right of secession, however, is a right claimed, not against, but under the constitution of a country. It virtually says, that the sovereign authority itself allows its subjects to throw off their allegiance at pleasure; that the Constitution contains within itself the elements of its own destruction. It was only a plausible sophism to smoothe the way to rebellion. No government on earth could allow this right, and live. No clause of our Constitution hints at it; no provisions of that instrument have it in view. The pretence of such a reserved right is like the mental reservation of Jesuitical oaths. The States may indeed rebel; but they cannot do so constitutionally. If they attempt a revolution, they must do it, as they are now doing it, at their peril. Even if our government be called a compact, none of the parties have a right to break it except with the consent of the rest. But the people of the United States formed not merely a confederacy, but a Union. The States themselves never had independent political being outside of the Union.* The fact, too, that the crime of “treason” against the United States† is defined by the Constitution itself is valid evidence against such a pretended right. The fact that the United States laws are paramount in all the States is also conclusive. And the absurdity of the claim involves its own refutation. Besides, in the present juncture, the plea is useless as well as worthless. The so-called Confederate States appealed to arms,

* Of the States now in rebellion only four, viz. Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, were among the original thirteen. The rest were all made States under the authority of the United States. Louisiana, Missouri, Arkansas, and Florida were purchased by the General Government. Texas was obtained by treaty. What antecedent, reserved rights can be pretended here?

† See Francis Lieber, *Lectures on the Constitution*, p. 29.

and made flagrant war upon the General Government. Illogical secession led inevitably and logically to rebellion and revolution. And the great political fact about this people is, that there can be here but one government, one nation, one Union. This is now the profoundest conviction animating the American mind. The real question is, whether that nation shall be a nation of freemen, or a nation that sanctions human bondage. If secession were for a time successful, it could only result in perpetual conflicts and attempts at reconstruction, until the underlying question of freedom itself were resolved. This generation has chosen to grapple with this question now, that its posterity may have a freer and more beneficent career. It is fighting against secession and slavery for the sake of good government and equal laws for all coming time.

The next point made by the *North British Review* is a recital of the alleged causes, producing what it styles "the accomplished and irreversible fact" of separation. Here it follows Mr. Spence, and the Southern agents of the Confederacy in Europe. These commissioners of the South, it is well known, at home made the anti-slavery sentiment of the North to be the fulcrum of the dislodging lever; but to gain the ear of England, of whom they had been the most bitter calumniators, they uniformly and shamelessly alleged commercial and geographical arguments, varieties of lineage, and general incompatibility of temper, as the moving causes of their attempted independence. They even asserted, that the North was never so ready to make all the concessions they required on the score of slavery, as at the moment of the rupture.

It is undoubtedly true, that the democratic party, and many conservative politicians in the Northern States, were for a long time willing, for the sake of the Union, to make any reasonable compromise, not inconsistent with the equal rights of the States, and enforcing the provisions of the Constitution. But the South demanded, not equality, but supremacy. It rejected all overtures, because it saw that the numerical and social superiority of the North was as certain as facts and

figures. Slavery in the Republic was doomed. Hence they revolted. But as soon as the North saw that the South was resolved upon separation at all hazards, then the very Union feeling which had made them eager to retain the South rose up with vigorous recoil against the slave system, which threatened the destruction of our national life. If slavery or the Union must perish—it shall not be the Union. And this is the formula at the heart of our crisis.

• The other alleged reasons for disunion are manifestly incompetent or irrelevant. All these reviews talk fustian about the descendants of Puritans and Cavaliers; though if the South were all Normans and the North all Saxons, this is no reason why they might not as well live here in unison as in England. The South is chiefly agricultural, but so is the West. The loss of political power on the part of the South means merely the loss of the predominance of the slave power. The loss of "civil justice and social safety" also signifies, that slavery is in danger. The "animosities" of the people are equivalent to the antagonism of pro-slavery and anti-slavery. The fact that slaveholders were held up by the North to the opprobrium of mankind has of course its roots in the same system. But how can the *North British Review* in one and the same breath say, that Slavery was not the impelling cause of the rupture, and then assign, as one of the most potent causes, the fact that the North alarmed the South for the safety of their institutions? How can it consistently affirm, that the South seceded because it believed "that emancipation would be absolute destruction"; and also assert, that the North were at the same time eager to concede to them the perpetuity of slavery; and likewise argue, that secession is the high road to emancipation? The logic is as bad as the facts. And as to the tariff and free trade, which were to the English mind the most palatable and plausible arguments in favor of the Confederate States—the potency and pertinency of this reason are completely dispelled as soon as it is remembered, that the tariff question has not for twelve years had a paramount influence as a vital issue in presidential elections. The Morrill Tariff was passed after secession had been accom-

plished. The rates even of this bill are not excessive. And if the South should now succeed, it would be burdened with a staggering debt, which it must meet by heavy taxation, either on its exported cotton, for which England must pay, or on its imports, which would check the free-trade boasting.

The rationale of secession is much simpler, and at the same time lies much deeper than any such manufactured arguments. It lies on the surface and penetrates to the core of Southern society. No solution of a great historical fact was ever more direct and conclusive. The existence of slavery in the Southern States is, and alone is, the real reason for the attempt to found a Southern Republic. All others reasons resolve themselves into this, and this explains and gives force to all the others.

The nature of slavery itself, as a form of human society, irresistibly tempts the slaveholder to hostility to a government administered for the benefit of freemen. There are only three hundred and fifty thousand slaveholders at the South, and only one hundred thousand of these own over ten slaves. The system is based on the anti-republican idea of the essential inequality of races. It creates a domineering class interest,* all the participants in which are firmly allied by a common material bond, and by the love of irresponsible power. Founded in might and not in right, it rules in the last instance by physical force. It looks with jealousy on the

* An interesting discussion on Secession in the Paris Society of Political Economy was reported in the *Journal des Economistes*, and translated in the *Evening Post* of New York. Mr. Mill, who was present, said, among other things: "The Southern States are mastered by a passion that blinds them. They are in a frame of mind which is the result of Slavery. Accustomed to exercise a daily despotic power over their fellows, they cannot bear control, criticism, or resistance. They draw a blind confidence from their heated and unruly tempers, and they so exaggerate their strength as really to imagine that they can bring the North to terms. Such is always the effect of the exercise of absolute power over one's fellow-man. The passion which inspires the North is born of nobler and worthier sentiments". Mr. Jefferson, in his *Notes on Virginia*, touched the root of the matter when he said: "The whole commerce between master and slave is a perfect exercise of the most bolsterous, the most unremitting despotism on the one part, and degrading submission on the other".

diffusion of education, and cannot endure free speech and equal rights. All who do not own slaves, the "poor whites" of the South, it degrades. It is instinctively opposed to free labor, for labor is equivalent to servitude. Such a system, of course, can thrive only as it is dominant. All that will not obey its orders must be ostracised. When it loses political power, its dissolution has begun.

This unholy system was fastened upon our colonies while under English rule, and in spite of colonial protests. In giving us the boon of independence, England also gave us the curse of slavery; a curse that has well-nigh proved the ruin of the boon. But all the Fathers of the Republic looked upon and legislated about slavery as an evil that must ere long be extinguished. Its very name was excluded from the Constitution. And it would have died out under the influence of free labor and free law, had it not been found a source of unequalled profit, especially in the culture of cotton, under the stimulus of the demand of British looms. England has thus indirectly done more than any other country to favor the consolidation of the slave power.

That consolidation was rapid and strong. The moral and Christian principles of the Southern States have undergone a total revolution within the last thirty years as to the rightfulness of human bondage. History has no more signal instance of the baleful influence of a single evil principle upon the morals and manners of a country. The contagion spread rapidly through the whole of Southern life and society. At the root was the "*imperiosa fames et habendi sæva cupido*", stimulated by the native and sinful love of absolute power; and this embodied itself in Southern life, until it "quite lost the divine property of its first being". Books of ethics and divinity were recast to meet the exigency. The conscience and religion of the South were forced into acquiescence with the unnatural dogma of the rightfulness of human slavery. And while England was freely using our cotton, with dextrous ethics it was also able to make the existence of slavery the grand reproach to our democracy. It thus supported its operations by stimulating the production of that material, which

built up the slave power ; and then it stigmatised slavery, so as to bring democracy into contempt, and thus incidentally help the cause of aristocracy. So curiously do human interests cross each other and intermingle.

Meanwhile the great Northern States, freed from the incubus of this terrible system, grew apace in numbers, wealth, and power, under the exhilarating influence of free laws, free speech, free labor, equal rights, and popular education. The two systems advanced side by side, and soon became the absorbing centres of political contention. The whole course of national politics for the last quarter of a century has hinged just here. The Missouri Compromise was acquiesced in through all the minor discussions about banks and tariffs. These being settled, the social question loomed up paramount. The moral destiny of the Republic was to be decided. Whether freedom or slavery was to rule the land, became the absorbing national theme. The final decision was staved off, by the skilful alliance of the Southern slaveholders with the Northern democracy—an alliance which well-nigh proved our ruin as a Republic. The South struggled with desperation to retain its control of national politics. The admission of Texas, however, was counterbalanced by the admission of California. The Fugitive Slave law was reinvigorated ; but it aroused Northern freemen. The Missouri Compromise was struck down ; but that made Kansas the battle-field of the contending hosts. The three last presidential elections were fought under the impetus of the demand to extend the slave power. In consequence of the growing numbers of the North the result was inevitable. Under Buchanan's treacherous administration the South was prepared for disunion by members of the Cabinet. Lincoln was elected on the issue of slavery or freedom in the territories. And then the South seceded. The line of secession was drawn by the strongest slaveholding (the Cotton) States ; and the Confederate power at once planted its armies in the Border States.

This has been the general course of history. And it is a demonstration of the position, that slavery, and slavery alone,

is at the root of this rebellion. And the same history likewise shows that England has all along been involved in the course of these events ; first by fastening the system upon us ; then, fostering it by its manufactures, at the same time casting it in our teeth as an evil ; and finally, after slavery had accomplished its foul work of treason and rebellion, England, throughout the crisis, has given to the rebellious slave republic the benefit of its practical sympathy and of its prophecies. If the rebellion succeeds, it will be through the life which England gave it.

Additional confirmation, were it needed, of the position, that in slavery is the *fons et origo* of the Southern revolt, may be found in the distinct avowals of the leading advocates of the Southern cause—men who probably know as much about the matter as the contributors to the *North British Review*. Dr. Thornwell of South Carolina, the ablest Presbyterian divine in the Southern States, in an Address, which he prepared by order of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States, says (p. 8): “The antagonism of Northern and Southern sentiment on the subject of slavery lies at the root of all the difficulties, which have resulted in the dismemberment of the Federal Union and involved us in the horrors of an unnatural war”. “The North cherishes a deep and settled antipathy to slavery itself, while the South is equally zealous in its defence.” The Vice-President of the Southern Confederacy, who even resisted secession to the last, Mr. Alexander H. Stevens, in a speech at Savannah, March 21, 1861, said: “The prevailing ideas entertained by Jefferson and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the foundation of the old Constitution, were that the enslavement of the African race was in violation of the laws of nature ; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically”. “Our new Government is founded upon exactly the opposite ideas. Its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man ; that slavery, in subordination to the superior race, is his natural and normal condition. This, our new Government, is the first in the history of the world based upon this great physical, philo-

sophical, and moral truth." On the 15th day of last May, the Virginia Senate passed a Resolution, to be communicated to all the other Confederate States, declaring that "negro slavery was the fundamental doctrine of Southern civilization". The most philosophical historian of America is not, we rejoice to say, a Southern man either in locality or sympathy; but he is as much entitled as any one to be heard on a question involving the largest and truest induction from the most complicated series of facts. In his able address, on the anniversary of the birthday of Washington, Feb. 22, 1862, he distinctly says: "Slavery has forced upon us the issue, and has lifted up its hand to strike a death blow at our existence as a people. It has avowed itself a desperate and determined enemy of our national life, of our unity as a republic, and henceforward no man deserves the name of a statesman who would consent to the introduction of that element of weakness or division into any new territory, or the admission of another slave State into the Union."

In the light of such statements and testimony, and of the undeniable facts of history, what can be said of the reckless assertion of the *North British Review*, that "we do not know which to be amazed at most—the audacity which, on one side, has claimed our [England's] anti-slavery sympathies on behalf of the Unionists, or the simplicity, on the other, which in the face of notorious history has listened to the claim"? In view of the plainest teachings of history, are not both the "audacity" and the "simplicity" to be found with those who have been befooled into the belief, that the North is the great upholder of the slave system, and that the South will be best prepared for emancipation by establishing a republic, as Mr. Stevens so pointedly avers, with slavery as "its corner-stone"? We may rightly have compassion for those who are involuntarily involved in the guilt of the system of slavery. We may even find palliation for such as are compelled, against their old convictions, to do it homage on its own soil in the hour of its ferocious triumphs over all free speech and free thought; they are overborne by the frenzy of an infuriate mob.

But those in England and Scotland who, from the mere calculations of commercial gain, or the dislike of our democracy, have lent themselves to the defence of this fearful system of oppression and of wrong, who have defended the South alone, and only vilified the North in the whole progress of this intense struggle, richly deserve the indignation which is so deeply and widely felt for their apostasy to freedom, and for their complicity with slavery. The lowest depth of their humiliation and their righteous retribution will be reached, when the Republic, which they have tried to alienate, shall have prevailed, and the slave-power, which they have courted, shall be hopelessly defeated; for then the conspirators and their abettors will be involved in a common disgrace. Not even the paltry anticipated commercial gain, not even the heartless triumph over the downfall of a great Republic, will remain to compensate them for their recreancy to the cause of constitutional government and human freedom in the hour of its trial.

It will hardly be worth while to follow the *North British Review* in detail through its calumnies of the North and its eulogy of the South. Some of its assertions and prophecies have become ridiculous in the light of recent facts; as, *e. g.*, that the Southern army is "very much superior"; "better disciplined, better led"; consisting in large proportion "of gentlemen and men of substance"; "single companies are worth three and four millions"—in Confederate stocks? The Northern army is "made up to a very considerable extent of Irish and Germans"; that is, of the same stuff of which good European armies are made; and, besides, authentic enumeration shows that not more than twenty-five per cent are of foreign birth, and that the larger part of these are naturalized citizens. Most of its officers are "electioneering jobbers"; very few "West-Point men". But more than one third of the regular officers (six hundred and thirty-two) are West-Point graduates; and of eighty-six West-Point graduates, of the rank of major and above, only seventeen are in the rebel service, and over sixty in our own. Of our twenty-two major-generals, seventeen had a regular military training; and Banks, Butler and Dix, have shown that they were born generals. The triumphant

progress of our army and navy for the past four months, in a series of victories to which history has hardly a parallel, is ample refutation of the superiority of the Southern "chivalry". The admirable and comprehensive plan of a vaster and more difficult campaign than ever Napoleon undertook is sufficient evidence that there is good generalship at the head, as well as steadiness, discipline, and courage in the rank and file. Our finances are not yet in "a slough of despond"; no other nation, with the exception, perhaps, of the States of Holland, ever yet carried on such a war from its own resources, while governmental stocks commanded a premium.* That the "actual conquest of the South is simply impossible" reads now very like a false prophecy. And so of many another stale slander, which we can well afford to forget, remembering that it comes from those who never felt and knew the indomitable spirit of a republican government, struggling for its existence.

But we cannot so readily forget or pass by the malign and calumnious assault of the *North British* upon the general character of our Republic, and its attempted proof that we have degenerated at a rate unmatched in history, and become a reproach to mankind. For there is here a wilful suppression of notorious facts, and a gross misrepresentation of the whole character and working of our institutions. It is not many years since the Free Church of Scotland sent to this country for pecuniary aid; and now its leading quarterly represents us

* The *Daily News*, London, of May 20th, says of our financial condition: "There is nothing to be compared with this for grandeur in the annals of European finance. In the midst of a terrific struggle, in which every energy and resource of the country is needed, with an army of seven hundred thousand men to raise, pay, feed, discipline and equip, at the excessive cost which, proverbially, attends urgency; and with a numerous flotilla of gunboats and iron-clad vessels of war to construct and arm, excise duties reaching every article of comfort or luxury have been imposed without a murmur of discontent, and public credit continues to be unflatteringly sustained at a figure which the exchequers of monarchy seldom hope to attain." "This is public credit, the public credit of a self-governing people, one of the greatest and most notable results of freedom in our time; one of the most complete and comprehensive answers ever given to the calumnies of its foes." When President Lincoln came into office the United States 6 per cents were at 92, they are now quoted at 106.

as in a more debased condition than any other nation pretending to civilisation. It presents exceptions as the rule, and from partial instances makes unqualified inferences. "In præmissis Pygmæus es, in conclusione, plusquam Gigantæus." By a most illogical and unfair argumentation it represents all our evils as the result of the Union. We have mistaken a "gigantic" for a "great nation", "confounded prosperity with civilisation", are "living in the shadow of an unparalleled delusion"; and, "under cover of the Union, have been degenerating at a rate almost unmatched in history". Of the great elements of civilisation, we have only "material well-being", but "neither social nor mental freedom," nor any "progress in political and moral culture". To call this "the land of freedom" is "a signal instance of presumption and delusion". "Probably in no country with nominally legal institutions, perhaps not even in Austria and Prussia, certainly not in France, is there less of real individual liberty of thought and speech." Citizens are "overawed and menaced by the intolerant and despotic majority"; they can "neither speak nor write, nor act, except as the mob around them please". "Few, who have not watched closely the progress of society in America, are aware how fearfully and to what an extent this social tyranny has demoralised all classes; how it has awed and silenced and rendered abject the thinking and dissenting few—how it has made lawless and brutal the paramount many—and how, between the two, it has brought the great and intelligent people of the Union into that condition of mingled ignorance and insolence, which, at the present moment, so astounds the world." "In nearly every element of political and moral civilisation, the deterioration has been appallingly rapid and decisive. It has ceased to be the land of progress, and become, in a peculiar way, the land of retrogression and degeneracy." Among the points cited in proof are, universal suffrage; elective judges; rotation in office; rowdies controlling all elections; the allegation that no decent man can be chosen to Congress, and no great man can become President; repudiation by ten States; failing sense of honesty; increased brutality of demeanor among the governing classes; "lawless violence by mobs, ferocious

outrages by individuals"; "assaults and assassinations in open day, in public halls and recognised sanctuaries", etc. It elsewhere speaks of the "inflated fancy, the lawless temper, the overbearing arrogance, the low and unscrupulous morality, the vaulting and unprincipled ambition, characteristic both of the people and politicians of America" and asserts, that it "may all be traced directly or indirectly to that Union which is now dissolved, and which blind and desperate men are vehemently striving to restore".

Now, we may be an arrogant, vain-glorious, boastful, conceited, self-deluded and self-worshipping generation; but our worst demagogues, our most inflated and unscrupulous newspaper writers never penned such shameless, ignorant, and insolent caricatures of any other people as are contained in these and kindred representations of the *North British Review*. Its poisoned arrows fly back like boomerangs to its own hurt. Does it not exemplify the arrogance it blames, and the conceit which it chastises? May not our British lineage, after all, have something to do with our possession of these amiable qualities, to say nothing of our "aggressive foreign policy", and our alleged contempt for the rights of other nations? In the good old Jewish times, it took two men to make a Pharisee and a Sadducee; modern critics contrive to commingle the traits of the two. Satire alone can reach such cases, and the satire of Mr. Hosea Biglow is not merely theoretical:

"Of all the sarse that I can call to mind,
 England does make the most onpleasant kind;
 It's you're the sinners, ollers, she's the saint,
 Wot's good's all English, all that isn't ain't;
 Wot profits her is ollers right an' just,
 An' ef you don't read Scriptur so, you must;
 She's praised herself ontill she fairly thinks
 There ain't no light in Natur when she winks;
 Hain't she the Ten Commandments in her pus?
 Could the world stir 'thout she went, tu, ez nus?
 She's all thet's honest, honnable an' fair,
 An' when the vartoos died they made her heir."

To reply, in detail, to the gross calumnies and ignorant

abuse of the *North British* would exceed our limits, and is hardly necessary. It is very successful in showing its animosity to our free institutions. The charges, in fact, are so vague and sweeping, that they can only be met by an equally broad denial on the ground of our knowledge of the facts of the case. As representing the general character and working of our republican institutions, they are absolutely and wickedly false. No human government is perfect. There are evils and excesses in every country. Ours are on the side of liberty, and in the direction of license. These we mourn and blame, and strive to amend. Abundant proofs of their existence can be cited from our own moralists and statesmen ; but how different are the wounds of a friend from the vituperations of a foe ! Bold, bad men may obtain local and transient influence. Ungoverned passions express themselves at times in evil words and deeds. Our evils are not to be ascribed to our Union, nor to our democracy ; they are rather the excrescences of our intense vitality, the rank luxuriance of our prodigious growth. And no people could have thus expanded and multiplied with less heat and license. The worst of our political and social tendencies are, in fact, derived from the influx of a foreign population, unable to bear with sobriety their sudden change to a free land offering such boundless opportunities. London and Paris would, to-day, go wild over speculations that New York merchants would not touch. And then, too, from the nature of a democratic country, the scum boils up speedily and surely to the surface. But the rapid disclosure of the evil also enables it to be more directly visited by the rebuke and check of a better public feeling. Society must be judged by its net results. And, here, in the general security and order, the peace and prosperity of our citizens, in their private moral and religious virtues, in their benevolence, sense of justice and intelligence, we fearlessly challenge a comparison with any people on the earth. There is less poverty, and there are fewer crimes, there is more manliness, and a much higher standard of morals and knowledge among our manufacturing and agricultural population, than in any other civilized nation. No such orderly, moral and religious villages and towns can

be found in any country as are scattered through our Northern and Western States. More than this, our system of public education is much more thorough and complete than in either England or Scotland; our abundant schools for private education, our academies and colleges, are chiefly sustained by private means and beneficence; and for religious instruction we give more than any other nation, and it is all a voluntary offering. Besides sustaining and educating our own population, we have also within the last ten years been able to receive and absorb over three millions of emigrants from Europe. Are there here no elements of a mighty and progressive civilisation? Not one of these points is hinted at by the *North British Review*.

There are evils in our political life. Too many experiments have been tried. Too many demagogues get office. Disgraceful scenes have been enacted in our legislatures and in Congress. But almost all of the violence on which this reviewer lays such stress—let him lay it well to heart—has been enacted under the influence, and to do the biddings of that slave-power, of which he is the apologist. Most of the mobs, the brutality, the public assaults in legislative halls, originated with this desperate class, which we are now reducing to subjection. It is not the Union, it is not democracy, but it is the fell and barbarous spirit of slavery striving to get control of this Union and of democracy, which has brought this shame upon us. When we conquer this power, we conquer the main spring of lawlessness in our political life.

And can no good men get into power? And can no great man be elected President? We would not exchange President Lincoln, as a wise and honest ruler, for any man now crowned in Europe. We would not exchange his Cabinet, for honesty and capacity, with any existing European Cabinet. There are many men out of Congress, who are wiser, better, and more cultivated than many who are in Congress. But our present Congress, freed from the domineering and boastful Southern delegation, has proved itself a sagacious, wise, and effective body of legislators. It has already passed a series of acts, (as the bill indorsing the President's Emancipation message,

the bills abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia, and in the Territories, the Homestead bill, giving a freehold to every new settler on our public lands, the Agricultural College bill, the Pacific Railroad bill, and the treaty for the Suppression of the Slave-Trade), having more vital bearings upon the progress of mankind in freedom and justice than any English Parliament that was ever convened.

For ourselves, under a favoring Providence, if this wicked rebellion can be crushed, and freedom enthroned as our national characteristic, and slavery made local instead of national, we have no fear as to the future progress of the Republic. Difficulties and dangers will arise; but if we can accomplish the herculean task of to-day, we may look with calmness upon the labor of the morrow. It is easier to reconstruct the wreck than to stem the torrent. Our British friends may be timorous about it, and prognosticate impossibilities; but we, who have the work to do, only ask of them that they will not balk us by untimely meddling. When the revolted States return to their allegiance, it will be by their own act; it will be because the Union feeling has triumphed. And it will, it must triumph in the end. Meanwhile we can afford to wait, and not be "over-exquisite to cast the fashion of uncertain ills". It is easy to prophesy impossibilities; it only requires skepticism about man and about Providence. The analogies of the past may cast gloom upon the future; but history does not always repeat itself. Our present triumphs have conquered some of these historical analogies. The social problem is an immense one, but neither society nor sociology is yet completed. *Ten-dit in ardua Virtus.*

As soon as commerce is restored along the Mississippi—and physical need and necessity will compel this—the spell of this disunion tyranny will be broken, and the slumbering Union feeling gather strength*. It will be a long, long time ere the

* A year and a half ago in the revolted States the votes stood 639,793 for the Union, and 486,554 for secession. In every State but South Carolina, the secession ordinances were carried after the arming had begun, and under the pressure of intimidation. In some of them, as in Virginia, fraud and force were combined. A determined and armed minority can effect a revolution in almost any State. England ought by this time to know that if an armed revolt be suppressed, submission is often followed by acquiescence. The analogy of history is here in our favor.

evils engendered by this rebellion can be wholly done away, before social and Christian sympathies can be revived as of old. But we are, after all, one people. This rebellion is the insurrection of a class. When the Confederate government has lost its army, as it has already lost its navy, it is wrecked. When that usurpation is dislodged, the bond of cohesion is gone, and the General Government, as before, will have to do only with the people of single and separate States. Restoration is difficult, but not impossible. It would be impossible, were we not contending for good government and righteous laws. It is possible, because justice and freedom must at last triumph in human affairs. And with all the undoubted and undeniable difficulties and dangers that hover around our future path, we would rather to-day, looking only for peace and progressive civilisation, for the blessings of good government and righteous laws, cast in our lot with this maligned Union, than with any other people in the world. England, France, Germany, Italy, have before them the prospects of more desperate conflicts than has the American Republic. We are already beyond the questions of aristocracy and democracy, of church and state, upon which these impending contests hinge. We are contending in the van of the race upon the major and decisive question of human freedom and equal laws for all mankind.

We need not enter into the argument by which the *North British Review* attempts to show what will be the advantages of a separation. We trust that this whole topic is theoretical. Some of the arguments have much more force in England than here; for example, that "we shall be reduced to growth under compression", "the normal condition of national life as seen in Europe". The greatness of our Union has been the cause, it alleges, of all our evils, has given us "the fatal and depraving sense of omnipotence"; whereas, if we are conveniently divided into six republics, for which there is quite enough room, this will "sanify our grandiose imaginations". We shall also be obliged to keep up armies and navies, and hold one another in check, and that will prevent us from turning our attention

to our neighbors and to Europe, while at the same time it will have the advantage of letting Europe come and do on this continent pretty much as it chooses. This separation, too, argue our friends, with a shrewd eye to the main chance, will, in conclusion, "necessitate free-trade", and make America "accept England's ordinary mode of payment". This explains itself. As to the other reasons, they are doubtless very good from the European standpoint; but this contest is an American affair, begun here, and to be ended here. These European reasons and arguments will not have, and ought not to have, any influence upon the actual result; or rather, so far as America is concerned, they are irresistible against the desirableness of a separation. We do not want, nor ought we to have, any more European colonies on this Western continent, least of all monarchical institutions. We firmly believe that this land is destined to work out the problem of republican institutions. We are not quite ready to be split up into such fragments of states as are in constant conflict in Central America, inviting foreign intervention. Had it not been for our Union, Europe would long since have interfered effectually with them. Too long already has Europe, and especially England, looked upon this land as if it were a semi-civilized region, to be used for its own benefit. Spain has taken advantage of our rupture to seize upon St. Domingo. Would France have ever dared to send an army to Mexico, under the pretence of paying Jeker & Co.'s exorbitant claims, but really, as it seems, for the sake of military occupation, and to attempt to enthrone a monarch, if we had not been involved in a civil war? Would England's Secretary for Foreign Affairs have ever written a note, in which he declared his disapproval of the whole French procedure, and ended with inglorious protestations of continued amity towards the Emperor, unless France and England were both willing to see the attempt to establish a monarchy successful upon our borders? unless they believed that the victory of the South would also give them an ally against the North? Had these powers any just reason for their foray upon Mexico? While carrying on such a war merely to recover a debt, are they to be at the same time blaming us for making war on the South

in self-defence, and to preserve the nation itself from ruin? Does not the whole course of events demonstrate, that if we become two nations, we shall inevitably be mixed up in conflicts with European powers? What England terms our offensive and aggressive foreign policy, has been our perpetual attempt to restrict the extension of European influence upon this continent. If the South were to become independent of us, it would become a commercial dependent upon England and France, and be ever ready to prompt or aid them, to the detriment of the North. For the sake, then, of peace with the nations of the earth, we must remain one people. Only as we are one, can we dissipate the dreams of Spain about regaining her lost possessions; make England content with what it already has; and give to France proper notice to keep its armies where they may be of some benefit to mankind. Mr. Seward's circular letter of March 3d, 1862, addressed to the American legations abroad, indicates the fixed policy of the American people; "a monarchical government established in Mexico, in the presence of foreign fleets and armies . . . has no promise of security or permanence". "It would be practically the beginning of a permanent policy of armed intervention by monarchical Europe, at once injurious and inimical to the system of government adopted by the American continent." "It is enough to say that in the opinion of the President, the emancipation of the American continent from the control of Europe has been the principal character of the past half century. It is not probable that a revolution in the opposite direction can succeed in the age which immediately follows this period", etc.

Thus do the reasons, which to an Englishman are most potent in favor of our separation, become to us strong arguments for the maintenance of our Union unimpaired. Thoroughly convinced that we have a great work to do for humanity and civilisation, we do not want to be hindered in it by the danger of ceaseless conflicts with foreign powers. The only mode in which we can keep them from their ambitious projects, is by presenting to them a strong and united front. "United we stand, divided we fall."

This of itself were sufficient argument, on the highest ground of national politics, for putting forth all our strength in the present exigency, to crush the rebellion which aims at our subversion. But there are other and equally cogent reasons.

Foremost among these is the demonstration of the fact, that a free government has sufficient power and vitality to maintain itself against internal insurrection, to execute with vigor the laws enacted in a constitutional way, to preserve unimpaired, in its rightly majesty, the legal will of the people. The great danger of a republic, it has been wisely said, is from within. Where all are free, there is hazard of the triumph of lawlessness. Can the supremacy of law be reconciled with the existence of freedom? Does not democracy irresistibly tend to anarchy? These are grave questions. And the great occasion has come for trying them—the test of the might of a republic. Had we succumbed to the rebellion, all Europe would have said, See the inherent weakness of a democracy; the colossal fabric tumbles into ruins at the first touch of the insurgent; and all Europe might have been tempted to try on us the same experiment. Now, when we resist the revolt that would compass our ruin, many Europeans cry out against us, because we repel arms by arms, and use force to coërcé freemen. But meanwhile they may be also learning that a republic recognises the authority of government as well as the rights of individual freemen, and holds the latter subject to the former. Mr. Mill has well said, that “we should be justly exposed to the pity and disdain of posterity, if we abandoned the contest while any means of carrying it to a successful issue remain”. And Europe must, we think, by this time be convinced that here is strength as well as freedom, a strength in proportion to our freedom. An army of three quarters of a million of men has been raised, equipped and sustained; a navy has been created sufficient to blockade three thousand miles of coast, and to storm every fort on the coast and the Mississippi; our annual expenditures have risen from seventy-five to five hundred millions; all this money and all these men have been freely given to the good cause; and yet the resources of the land and the power of the nation have only just begun to be

developed. In all the Northern States there has been no lack of food or raiment; there has been no outbreak; crime has decreased. New York is as peaceful to day as is London. The land has been full of corn; labor has been amply employed; money has been abundant. The manufacturing population of this country has been benefited by the war itself, while the same class in England and France have suffered on account of the same conflict. We are a stronger nation this day in every element of general prosperity than we were when the war began. And this has been accomplished without the aid of a dollar or a man from any foreign power; the only doubt about its being accomplished was in the possible intervention of those powers to aid our foe. We are an independent, self-sustaining and even prosperous nation, in the midst of one of the most tremendous civil contests that has ever been waged. Thus are we demonstrating the power and the resources of a free Republic.

Another reason for maintaining the integrity of our Union is found in the fact, that in everything but slavery the people of these States have, and can have, only one national life. One of the strongest tendencies of modern society and history is in the direction of national unity; the reünion of fragments of the same race, and the union of those having the same speech, customs, and laws. This tendency seems likely in future to control history more than ever. A common national life is a sacred reality, and an indefeasible trust. It is the very "mystery in the soul of state,

"And hath an operation more divine
Than breath or pen can give expressure to."

It cannot be voluntarily given up without national suicide. To abandon a grand and free national life without a struggle, would be an ineffable cowardice and treason to mankind, subjecting us to the just scorn and contempt of the other nations of the earth. It were equally abhorrent to the vital instincts of our past history. That we are, and must remain, one nation has been the deepest conviction of people and statesmen,

through all the decennia of the Republic. Washington, in his Farewell Address, told us that the Union was "the palladium of our political safety and prosperity". The foremost men of all our parties have echoed the same sentiment. The chief errors of many of our best statesmen have come from preferring the Union to all else. Love of the Union is now written upon the heart of our nation, with a pen of iron and with the point of a diamond. It is the animating idea of the present war. Men all over the land will live and die for it. An unselfish patriotism is prompting us to sacrifices, while it exhilarates with large hopes for the future. As truly as Rome felt itself to be the mistress of the nations, and Britannia that it was to rule the seas, and France that it was to be the arbiter of the affairs of the continent, so truly, so really do Americans now feel that they are to be one Union, one people, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from the Lakes to the Gulf. It is our national instinct, our American life. The very topography of the country forbids a separation. The same power must hold the delta, the sources and the mouth of the Mississippi*, and the whole flow of the Missouri. The North must have the Potomac, the Chesapeake, and Fortress Monroe. The highlands of Tennessee, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Northern Alabama, and the whole of Western Virginia are inhabited by a loyal people. The very course of the mountain ranges forbids a division between North and South.

Our federal and representative system, too, is susceptible of the widest expansion, while maintaining the closest unity. If ever a country and a people were marked out by Providence as one, it is our country and our people. And whatever stands in the way of this, stands in the way of the deepest instinct of our nation's life. And therefore must this revolt be subdued.

"The land we from our Fathers had in trust,
And to our children will transmit, or die;
This is our maxim, this our piety;

* See Captain Humphrey's Report on the Mississippi, and the *North American Review*, April, 1862: "The beneficent action of the General Government alone has solved for the States of the Southern Mississippi valley, the problem of river protection, which is to them the very issue of life and death".

And God and nature say that it is just,
That which we would perform in arms—we must.”

Equally imperative is the obligation to prosecute this conflict arising from the character and aims of the rebellion itself. No nation can live unto itself; it is but a part of the race and must live for humanity. If it truly lives, it is animated by some high ideal. Within its lawful sphere it is bound to seek the highest good of all. Without a forfeiture of its own title to prosperous existence, it cannot allow any part of its rightful domain to be given up to brute force and barbarising institutions. The slave power, failing to achieve our subjection, determined upon the destruction of the Union, and the formation within our borders of a Republic, where slavery should be unchecked by our moral or political influence. Urging the right of secession, it attempted to establish a Confederacy of which the rightfulness of human bondage should be the distinguishing characteristic. When any community has become so far degraded in its political principles as to believe and act upon these two false maxims—the rightfulness of secession, and the rightfulness of slavery—and to attempt a revolt from a beneficent government on these grounds, the only practicable mode of dealing with it is to subdue it by force of arms. For the first of these principles annuls the possibility of government, and the second of them is a denial of the primary rights of manhood. To allow such a Republic to be consolidated on the soil of the United States, when we had the constitutional right and physical power to prevent it, would make us participants in the highest crimes against the human race. We contend not merely against treason to our state, but against treason to humanity. We are in arms to suppress a rude and barbarising power. And the war began not an hour too soon. Had the corruption, proscription, and lawless violence engendered by slavery, been allowed to extend itself unresisted for another olympiad, it would have well-nigh defied subjugation and control. The ship of state was on the breakers, when the guns were fired at Fort Sumter. Slowly but surely it righted itself in the darkest night that ever lowered upon this continent. It was a kind Providence that made the issue, when and where

and as it was. The fatal poison was eating out the very life of Southern and of Northern society and manhood. The depth of the disease is indicated by the fever and frenzy with which the long-prepared and long-dreaded revolt spread through all the Southern States, and by the crimes which have since marked their career.* The war is necessary to save the South itself from despotism and barbarism. Loyal citizens of the United States, like the heroic Parson Brownlow, have been hunted down as wild beasts, and endured untold calamities for their faithfulness to the Union; and shall the government for which they suffer leave them to be the victims of these terrible inhumanities? The barbarities inflicted on our Union soldiers by Southern troops are atrocious; their skulls have been made into drinking-cups, their bones into spurs and knife-handles, their gory heads, hacked from their bodies, have been swung in fiendish joy from railroad-cars and in triumphal processions. The helpless and wounded have been bayoneted on the field, and dead bodies dug up to be dishonored. The South itself has been the victim of a reign of terror. Wholesale conscription, already thrice attempted, has forced their whole male population between eighteen and sixty years of age into their armies. The stock of the Confederate States has been made legal tender at the point of the sword. Bridges, villages, cotton and tobacco, are ordered to be destroyed. Hundreds of those we took captive, and released on their oath not to bear arms against us, have at once reenlisted in their armies. Whatever is esteemed just, human and sacred among men, has thus been trampled under foot at the bidding of that corrupt despotism, which now bears sway in the revolted States. And all this is the legitimate and necessary result of the unchecked domination of the slave power. History does not record a more awful disclosure of the profound depths of human wickedness. The history of these Southern States for the past year, if ever written, will be written in tears and in blood: The progress of the war has demonstrated that it is a contest between essential barbarism on the one hand, and the progress

* See Mr. Wade's Report to the Senate, May 1, on the Barbarous Treatment of the Remains of Officers and Soldiers of the United States.

of civilisation on the other. And the manhood of the North has been developed in striking contrast with the inhumanity of the South. The progress of our arms in the South has been the deliverance of conquered towns from lawless violence, and the restoration of commerce, currency, and social order. Schools, even for the negroes, are already springing up, wherever we hold the soil. Our soldiers are every where stationed to protect private mansions, even of the disloyal, from being sacked and wasted. No armies under such provocations, and which had won such victories, were ever so abstinent of revenge. And this is because we are contending in behalf of social order and of civilisation. It is our purpose, of course, to subdue all Southern men in arms; this war, like all wars, is waged for the conquest of our foes. But we subdue them to substitute order for anarchy, law for force, constitutional freedom for despotism, and a purified for a corrupted civilisation. We subdue them to save the nation from Southern domination, and to save the South from itself. The only hope of saving the Southern States themselves is, by restoring to them the impartial blessings and wise restraints of our Federal Union.

And, in doing this, we also believe that we are doing a work for all the other nations. For were that slave republic established, it would be a pest to the earth. It could not be otherwise. Its dream was to found a haughty empire around the Gulf, to seize upon Mexico and Central America, and to clutch the gem of the Antilles. Many a Ponce de Leon would there have fitted out marauding expeditions, under the restless hallucination of finding the land of gold and the fountain of youth. Does any one, versed in history, believe that such a bold, bad power, begotten in perjury, founded in tyranny, with the oppression of more than half its inhabitants as the corner-stone of its policy, seeking by necessity new lands to restore the inherent wastefulness of its industrial system, would have subsided into a peaceful and stable nation? Is it reasonable to expect that the infamy of a treason worse than that of Catiline, would expand into an honesty and wisdom that would rival the fame of Washington and Franklin? Can the

Ethiopian change his skin and the leopard his spots? Then may a Southern fire-eater become a wise legislator, a Southern repudiator honest, and a slave republic peaceful and beneficent. Does anybody, excepting a secessionist, pretend to think that the prohibition of the slave-trade by the Confederacy was aught but a feint, or its pretended regard to England anything but a temporising hypocrisy? It requires all the assurance of a Southern Commissioner to Europe to say such things, and all the credulity of the *North British Review* to credit them. Philanthropists are said to be visionary men; did any one of them ever dream that the way to hasten emancipation was to establish a slave republic? and that the South, breaking loose from the North because it was anti-slavery, would become the admiring and docile pupil of English abolitionists? None that we know, excepting our sagacious transatlantic critics, who seem to have even a superfluity of that charity which beareth all things, believeth all things, and hopeth all things of the people "that will accept England's ordinary mode of payment". The theory of the *North British Review* has the merits of ingenuity and novelty. It says that the Union has been the chief support of slavery; that the North has "*raised half a million of soldiers, and voted five hundred millions of gold that they may again become a nation of slaveholders*"; and hence, that the restoration of the Union is the perpetuity of slavery. Whereas, if the South become a separate people, there will be no Fugitive Slave law, and the slaves will escape; the South cannot get any more land to extend its area, so that even if the slaves do not run away, slavery will die out; the African slave-trade, "carried on by the North", will be extinguished; Cuba would, in that case, have to mitigate its slavery, or "the black race, and with it the culture of sugar, would die out". "In either case, a terrible blot on civilisation would be wiped away, and—*our* West-India possessions will largely profit by the change!" And, then, too, the South, being made up so largely of "men of education, of letters and of refinement", would, of course, do the right thing, and "the euthanasia of slavery" would come. It seems a pity to dissipate such a delightful vision, in

which historic speculation, mild philanthropy, and a fitting regard to "our West-India possessions" are so pleasantly commingled. But, judging after the manner of men, it certainly looks quite as probable that emancipation would be more speedy under the programme of President Lincoln's emancipation message, than under the influence of Vice-President Stevens' pro-slavery speculations about the new civilization, founded in the inequality of races. If the North conquer, the national power of slavery is subdued; would it not be quite as likely to be hemmed in and die under that regimen, as in a Confederacy in which all else should be made subservient to it? Or does the lust of power decrease in proportion as it is gratified? And is it quite certain that Mexico would be left in peace, and that Cuba and the South, together, could not and would not carry on the slave-trade? And, besides, who can imagine that the Confederacy, after it became independent, would at once begin to do, willingly, what it seceded that it might not be compelled to do—that is, give up its ambitious projects and free its slaves? Is it not illogical, not to say absurd, for it to go off and do, what it went off because it did not want to do? Has it involved thirty-two millions of men, and led to the sacrifice of a hundred thousand lives, and aroused all its hate, and put forth all its power, on such an issue, and for such an end? And does the *North British Review* hope to blind others as itself is blinded, and to make them believe what it cannot itself believe, if it has sense or reason left? We may be here living, as it so decorously alleges, "in the midst of an unparalleled delusion"; but being ourselves in the strife, and aware of the stake, we know that the South is terribly in earnest, and earnest because it is logical, and logical only because it is maddened by the hope of establishing a Confederacy, where slavery shall be perpetuated. And we war against it because such a State, once founded, would lead to endless conflicts, and become a scourge to the nations of the earth; unless the race is to recede, and its progress to become a progress in injustice and not in freedom under law. And here is the awful responsibility of the issue now presented to this nation. It is fighting a battle for

the nations of the earth, in the name of whatever is best and holiest in the past, and for the undying benefit of all coming time. And God be thanked that we have not faltered, though England deserted us in the crisis of our fate. By her sympathy she sustained this rebellion; had it not been for her, it would long since have died out. But the delay of the avenging Deity is often terrible. Every month that this war is protracted, and the more desperate the resistance of the slaveholder, the stronger is the hope for the slave, the more sure is emancipation to do its work. The sacrifices of freemen will be the gain of those in bonds; the higher race is here living and acting for the abject and oppressed as never before. And this sublime Christian principle is part and parcel of this war; and so it is a war for the highest good of mankind.

Other considerations might easily be added to show that a necessity is laid upon us for pressing this unholy rebellion to its final issue. For on this point the heart of this people is resolute, whatever foreign governments may meditate in the way of intervention — and we see that our firm and noble friend De Gasparin, in his latest work, still warns us of this danger. It would be a sad day for us if this menace should be fulfilled; but might it not also be an evil day for the power that should attempt it? This nation is still in its youth; its boundless resources we have just begun to touch and handle with manly vigor. For food, and money, and manufactures, and all the implements of war, it is now absolutely independent of any power in the world. This war has proved that it has even a surplus of the material out of which the best armies are made. Its navy is large and efficient. Nor do we lack the *nervi belli, infinita pecunia*. Foreign intervention, too, would necessitate emancipation; and these two causes combined would arouse our people to the most intense and determined exertions. And whatever be our present dangers and trials, our future destiny as a great maritime, commercial, and naval power is unquestionable. The United States must have the hegemony on this Western continent. If European nations wish to make us at once a

first-rate military and aggressive power, the surest road to this will be their intervention. Even if they should impede and cripple us for a time—the time must be short; for we are only on the threshold of our growth and career. In a few years—a brief span in a nation's life—we may be strong enough to dictate our own terms, and those terms would not be easy to the power that should now interfere in our domestic affairs. The *North British* expresses its joy that we have ceased to be a peaceful and prosperous people, and that we are coming to adopt the European restraints and burdens of large armies and navies. Will England esteem us any less an object of dread, when we have an army larger than its own, and a more formidable navy? We should not have raised them, but for its encouragement to the South.

The *British Quarterly Review* warns us, that it will be dangerous for us to try England's "forbearance" much longer, and that "if the future in this respect is to be as the past, there CANNOT be peace". Such threats would have seemed more valorous two years ago than they do now; will they be repeated two years hence? If so, it may be found that this country is in no mood to endure in silence the dictation of Great Britain. For the last time has a British Secretary of State catechised us about sinking stones to aid the blockade of our own harbors. A change has come over us, because a change has come over England. There is here no desire for war, our national policy is peace; but there is a calm and strong conviction as to the evil we have suffered in consequence of England's want of fidelity to the cause of freedom; its apparent willingness to press us down and press us to the wall when we were thought to be weak; and especially its joy, so openly and generally expressed, at the rupture of our Republic. Roman moralists forbid us to rejoice over a fallen foe; could not a Christian people hide its exultation over a fallen friend, and a friend fallen for its fidelity to the cause of freedom and humanity? To befriend us would not have cost England a cent, nor a man, nor even its consistency. It had a golden opportunity to be faithful to the cause of good government and of human freedom, such an opportunity as cannot be re-

called, for the past is irrevocable. It chose the seeming advantage, and greeted us, while we were in the thickest of the fight, with reproaches and menace. On the score of utility, it committed a blunder; on the score of justice, it was faithless to its own history and to the claims of humanity itself.

If we are successful, we shall doubtless find that we have many a friend in England, Scotland, and Ireland; they will come forth from their hiding places, and tell us that their prayers have been heard and their prophecies fulfilled. And we will thank and bless all these for all they have done for our cause. But the strong and mighty men who have maligned us cannot retreat behind these silent Christian souls, and let them say that they speak in the name of England. We have heard and know what that voice is, and this generation will never forget it. Many an old tie is sundered, and grateful and hallowed memories have become dimmed. We have been unduly sensitive to all that was said of us in the old world; we yearned for sympathy from old England as from no other land; and when we came into the deep waters, and tribulation passed over us in our deadly strife for the cause which we believed to be so dear to our mother land, we thought in our inmost souls that she would speak as she never spake before to vindicate the majesty of law and the rights of freedom. And at her rebuke the front of treason would have quailed. And never shall we, can we forget the speechless hour when we were compelled to believe that all this confidence was vain; that treason was shaping its plans in the hope that Great Britain would intervene in its behalf; and that the slave-power had just grounds to think that cotton was mightier than freedom in the freest land of Europe. Never shall we forget the darkness that brooded over the land, when it was feared that England would force us into a strife; nor the immeasurable relief that ensued, when this black cloud was driven from the sky. The sun again shone down upon us; and never since that time have we doubted of the triumphant success of our national cause—the cause of liberty and law. And ever since that time have we been a truly independent people. We have our own work to do.

England's wisdom cannot understand it, and from England's power we can expect no aid.

As Christian men we deeply regret this loss of mutual confidence, and this sundering of sacred ties; but we cannot forget that it was in the power of the Christian men of England and Scotland to have prevented all this, and they did not use their power. As Christian men we respond as cordially as ever to all that is noble and generous in the heart and life of our brethren in the old world. And we fervently pray, that these sympathies may assuage the bitterness of our disappointment and lead England to better and wiser thoughts and words. But as Americans and as men we have felt to the quick the disparagements and reproaches that have been heaped upon the country we love by those that have made and ruled the public opinion of England, by its leading journals and reviews, at the time when we were passing through the crisis of our destiny as a nation. Those that have thus wronged and assailed our country, have wronged and assailed all of us. The attack has made us bind it closer to our hearts, as our conflicts have made us stronger in its defence. Every word spoken against us in Great Britain has led us to scan more closely and to prize more dearly the free institutions and the sacred Union, which have been slandered by ignorance, defamed by jealousy, and traduced by those who dread the growth and prosperity of democratic governments. While we lament the license of some of our public journals, and rebuke the lawlessness of demagogues and profligate men, and clearly see the perils to which our very freedom exposes us, we also see and know, that these are the excesses of the few, the sins of individuals, and do not express the temper of the State or indicate the destiny of our Republic. We venerate and confide in that imperial Republic as never before. We learned to love it more deeply and wisely in the hour of its calamity than we ever did in the zenith of its prosperity. It was riveted to our hearts when traitors struck down our flag, and foreigners rejoiced in our downfall. And now, when its banner floats proudly in triumph over the sea and over the land, we doubly rejoice in its tried constitution, its wise laws, its unequalled freedom, its broad hospitality to the needy and

oppressed from all other countries, its schools and churches open to all, its magnificent public and private charities, its marvellous growth, its abundant internal resources, and its terrible power, when once aroused, to resist and subdue a rebellion that would have defied the skill and might of every European monarchy or empire. In all this we rejoice, because it seems to indicate the progress and perpetuity of free government and righteous laws, and that a divine Providence is guiding the course of history to wise and beneficent ends.

P. S.—Earl Russell and Lord Palmerston are reported to have declared in Parliament, June 13, that there had been no negotiations with France on the question of “mediation” in our affairs. They still think it “inopportune”. (We shall have twelve Monitors ready in the autumn.) The same evening both Houses of Parliament became indignant over General Butler’s police regulations for putting a stop to the shameless conduct of the New Orleans women. Earl Russell intimated that the order “would lead to great brutality”; and Lord Palmerston denounced it as “infamous”. It seems that they had only seen Beauregard’s falsification of it, and supposed that it gave license to our soldiers. Why could not these humane and dignified legislators “the guardians of civilisation”, wait for the official documents? Then they would have seen, that the order (perfectly understood at New Orleans, where it has worked well) only declared that women who behaved in a shameless and indecent manner to our soldiers, should be treated according to an old police regulation of the city, that is, be “shut up in the calaboose for the night”. But then, too, had not Parliament been so meddlesome, we should have missed the edifying spectacle of English “gentlemen” taking the part, in such gallant style, of the New Orleans “ladies”, who spit in our soldiers’ faces and insult them by indecent gestures. Neither our generals nor our people have anything to learn even from English noblemen about the honor due to woman. Such untimely discussions and supercilious assumptions only feed a growing indignation, whose influence will be felt for years and years to come.

ART. VI. — THE PRESBYTERIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLIES.

THE two Assemblies, each of which is styled the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, have held their annual sessions, — the so-called New School at Cincinnati, and the so-called Old School at Columbus, in the State of Ohio. The proceedings of both were marked by an earnest, practical and patriotic spirit, and also by an increased disposition to consider the question of a renewal of Christian intercourse and fellowship between these two powerful denominations, which were so unjustly sundered, just a quarter of a century ago. Though our limits forbid us from giving a full account of their proceedings, we select some points of leading interest.

The Assembly that met at Cincinnati had an unusually short session, beginning May 17th and closing its deliberations May 24th. The last Moderator, Rev. J. R. Condit, D.D., of Auburn, opened the sessions with an eloquent and forcible discourse on Biblical Preaching. Dr. George Duffield, of Detroit, was chosen Moderator. The roll shows a large representation, especially of the laity, from all parts of the church, including the return of the delegations from St. Louis and Washington. It was the largest New School Assembly ever convened. Commissioners were present from twenty-two Synods, composed of one hundred and four Presbyteries. Comparatively little time was spent in making speeches; it was a working Assembly, including many of the most experienced and able ministers and laymen of the denomination. Not a single judicial case was brought before the Judicial Committee.

The tenth annual Report of the Publication Committee, presented by its Secretary, Rev. John W. Dulles, showed that

this part of the work of the church is steadily gaining in public appreciation. It has been vigorously sustained, in the time of its depression, by faithful friends in Philadelphia. A Committee of Seven was appointed to report to the next Assembly upon the whole subject; and, meanwhile, it has been made one of the four main objects to be presented each year to our churches, for their contributions. Dr. Charles Hawley, of Auburn, delivered an appropriate discourse on the subject. The Treasurer's Report showed a total of donations, \$5,158; sales, \$14,107. Books and tracts have been given away to the amount of \$936. The Committee have published twenty-three new works the past year, and have in hand several unpublished works, which they ought to have the means of carrying through the press; among them is a History of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, by Rev. E. H. Gillett. We quote from their Report, on the subject of Endowments:

"Whilst the Committee continue to press upon the churches the duty of annual contributions to this cause, as absolutely necessary to its existence, in the absence of a proper business capital, they would not have the fact overlooked, that the work cannot be properly done until such a capital is secured. From year to year they have frankly told their constituents that efficiency not only, *but economy also*, demanded that a considerable sum should be invested at one time in the enterprise; that, the longer this endowment was delayed, the more costly would be the preparatory work. The Committee have no reason, at the close of another year, for changing their estimate of the importance of early attention to this point. Rather are they more deeply impressed with the urgent demand for the attainment of such a position for efficiency and usefulness as can be afforded in this way alone."

The Report on Education was presented by the Secretary, Rev. Thornton A. Mills. There have been one hundred and nine students at the Union Theological Seminary, New York; seventy-two at Auburn; and twenty-seven at Lane Seminary. During the year, the Committee received \$5,902.15, and aided ninety-four students. As nearly as can be ascertained, there have been aided, throughout the entire Church, by the Permanent Committee, local organizations, presbyteries, and individuals, not far from two hundred and fifty students, at an

expenditure of nearly \$25,000. The Report states that an effort to unite the various local educational organizations throughout the church, in the Plan of the Assembly, has been successful, and that hereafter there will be but one treasury for the whole church, from which students will be aided in accordance with the Assembly's rules. The Report was referred to a Special Committee, at whose recommendation the following, among other Resolutions, were unanimously adopted:

"That it should be the purpose of the church to render the education fund adequate to the wants of the cause; and that the Assembly regard the faithful observance of Article 5th of the plan which recommends a collection to be taken in each congregation for the same, as essential to the vigorous and just working over the entire field.

"That, to secure impartial and united action throughout the church, it is necessary that all contributions should be disbursed from the general treasury, under the Assembly's rules, and where, in any case, additional provision may be deemed necessary, it should be so made as not to diminish the General Fund.

"That, as the whole responsibility of selecting and recommending candidates for pecuniary aid devolves upon the Presbyteries, they be enjoined to a strict observance of the first of the Assembly's rules prescribing the qualifications of such candidates."

The Committee, as appears from the Report, received only about one fourth of the money contributed for this object by the churches. It is desirable that there should be a union of all the local organizations in one plan. If that plan cannot be so worked, as to meet all the cases of applicants for aid, the deficiency can, and doubtless will be made up, in a more private way, without interference with the general objects and action of the Committee.

The Report of the Church Erection Committee, presented by Rev. James W. McLane, D.D., shows a healthy state of this large and useful fund, now amounting to \$114,654. The Report among other things states:

"The whole number of grants made during the year is twenty-two, of which twelve have been in loans and ten in donations. The whole number of grants made from the beginning is one hundred and eighty-two. The whole amount granted is \$64,471. The whole amount of loans is \$54,766,

and that of donations is \$9,975. The general average of the former is \$424, and that of the latter \$188. In some cases the character of a grant has been changed, at the earnest solicitation of the parties, and with the approbation of the Synodical Committee, from a donation to a loan, and *vice versa*. The tendency for the last two years has been in the direction of donations, and the general average in that line of grants has increased in amount. The Assembly's plan allows only one fourth of the amount appropriated to any Synod to be granted in donations. That limit has not been exceeded, except in one case, where conformity to the rule would have obliged the Board to make a fractional grant, which they have never made in any case. In this practice they have been uniformly sustained by the Assembly from year to year.

"Sixty-four per cent of the fund has helped to secure more than four hundred and seventy-two thousand dollars' worth of church property. It will also be seen that the fund has thus far been used for the end for which it was designed by those who established it. The size and cost of the houses of worship erected, show very clearly that, in most cases at least, the churches that have been assisted from the fund are 'feeble congregations', and the help thus afforded them met a want which could not otherwise have been supplied. Another fact of great interest in this connection may be stated, that these churches have not been left with a debt resting upon them to embarrass their efforts and to crush their spirit. The plan of the fund requires that the churches aided from it shall own their property in fee, and be free from debt, and thus secures a most desirable end."

One of the most important topics brought before the Assembly was that of Home Missions in the Report of Dr. Kendall. This Committee in its present form was constituted a year since, and has been doing a useful work in a wise manner. About \$20,000 have been paid to our home missionaries during the year. Many of our members and churches still contribute to the American Home Missionary Society, not fully understanding that the policy adopted by that institution virtually excludes our churches from its aid. The history of this exclusion still remains to be written. But as it is an accomplished fact, our churches have no choice but that of putting forth their best and united efforts to aid all the feeble churches in our bounds. The Committee have issued an appeal to the friends of Home Missions in the course of which they say:

"Though from \$12,000 to \$16,000 have recently been paid into the treasury of the American Home Missionary Society — *the Legacies and Donations of Presbyterians* — we understand that not a dollar of it will

ever be paid to any home missionary connected with any Presbytery which operates through our Committee, or endorses the action of our Assembly, after his present term of commission expires! That Society, therefore, becomes to all intents and purposes a Congregational institution. Nothing given to it will assist *our* feeble churches or the missionaries in our connection. *We* must do our own work, and render them the aid they need, or the latter will fail of support and the former be disbanded."

The *Home Missionary*, the organ of the American Home Missionary Society, began its new year May, 1862, with taking the ground that this Society is now, "practically, the organ of but one Christian communion, instead of two"; though it also tries to show that this is the Society's "misfortune" and not its "fault". The Secretary of the Congregational Union, and the *Boston Recorder*, have recently claimed it as a Congregational Society. We cannot here and now enter into this discussion. This result has been long foreseen by those acquainted with the "Rules" and policy of the Society. As the separation is virtually complete, one source of irritation between two large denominations, animated by the same general spirit, is taken away. Henceforth may they only provoke one another to love and good works. The Assembly appointed a Committee "to confer with the American Home Missionary Society, to arrange with them to secure for Presbyterian churches the legacies and other funds from Presbyterian sources, that from time to time may have or shall come into their treasury". We trust that they will be met in an equitable and fraternal spirit. The need of efficient action on our part is forcibly urged in Dr. Kendall's excellent Report. In commenting on the results of the war, he says:

"After the suppression of the rebellion, the tide of emigration will probably flow southward. Northern men are tempted southward by a mild climate and a fertile soil. In the results that are inevitable, and in the success of our arms we may expect to see Northern men and Northern ideas go southward, and with them Northern sympathies and Northern wants. Two consequences, therefore, are to be anticipated. 1st. That the churches now weak at the West, will continue weak longer than has been customary, because supplies of good men from the East will be reduced, or turned into another direction. 2d. New churches will spring up

which will need assistance from those whose record is clear like our own, who are not complicated with, and who do not connive at the system of American slavery."

The annual sermon on Home Missions, by Dr. Asa D. Smith, of New York, was a comprehensive and patriotic exhibition of the claims of this great work. The Committee of the Assembly recommended that \$75,000 be raised for this object the next year, a sum none too large for the growing needs of the church and the country.

Walter S. Griffith, Esq., of New York, presented the fourth annual Report on Foreign Missions, prepared with great care. Our churches act for this object, through the American Board of Commissioners, with continued harmony. The whole number of foreign missionaries is fifty-four, connected with twenty-seven of our presbyteries, and distributed as follows: Western Africa, 3; South Africa, 3; Western Turkey, 5; Eastern Turkey, 3; Central Turkey, 3; Syria, 6; Nestorian, 4; Southern Asia—Ceylon, 2; Mahratta, 2; Madura, 6; Eastern Asia—Canton, 2; Fuh Chau, 3; Sandwich Islands, 5. In North America—Dacotah Indians, 1; Senecas, 1; Ojibewas, 1. The proportion of army chaplains from our denomination is larger than that from any other communion. The same Committee submitted the digest of a plan for the collection of funds. The whole subject of Systematic Beneficence was also thoroughly and wisely canvassed in a special report from Dr. Kendall.

The Committee on the State of the Country, Dr. Beman chairman, presented a long series of Resolutions, reciting the causes of the war, and the aims of the rebellion, and giving assurances of the most uncompromising loyalty, which were unanimously adopted, as was also a fervent letter to the President of the United States.

THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE TO THE LETTER.

"DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, 9th June, 1862.

"To the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of the United States, holding its annual session in the city of Cincinnati.

"REVEREND GENTLEMEN: I have had the honor of receiving your address to the President of the United States, and the proceedings of your venerable body on the subject of the existing insurrection, by which that address was accompanied.

"These papers have been submitted to the President. I am instructed to convey to you his most profound and grateful acknowledgments for the fervent assurances of support and sympathy which they contain. For many years hereafter one of the greatest subjects of felicitation among good men will be the signal success of the government of the United States in preserving our Federal Union, which is the ark of civil and religious liberty on this continent and throughout the world. All the events of our generation which preceded this attempt at revolution, all that shall happen after it, will be deemed unimportant in consideration of that one indispensable and invaluable achievement. The men of our generation, whose memory will be the longest and the most honored, will be they who thought the most earnestly, prayed the most fervently, hoped the most confidently, fought the most heroically and suffered the most patiently, in the sacred cause of freedom and humanity. The record of the action of the Presbyterian Church seems, to the President, worthy of its traditions and its aspirations, as an important branch of the church founded by the Saviour of men.

"Commending our yet distracted country to the interposition and guardian care of the Ruler and Judge of nations, the President will persevere steadily and hopefully in the great work committed to his hands, relying upon the virtue and intelligence of the people of the United States, and the candor and benevolence of all good men.

"I have the honor to be, reverend gentlemen, your very obedient servant,

"WILLIAM H. SEWARD."

We have room for but a fragment of the impressive "deliverance" of the Assembly:

"*Resolved*, first, That we deem the government of these United States the most benign that has ever blessed our imperfect world, and should it be destroyed, after its brief career of good, another such, in the ordinary course of human events, can hardly be anticipated for a long time to come, and for these reasons we revere and love it as one of the greatest sources of hope under God for a lost world, and it is doubly dear to our hearts because it was procured and established by the toil, sacrifice and blood of our fathers."

"*Resolved*, fifthly, That, in our opinion, this whole insurrectionary movement can be traced to one primordial root, and one only, African slavery, the love of it, and a determination to make it perpetual; and while we look upon this war as having one grand end in view, the restoration of the Union, by crushing out the last living and manifested fibre of rebellion, we hold that everything, the institution of slavery, if need be, must be made to bend to this great purpose; and while, under the influence of humanity and Christian benevolence, we may commiserate the condition of the ruined rebels, once in fraternity with ourselves, but now—should the case occur—despoiled of all that makes the world dear to them, we must be, at the same time, constrained to feel that the retribution has been self-inflicted, and must add—*Fiat justitia ruat cælum.*"

There were no scruples felt as to the "constitutional" right of the Assembly to pass resolutions of loyalty; there was no doubt about the propriety of doing what was plainly right. And there was no hesitation in going to the root of the matter and designating in unmistakeable terms the real causes of this wicked rebellion. The annual Narrative on the State of Religion also says, in relation to the war:

"We recognise, with devout thanksgiving to Almighty God, his favor upon us, not only in the national successes granted in answer to prayer, but also in that overruling of the developed patriotism of our people, by which it has been made a means to the end of a higher sanctification, and directly a means in the salvation of souls."

The subject of a reünion of the two main branches of the Presbyterian Church was brought before the Assembly by overtures from four presbyteries, the most important of which was the united paper of the Presbyteries of Ogdensburgh (O. S.) and St. Lawrence (N. S.) adopted at a joint meeting, January 14, 1862.* This question has been widely discussed during the past year. The withdrawal of the Southern churches from the Old School has had a favorable influence. The general feeling expressed by the New School ministers and churches is, that there is no real obstacle to a reünion on their part; that they are ready for it as soon as it can be effected in an honorable and equitable way. Of course, they have no thought of a reünion, if that would imply a sanction of the excising acts, or involve any appearance of submission to the Old School as a more or

* That paper is as follows:

"Whereas, The greater part of the churches and ministers, presbyteries and synods, in the Southern and South-western States, have withdrawn from the Old School General Assembly; and the greater part of the Congregational churches and ministers on the Union of 1801, have withdrawn, or the articles of union substantially vacated; it appears to us that a reünion of the Presbyterian family should take place of those which remain; therefore

"Resolved, That having confidence in each other's piety, orthodoxy, and patriotism, we desire to be united in one Presbytery, in one Synod, and in one General Assembly.

"Resolved, That a copy of this paper be sent to the two respective General Assemblies, and they be overtured to approve and adopt the same."

thodox or Presbyterian communion. Some of the chief obstacles to a reünion are set aside, as soon as the Old School is ready to reäffirm cordially the action of the Assembly of 1818 on the subject of slavery, and is willing to allow differences of opinion on some contested points of theology, as inability, immediate imputation of Adam's sin and limited atonement. If the latter points are made necessary conditions of ministerial fellowship, we had better remain apart.

There are also some serious practical difficulties, which would need to be thoroughly canvassed. The general feeling in the New School is, that they are doing well as things now are; that to reünite only to quarrel would be a misfortune and not a gain; that there is no occasion for any haste; and that everything lawful should be done by them to encourage fraternal intercourse. The Cincinnati Assembly unanimously adopted the following paper in respect to the overtures:

"Resolved, firstly, That the temper of these overtures meets the hearty approval of the Assembly; entirely accordant as it is with that spirit of brotherly affection towards other denominations, and of coöperation in matters of common interest, which has marked our whole history.

"Resolved, secondly, That while we have ever regretted the divisive acts of 1837, deeming them at variance alike with the constitution of our church and the Word of God, we have never cherished any unkind or exacting spirit, as has been evinced in various ways, particularly in the proposition made by us some years since to gather, with our brethren of the other Assembly, around the table of our common Lord.

"Resolved, thirdly, That it would give us pleasure to unite in closest fellowship with all persons who can stand with us on the basis of our Confession of Faith and Book of Discipline, and who substantially agree with us on the great moral questions of the day, especially in the matter of loyalty to the government, and in the views of slavery, set forth, prior to the division, in the deliverance of 1818.

"Resolved, fourthly, That while we bear in mind the prayer of our Lord that his disciples may be one, and while we can see some special advantages to be derived from a reünion of the two branches of the Presbyterian Church, we do not perceive that, beyond the previous declaration of our views, any thing remains for us, at the present, but to await humbly and teachably the movements of Divine Providence."

The same subject was brought before the Old School Assem-

bly at Columbus. The younger members of the body were said to be in favor of union; but the Assembly decided that the right time for such a measure had not yet come, and voted down a proposition to consider the matter "fraternally in future" — about eighty votes, however, being given in its favor. But they did not stop here. Dr. Tustin presented a Minute, which was unanimously adopted, proposing a correspondence with the New School Assembly, in the following terms:

"The Assembly having considered certain overtures sent to it by a few of the presbyteries under its care, proposing that steps should be taken by it toward an organic union between this church and the church under the care of the Presbyterian General Assembly, (N. S.), and having determined against the course proposed in said overtures, has also been informed that the other General Assembly has about the same time come to a similar conclusion, on similar overtures laid before it by a certain number of its own presbyteries; of its own motion this General Assembly, considering the time to have come for it to take the initiative in securing a better understanding of the relations which it judges as proper to be maintained between the two General Assemblies, hereby proposes that there shall be a stated annual and friendly interchange of Commissioners between the two General Assemblies, each body sending to the other one Minister and one Ruling Elder, as Commissioners, year by year; the said Commissioners to enjoy such privileges in each body to which they are sent, as are common to all those now received by this body from other Christian denominations.

"The Moderator of this Assembly will communicate this deliverance to the Moderators of the other Assemblies, to be laid before them with Christian salutations."

The New School Assembly had adjourned before this action was taken, or it would doubtless have responded in the most cordial terms. It is an auspicious indication, welcome to every Christian heart. The same subject also came up in the Dutch Reformed General Synod at Syracuse, which apparently took heart from the action of the Old School Assembly, and adopted with its wonted circumspection the following Minute:

"*Whereas*, This Synod considers the interchange of Christian courtesy and kindness between ecclesiastical bodies as most desirable wherever it can be practicable and hearty, even when differences of doctrinal view may preclude that form of correspondence contemplated in Chapter II, Article V, Section 8, of our Constitution,

Resolved, That this Synod send to the next New School General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church a commissioner, whose office it shall be to assure that body of our fraternal affection and interest, and to propose to it a yearly interchange of kind expressions by letter."

This Synod adopted a like minute as to its mode of correspondence with the Old School. The hint about "differences of doctrinal view" was undoubtedly intended to indicate the Synod's love for the truth, and not to cast any disparagement on the so-called New School. That name, "New School", has always worked against us most unfairly in the minds of our well-beloved Dutch brethren. But they should recollect that it has never been adopted, except as a term of convenience, to save circumlocution. We profess to stand on the old foundations, and are "new" only as each generation has a new task, only as the old is never fully reproduced, and cannot be, if human history is a real progress in man's knowledge of truth and practice of righteousness. But the truth and righteousness themselves are eternal and unchangeable. We are glad that we are to have a delegate in person, if only for once; and we can assure the Rev. H. D. Ganse of a cordial reception, and the Synod of "kind expressions by letter" in return.

The General Assembly (O. S.) at Columbus held its sessions for eleven days, from May 14 to May 27, in the Hall of the House of Representatives of the State of Ohio. Ten of the Southern Synods were not represented, most of them having formally seceded, viz. Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Nashville, Memphis, Arkansas, and Texas. This reduced the representation about one third, leaving it not much larger than the Cincinnati Assembly. Dr. Backus of Baltimore preached the opening sermon from Heb. xii, 28. Dr. Charles C. Beatty was elected Moderator. The usual reports were read and business transacted on all the main branches of ecclesiastical work. The subject of a revision of the Book of Discipline was again postponed. In the course of the debate on this matter Dr. Breckinridge said of the revised book:

"It is a good book—the best, in my estimation, in the English language. It has left out *preaching* and *exhortation*, and put in *law* and *logic* instead. If you want preaching and exhortation, it is a mean book; if law and logic, it is the best on earth. Dr. Thornwell did much to impart to it its logical and legal excellence, and few men were more capable. The book, in its present form, is a barrier to the administration of justice in our Church courts. He had been studying ecclesiastical law for thirty years, and he was more and more convinced every year, of the imperfection of our Book of Discipline. It is tantamount to a denial of justice, to go by a system so loosely constructed, and the terms of which are so vague. And our system will amount to a denial of justice, if two hundred and fifty judges have to go by loose law, and obscure records and pleadings, such as are almost inevitable under our present systems. The smart man gets clear; the dull man, or one who has not a smart advocate, is condemned."

The Board of Publication reported receipts, \$68,086; expenditures, \$70,700. The Board of Domestic Missions reported their receipts at \$85,332; missionaries, 639; churches supplied, 803; new churches organized, 18. The Committee on Church Extension have appropriated \$17,777 to fifty-eight churches; the available means of the year were \$30,938. The Board of Education has aided 375 students during the year. The Committee on Theological Seminaries reported, that there had been at Princeton 170 students; at Alleghany, 158; at Danville, 11; at Chicago, 11. The noble donation of \$50,000 to Princeton, by Messrs. R. L. & A. Stewart of New York, was appropriately noticed. The receipts of the Board of Foreign Missions were \$176,939. The unprofitable debate, occasioned by Dr. Breckinridge's useless resignation of his professorship, ended, as every one foresaw it was intended to do, in a vote of continued confidence in the Professor.

Of more general interest was the action of the Assembly upon the State of the Country. Last year it pledged its loyalty by passing Dr. Spring's strong and timely Resolutions. To these resolutions men of unquestioned personal loyalty, as Dr. Hodge and others, objected on the ground that the Presbyterian Church had no constitutional right to commit all its members to loyalty to any particular government; it could enjoin loyalty in general, but not in particu-

lar. Modifications were propounded in some of the Border States. The Presbytery of Louisville, for example, took the ground, "that it was incompetent to the Assembly, as a spiritual court, *to require or to advise acts of disobedience to actual Governments, by those under the power of those Governments*". This is also implied in the paper adopted this year by the Assembly, in contrast with the resolutions of last year. It disagrees with the positions of last year's protestants by making a declaration of loyalty, and by warning and rebuking those who are disloyal to our General Government. It differs from the Resolutions of the last year, in not laying a formal injunction upon all the members of the church, including those in the disloyal States, to be loyal to the General Government. Perhaps some minds are quieted and comforted by this difference. We do not see that much can be made of it. It amounts to this: last year the disloyal men in disloyal States were by implication supposed to be told to obey the General Government even if their State Governments told them to be disloyal. This year they are told that it is a great sin to be disloyal to the General Government, but they are not exhorted to rise up in arms against their disloyal States. As all the Presbyterians in the disloyal States have already seceded from the Assembly, we cannot see that this difference of action amounts to much, excepting that it was perhaps the means of getting some votes from the Border States. Of course, neither the action of last year nor of this year has any penalties attached; it is simply declarative of the mind of the church. Those that do not agree protest; and there the matter ends. The only real question, after all, is this, whether the Assembly has the right to declare that all citizens of the United States are bound to be loyal to the General Government, and that, if they are not loyal, it is a sin against God. Dr. Stuart Robinson is quite right in saying that this is the real point; and he is quite consistent, though very wrong and perverse, in taking the ground that the Assembly is bound to say and do nothing. There is really no Border State or half-way position that can be logically maintained. Suspense here is the fabled state of Mohammed's

coffin. The church is either bound to say that disloyalty is a sin; or it is bound to say nothing. It cannot compromise matters.

But when the ground is taken that the church can say nothing, the greatest difficulties ensue. The church is forbidden from making any declaration on the most momentous question of political ethics. Lower questions, it is granted, belong to its proper sphere, but the highest subject of national welfare, the primary political duty, is ruled out. The Word of God and the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church are equally opposed to this view; for they both enjoin the duty of submission to the powers that be. The distinction between Cæsar's kingdom and Christ's kingdom is of no avail. For Christ enjoins us to "Render under Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's"—unless this involves the giving up of allegiance to Christ, or unless Cæsar becomes so oppressive and tyrannical, that we are willing to declare ourselves disloyal and to inaugurate a revolution. But in that case, or in any case of revolt, the disloyal of course expect to be called so by those who remain loyal, whether in church or state. (By an entertaining historical blunder Dr. Robinson terms those "Erastians" who assert that the church is bound to profess its loyalty; but Erastianism is properly applied only to such as claim the supremacy of the state in things ecclesiastical, never to those who only say that the church is bound to be loyal in things temporal; it refers to a usurpation of the state over the church, and not to a voluntary declaration of the church about its proper duty to the state.) Nor is the distinction between the General and State Governments here of any account. It gives no logical resting place. Thus: you say that the General Assembly cannot rightfully declare that all Presbyterians are bound to obey the General Government, because some of its Synods and Presbyteries hold that they are bound by the acts of their State Governments against the General Government. But these Synods and Presbyteries then manifestly hold, that they are bound to be loyal to their State Governments. That is, they recognise loyalty as binding on them, but apply it to another than the General Government.

That is to say, they stand on the very ground which, to support them, you oppose. Your view is good neither for the North nor the South. You are stranded between the two, in a place where two seas meet. Logically, you are in a state of suspended animation, and can really maintain your ground only as you hold that secession is right, and obedience to the General Government is naught in comparison with obedience to disloyal State governments. That is, in short, only those who sympathise with secession or seceders, and who may hope by and by to make common cause with them, can possibly take such ground about church action. Practically none of the seceders themselves take such ground. It is a well-known fact, that ministers and churches in the Confederate States, the most earnest against preaching, praying, and "resolving" in behalf of the General Government, are equally zealous in preaching, praying, and "resolving" in behalf of their Confederate Government and their State authorities. Some of them attempt a show of consistency, like the astute Synod of South Carolina in its resolutions adopted at Abbeville Court House, the first whereof reads textually thus :

"Resolved, By the ministers and elders comprising this Synod, not in their ecclesiastical capacity as a court of Jesus, but in their private capacity as citizens and a convocation of Christian gentlemen, that our allegiance is due, through the sovereign State to which we belong, and shall be rendered, to the government of these Confederate States so long as South Carolina remains in the number."

Was ever self-stultification more elaborate ? The metamorphosis is as good as that of a harlequin. The Synod, by a formal vote, is resolved into "Christian gentlemen", "in a private capacity", and then they say what they want to. Was it then a "Synod", or men "in a private capacity" ? The question never can be answered until the old puzzle is resolved—when a liar says he speaks the truth, does he lie or does he speak the truth ? When a Synod, by a synodical resolve, votes that it is not a Synod, is it a Synod or is it not a Synod ? If it is a Synod, it contradicts itself ; if it is not a Synod, the vote is a joke.

But to return to the General Assembly. The paper on the State of the Country was drawn up by Dr. Breckinridge, whose patriotic course in the present national crisis has won him such deserved commendation. We are almost willing to forget and forgive the many harsh and violent things he has said about the New School, when we see to what a noble use such a pugnacious and patriotic nature can be put in times of trial. His paper was opposed, plausibly by Dr. Backus, skilfully by Dr. Robinson, and prudentially by Judge Gamble, who propounded a feeble substitute. But it passed by the overwhelming vote of 199 (afterwards increased to 202) to 20. Protests of various shades were of course presented. From the Free States there were eight Nays—two of them from New England. The Border Slave States stood eleven Ayes, twelve Nays. Some from the Border States approved the principles of the document, but doubted its expediency. The main points of the paper are these :

“Peace has been wickedly superseded by war, in its worst form, throughout the whole land; and public order has been wickedly superseded by rebellion, anarchy, and violence in the whole Southern portion of the Union. All this has been brought to pass in a disloyal and traitorous attempt to overthrow the National Government by military force, and to divide the nation contrary to the wishes of the immense majority of the people of the nation, and without satisfactory evidence that the majority of the people in whom the local sovereignty resided, even in the States which revolted, ever authorized any such proceeding, or ever approved the fraud and violence by which this horrible treason has achieved whatever success it has had. This whole treason, rebellion, anarchy, fraud, and violence is utterly contrary to the dictates of natural religion and morality, and is plainly condemned by the revealed will of God. It is the clear and solemn duty of the National Government to preserve, at whatever cost, the National Union and Constitution, to maintain the laws in their supremacy, to crush force by force, and to restore the reign of public order and peace to the entire nation, by whatever lawful means that are necessary thereunto. And it is the bounden duty of all people who compose this great nation, each one in his several place and degree, to uphold the Federal Government, and every State Government, and all persons in authority, whether civil or military, in all their lawful and proper acts, unto the end hereinbefore set forth.

“The Church of Christ has no authority from him to make rebellion, or to counsel treason, or to favor anarchy in any case whatever. On the con-

trary, every follower of Christ has the personal liberty bestowed on him by Christ, to submit, for the sake of Christ, according to his own conscientious sense of duty, to whatever government, however bad, under which his lot may be cast. But while patient suffering for Christ's sake can never be sinful, treason, rebellion, and anarchy may be sinful — most generally, perhaps, are sinful — and probably are always and necessarily sinful in all free countries, where the power to change the government by voting, in the place of force, exists as a common right constitutionally secured to the people, who are sovereign. If, in any case, treason, rebellion, and anarchy can possibly be sinful, they are so in the case now desolating large portions of this nation, and laying waste great numbers of Christian congregations, and fatally obstructing every good word and work to those regions. To the Christian people, scattered throughout those unfortunate regions, and who have been left of God to have any hand in bringing on these terrible calamities, we earnestly address words of exhortation and rebuke as unto brethren who have sinned exceedingly, and whom God calls to repentance by fearful judgments. To those in like circumstances who are not chargeable with the sins which have brought such calamities upon the land, but who have chosen, in the exercise of their Christian liberty, to stand in their lot and suffer, we address words of affectionate sympathy, praying God to bring them off conquerors. To those in like circumstances, who have taken their lives in their hands and risked all for their country and for conscience' sake, we say we love such with all our heart, and bless God such witnesses were found in the time of thick darkness.

“Disturbers of the Church ought not to be allowed; especially disturbers of the Church in States that never revolted, or that have been cleared of armed rebels; disturbers who, under many false pretexts, may promote discontent, disloyalty, and general alienation, tending to the unsettling of ministers, to local schisms, and to manifold trouble. Let a spirit of quietness, of mutual forbearance, and of ready obedience to authority, both civil and ecclesiastical, illustrate the loyalty, the orthodoxy, and the piety of the Church. It is more especially to ministers of the Gospel, and, amongst them, particularly to any whose first impression had been, on any account, favorable to the military revolution which has been attempted, and which God's providence has hitherto so signally rebuked, that these decisive considerations ought to be addressed. And in the name and by the authority of the Lord Jesus, we earnestly exhort all who love God or fear his wrath to turn a deaf ear to all counsels and suggestions that tend towards a reaction favorable to disloyalty, schism, or disturbance, either in the Church or in the country. There is hardly anything more inexcusable connected with the frightful conspiracy against which we testify, than the conduct of those office bearers and members of the Church who, although citizens of loyal States, and subject to the control of loyal Pres-

byteries and Synods, have been faithless to all authority, human and divine, to which they owed subjection."

One remarkable omission will be noticed in this "deliverance" as contrasted with that of the New School. It does not even allude to the subject of Slavery, as having ought to do with this crisis. The paper might seem to imply, that the rebellion is a pure work of malignity, an absolute self-determination of sin, without ground or motive. Its author on other occasions has said, that "the system which makes, or proposes to make, the relation of master and slave hereditary, perpetual, and absolute, must be wrong, as it is a negation of the principles and precepts of the Gospel, and of the very idea of civil liberty and inalienable rights"; and that "there is an almost superhuman effort in the present rebellion to base the entire frame-work of the Government on the principle of hereditary servitude". Why were not these points propounded to the General Assembly? Why this reticence as to the heart and life of the rebellion? Can an Assembly, which has spoken so manfully about one sin and one duty, long remain silent about another sin and another duty? The momentum has been given; how long can the body resist? The arguments once used for silence about slavery were equally good for silence about disloyalty. The arguments now used in favor of a proclamation of loyalty and a rebuke of disloyalty, are quite as good in favor of a declaration about man's inalienable rights and about the sinfulness of slavery. Some advance has been made; other times are coming on. And ere many years are passed we hope to see our brethren of the Old School as explicit on the sinfulness of the slave system as they now are on the crime of treason.

Other churches, even those esteemed most conservative, have not been so silent on the main question—excepting the Cumberland Presbyterians, who said a good deal—and nothing. The General Synod of the Reformed Dutch Church passed the strongest Resolutions, declaring that "loyalty to Christ" "demands of us an earnest and unqualified support of our Government", and praying, that God "will in infinite wisdom guide us in a way by which in the best manner every

yoke may in his own time be broken and the oppressed go free". The Lutheran General Synod described the rebellion as "most wicked in its inception, unjustifiable in its cause, unnatural in its character, inhuman in its prosecution, oppressive in its aims, and destructive in its results to the highest interests of morality and religion"; and declared that it is "more immediately the natural result of the continuance and spread of domestic slavery in our land". The Reformed Presbyterian Synod addressed congratulations to Congress upon the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, and the President's emancipation scheme, and also urged legislative provision for the instruction of the freedmen. The United Presbyterian Church in a letter, May 26, 1862, to the United Presbyterians of Scotland, says: "Beyond a doubt, an important, if not the chief, element in the causes of the desolating war now unhappily waging in our land was the existence of slavery, and the determination of the Southern section of the United States to perpetuate and extend it". The American Baptist Missionary Union "*Resolved*: That we believe the institution of slavery to have been the principal cause and origin of this attempt to destroy the Government, and that a safe, solid, and lasting peace cannot be expected short of its complete overthrow". This indicates a very striking and thorough change. All the Congregational Associations and Conventions held last year took the same ground as to the relations of the war to slavery; and their testimony will undoubtedly be repeated this year in still more emphatic terms.

These decisive testimonies confirm all that we have said in the article on British Sympathy for America, and effectually refute the English theory as to the real origin of the war. Opposition to slavery is the heart of the contest. And the American churches of every name are fast taking the position which will ensure the triumph of our national cause, by making it redound to the highest welfare of man. Thus will this conflict mark a stadium in the progress of the kingdom of God.

Literary and Critical Notices of New Books.

BIBLICAL LITERATURE.

Introduction to the Study of the Gospels. With Historical and Explanatory Notes. By BROOKE FOSS WESTCOTT, A.M. With an Introduction by H. B. HACKETT, D.D. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1862. 8vo, pp. 476. For sale in New York by Blakeman and Mason, \$1.50. Mr. Westcott's well-known work on the *Gospel Harmony*, 1851, is here filled up, and made more complete. Discontented with the current methods of harmonising the Evangelists, he treats the subject in a more free manner, aiming to indicate the internal rather than the external order and congruity of the four-fold Gospel. The author is a scholar, well read in the literature of the subject; and, while ardently attached to the truth, he always shows a candid spirit in treating of the difficult points that beset the subject. Ministers, students, and teachers will find this work a very useful help in their studies. The topics are just those on which such help is needed: Inspiration, Origin and Characteristics of the Gospels, their Differences in Details and in Arrangement, etc. On inspiration he opposes the "mechanical" theory, which he calls "Calvinistic", though it was even more strictly the theory of the old Lutheran divines. The patristic testimony to inspiration is collected with care in one of the Appendices; and here too are interesting accounts of the Apocryphal Gospels, and a classification of the miracles and parables. Dr. Hackett's strong recommendation of the book is a sufficient guarantee of its solid qualities. Gould & Lincoln, as usual, have brought it out in good style. We wish that they might also reprint Westcott's *New Testament Canon*, which is an excellent work, and quite as much needed by our students.

LANGE, J. P. *Theological and Homiletical Commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew.* Translated by Rev. A. EDERSHEIM and Rev. W. B. POPE. Vol. II. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1861. New York: Scribner. 8vo. pp. 471. This volume carries on the commentary to the middle of the twenty-sixth chapter, leaving two and a half chapters to complete the Gospel. We need not repeat what we have so frequently said about the characteristics of this commentary and its great value to ministers and theological students. The homiletical hints appended to each section are much better than books of skeleton discourses. Dr. Lange's well-known ingenuity and constructive talent, not unmixed with fancy, are seen on every page. Chapters xxiv and xxv are interpreted on the "law of cyclical representation", thus: First Cycle: Sketch of the Last Things to the End of the World (xxiv, 1-4); Second Cycle: The Specific Last Things, Destruction of Jerusalem, Interval of Silent Judgment (15-28);

Third Cycle: End of the World (29-44); Judgment of the Rulers of the Church (45-51); Judgment in the Church itself (xxv, 1-12); Retribution of Individuals (14-80); Judgment upon Nations (81-46). In the general order here, he follows substantially the views of Ebrard. Auberlen has a valuable dissertation on this same perplexing passage in the *Studien und Kritiken* for this year.

The Family Bible; containing the Old and New Testaments. With brief Notes and Instructions, designed to give the Results of Critical Investigation, and to assist Common Readers to understand the Meaning of the Holy Spirit in the Inspired Word—including the References and Marginal Readings of the Polyglott Bible. Published by the American Tract Society, New York. Royal 8vo, pp. 1504. \$3. This invaluable work, begun by the late Dr. Justin Edwards, and now revised by Professor Barrows and Dr. Williams, has already taken an honored place among our most useful practical commentaries: In a brief and lucid manner, it gives the results of patient study in a form eminently adapted to the devotional use of the Sacred Scriptures. We have been impressed with the entire freedom from mere theory which pervades all the comments. The evident design, successfully attained, is to give the mind of the Spirit as revealed in the written Word. The typographical execution and binding are excellent, and the price is moderate. Several new Maps, well engraved, a Chronological Index, Tables of the Patriarchs and Prophets, a Harmony of the Gospels, etc., increase the value of this volume, for which we wish, as it deserves, the widest circulation.

The Holy Bible. Translated and arranged, with Notes. By LEICESTER AMBROSE SAWYER. Vol. III. *The Hebrew Poets.* Boston: Walker, Wise & Co. 1862. Pp. 848. This volume contains the translation of the Psalms, Proverbs, Job, Canticles, Lamentations, and Ecclesiastes. The Notes extend from p. 289 to the end. With each new volume, this translation improves, though we think it would be still better, if made more conformed to our old and hallowed version. The author is evidently laboring with fidelity on his great task; and some of the results of his studies will doubtless be worked into the revision to which scholarship is tending. Job he views as an allegory; and he rejects the Solomonic authorship of Canticles and Ecclesiastes. The Psalms are divided into five books, each having its peculiar character. Some of the new divisions throw new light upon the text.

THEOLOGY.

Discourses and Essays. By WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD. Andover: W. F. Draper. 1862. Pp. 324. It is a good sign, that a new edition of these vigorous and thoughtful essays is demanded by the public. An Essay upon the Doctrine of the Atonement, taken from the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1859, is added to the previous series. Every page gives evidence of masculine and independent thinking. The strongest doctrines of the Calvinistic system are advocated on the basis of a highly speculative system of philosophy. The style is clear and trenchant, and the method of discussion is uniformly progressive. Incidental allusions betray a wide range of reading; felicitous comparisons and analogies reveal a cultivated taste. But sharp, strong thought is the main characteristic. Forms of doctrine that

many New England divines have rejected are advocated with an earnestness and comprehensiveness that show the insufficiency of the popular objections. A distinctive Christian realism, in marked contrast with the prevalent nominalism, pervades the discussions upon sin and the atonement. The volume gives convincing evidence that the attempt to resolve all sin into sins, and all atonement into a satisfaction of benevolence, is not accepted by some of the best thinkers of the day. The addresses on the Method of Theological study and on the Historic Spirit are worthy of being thoroughly weighed and studied by our students.

The Works of ORVILLE DEWEY, D.D. 3 vols. Boston: Walker, Wise & Co. 1862. Pp. 396, 388, 388. The first volume of this new edition of Dr. Dewey's works contains his discourses on Human Nature, Human Life, and the Nature of Religion; the second is on the Nature of Religion, and on Commerce and Business; the third is devoted to Controversial Theology and Practical Religion. The author belongs to the more conservative Unitarians, filling an honored place among the ablest and most eloquent expounders and defenders of their system. Most of these discussions were originally sermons or articles in reviews. Had the author produced them as full and rounded treatises, written with a definite plan, they would doubtless have exhibited still higher evidences of power. But as it is, next to the writings of Dr. Channing, they take the highest place in the Unitarian literature of this country. Dr. Dewey is a supernaturalist, and ably defends the Christian system, as a specific revelation, against the cavils of infidelity. His disquisitions on moral themes are elevated and felicitous. His religious susceptibilities are strong, and he often rises to a high order of eloquence in his descriptions and appeals. Against Trinitarianism and Calvinism he argues on grounds from which, of course, we dissent, and so represents our views as to make their refutation seem a comparatively easy task. We cannot here, of course, enter into this argument; though those who are engaged in the study and defence of orthodoxy ought to understand the objections of so skilful and, in the main, candid an opponent.

The Baptism, the Covenant, and the Family. By Rev. PHILIPPE WOLFF. Boston: Crosby & Nichols. 1862. Pp. 345. The author of this sharp criticism of the Baptists is a native of Geneva, and now a minister in Montreal. He wrote this work at first in French, with reference to the needs of Swiss and French Protestants, and has himself translated it into English. His acute logic and severe satire will doubtless provoke retorts; but many of his arguments are novel and ingenious, and from some of his positions we think it will be difficult for our Baptist brethren to escape.

The Testimony of Christ to Christianity. By PETER BAYNE, A.M. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1862. Pp. 200. The modern defence of Christianity is centring more and more in the person of Christ, where alone the vital question between Christianity and infidelity can be fully settled. This volume, slight in bulk and weighty in matter, belongs to the same general class with the works of Ullmann, Young, Dr. Alexander of Edinburgh, and Bushnell, and is worthy to be read with them. The argument, in substance, is this: if Christ can be believed, Christianity is true. It is a calm, mature and convincing disquisition, philosophical, and appealing as well to the deepest as to the most universal Christian experience.

The Catholic Doctrine of a Trinity. By Rev. WILLIAM JONES of Naylor. American Tract Society, New York. We welcome a reprint of this valuable argument, or rather, series of arguments, for the Trinity. It is clear and convincing, "expressed for the most part in the terms of the Holy Scripture, compared in a manner entirely new".

HISTORY OF THE CHURCH.

Lectures on the History of the Eastern Church. With an Introduction on the Study of Ecclesiastical History. By A. P. STANLEY, D.D. From the second London edition, revised. New York: Scribner. 8vo, pp. 551. \$2.50. At less than half of the price of the English edition, Mr. Scribner gives us a more beautiful copy from the Riverside press, in fine, tinted paper, and pays the author a copyright. The Regius Professor of Church History at Oxford infuses life into all he undertakes. The introductory Lectures are an animated vindication of the worth of ecclesiastical history, including an estimate of its province, character, and manifold relations. The bulk of the work is devoted to the Eastern and the Russian churches, one chapter giving a less thorough account of Mohammedanism. Dr. Stanley excels in vivid and picturesque narrative. All facts are referred to persons; and all personages are to him real men, living, talking, and acting. This gives the charm to his volume. He must be very dull or superficial who finds church history tedious, with such a guide. Not only clergymen and students of theology should read the work, but all who have an interest in the marvellous record of the progress of the kingdom of God in the midst of human history.

History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ. By Dr. J. A. DORNER. Vol. I. (Division First.) Translated by W. L. ALEXANDER, D.D. Edinburgh, 1861: Clark. New York: Scribner. The first part of the first division of Dorner's great work is here given in a faithful version by Dr. Alexander, the notes being translated by Mr. Simon. It comprises the general Introduction, giving the faint anticipations of the christological idea in heathenism and its fuller outlines in Judaism; yet contending that it is original and fundamental in the Christian system. A concise sketch of the Biblical evidence is then presented, and all the writings of the first epoch are fully explored, to A.D. 150. The second epoch is "the age of the completion of the Christian concept of God", A.D. 150-325. The views of Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, and Clement of Alexandria, are here unfolded. Though the translation is sometimes stiff, it is in the main accurate. Those who are only familiar with the range of discussion in the works of Bull, Priestley, Faber and Burton, will find in this work of Dorner a fund of new materials. Our students of theology should master the book.

The Princeton Semi-Centennial Jubilee. A Discourse to the Alumni, April 30, 1862. By WILLIAM B. SPRAGUE, D.D. With an Appendix. Albany, 1862. Pp. 72.—*Semi-Centennial Catalogue of the Theological Seminary, Princeton, N. J. 1812-1862.* Pp. 92. Princeton has had 2,422 students, of whom 485 are deceased. A Seminary that has numbered the three Alexanders, Miller, and Hodge among its professors, must needs be illustrious. It has accomplished a great and good work for our country and the world. The Discourse of Dr. Sprague is affluent in facts,

and felicitous in its structure and diction. The proceedings of the Jubilee were fitly crowned by the munificent donation of the Stuarts.

Report of the American Mission among the Mahrattas for 1861. Bombay, 1862. Pp. 64.

Historical Sketch of the Syria Mission. By Rev. THOS. LAURIE. Published by the A.B.C.F.M. 1862. Pp. 32. A careful and excellent account.

To What Purpose is this Waste? A Sermon for the Board of Foreign Missions. By Rev. J. M. KREBS, D.D. New York. 1862. Pp. 19. A forcible vindication of the economy of missions.

PRACTICAL RELIGIOUS LITERATURE.

Sermons. By JABEZ BUNTING, D.D. Vol. I. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1862. 8vo, pp. 472. With a Portrait of the Author. Dr. Bunting would have been a great man in any denomination, or in any profession. Practical sagacity, the art of governing well, facility and cogency in debate, force and eloquence in preaching, were among his eminent characteristics. In reading these able discourses we have been impressed anew with the masculine power and clearness of his intellect, as well as with his vivid appreciation of spiritual realities, and his power of impressive appeal.

Faith: treated in a Series of Discourses. JAMES W. ALEXANDER, D.D. New York: Scribner. 1862. Pp. 444. In these evangelical discourses, Faith is exhibited in its nature, object, relations and effects, with Dr. Alexander's wonted simplicity and earnestness. In such a treatise as he projected, other points would doubtless have been added and some incidental difficulties cleared up. But we are glad to have the sermons in their present form. In this connection we may also mention that some wealthy and benevolent friends of the Alexanders have given six volumes of their discourses to all the students in our Presbyterian and Congregational theological seminaries. This is a wise liberality.

The Way to Life. Sermons by THOMAS GUTHRIE, D.D. New York: Carters. 1862. Pp. 396. We frankly confess that we should have been more edified nine months ago, than we can now be, with these discourses of the vigorous and eloquent Pastor of St. John's Free Church, and present Moderator of the Free Church Assembly. He has lost no opportunity of holding up our country to reproach, thinking, doubtless, that he was thus doing God service. His *Way of Life* is a series of sermons, profusely illustrated by descriptive scenes, better fitted to awaken emotion when delivered than to stand the test of criticism when read.

The "I Wills" of Christ. By Rev. PHILIP B. POWER, of Christ Church, Worthing. New York: Carters. 1862. Pp. 395. The passage of Scripture in which our Lord uses the words "I will" are here collected, and made the themes of earnest meditation and exhortation. The work is written in an attractive style, abounds in biographical illustrations of truth, and has a high practical and religious value.

The Parable of the Ten Virgins: in Six Discourses. And a Sermon on the Judgeship of the Saints. By JOSEPH A. SEISS, D.D. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1862. Pp. 189. Dr. Seiss interprets this parable as a symbol of the church and its bridegroom. The Ten Virgins are the Church, the foolish virgins are church-members, in the stupor of sin, and not finally lost. The coming of the Bridegroom is the Second Advent. Those that do not agree with the theory of this exposition may yet be led to a profitable examination of this important passage, and to more devout and earnest preparation for the coming of the Lord. The author has evidently studied the subject with much care, and presents the results with clearness and ability.

The Life of Arthur Vandeleur, Major, Royal Artillery. New York: Carters. 1862. Pp. 303. Religion in the army, and the lives of brave and Christian soldiers, always interesting, are now doubly important to us. Such books as the *Memoirs of Havelock*, and this life, by the same author, should be scattered among our troops. They cannot fail to do great good.

Twenty-four Pocket Tracts for Soldiers. Published by the American Tract Society. New York. The first of these tracts, on "Civil Government," is excellent. The whole volume is a good book for distribution.

Louise Juliane, Electress Palatine, and her Times. By FANNY ELIZABETH BUNNETT. New York: Carters. 1862. Pp. 263. The virtues of the Electress Palatine, daughter of William of Orange, were commemorated by Spanheim (1645); and her memory is revived in this most interesting volume, which exhibits the fruits of much research. Traversing some of the ground occupied by Mr. Motley, it is still the fruit of independent investigation, and has a historical as well as religious value.

Christ's Work of Reform: A Bible View. By a Layman. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1862. Pp. 208. We thoroughly like the principles of this volume. It goes to the root of the matter of reform. Making every thing centre in union with Christ, it gives the safe basis for all reformatory movements. It does not divorce, as too many schemes have done, natural ethics and the dictates of benevolence from the distinctive truths of the Christian system.

The Christian Sabbath: Its History, Authority, Duties, Benefits, and Civil Relations. By N. L. RICE, D.D., WILLIAM HAGUE, D.D., REV. HARVEY D. GANSE, WILLIAM ADAMS, D.D., and ALEXANDER H. VINTON, D.D. With a Sketch of the Sabbath Reform, by the Secretary of the New York Sabbath Committee. New York: Carter and Brothers. 12mo, pp. 271. No series of discourses on the Sabbath has been better planned or executed. Free from extreme views, they enforce the necessity and benefits of the Sabbath in a wise and eloquent manner. The introductory Sketch of the Reform, by the Secretary, Rev. R. S. Cook, shows how much good can be done by quiet and earnest efforts—in *spe et silentio*, to quote Bunsen's motto. The Sabbath Committee have also collected the twenty Documents and four Occasional Papers, which they have published, in one volume, under the title, *The First Five Years of the Sabbath Reform*.

POLITICS AND HISTORY.

Considerations on Representative Government. By JOHN STUART MILL. New York: Harpers. 1862. Pp. 365. Of all modern radicals Mr. Mill is the most thoughtful; of all the advocates of Positive Science, he is the most purely intellectual. His words would always command a deep interest; now they come to us with more power and interest, because he has spoken so nobly and manfully in our behalf. Mr. Mill holds that, where the people are educated, representative government is the only normal form. Women should have a voice in elections. Voting should be public and not private (by ballot). The great unsolved problem of representative government, is the representation of minorities, which Mr. Mill forcibly advocates as essential to the full realization of the representative idea. The practical difficulties of any such scheme are probably insuperable. The argument would run out into an infinite series. If minorities of the people, in a district, must be represented, then in a legislative body, they should equally have some right and control over legislation. And if one minority must have a voice, then another, and so on. But the whole subject is worthy of profound study. All thoughtful republicans need to study this volume, which traverses most of the topics and problems, that are of vital interest to our government, as distinguished from an aristocracy or monarchy. The combination of the federalism of States with popular representation, gives us advantages well worthy of study, and which Mr. Mill has weighed in some, though not in all their bearings. It is the great safeguard of our national system; the real guarantee of our political success and national expansion.

A Discourse on the Life, Character and Policy of Count Cavour. By VINCENZO BOTTA, Ph.D. New York: G. P. Putnam. 1862. 8vo, pp. 108. This admirable and comprehensive discourse, delivered before the New York Historical Society by Professor Botta, contains not only one of the best accounts of Cavour's career by a personal friend, but also a philosophic estimate of the whole Italian movement, by one who thoroughly understands it and himself had a part, as a member of the Sardinian Parliament, in its initiatory stages. The author's command of the English language is remarkable for a foreigner. The closing invocation to Dante is conceived in the finest vein of truthful eloquence: "Bend down, O immortal genius of Italy, bend down from thy paradise, where 'in the light supreme thou livest'; receive into thy bosom the spirit of the great Italian whom we mourn; who has wrought thy divine poem into thy nation's history; who has accomplished the work to which thou didst give thy life."

The Enormity of the Slave-Trade; and the Duty of Seeking the Moral and Spiritual Elevation of the Colored Race. Speeches of Wilberforce, and other Documents and Records. American Tract Society, New York. Besides the documents bearing on the English suppression of the slave-trade, this little volume also contains the action of the General Assembly in 1818; the Plan of the Synod of Kentucky, 1836; and Dr. Young's able discourse on the Duties of Masters. We welcome the work as evidence that the American Tract Society is taking the true national ground.

The Pulpit: its Relations to our National Crisis. A Sermon by N. L. RICE, D.D. New York: Scribner. Pp. 71. Dr. Rice is no advocate of the divine right of slavery, but is strongly opposed to abolitionists. He

does not approve of secession; and supports the government from a sense of duty. "Patriotism", he says, "is not, as many seem to imagine, a Christian virtue". "Have you ever observed that there is in the Bible no command to love one's country?" Why not? "Because patriotism is *natural*, just as it is natural for members of the same family to love one another." Consequently—the love of members of the family to one another is not a Christian virtue? Will that hold? Cannot a "natural" virtue also be a Christian virtue?

Sketches of the Rise, Progress, and Decline of Secession; with a Narrative of Personal Adventures among the Rebels. By W. G. BROWNLOW, Editor of the *Knoxville Whig*. Philadelphia: Geo. W. Childs. 1862. Pp. 458. Parson Brownlow is no abolitionist, but he is a very determined opponent of rebellion, and his patriotism has been tried by persecution and suffering. None who have heard his impassioned addresses will ever forget his burning denunciation of rebel barbarities and crimes. The iron has entered into his soul. He does not preach non-resistance against assassins. No narrative shows more clearly that this war, in one of its most practical aspects, is a conflict between anarchy and law, between barbarism and civilisation. It will be widely read, and it ought to be. We do not notice it to commend it to general circulation, for sixty thousand copies have been already ordered of the publishers, but to express our profound sympathy with the moral heroism and unflinching courage of a true patriot, who deserves well of his country. Subscribe for the *Knoxville Whig*.

The Future of Africa; being Addresses, Sermons, etc., delivered in the Republic of Liberia. By Rev. ALEX. CRUMMEL, B.A., Queen's College, Cambridge. Second edition. New York: Scribner. 1862. Pp. 372. This is a volume of remarkable interest, as indicating the capacity of the negro race. The various Addresses show a good range of thought and power of fitting expression. If Liberia in her infancy can appreciate such counsels, her future destiny may well exceed the hopes of her most sanguine friends. The orations on the Progress of Civilisation along the West Coast of Africa, on the Duty of Free Colored Men in America to Africa, and on Hope for Africa, are better than many a Southern member of Congress ever delivered or could deliver.

L'Amérique devant l'Europe. Principes et Intérêts. Par le Cte. AGÉNOR DE GASPARIN. Paris: Michel Lévy, Frères, etc. 1862. 8vo, pp. 556. De Gasparin evidently was much pleased with the success of his first book on American affairs. He takes great satisfaction in reflecting that he spoke in our behalf in a dark and threatening hour. He is right in this; being fairly entitled to the honor and reward of having advocated a good cause, without regard to its immediate or prospective success. The present volume is more able and valuable than its predecessor. It shows signs of greater research. The author proves that he has made himself thoroughly acquainted with our Constitution and history. He has collated the facts pertaining to the Rebellion with singular accuracy. His volume forms a fitting pendant to that of De Tocqueville; both showing not only how well Frenchmen can analyse and describe our institutions; but how profound is the interest felt by thinking men in Europe, in American ideas, as reacting upon the Old World.—From his point of view, our Swiss friend cautions us against being deceived by the belief that we have escaped all probability of complication with European politics. He bids us understand that there are multitudes in Europe—he refers especially

to England—who, at heart, wish the dismemberment of the United States; and on this account encourage the South to prolong the war. He assures us that if decisive successes are delayed much longer,—his introduction is dated 4th March,—if foreign manufactures are still further embarrassed, and if the Mexican Expedition should become ensnared, then the danger of foreign intervention will be more serious than ever. If the theory be true that the real reason of Anglican indifference and “neutrality” as to our struggle, is a jealousy of our growing power, then the nearer we approach to success in defeating all rebellion and schism, the less of congratulation we shall receive.—The chief value of this book is its manly defence of *great principles*. It was written when as yet the issue of the war was uncertain. The opinions of the author do not depend upon successes. His inquiry is, “What is *right*?” believing that, in due time, this will triumph. *Faith in principles* is the one thought which pervades the whole work. Policy and principles, though not starting *from* the same point, in the judgment of our author, invariably tend *to* the same result. Success may be delayed; principles live, and they should be loved and admired, with constancy, for their own sake. Adopting this rule of judgment, Gasparin soon reaches the heart of our affairs. He sees the United States, contending for national existence, for law and order and constitutional government, in opposition to disloyalty and rebellion in the interest of slavery. This, as we know, is the true statement of the case. Because it is true, the conduct of England towards America is pronounced strange, inconsistent, and reprehensible. It should be observed that in passing judgment upon the attitude of the British people, this accomplished Frenchman himself furnishes the evidence that he is actuated by no narrow-minded antipathies of race [*mesquines jalousies*],—for he is an avowed Protestant, an ardent lover of liberty, civil and religious, and a generous admirer of all which England has done in behalf of personal rights and good government. It is because England is pledged, by all her acts and annals, before the world, to sympathise with all which *pertains* to well-regulated liberty, that she is here arraigned for an unconcealed preference for that party in our strife which represents anarchy and slavery. For a long time our author sought to account for the existence of this sentiment on the ground of misinformation or ignorance of the true status of the question. Compelled to abandon this charitable opinion, he declares it to be one of the “scandals of our age, that the cause of right has not roused these men of right; that the cause of liberty has not roused these men of liberty”. It would seem to him, that in such an affair, involving self-government, good and honest laws, personal and national liberty, in conflict with lawlessness, barbarism, and slavery, the sympathies of all Britain ought not to be left to doubtful inferences, but should have been expressed as with “the sound of many waters”. The recent speech of Lord Brougham furnishes evidence coincident with that contained in this volume, that the real cause of the satisfaction felt by the British aristocracy in our national troubles is the opportunity which it presents for checking the growth of American notions concerning general suffrage and free institutions, as advocated by Mr. Bright and his well-hated party. We can bide our time. If our position and principles and *role* are not understood and appreciated abroad, let us not be too sensitive to the judgment of others; but do our own work, calmly and steadily, turning not to the right or the left, appealing to God and posterity.

A simple reference to some of the topics treated in this volume will show the extent and thoroughness of the discussion. — The attitude of Europe in

the light of conscience. What ought to have been the conduct of Europe. How its conduct is to be explained. Division of sentiment in England. The true motives of Anglican conduct. The Trent, and the Blockade. The prevalent errors (*erreurs accreditées*) in Europe; such as these: *a.* 'The war has no reference to slavery; *b.* Civil war, above all things, ought to be discountenanced; *c.* The South had a right to secede; *d.* The South, even if it be subjugated, will never be brought back to the Union; *e.* The South never will be conquered.' The true interests of Europe in America. The old political colonies:—Spain, St. Domingo, Mexico. An appeal to Christians in America and in Europe; the former are exhorted to be faithful to the interests involved in this crisis. Free institutions throughout the world; the abolition of slavery, and the grandeur of the future. Thanking the author of this able, philosophical, eloquent and Christian book, for his services, we are more than ever impressed with the obligation imposed by Providence upon good men and thinking men on both sides of the Atlantic, to interpret to each other the sentiments and actions of their respective countries. We are glad to announce that an English translation of this volume will be issued immediately in this city from the press of Mr. Scribner.

W. A.

BOOKS OF TRAVEL.

The City of the Saints, and across the Rocky Mountains to California. By RICHARD F. BURTON. With Illustrations. New York: Harpers. 1862. 8vo, pp. 574. Captain Burton has made an entertaining book out of extraordinary materials. This phenomenon of Mormonism, in a religious point of view, is the marvel and scandal of this century and of this country. There is a science of physical monstrosities; there is also a philosophy of moral deductions. Mr. Burton has not exactly hit it, and some of his deductions are unpardonable scandals about religious things and men. He evidently views religion as merely a curious phenomenon, to be studied for the fun of it by such a cosmopolitan as himself, who once we believe professed Mohammedanism, and was evidently fascinated with some of the vagaries of Mormonism. He inclines to the theory that it must, legitimately, run out into pure materialism, after Orson Pratt's mode of theorising; and this materialism, too, he believes, is the tendency of modern thought and society. Mr. Buckle is his oracle. The style of the narrative is off-hand and slipshod. Many points in the history and state of Mormonism are presented more at length than in any other work on the subject. It should be read by all who are interested in the aberrations of mankind. Its minute descriptions make it useful as a guide-book. Of course, it is well got up by the Harpers.

North America. By ANTHONY TROLLOPE. New York: Harpers. 1862. Pp. 623. 60 cents. Mr. Trollope has succeeded in writing a frank, interesting and cordial book upon what is now a very difficult country to write about or understand. In an easy style he talks about every body and every thing. His opinions are made up from his impressions; and his impressions are such as a candid, good-natured, quick-sighted man would be likely to get in rapid travelling, quick talking, newspaper reading and hotel life. There are many errors in details; but the tone of the book is much more favorable to the United States than that of most of the recent

English criticisms. His good-natured satire at our faults and follies will not be resented even by the most "thin-skinned"; for the critic has a generous and manly soul.

Harper's Hand-Book for Travellers in Europe and the East, by W. P. FETRIDGE (12mo, pp. 480), is well arranged, concise and useful, giving plans of tours, expenses, accounts of towns, hotels and objects of interest, and is accompanied by a map embracing colored routes of travel, with all needful directions. It is just the book for a traveller to take along with him.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

Lectures on the Science of Language. By MAX MÜLLER. From the second London edition, revised. New York: Scribner. 1862. Pp. 416. \$1.50. Another Riverside volume, in the best style, at one third of the cost of the English editions. The author was born in Dessau, 1823, but has resided at Oxford since 1848. He translated the *Hitopadesa* in 1844; edited the *Rig-veda* and other works; published on the *Languages at the Seat of War in the East*, 1855, and a *History of Sanskrit Literature*, 1858, of deserved repute. This new work was a series of lectures before the Royal Institution of Great Britain, and examines, in a thorough yet popular way, the science of language, in its principles, methods and history. Altogether, it is the best work of the kind, and must be had and studied by all literary men. The science of language is considered (Lect. I) as one of the physical (?) sciences; the growth, in distinction from the history of language, is next described (Lect. II); the empirical stage of the science (Lect. III), its classificatory stage (Lect. IV), and the genealogical classification (Lect. V) are reviewed at length. Comparative Grammar is discussed in Lect. VI, one of the very best. Lect. VII is on the constituent elements of language; Lect. VIII on the morphological classification; Lect. IX on the theoretical stage, including the origin of language. An Appendix treats genealogical tables of languages. The Index is valuable. Such a book, by a reverent Christian scholar, supplies a desideratum in our literature.

• The *Literary and Theological Intelligence* is necessarily deferred. The following books have also been received, and will be noticed more fully in the next number:

From TICKNOR & FIELDS:

Religio Medici. By Sir Thomas Browne. Pp. 440.

Leisure Hours in Town. Pp. 487.

The Beauties of De Quincey. Pp. 432.

Memoirs of De Tocqueville. 2 vols.

From GOULD & LINCOLN:

Annual of Scientific Discovery. 1862.

Health. By Dr. Mussey. Pp. 368.

From HARPER & BROTHERS:

The Last of the Mortimers.

The Struggles of Brown, Jones, and Robinson.

The Children's Picture-Book.

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ART. I.—THE COUNCIL OF TRENT.

By ROSSEUW SAINT-HILAIRE, Professor at the Sorbonne.*

THE Council of Trent is a great date in the history of Catholicism; it is that of the decisive victory of the papacy over the church. Humbled successively by all the kings of Europe, from Philippe le Bel to Charles V, Rome avenged herself by subjecting consciences to the yoke which kings were unwilling to wear. All independence of thought, all individuality in faith is henceforth banished. The dogma is closed, the symbol is fixed forever. The faithful and even the clergy have now only to believe and to obey.

This Council is naturally divided into three parts, unequal in length as in importance. The first,† extending from the thirteenth of December, 1545, to the eleventh of March, 1547, is the decisive epoch of the formation of the Catholic dogma. Until then wavering and indefinite, it became fixed and com-

* Translated from the *Revue Chrétienne*.

† See the author's *Histoire d'Espagne*, vii, 416.

pact under the pressure of the threatening Protestantism ; it peremptorily banished from its bosom all the latent germs of opposition and reform which had revealed themselves in the Councils of Basle and Constance. *Justification by faith* in the hands of Luther had sufficed to make a breach in the whole edifice of Catholicism.* The Romish church did not dare reject this vital dogma ; but it annulled it by associating works of grace and human merits with those of Jesus Christ. Thenceforth the schism was complete. By making man, in any degree whatever, the author of his own salvation, the Roman Church parted company forever with the pure evangelical doctrine, and with the Reformation, which goes to the fountain-head in the word of God.

Yielding to the entreaties of Roman Catholic princes, the Council touched, for form's sake merely, upon some points of disciplinary reform ; but taken as a whole, the first period was essentially dogmatic. Tradition was made equal to the Holy Scripture, and its authority placed on the same footing. The Romish church and the pope, its impersonation, were pronounced infallible ; the *seven* sacraments were recognised and declared divine, in spite of the Gospel, which mentions but *two*, baptism and the Lord's supper. The sacraments were declared to bestow divine grace after it had been lost, and baptism was said to wash us *completely* from original sin. The *Vulgate*, swarming as it does with errors, proved such in the Council itself, was accepted, with all the apocryphal books, which the Jews had never acknowledged, as the only authorized translation of the Bible,—dangerous reading, which must be left to the learned and to experts, that is, to the priests, who alone can extract the remedy from the poison, and cure with that which kills. An impassable abyss thus forever separated Catholicism from all Protestant communions. The premises were laid down, with an incontestable vigor of logic, in this first period of the Council. The germs of all its future decrees were contained in it, and

* This has been victoriously demonstrated by M. Chs. de Remusat in his admirable article on Merle d'Aubigné's *History of the Reformation*, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15th June, 1854.

the two succeeding periods had only to deduce the consequences.

The second period began under Julius III, May 1st, 1551. During the interval the Council slept, but the papacy was vigilant. For some time two councils, purely nominal, existed at once: some Italian bishops sat at Bologna under the papal banner; some Spanish and German bishops at Trent under that of the Emperor. But the obstinate hatred of Paul III (Farnese) to Charles V was an obstacle to any serious renewal of the debates of the assembly. Julius III (del Monte) at length took the place of Paul upon the throne of St. Peter, and there showed himself as devoted to the Emperor as his predecessor had been hostile to him. Charles V, disappointed in the hope of himself giving religious unity to Germany, fell back upon the Council; he summoned the Pope to reopen it, and thus pay the price of the bargain by which he had been elected. Julius III was obliged to comply; he reluctantly convoked, for the first of May, that council which Rome had little reason thus to fear.

Only fifteen bishops were at Trent at the opening of the session. They adjourned to the first of September, to give the tardy ones time to assemble. It reopened in fact at that date. The imperial envoy set forth only assurances of submission. France, on the contrary, through the mouth of the learned Amyot, protested against locating the assembly at Trent, which was at once too German and too Italian a city. Amyot, who was *in petto* a Protestant, wanting only courage to become so in fact, declared with a cold and polished firmness "that the king his master could not send his bishops to a city, the access to which was neither free nor safe; that he could not look upon the actual assembly as a general council, but only as a private council from which he was excluded, and whose decrees neither he nor his prelates nor his subjects could obey". At the same time Henry II ordered the prelates of his kingdom to prepare themselves for a Gallic council, that old bugbear of the holy see, and forbade his subjects to send any sum of money from France to Rome, under any pretext whatever.

This language, still more these acts, boded ill for Rome. The session opened under bad auspices for the papacy. The Emperor, alarmed, strove to arrest the blow aimed at his cherished council, by recruiting it from the German and Spanish bishops, to the great dread of the Pope, who was afraid of being outnumbered. But the end of Charles was not attained; his dream of fusion still beset him. He tried to force the Lutherans to repair to Trent; but the doctors of the Reformation, who remembered John Huss, demanded a triple safe-conduct from the Emperor, the Pope, and the Council. The Pope, who dared not refuse them outright, but who had little desire to see Protestants at Trent, wrote to the Emperor that he "did not wish to have to fight with a shut-up cat". The Emperor insisted, and the Council ended the matter by giving a safe-conduct, in such equivocal terms, that the Lutherans found in it what they desired, a pretext for not going.

In the midst all these intrigues, the little knot of bishops réassembled at Trent gradually increased. Three electors, those of Mayence, Cologne, and Trèves, had come by order of Charles V. Awaiting the much-promised reform, they peaceably discussed transubstantiation and communion of the two kinds. The presiding legate, the Cardinal of Saint-Marcel, reigned alone in the assembly, and by him the Pope held the thread which moved everything. The following citations of the envoys of the Emperor will edify those who may perhaps still question them. Don Francisco of Toledo was the first who pressed the legate to enter upon the chapter of reforms. Then the legate confided to him, under the seal of secrecy, a letter in which the Emperor promised "that the Reformation should not be discussed except so far as his holiness thought good: his majesty would arrange that the bishops should agree to everything that he wished" (Vargas, *Lettres et Mémoires*, p. 63). But let us hear Vargas himself, that veteran of imperial diplomacy, who was engaged in all the battles of the first session: this is what he wrote on the twelfth of October: "The legate is absolutely master of the assembly. He even prevents certain matters from being

passed, although the Pope would be very willing to grant them" (p. 117). "The legates", writes the Spanish Bishop of Orense, "show no zeal for the reform of the clergy. They declare without ceremony, that we ought to be contented with what they are willing to grant us, without opening our mouth to ask for anything more" (p. 158). Vargas writes further on the twelfth of November: "The legate goes his own way continually. He consumes the time by making the theologians dispute about dogmas. Then, at the last moment, with an impressive air, he proposes some vain semblance of reformation. There is no time either to read or to understand. All this serves only to embroil matters, and to give food to raillery. Remonstrances are useless here. I believe that they are not less so at Rome. They are blind. *They think only of the interests of the flesh and the world.* The council can do nothing of itself. It has neither authority nor liberty. The legate holds everything in his own hands; after such things one should be astonished at nothing" (p. 188-191). The holy mother, the Romish church, is here painted by the hand of her children, and the portrait is not too flattering.

We will not analyse those theological debates which the leaders of the assembly gave over as food to the pious souls who regarded the Council as in earnest. In the discussion concerning the cup, Rome was inflexible; she held to maintaining the barrier which it raised between the mass of believers and the priest, the privileged guest at that mystic feast, who enjoyed a more intimate communion with his God. It imported little to the legate and to the majority who obeyed him, that the communion in the two kinds had reigned during centuries in the eastern as well as in the western church. Little imported the Gospel itself, and the institution of the holy supper by Jesus Christ. They unhesitatingly voted transubstantiation and communion in one kind, although both had been ignored by the church up to the twelfth century, even by the confession of the Council of Constance.

While discussing dogmas, it was needful to seem to be œ-

cupied with reforms. The Emperor, desirous of drawing Protestants to the Council, constantly insisted upon the concession of the cup, so often promised and so often evaded. At his entreaties, the Lutheran princes of Wurtemberg, of Brandenburg, and of Saxony sent their deputies to Trent, to the great joy of Charles, who saw already realized his dream of Germanic unity. The envoys of Saxony and of Wurtemberg distinguished themselves by the vigor of their expostulations. "It is not just", they said, "that the Pope and his bishops should be judges in a case where they are parties, whether as accusers or accused. The bishops who sit in the assembly ought at least to be absolved from all oaths in regard to the Pope. Have not the Councils of Basle and of Constance declared, that in cases of faith, even such as touch upon the rights of the pontiff, *the pope is subject to the Council* ? Thus it clearly resulted from the debates of these two assemblies, that the bishops are, *in fact*, freed from their oaths to the Pope, even if he should not remit them." More than one bishop, Italian even, who had been silenced by the artful manœuvres of the legates, applauded heartily the boldness of this language. "They have said aloud", wrote the Bishop of Orense, "all which we did not dare to say for ourselves . . . ; but there is good care taken that the people shall not hear it" (Vargas, *Lettres*, p. 468).

The nineteenth of March had come, and the reforms had made no advances. However, it was necessary to have at least the appearance of doing something. The first question brought up was the episcopal jurisdiction ; upon this delicate point a deaf spirit of opposition reigned on the bishops' benches. Even among the most submissive, there was not one who did not wish to put a limit to the encroachments of the holy see upon the rights of the episcopate. But as this question, so weighty in itself, touched upon another still more weighty, ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which must be maintained at any cost ; as the pope alone was able to defend this jurisdiction from the attempts of temporal princes jealous of recovering their rights ; as, in fine, the papacy was the summit of the vast judiciary edifice, that bold challenge thrust at

secular justice, it was necessary to be careful in touching the key-stone of the arch lest the whole building should crumble. The universal interest of the Church silenced all private interests. In order that the Pope should remain arbiter of the crowns of the earth, he must be arbiter of the bishops. *Appeal to the Court of Rome in cases of abuse* was therefore maintained by the very bishops who, taken separately, would have wished only to abolish it. The grave question at the root of all the others, "Is the episcopal power by divine right, or does it emanate from the Pope?" was implicitly decided in the papal sense.

To this weighty decision were joined certain disciplinary measures; from the most flagrant abuses particular ones were selected and corrected. In order to learn accurately the range of these reforms, we must interrogate, not the decrees, too often contrived to say nothing, but the fathers of the Council, whose mouths were not yet closed by the papal discipline. "As to the disciplinary decrees", wrote the Bishop of Astorga to Granvella, "they are not what are needed to put a stop to scandals. We do here not what we wish, but what we are permitted to do". "Beautiful reformation!" cried the Bishop of Verdun, one of the few representatives of France at Trent; and the legate's only reply was to call him "impertinent, and a hot-headed youth".

While the *reformers* were laboring so hard to accomplish nothing, the *theologians* worked more expeditiously. In matters of doctrine they proceeded with a rapidity little edifying. Penance and extreme unction had been brought in at the threshold of the course, and proclaimed sacraments of the Church. They pretended to wait for the Lutherans, who did not come, and were not coming, before touching seriously upon matters of reform; but they hastened to decide without them what were in fact the most controverted doctrinal questions. To give them time to arrive, the Council had adjourned to the first of May. Suddenly resounded like a thunderbolt the tidings—strange, incredible, yet too true—that Maurice of Saxony, the right arm of the Emperor, the Lutheran champion of Catholic Germany, had entered Augs-

burg. He summoned Germany to a revolt against the Pope and against the Emperor in taking for his device: Political liberty and liberty of conscience. Soon it was known that he was at Innsbruck, some days distant from Trent, and that the *invincible* Charles V had to flee before him. The plague had suddenly closed the first session of the Council; the pest of heresy, worse still and more dangerous, cut short the second. The bishops, the legates, the nuncios demanded of Rome the suspension of the Council, and the Pope made haste to grant it. On the twenty-eighth of April, 1552, the Council was dissolved, in fact, before it was so in form, held its last session, and adjourned for two years, "or longer if it was necessary". But instead of two years, the Council waited ten.

Maurice, the most mortal enemy of Catholicism, had rendered a signal service to the holy see; he had delivered it, and for a long time, from the menace or the embarrassment of a council. The Emperor, overwhelmed by this unexpected blow, forced to renounce at once his two most cherished plans, Catholic unity, and the succession of the empire in his family, had now many other thoughts in his head. Until the death of Julius III in 1555, there was to be no more question about a council. The successor of Julius, the pious and candid Marcellus II, announced, it is true, his intention to reöpen it; but his reign of twenty days gave to the Catholic world nothing but hopes, which death did not permit him to realize. Paul IV (Caraffa), elected on the twenty-third of May, brought to the throne only two ideas, or rather, two passions; in politics, hatred of Spaniards, in religion, hatred of heresy. He desired, however, the reformation of the Church, but he wished it done by himself alone. "What need have I of councils", he often repeated, "since I am above them all? Is it not ridiculous to send to deliberate among the mountains threescore of bishops, among the least learned, and fourscore of doctors, among the least enlightened, as has already been twice done? Does any one think that such people are more fit to reform the world than the vicar of Jesus Christ, assisted by his cardinals, the *élite* and the pillars

of Christendom?" At one time, Paul IV dreamed of opposing to the two Tridentine councils, which in his eyes were invalid, a council held in Rome itself, at St. John of the Lateran; but he was obliged to renounce the idea, as none of the Catholic princes of Europe was willing to accede to it.

From a pontiff, the personal enemy of Charles V, and who was soon to combat in Rome the general of Philip II, there was not much to be hoped in the matter of councils. If he had convoked one, it would have been a tribunal charged with the trial of the Emperor and the kings, all in his eyes suspected of heresy and revolt. Among the Catholic princes had not the Emperor Ferdinand and the Duke of Bavaria authorized in half of Germany the use of the Lutheran service, and permitted even to their own subjects the communion in two kinds? It was worse than a heresy; it was an usurpation which a pope like Paul IV was unable to pardon. It was necessary, therefore, to wait till his death, in August, 1559, that is, four years and a half, before the question of a council could again be broached.

After three months of stormy debate in the conclave, Pius IV (de Médicis) was at length elected. The papacy found in him a champion of its most extreme pretensions, as decided as Paul IV. Paul, previous to his election, was obliged to swear to the cardinals that before two years he would convoke a council: we have seen how he kept his promise. The same engagement was required of Pius IV, who proved more faithful to it. Rome, revolting against the memory of Paul IV, convoked the council as a desperate remedy for the evils of the last pontificate. The Emperor and the King of Spain instantly protested; France, though almost renouncing all hope of obtaining it, spoke more than ever of a Gallican council; Rome did what she has always done in an emergency, she yielded or seemed to yield. France and the Emperor demanded a new council independent of the old, proposing as its seat Constance, Cologne, or Trèves, between Germany and France and distant from Italy; but the Pope was inflexible: "I should regard myself", said he, "as a traitor to God and the Church, if I should suffer a single one of the points of

faith which have been decided to be again discussed. I am ready to lose my blood and my life rather than consent to it".

At length, in 1560, appeared the bull of convocation. It fixed definitely the seat of the Council at Trent, and its opening at Easter, 1561. It did not pronounce the word *continuation*, of evil sound in the ears of princes, but avoiding the difficulty, it connected the new Council with the old by declaring "all suspension removed". Pius IV, thanks to this middle term, had thought to conciliate both parties, but succeeded only in making everybody dissatisfied. France, after having found fault with the bull, ended by resigning herself to it, and promised to send her prelates to the Council. But at the same moment, Catherine de Médicis, accustomed to beat about between the two parties, reopened the prisons, suspended all processes against the Huguenots, and reclaimed from the Pope communion in the two kinds. Finally she convoked, in August, 1561, the Colloquy of Poissy, that last and vain attempt to bring together two churches doomed never to come to an agreement! The Pope and the King of Spain were highly indignant at these concessions made to heresy, which, however, did not prevent Pius IV from sending deputies to the Protestant princes, to invite them to take part in the Council.

The day having arrived, the Cardinal of Mantua, president, presented himself with another legate and nine bishops, all Italians. It was impossible to inaugurate the session with so ridiculous a number. At length, after eight months of patience and of intrigues, the Council was opened, January 18th, 1562. One hundred and ten bishops were present, the majority being Italians; but no ambassadors and few or no prelates from Germany or France, to the great displeasure of the legates, who at the same time feared and desired their presence. France, in fact, was eager to carry to Trent her Gallican doctrines, so dreaded by the court of Rome. The Emperor insisted on the cup and the marriage of priests. Spain, more orthodox, was only more exacting; she spoke only of diminishing the power of the holy see, and especially of tak-

ing from the Pope the right of derogating from the decrees of the Council.

By a strange coincidence, on the seventeenth of January, the day before the opening, the famous assembly of St. Germain was held in France. The Chancellor de l'Hôpital, sustained by the queen regent, whose policy inclined for the moment to the side of the Huguenots, demanded for them a relaxation of the rigors of the law. In fine, notwithstanding the clamors of the Catholic party, the *Edict of January* granted to the Reform, with many restrictions it is true, the exercise of their own worship.

The bishops who were present, without waiting for the dilatory, boldly entered upon their work. But at the very outset a clause, dexterously inserted in the decree for the opening, came near to spoiling everything. Ten years before, Rome was satisfied with the formula, *præsentibus legatis*; there was now added *proponentibus*, an important modification, as it implied the exclusive right of the legates to propose to the Assembly the questions for discussion. Four Spanish prelates alone dared to protest, but notwithstanding this, the Council went on, and from the first, the authority of the holy see sat upon a firm foundation in this incomplete assembly, where opponents were wanting.

The legates wanted courage to declare that the new Council was but a continuation of the old, but they used every effort to attach its decisions to those of the two previous sessions. In vain did Germany and France protest—the decree was passed; they still went on, supported by Spain, which demanded a pure and simple *continuation*. But the ground was slippery, and the legates trod it slowly and circuitously. Demands for reform rained from all quarters; the ambassadors, supported by their masters, spoke louder than the bishops, and knew better how to make themselves heard. The grand-child of Isabella the *Catholic*, Ferdinand, with the consent of France, demanded “the complete reform of the abuses of the Court of Rome, of the conclave, of the papal election, and of the irregularities of the clergy, the abolition of dispensations, of the plurality of benefices, and of simony.

He demanded the residence of the bishops, the most edifying forms of worship, and finally the instruction of the people by preaching and schools". A Protestant prince could not have exacted more, and the imputation from a Catholic mouth had only the more weight. Thus did Protestantism, excluded from this Council, which haggled at its safe-conduct, react upon it from without. The Emperor and the King of France became its mandatories before the Assembly. In fine, Catholicism itself was forced to compress its dogmas and temper its discipline under the vigilant control of orthodox princes, inspired unconsciously by the breath of the Reformation.

Demands so pressing, so often repeated, and coming from so many different points, could not easily be set aside. Rome herself and her legates hesitated a moment, as may be proved by the *Ecclesiastical Annals* of Rainaldi (ad ann. 1562), where we read these astonishing words: "It may perhaps be permitted, in some places, to mingle with the Latin hymns, songs, in the vulgar tongue, faithfully translated. Ought not the Council to relax a little from the rigor of positive law, and yield to the desires of foreign nations, for example, in regard to communion in the two kinds, and in regard to fastings?" Rome was shaken, and, for the first time, began to doubt about herself. If all the Catholic princes had been able to agree, if they had said plainly what they wished and what they did not wish; if the bishops, relying upon the feeling of their independence, had made head against the legates, like the Spaniards, who, although enemies to all dogmatic reform, were the advocates of disciplinary reform, the holy see would have done what it has always done in like cases—it would have yielded. The Council, given over to itself and to the breath of primitive Christianity, which would have passed over it, would have been drawn along further than it thought, further even than the kings desired.

But the miserable tergiversations of Catherine and of France, the incurable lack of logic and of courage which lies at the basis of Gallicanism, a kind of abortive Protestantism, which, with the most loyal intentions in the world, has always stopped short on the way, lost everything, and made

shipwreck of everything. The French ambassadors were at first united with those of the empire in demanding the cup, the abolition of the worship of images, the mass in the vulgar tongue, and the marriage of priests. But for some time past, the position of France had been altered at Trent. The French prelates, after eighteen months' absence, which nothing could justify, came by degrees to the Council. They daily expected their chief, the too famous Cardinal of Lorraine, who, under one pretext or another, put off his coming from day to day. Expectation and anxiety in regard to the attitude which he would take, were as great at Rome as at Trent. All parties claimed in advance this important accession. As prince of the Church, the holy see thought it might count upon him ; but as prince of France, notwithstanding his notorious orthodoxy, he had to preserve caution, even with the Protestants, whose affairs, up to this time, had been managed by the French embassy. Thus, up to the arrival of the Lorraine prelate, the question of the cup, of which he was known to be an advocate, remained suspended, like a menace for Rome, and as a rallying-point for all the independent voices in the Council.

As to the Spaniards, there was no counting upon them. Encased in their haughty orthodoxy, holding themselves aloof from everybody, from legates, ambassadors, and foreign prelates, they were for every body a subject of embarrassment and fear. Ultramontane in dogma, and mortal enemies of all concession to heresy, they made themselves thereby a title to sustain against the holy see a kind of orthodox crusade to the profit of the episcopate. It was they who had raised in the Council the weighty question of the *residence* and the *divine right of bishops*, and had settled it in these redoubtable terms: "Is it by command of the Pope or by command of God, that a bishop is obliged to reside in his church?"

The Cardinal of Lorraine at length arrived, November 13th, 1562. He was received with high honors. The legates and bishops went to meet him, and escorted him to his hotel. In his reception address, he contrived, without pledging himself to anything, to charm the legates and the Council by his ap-

parent moderation and his lordly urbanity. Soon, however, his secret instructions began to show themselves: "As to discipline, reformation in the morals of the clergy, and correction of abuses; as to dogma, concession of the cup to *all* the subjects of the King of France; mass, prayers, and psalms in French, and, if it can be done, the marriage of the priests, and the abandonment of ecclesiastical possessions". But the Cardinal himself possessed three hundred thousand crowns of benefices; this last threat, then, was not serious. But certain words, however, adroitly thrown in, sufficed to fill the legates with affright and to give courage to the timid. As ambassador of the King of France and prince of the Romish Church, he would have a double weight in the deliberations. His impenetrable reserve increased the strength of his position. He menaced Rome and the legates by his reticence, complaining without inferences, and insinuating without propositions. A biting harangue of the second envoy of France, Du Ferrier, who showed to Rome the perspective of a national council, and, with sword at the throat, demanded a reform, added irritation to fear. But no one dared to protest; they had too much fear and too much need of France to attempt aught against her.

In January, 1563, the French ambassadors, as a New-Year's gift, presented to the Council a project of reformation; they demanded in it the communion in the two kinds, and the service in the vulgar language. The worship of images, benefices, dispensations, were all treated in a way which disturbed at once the interests and the inclinations of the holy see. The legates reported it to the Pope, whom the blow would first strike, but the Cardinal of Lorraine, who had affected to hold himself apart from this project, caused the Pope to be secretly informed that he knew how to avert the storm. The prince of the Church now supplanted the ambassador; the wily Lorraine, who could have advised the most subtle Italians in matters of diplomacy, began to separate his own interests from those of his country and his king.

To increase the difficulties of his position, the worthy brother of the Guises bethought himself of an expedient which

would still heighten the kind of mute terror which environed him. The Emperor was at Innsbruck with his son, both greatly dissatisfied with the Council, and still more with the Pope. By their theologians, they there made an examination of certain theses, as big with tempests as those of Luther: "The clause *proponentibus legatis*—is it not contrary to the liberty and the dignity of the Council? Can the Pope transfer or dissolve it without the authorization of the princes? Should not the bishops, who sit in it, be declared independent, as well of the Pope as of their sovereigns? If the Pope should die, would not the election appertain to the Council? etc." The Cardinal set out in February, leaving behind him disquietude and fear. He remained five days at Innsbruck, and each day spent several hours with the Emperor and his son, the *King of the Romans*. Nothing transpired of these mysterious conferences, in which was decided the future of Catholic reform. The Cardinal returned more impenetrable than ever; the only indiscretion which escaped him, as if involuntarily, was in speaking of the satisfaction of the Emperor and his close union with France.

It is now very evident that, if the three great Catholic nations, Spain, France, and Germany, had been of one mind, nothing would have been easier than to dictate the law to the holy see. But what common action could be expected of kings, nations, or churches, summoned to make in this work of pretended reform a community of interests, which were as discordant as their principles? France, the most illogical of the three, imagined, and imagines still, that one can be a Catholic without believing in the Pope, and especially without obeying him. Germany, shaken in her respect for the papacy, inclined, without avowing it, to Protestantism. Spain, the only consistent one, wished to have the principle of the papacy applied by law, if not in fact, in all its rigor. She put but three limits to it—the rights of the inquisition, those of the episcopate, and those of a king as Catholic at least as the Pope himself.

The chief direction of the Council, which pertained to Germany, in 1551, had since then escaped from her hands. Since

the abdication of Charles V, the Empire and the Emperor had lost much of their credit at Trent. Instead of a victorious prince, always ready to place his sword at the service of the faith, he was now only a pacific prince, orthodox undoubtedly, but having little fancy for a crusade. Maximilian, his son and future heir, was suspected of leaning to the doctrines of Luther. The project of a diet was on foot, and the Pope, with good cause, feared new concessions to heresy. But the policy of attacking its enemies one by one, in order to conquer the more surely, had been bequeathed by the old Rome to the new. The least formidable of the three, and the most exacting, was the Emperor. He alone dared to say aloud what each thought to himself, "That there were two Councils, one for form, at Trent, the other, the only real one, at Rome". The Pope concluded, with reason, that, by taking Ferdinand alone by himself, he would have done much better. The president of the Council had just died, and had been replaced by the Cardinal Morone, the most acute diplomatist of the conclave. Ferdinand, who was not powerful in himself, became so by his relationship to Philip II; he became so by the clearness of his position, by the audacity of his demands, by Lutheranism, whose phantom rose up behind him; he became so, in fine, by the support of France, who, seeing him in the advance guard, had begun to follow in his train, though only to desert him on the road. The knot of the problem was still in his hands. To bring back the Emperor, even to silence him, or indemnify him, was almost victory.

Suddenly Morone conceived an idea with a sagacity which did him honor. What was his plan? To make the Emperor understand that the Council was not at Trent, as he had well said, but wherever the papacy, who held its threads in her hand, had sway, and that, in coming to an agreement with it, he would have more profit in its triumph than in its degradation. Pius IV, before the departure of Morone, had made this remark, which comprised the whole state of the case: "Bring the Council to an end as soon as possible, for the

papacy cannot free itself from it except by the support of the princes."

In fact there was no time to be lost, for the Cardinal de Lorraine continued to correspond with the Emperor. Lorraine, after having vainly endeavored to be appointed legate, a title not easily reconciled with that of representative of France, had gone to take the air at Venice. Scarce arrived at Trent, Morone started on the fifteenth of June, alone and quietly, for Innsbruck; there he found the Emperor gloomy, irritated, bitterly complaining of the Pope and of his legates. After several days, by force of promises, he came to this result:

"It is not the Council," he said, "it is not the legates, nor the holy father who are opposed to his demands; it is the Spaniards who must be looked after. But that which the Council cannot do, the Pope will take upon himself. Objections have been made to the right of *proposing*; very well, the legates are ready to share this right with the ambassadors, but not with the bishops, for if once the initiative is granted them, they will turn against Rome and against kings the dangerous weapons put in their hands."

The Emperor, like the Pope himself, like the secular princes, like every body in fine, was already tired of this Council, in which "every one", as Pius IV wittily remarked, "wished to reform every body except himself." Ferdinand, weary of contest, finished by abating his demands, or by transferring them from the Council to the Pope. He consented to demand no longer the "reform of the head", but to be satisfied with that of "the members"; to leave at rest the formidable question proposed by the Sorbonne: "Is the Pope superior to the Council, or the Council to the Pope?" The legate, in return, promised a serious reform in discipline and of abuses. He then returned triumphantly to Trent, having succeeded beyond his hopes in this difficult mission. And then the final triumph of his skill was to conceal his victory from the envious eyes which sought to divine it. The envoys of the Emperor continued for form's sake, in concert with those of France, to demand the promised reforms; but at the bottom, beneath

this parade of opposition, an accommodation between the Emperor and the legates was suspected. The penetrating Sarpi, the historian of the Council, was not deceived; what he could not know he guessed at, with the malevolent sagacity of an enemy.

From this date the Council, deprived of the support of the Emperor, became much more tractable. France and Spain remained, it is true, two governments not accustomed to march in unison. But these two nations, whose swords and whose counsels weighed most in the scale, were at this moment occupied with discussing questions of precedence, and disputing about the place of honor. France was then in a difficult position. The Queen-Regent, absorbed in her project of conciliation with the Huguenots, gradually lost her interest in the Council, from which she expected no good, and the country followed her example. She urged the Cardinal de Lorraine to return, saying that he would be more useful in Paris than in Trent. The Guises, aggrieved as much as Rome by the edict which conceded liberty of worship, however restricted, to the Calvinists, aimed at a conciliation between France and the holy see. The Cardinal, who was much more their representative than that of Charles IX in the Council, made every day a step toward the legates, who on their part made two toward him. The worthy prelate had but two thoughts, the aggrandisement of his house, and the extirpation of heresy. To attain this double end, what other ally should he seek than the Pope? Thus we see him, on the fifteenth of September, 1563, setting out for Rome, whither the holy father had for a long time been inviting him. Pius IV received him as his deliverer, as Paul IV had recently received his father, Francis of Guise. What passed between them? Did the Pope promise him, as is affirmed, that he would designate him as his successor, and would do everything to insure his election? We are ignorant, here as at Innsbruck, and can judge only by the results. One thing is certain, and that is, the harmony which existed from that time between the legates and the wily Cardinal, who was always ready to sacrifice France to Rome, the King to the Pope, and his duty to his interest.

The condition of Spain was different and still more complicated than that of France. The Spanish prelates, elated by the grand position which they had made for themselves at the beginning of the Council, had not breathed in vain that air of liberty which always circulates in a great assembly. These prelates, so submissive in Spain, took another attitude at Trent. Already more than one voice among them had dared to lift itself against the forced loans which Philip had not spared them. The King was alarmed, accustomed as he was to be always and everywhere obeyed. He had even, strange to say, entreated the Pope to suppress these velleities of independence. Pius IV, adroitly using the weapons put in his hands, had no difficulty in making Philip understand, as Morone had made the Emperor, that "their interests were the same, and that it would be poor policy to demand for these bishops a right of initiative which they would soon turn against him. So long as the legates were only empowered to make *propositions*, no such danger was to be feared. It was then only a question of compromise". The Pope was no less weary than the King of the independent proceedings of the Spanish bishops; their opposition was even more dangerous than that of all the others, for they could not be charged with heresy. On this common ground, conciliation was the result. A tacit alliance was concluded between these two powers, condemned to be always suspecting each, and always allied. Thenceforth the Pope, supported by the Emperor, by the King of Spain, and the Cardinal de Lorraine, if not by France, ruled more and more with a high hand in the Council.

Let us not be accused of diving too deeply into all these intrigues; the play is here acted in the gutters, and not upon the stage; and intrigue sometimes rises to the dignity of history. Sarpi and even Pallavicini are our witnesses. Still better than they, the dispatches of the ambassadors reveal to us these subterranean plots, without which the decrees of the Council would be only enigmas. All matters of importance were discussed with closed doors, by the legates and ambassadors, and empty theological debates designed to amuse the spectators consumed the sessions, which were brought to a

close by long suspensions, one alone of which lasted more than eight months.

We must say a word concerning these debates, before hastening to the *dénouement*, as ardently desired by the King as by the Pope ; much as they had insisted upon the convocation of the Council, so much did they now hasten to see its end. Occupied as they were among themselves in suppressing or in falsifying the representative system in politics, they felt the danger of allowing it to prevail in religion. The omnipotence of the holy father, which every good catholic allowed, seemed to them, taking all things into the account, less dangerous than that of the bishops, and not so bad a precedent. The one was distant, the other was near at hand, and they preferred a papacy enthroned at Rome, to a petty pope in each of their dioceses.

In this third period, as in the two former ones, the legates, the real directors of the Council, endeavored to mix up decrees of reform with decrees about dogmas. They had the art to elude, even in granting, the pressing demands of the Council and the princes. Is there power in such art ? We think not ; surely it is not a virtue in the successors of the apostles, and the "wisdom of the serpent" in this case excludes the "harmlessness of the dove". Let us single out among the dogmatic decrees, the communion under two kinds demanded so urgently by the King of France and by the Emperor. The Council, unable to come to an understanding upon this contested point, at length took the course of referring it to the Pope, that is, to abdicate in his favor. We know in what sense the holy see decided the question. As to the reformatory decrees, let us pause only at those which raised the most opposition. Let us first remember, that universally where the interest of the papacy did not cut it short, there was a sincere effort on the part of the assembly to labor for the reform of abuses, and for the purification of the morals of the clergy. Truly these efforts were not always fortunate ; numerous abuses, designated and disgraced in the decrees, are still in force, and the evil has too often survived the remedy. But the debates of the Council are there to attest that, except the majority of the Italian

prelates sold to the Pope, and held fast by his privy purse, the greater number of the fathers of the Council sincerely desired reform in discipline, so far as it should not touch the power and the rights of the episcopate. Rome alone hindered or baffled all; even the reforms of detail which she condescended to let pass, have been for the most part smitten with sterility, and have remained a dead letter in her hands.

Among all the debated questions, that which raised the most tempests was the *divine right of bishops*. It was an important question which hovered, so to speak, over the whole duration of the Council. We see it continually returning, evaded as it was at each return by the wisdom of the legates, who were always ready to postpone a matter which they could not settle. The debate begins on the eighteenth of September, 1562, before the arrival of the Cardinal of Lorraine. To avoid difficulties, some wish to confine themselves to the declaration that "the bishops are the successors of the apostles", but the Spaniards wish for the addition that "they are instituted by divine right". Now appears in the Council, for the first time, a personage who is destined to play a more important part than that of the Cardinal of Lorraine; it is a Spaniard, the fiery Lainez, general of the Jesuits, the worthy successor of Loyola, whom he equals in audacity and surpasses in that strange mingling of astuteness, violence, and faith, which characterises him. We should see (in Sarpi) this hardy monk, who is not even a bishop, and would not deign to be one, this ultramontane Luther, bringing to his bar the entire Council, which listens, bending toward him; we should see him, seated in an arm-chair in the middle of the hall, the haughty incarnation of that principle of the papacy before which the legates recoiled, fill with his powerful words the whole of one session, which had been reserved for him, so great is the interest which he excites. The famous order which he represents had not yet given to the holy see a public testimony of the bond which holds them. The eyes of the Catholic universe are upon the heir of Loyola. One wishes to see what use the *Society* will make of its power, born but yesterday, yet whose roots are now spread everywhere. Will Lainez

take sides with the bishops? But he is a monk, and, as such, a born enemy of the episcopate. Chief of the formidable soldiery which Rome has just equipped against the century, heresy is what, above all things, he desires to combat; but all the enemies of the holy see are his own, and it is a heresy only to restrict, even for the advantage of the episcopate, the least of the privileges of the papacy. Lainez speaks, and for two hours he holds the assembly hanging upon his lips. Was he eloquent? We dare not call him so, for he was very subtle, and, besides, the two historians of the Council give us each a different discourse; but one is always eloquent when inspired by a strong conviction, when one knows what he wants, and calculates what he dares. We know at least that this haughty monk made himself the out-and-out champion of the papacy before the Council. We can judge of him by this short extract:

“The Church has neither made nor constituted herself; Jesus Christ, her founder, her king, has given her laws. Essentially subject, she has of herself neither liberty, nor jurisdiction, nor power. The first foundation on which she is built is St. Peter. It is to him alone that Christ has said, ‘Feed my sheep’, to him alone that the keys have been given. The Pope being his successor, in the Pope there dwells the plenitude of jurisdiction. And as Jesus Christ said to St. Peter that he had ‘prayed for him that his faith fail not’, there is not, there cannot be anything infallible but the Pope.

“This being established, to St. Peter alone pertained the right of conferring the priesthood upon the apostles. Undoubtedly he did so, at least so far as Christ did not do it in his place. The bishops are the successors of the apostles, as the Pope is the successor of St. Peter, and by this title they owe him obedience. If the Church is a monarchy, of which the Pope is king, no authority in the Church can emanate from any one but him. But then, you will say, has the Pope the right to abolish the episcopacy? No; it is by divine right that there are bishops in the Church; but each bishop, taken by himself, exists only by papal right. The Pope cannot suppress the bishops, taken as a whole, but he can pronounce as a sovereign upon the existence of each particular bishop.

“So of the councils; each bishop is fallible, an assembly of bishops is fallible also. If you admit that the decrees of a council are infallible, you will acknowledge, at the same time, that its infallibility emanates from another source, that is, the Pope, who alone has the right of confirming the decrees. If the authority of a council comes from the bishops, why do we call those

General councils where only a weak minority of the episcopal corps are present? If their decrees have become laws to the Church, it is because the Pope, alone infallible, has approved them. In any council, however numerous, when the Pope is present, it is he alone who decides, as is proved by the formula: *Approbante, or Præsente concilio*. But, some will say, 'what part remains then for the bishops'? A more profound examination of the question, and a simple declaration of adhesion, a declaration which they cannot refuse. Without the Pope, a council has neither the aid of the Holy Spirit, nor infallibility, nor the power of binding the Church; it holds its authority solely from him to whom Jesus Christ has committed his own."

The effect of this speech was immense. The legates and ultramontanists, ravished and confounded by such audacity, were astonished to find themselves surpassed in servility, and carried even farther in their subjection to the Pope than they wished to go. The independents, especially the French, indignant at seeing the hand of a Jesuit demolish their old idol of Gallicanism, cried out against this monstrous doctrine, which dated scarcely from half a century, and which their venerable Sorbonne had already condemned. However, Lainez was right, a hundred times right. "When a council and a pope are present", as M. Bungener has well said (II. 190), "it is absolutely necessary that one of the two should be everything, and the other nothing. All intermediate solution is illogical and impossible. Ultramontanism makes the council nothing, Gallicanism the Pope. But as Gallicanism, definitively, cannot do without the Pope, while ultramontanism does very well without councils, and has done so since Trent", we shall conclude, with Lainez, that for a consistent Catholic to believe is to obey; that all power emanates from the Pope, and returns to him; that the bishops are only his delegates, the council his secretaries, the Holy Ghost his minister, and that an emancipated papacy has no more need of councils, not even to make dogmas, as she has just given proof.

We will not follow further this question of the divine right of the episcopate, constantly suppressed, and constantly reappearing, because it implicates that weightier question, which lay at the bottom of all others, "Is the Council superior to the Pope, or the Pope to the Council?" Lainez had boldly decided

both, but none except the ultramontanists accepted his decision. Thus, after interminable debates, which lasted not less than ten months; after bitter recriminations between the French and Spanish prelates; after a second speech of Lainez upon dispensations, which, in boldness and violence, far surpassed the first, the matter ended, as everything in the Council ended, by a compromise. The canons, twenty times altered, were at length, on the fifteenth of July, committed to writing, without opposition, in the form in which they now stand. (Session XXIII, canons 6 to 8.) The disputed question, "Do the bishops hold their institution immediately from Christ, or immediately through the Pope?" was set aside. It was only declared "that the hierarchy was of divine right, and that the bishops were elected by the authority of the pontiff", which was true; but a prudent silence was observed concerning their relations to the papacy. However, the casuistic thunder of the general of the Jesuits had not sounded in vain in the Council, and more than one conversion resulted from it. The independent position of Lainez, his audacity in claiming for the Pope an omnipotence to which he had not dared to pretend; the old grudge of the monks against the episcopate, which appeared at last in full council, and won for them independence by stress of servility, all united to discourage opposition, and to carry captive the irresolute and timid. On that memorable day the *Society of Jesus* paid in full measure its debt to the holy see, and became bound to it by a covenant which nothing yet has been able to break. To this very day the papacy, supported by the sons of Loyola, bends councils and episcopates to its law, and shakes off all dependency except that of the order which affranchised it. Jesuitism was destined to become and to remain the protector of the holy see, the champion of all its contests, in fine, the last word of Catholicism which now struggles in vain beneath this double yoke, the papacy which gives the orders, and Jesuitism which dictates them.

As to the rest, the Council of Trent is judged more severely by one of its own members than we ourselves should dare to judge it. This is what the Bishop of Tina, in Dalmatia,

says: "What good could be done in a council where opinions were counted and not weighed? Against each one of our side the Pope brought hundreds of his own, and if hundreds had not sufficed, could he not create thousands? One should see these hungry prelates coming every day to Trent, most of them beardless youths sunk in debauchery, enrolled to vote at the signal of the legates, ignorant and stupid, but whose audacity and impudence could render useful service. What has the Holy Spirit ever had to do with this Council? One should see the couriers flying night and day to Rome, to report to the Pope all that was done. It is thence as from Dodona or Delphi that the oracles are expected. This Holy Spirit whom they boast as being a partaker in their councils, travelled about shut up in the messenger's bags. When the rivers had overflowed, he had to wait till the inundation ceased before he could reach Trent, and the Holy Spirit did not move upon the waters, as is said in Genesis, but along the waters. The legates notified the will of the holy father, and the Italian bishops, monthly pledged to his privy purse, some of them very bishops in the air, without residence and without diocese, voted, faithfully following their orders; for to do otherwise was a capital crime." (*Apologia ad Maximil. Imperat.* Edit. Quirinus Reuter. Offenbach. 1610.)

We have arrived at the end of our task; the remainder of the acts of the Council contains but one idea, that of dissolving, and does not deserve the honor of being recounted. The ambassadors of France retire to Venice, and protest at a distance, but their protestations have no effect; the Cardinal de Lorraine, remaining at Trent, intrigues, beats about between the different parties, and puts his shoulder to the wheel of the Council, to bring it more speedily to a conclusion. The Pope writes confidentially to the legates, that "they need not regard too much the protest of the Spaniards, since their king is sure". And when Vargas, ambassador at Rome, contrary to the secret intention of his master, of which he is ignorant, insists upon "the prolongation of the Council, as all the world desires", the Pope replies to him: "Who, then, is *this all the world?*" "It is Spain first", responds Vargas, "and then all

the world!" "Write to Spain", replies the Pope, "to read Ptolemy, and they will see that Spain is not *all the world*!" Thus the Emperor and the King of Spain, secretly gained to the holy see, hide their connivance behind the tumult made by their envoys and the prelates. France, as she has done through the whole Council, speaks when it is necessary to act. The Pope in all his letters urges, entreats the fathers to make haste; being sick, he conjures them "to spare him the grief of dying before the assembly closes", for, above all things, he fears that the Council will take upon itself the election of his successor, and enter into strife with the conclave. Thenceforward the decrees follow each other with a scandalous precipitation. All points on which they do not at once agree are set aside; all difficulties which cannot be solved are eluded; in fine, the work of two years is concluded in three weeks. Purgatory is declared an article of faith, in spite of the Gospel which denies it, and the Protestants who attack it. The principle of indulgences is maintained, but their sale and abuses suppressed; for the grand voice of Luther reëchoes yet, even in the bosom of this indifferent Council. The worship of the Virgin and the saints, of their relics and images, is authorized and advised, with this reservation, that prayers should be addressed not to the image, but to him whom it represents. In fine, in the last session but one, December 2d, 1563, the decrees of the two previous sessions were read, in the midst of the approving silence of the assembly; the unity of the Council was thus tacitly proclaimed, and the empire and France, who had lately combated so warmly the idea of *continuation*, forgot this time to oppose it.

On Friday, the third of December, 1563, they proceeded to the reading of the decrees, on which they had labored all night. The legates had had the art to slip in a significant clause: "Without prejudice to the authority of the apostolical holy see (*salva semper sedis apostolicæ auctoritate*)",—an artful reservation, which, leaving the Pope sole judge of what was meant by "his authority", opened a door of escape from the pressure of the decrees. The Council, in voting for this clause almost without discussion, abdicated, we may say, and

deposed all its powers in the hands of the holy father. The Pope aggravated the evil in his bull of confirmation (January 26th, 1564), by forbidding "all persons, clergy or laity, of whatever rank they may be, from commenting or interpreting, in any manner whatever, the decrees of the Council"; thus tradition supplanted the Bible, and the Pope supplanted Jesus Christ. From the height of his infallibility, he adopted, in confirming them, all the acts of the Council; by one stroke of his pen, he took from the bishops the right of commenting even on the decrees which they had rendered, and permitted to the Catholic world no other thought concerning these decrees than that of obeying them.

The Council, happy at feeling freed from its heavy responsibility, closed with acclamation. The Cardinal de Lorraine, lately one of the most formidable opponents, himself intoned the hymn of release. In a long litany were sung successively the praises of each of those sovereigns whose demands for reform had all been thwarted. The King of Spain was the only one who considered himself satisfied; the Emperor understood at last, somewhat too late, that he had been playing the part of a dupe. As to France, justly wounded by that final clause, "without prejudice to the authority of the holy see", which set the Pope above the Council, leaving him free from accountability to the decrees, except so far as was convenient, it reserved its vengeance for the oppressed Council by wounding the papacy in the tenderest point. The decrees of the Council of Trent were, in fact, never officially recognised by France, in spite of the persevering demands of the clergy for half a century. Never have these decrees been received without restriction in any State in Europe, not even Spain, for they infringe in too many points upon the most legitimate demands of civil power. The Church alone has bowed without reservation before the thrice-sacred canons of the Council of Trent. She has made it her chart, not of liberty, but of servitude, and with her own hand has riveted the fetters that they may not break. In fine, the episcopate itself, abjuring those last desires for independence which we saw break forth in Trent, is curbed forever under the papal

omnipotence, forbidding herself in so doing even a regret or a retrospective glance, and consoling herself for the yoke which she wears by that which she imposes.

In running through the long series of the decrees of the Council, edited in magnificent order and in irreproachable Latin, in seeing day after day discussed, with indisputable science and skill, the most profound mysteries of dogma and the most knotty questions of discipline, we are tempted to regard as earnest the laborious work of the Tridentine fathers. We think involuntarily of those councils of the fourth century, where so many treasures of faith, of learning, and of genius were dispensed; where were settled forever, as was hoped at least, the dogmas of our holy religion. But eleven centuries had not passed in vain over the primitive constitution of the Christian Church. An emperor, Constantine, was the one to strike the first blow. In assigning a dotation to the clergy, until then requited by the piety of believers, he brought it down to the arena of the interests of this world. In associating it with the action of the civil power, he favored the invasion of politics into matters of faith, and prepared the most serious embarrassments for his successors. The episcopate seized at first the proffered power, but the papacy soon snatched it from its hands. Charlemagne, in reconstructing the empire, thought that he needed a sanction for his work. This powerful but imperfect genius aggravated by repeating the fault of his father, and gratified the holy see by a temporal dominion, to his own misfortune and that of the kings. The empire set itself to work to endow its rival and strengthen him upon his throne, and the papacy, soon emancipated, cast at its feet that secular power which had enriched and established it.

In the history of the Church everything is explained by the first endowment of the clergy; everything in the history of the pontificate by this fatal gift of territorial sovereignty, so heedlessly granted by Pepin and Charlemagne. It was too much to arm a man, though infallible, with these two powers, which, united, embrace everything, the world of matter and that of mind. The most audacious pretensions of Gregory

VII and of Innocent III were foreshadowed and almost justified by this inconsiderate grant. And although, as a whole, the power of the holy see has declined since the thirteenth century, the Council of Trent remains no less a memorable date in its annals. History, so long mute, has at last spoken. We know now what secret springs moved this complicated machine. But, contemplated from without and from afar, as the Catholic Church regards it, it is still imposing, and commands respect. Renouncing, although unwillingly, the giving and taking away of earthly crowns, Rome at Trent still strengthened its spiritual dominion. If it can no longer put its foot upon the neck of kings, it at least knows how to bring them to pay obeisance, and still reigns by astuteness in default of genius and of sanctity.

ART. II.—THE RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS VINDICATIONS.

By EDWIN HALL, D.D., Professor of Theology in Auburn Theological Seminary.

AN article in the last October number of the *Princeton Review*, on Dr. Hickok's revised edition of his *Rational Psychology*, has called forth two responses from Dr. Hickok himself, one from Professor Tayler Lewis, and another, understood to be from a distinguished professor, a friend and former pupil of Dr. Hickok. Of these, the first three were published in the *American Theological Review*, and the last in the *Princeton Review*. Seldom has any system of Psychology been favored, in so short a time, with so many vindications from so formidable an array of defenders. The *Rational Psychology* may well be proud of these, and be well content to rest its cause, if anywhere, upon these defences. Its author informs us, that "It is given in this revised form, from the conviction that its use is still needed"—"especially as a text or reference book in the higher philosophical instruction in our colleges." It is from posts of eminence in important colleges that its vindications come. Other indications also show,

that it has already established its own school in philosophy, and is rapidly and widely doing its work in forming the intellectual principles and habits of the rising generation of scholars. These considerations, as well as the intrinsic importance of the questions and principles at issue, are sufficient to stand as an apology for some further examination both of the *Psychology* and of its vindications, which examination it is now purposed to make, so far as the brief limits assigned us here will permit. For a better understanding of the case, let us first notice the state of the question.

The doctrine of perception might seem, at first view, a matter of small moment; yet on this depends the possibility of all philosophy, and of all assured knowledge, whether there is a real world, or whether all things exist to us only in idea. Dr. Hickok has therefore well stated it as the great problem in philosophy: "The problem which philosophy has felt herself called upon to solve, is this: How may the intellect know that which is out of, and at a distance from itself?"

The doctrine of Natural Realism, advocated by Reid, and more fully developed by Hamilton, assumes that our faculties of cognition, in their normal state and action, are true. Or rather, in the view of its advocates, it assumes nothing, but only recognises the fact given in consciousness, that we immediately behold—are presented face to face with—the object of the cognitive faculty, and so not only know the object immediately, but *know the knowing*—are conscious of beholding it in direct intuition. This they regard as the highest certainty. Doubt this, and we know nothing. There is nothing that we may not, on the same grounds, call into equal question. Proof is impossible; not because the intuitive beholding is doubtful, but because there is nothing more certain, by which proof might be possible. The proof of the proof would need proving, and then the proof of the proof of the proof, and so on forever. Proving the intuitions of one faculty by those of another faculty equally human, involves the same infinite series of absurdities as before. One, therefore, who begins by doubting an intuition, whether an axiom of reason, or a direct cognition by another faculty, must either doubt universally

and doubt forever, or continue to give proof of proof, with no possibility of reaching anything ultimate or certain, and no possibility of ceasing this endless labor, unless he shall at last find refuge in some transcendental world, created by the "antagonisms and diremptions" of absurdities and self-contradictions.

The advocates of Natural Realism maintain, of course, that we are carefully to limit the witness of each faculty to its own objects. Sense can give nothing save objects of sense. It is reason that rises to causes and necessary principles and truths, and that discerns in objects of sense more than sense reveal, and more than can be yielded by any mere analysis of the objects of sense. Nor is it every sense that gives immediate intuition of an outward object. The hearing, for example, is limited to the sensation. No advocate of Natural Realism pretends that hearing alone could give knowledge of a bell. The Natural Realist holds that in the sense of touch, or rather in the muscular sense of resistance commonly included in touch, we are presented face to face with outward objects having extension and solidity. These qualities are immediately perceived; and, says Sir Wm. Hamilton, they "really exist in the objects, as they are ideally presented to our minds". These are called Primary Qualities; without them no material object can have existence. There are other qualities, not supposed necessary to the existence of material bodies, and which belong to them occasionally. They have power to give us sensations, while the quality itself is not perceived, but is to us simply an unknown cause of the sensation. For sufficient reasons we *judge* these causes to be qualities in the object. Such are the qualities which give us the sensations of heat, taste, smell and hearing. These are called Secondary Qualities.

This distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and between an immediate *perception* of an object and a *judgment* of its existence, is wholly ignored by many others, who hold that in all perception nothing is directly given save our own sensations. To them all qualities are but such as Natural Realists regard the secondary. In their view, if in

hearing we do not have immediate perception of a "bell", then in no sense have we an immediate knowledge of anything outward. Thus, Professor Tayler Lewis argues at length, from the fact that we hear the *sound*, and do not immediately receive the *bell* in the hearing, that no outward object whatever is ever perceived; and—what more surprises us—he argues as though he really supposed that those of a different philosophy maintain that we perceive the bell by hearing alone!

As an immediate cognition or intuition is incapable of proof, so also it is to us incapable of explanation. It is to us an ultimate fact; there is nothing more direct or simple, by which explanation might be possible; and we are too ignorant to attempt to tell either how the sensation, or how knowledge, through the sensation is ever accomplished. We cannot give an "Idea" of any Intelligence, much less of "All Intelligence."

Another point demands attention here, viz., the distinction "between the *being* and the *becoming*". Suppose it granted that we do immediately perceive some outward phenomenon: Dr. Hickok still meets with two difficulties in the way of perceiving any real thing. The real amount of these difficulties is, first, that we cannot *perceive* a real thing; and, secondly, that there *is* no real thing having permanent being, and that there can be none. Thus (*American Theological Review*, April, p. 204), Dr. Hickok says:

"The phenomena of sense"—"are constantly coming and departing."
 "The color or the sound of one instant is not that of the next." "To such as contemplate nothing but the phenomenal, it must appear that '*all things flow*.'" "The instant of the coming in sense, is also the instant of *evanishing*; and we cannot say at any time it *is*, but only it is *coming* into manifestation." "Hence we know the phenomenal only as the *becoming*."

That is, suppose a real thing, as a horse—we cannot *perceive* him as a real horse; we can never say that it is, but only that it is *coming* into manifestation. No horse is *manifested*, but only a phenomenon in a "flow". There is no permanent phenomenon for us to perceive.

But, secondly, we cannot suppose a real thing. There can be no real permanent thing. Thus (*American Theological Review*, July, p. 404), Dr. Hickok says: "The Psychology supposes universal nature to be the perpetual product of the Creator's continued agency"; i. e. matter is force, constantly coming into being while the Creator keeps his spiritual acts in counter-agency. When counter-agency ceases, as there is nothing else in matter, matter ceases to be. Suppose, then, that all our faculties combine, to give us, for the moment, cognition of an objective and supposed real horse. The object itself is in as much a "flow" as the sensations. All the horse there is, is "constantly coming and departing". We may say of it, as of the sensations: "The instant of its arising in sense, is also the instant of its evanishing, and we cannot say at any time it *is*, but only it is *coming*." Horses are constantly *about to be*, but they never *are*. There are therefore no real horses for us to perceive. Here is the famous distinction between "the *being* and the *becoming*", of which Dr. Hickok declares his reviewer to be so profoundly ignorant, as not to have "taken the first step in that long path which philosophy has for so many ages been travelling". So clear is it to Professor Tayler Lewis, that things cannot have any being, that (*American Theological Review*, January, p. 110) he quotes Scripture to prove that objects of sense are—not merely transitory and changing—but that they have no *being*, while all things that are real are "above the world of sense for evermore". Where, then, did he find his Bible? If he believes it as he interprets it, then he believes there is no Bible.

The question of a knowledge of outward things should seem to be here forever decided and foreclosed: we can *perceive* no such things. Such things neither *are* nor *can be*. We come to the end of the path which philosophy has for so many ages been travelling, and soon we expect Professor Lewis and Dr. Hickok, for we have left them on the road.

The Natural Realist is not troubled with difficulties like these. If his senses give to him, for the moment, an outward horse, he will take him and use him, not questioning whether it be a horse in a "flow", created anew and different every

moment, nor whether—supposing a real horse—sense never presents him as a horse in *being*, but only as “*becoming*” a horse—a horse *about to be*. If all this be so, he, a flowing man, will use the flowing horse for the flowing moment—the horse for the moment created in a flowing creation. Such as he is for the moment, he is sure he, for the moment, perceives him. Questions about the being and the becoming pertain not to perception, nor to the knowledge of what *is* for the present; let those who meet them solve them.

But, suppose one urges that our faculties may deceive us? If they do this in their normal state and action, then they may deceive us in the proving, and we can know nothing. If such a man is sincere, nothing can help him. If he doubts through mere superfluity of naughtiness, then we can bring nothing more certain; he is joined to his idols; let him alone.

But, suppose one gives to this general doubt of all our faculties a specific form? Suppose he affirms that the inevitable witness of consciousness in all men is, that we perceive outward things immediately, while the reason demonstrates that all such immediate perception is impossible, and that this contradiction in the very sources of knowledge destroys all possibility of knowledge?

We will not argue with him on this basis; it assumes the futility of all argument. We deny the alleged facts assumed as the premises. It is indeed true that “all minds are shut up to the testimony of consciousness for a direct and immediate perception of the outward object”; but it is not true that reason has ever demonstrated the contrary. This position is so important to the very possibility of all philosophy, that we ask to be heard upon it for a few moments. We affirm then,

First, that *Reason is incapable of any such demonstration*. Reason cannot, in the last analysis of sense, show any contact between matter and mind, nor comprehend how such contact is possible; nor, if it were possible, how such contact should give knowledge. As little can she explain how knowledge may be given without contact. She is wholly unable to ex-

plain or comprehend the manner, or the idea, of any actual knowledge by any one, or by all of our senses. She is as much lost in trying to explain how there can be a sensation, as in trying to explain how sense can give knowledge of outward things. Reason, then, is wholly incompetent to make any demonstration in the case, or to give any "Idea" of any "Intelligence," and cannot rationally make the denial attributed to her. With a little more light she might see, that what she is assumed to deny as impossible is beautifully and most rationally true.

Indeed, reason would have been quite as likely, *à priori*, to deny the possibility of sensation. For, does not sensation involve either contact, or union, or intercommunication between mind and matter, such as constitutes the very difficulty supposed to be in the way of coming to a knowledge of outward things? What philosopher could have told, *à priori*, that matter and mind—separated, as the philosophers say, by "the whole diameter of being"—could ever come together to form the creature man, or to give to any being such a faculty as *sense*, in which mind and matter must in some way combine? The supposed impossibility of such contact, or combination, or intercommunication, in perception, led to the Platonic invention of a *Plastic Medium*, to the notion of Malebranche, that, as sense can give us nothing, we "*see all things in God*", and to the notion of Leibnitz, that, as mind and matter can have no intercommunication, God has ordained a *preestablished harmony*, in which, with no mutual influence upon each other, mind and matter act in concert. Reason could comprehend nothing and explain nothing. Yet, those were attempts rationally to explain, and, like Dr. Hickok, to give "subjective Ideas of Intelligence". The attempts ended only in absurdity. Reason, then, has never made the demonstration attributed to her. She is incapable of such demonstration. The very attempt is irrational, as it ever must be irrational to attempt to give an *à priori* Idea of All Intelligence. The testimony of consciousness, therefore, is wholly unimpaired. There is no such contradiction in the sources of our knowledge as has been supposed.¹

But in the second place, *all schemes based on the supposed truth of the alleged demonstration have hitherto ended most logically in Idealism or Pantheism; and so have practically reduced the alleged demonstration to absurdity.* The course of reasoning which led to such results will show that all other schemes, based on the same principles, must come at last to the same end.

Berkeley began with assuming, that in perception we are conscious only of our own sensations. He ended—most logically—with concluding that there is, to us, no world save our own ideas.

Kant *assumed* the existence of something outward, but held that the apparent form and qualities are determined, not by the outward thing, but by our faculties, so that in perception, things conform to our cognitions, not our cognitions to things. He concluded, therefore, that the province of philosophy is not to study outward facts, but *à priori*, our powers of knowing. "The new method of thought which we have adopted", said he, "*is based on the principle that we only cognize in things, à priori, that which we ourselves place in them.*" (*Meiklejohn's Trans.* p. xxix.)

True, said Fichte; but if our minds posit the form and quality, why not the substance also? All is sufficiently accounted for, by regarding all as mental positings. Our minds create all the worlds, we know; and God, also, is but an idea which man creates.

Even our own Edwards, in his very youth, before Berkeley's speculations were given to the world, and before Kant was born, assuming the same principle, came to a similar conclusion. "*Consciousness*", said he, "*is the mind's perceiving what is in itself.*" A harmless and very reasonable position, one might have thought. But, mark the logical consequences wrapped up in that seemingly harmless sentence! For Edwards proceeded with the power of a modern locomotive, and kept the track: thus, "Body and solidity" are, to our perception, "the same". The perception of a supposed outward solidity is only the consciousness of a sensation of resistance; since we are conscious only of our own sensations. There is

no need of supposing anything outward, whether substance or quality. All you can know is, that you are conscious of a sensation.

"The reason", said he, "why it is so exceedingly natural to man to suppose that there is some *latent substance* that upholds the properties of bodies is, because all men see that the properties of bodies are such as need some cause". "All, therefore, agree that there is *something* that is there, and upholds these properties. And it is most true there undoubtedly is; but men are wont to content themselves in saying that it is *something*, but that something is He by whom all things consist." (*Appendix*, vol. i, p. 676. Carvill's Ed.) Again, "Resistance, or solidity, is by the immediate exercise of the Divine power; it follows that that which philosophers used to think a certain *unknown substratum*, which stood beneath and kept up solidity, is nothing at all distinct from solidity itself; or that, if they must needs apply that word to something else, that does really and properly subsist by itself, and support properties, they must apply it to the Divine Being or power itself"—"so that, speaking most strictly, *there is no proper substance but God himself*". (*Ibid.* p. 713.)

Perhaps Edwards derived these notions from Sir Isaac Newton, who, assuming that we are conscious only of our own sensations, supposed that what we regard as matter and an outward world, may be fully accounted for, and a rough idea of creation be attained, without the necessity of supposing any such thing as matter. He supposed that God, by his power, renders a certain portion of infinite space impenetrable to another portion of space rendered likewise impenetrable; both spaces continuing absolutely void as before. From these he supposes that motion and the other properties and accidents ascribed to matter may be educed. (In *Wight's Hamilton*, p. 303.)

A moment's reflection shows that the supposed impenetrable space is quite as unnecessary, on the assumed principle of perception, as either real qualities or real substances. For, as we are conscious only of sensations, why may not sensations be given as well without the impenetrable space? Or why may not the sensation, as well as the space, or quality, or substance, be a mere idea? Edwards was too acute not to see this.

"But now it is easy to conceive of resistance as a mode of an idea." "How is there any resistance except it be in some mind?" "The world is therefore an ideal one." "The material universe exists nowhere but in mind." "*Place* itself is mental, and *within* and *without* are mere mental conceptions. The material universe is absolutely dependent on the conception of the mind for its existence" (pp. 670-1).

And even this ideal universe, Edwards concluded, has no *being*, but is only *becoming*, just as long as God continues to raise these conceptions in created minds. As the world is *thought*, and not *matter*, and as the Divine thoughts are eternal, Edwards held that the world, as to God, was eternal, since "things as to God exist from eternity alike" (p. 671). As to man, Edwards held that the world was created, creation consisting simply in raising up "such ideas in created minds".

It occurs to us to inquire, How, then, could the earth have been created before man?

If we may be allowed a moment's digression, we may suggest a possible solution of the difficulty. Dr. Hickok has shown (*Cosmology*, p. 85), that "Reason is not a *fact*, a thing that has been *made*, but from its own necessity of being, can be conceived no otherwise than a *verity which fills immensity and eternity*". Professor Lewis shows that the human reason, "though physically, sentiently, individually, born in time, *shares in the universal reason*, and breathes the higher life of the uncreated world"; that it brings with it "*a priori* knowledge", "ideas", and "thoughts" that "come with it from its preternatural and *preëxistent* sphere", and that "lie in the soul ready for use",—"divine ideas"—in a "divine faculty". (*American Theological Review*, pp. 120, 121.) Now we have seen that Professor Lewis holds that objects of sense have no being, while all things that are real are "above the world of sense for evermore". As sense cannot, therefore, perceive force, may not Professor Lewis well have brought with him, from his "*preëxistent sphere*" all the world he ever knew? And, as Dr. Hickok holds (*American Theological Review*, July, p. 440), with regard to all rational ideas, that "the idea in God and man is the same, and is in truth only

the Divine idea", why may not Professor Lewis have brought with him that identical eternal world supposed by Edwards?

But to return. So ended in the hands of Edwards, and under his relentless logic, the demonstration of reason, that in perception we are conscious only of our own sensations. Newton, and Berkeley, and Edwards, and Kant, and Fichte—all assuming the same principle, were swept alike by the same resistless tide of inevitable logic, to the shores either of absolute Idealism or of dreary Pantheism. Can the premises ever yield any other results?

And now Dr. Hickok assumes the same principle. His own latest account of the view taken of this matter in his *Rational Psychology* is, that "*The phenomena of the sense are all thoroughly subjective*", that "*the perceiving is not a fantasy or delusion, but a genuine sensation*", and that "*what the affection has come from, the clearest perception must leave in doubt*". (*American Theological Review*, July, p. 411.) We shall see that in Dr. Hickok's hands also this principle still yields its necessary results of Idealism or Pantheism.

He adds another difficulty, viz., such a contradiction between reason and consciousness, with regard to perceiving outward things directly, as gives to the skeptic a "*logical right* to doubt whether permanent mind or matter exists". (*Psychology*, p. 45.) In the *American Theological Review* of April, he maintains that all modern philosophy, even that of our Common Theology, is itself Atheistic or Pantheistic, and that his *Rational Psychology* constitutes "the very defences and support" of the Christian Creed, and that, without the principles of that *Psychology*, our adoption of that creed "can be nothing but an *unreasoning credulity*". The removal of these grounds of doubt he declares to be "*hopeless* in any other than through an *à priori* method of investigation". (*Rational Psychology*, p. 45.)

Beginning just here on the basis of absolute ignorance and doubt, receiving nothing from experience, neither knowing nor assuming the possibility of experience, or the existence of facts, or the existence or possibility of reason itself, Dr. Hickok proposes to build up an *à priori* science of mind, and

so to solve the problem of a knowledge of outward things. *What ground has he to stand on? What instruments has he to build with? What means of verifying the truthfulness of his speculations?* He stands on nothing. He supposes the certainty of nothing. Everything and every faculty is called in question. He will prove everything, and assume nothing. He must therefore sustain his proof by putting another proof under it, and, in like manner, sustain the proof of the proof; after the manner of the honest Hibernian, who said, that in his country they began to build chimneys at the top; and when inquired of how they made the top brick keep its place, he answered: "Ah! as for that matter, they put another brick under it." The instruments of building are the unknown and perhaps impossible reason, whose speculations are "void conceptions" until verified by *facts* found in the use of a worse than dubious consciousness—his other instrument. The reason shall tell *à priori* how things *must* be; consciousness shall tell how they *are*. If these agree, the Rational Psychology demands that we receive their conclusion as *science*, the end of doubt, the "Subjective Idea, and the Objective Law of All Intelligence". The rational axiom here assumed is, that when two dubious witnesses agree, one of them a demonstrated falsifier, and the other of doubtful veracity, and even of doubtful existence—their agreement can result in nothing but certainty.

But now Dr. Hickok (*American Theological Review* of July) affirms that the alleged contradiction between reason and consciousness pertains not to him, nor to the *Psychology*, but "belongs solely to the skeptic". This affirmation we shall presently examine. For our present purpose it is sufficient that he regards the contradiction so far valid, as to give the skeptic a "*logical right*" to doubt whether mind or matter exists. This being so, it is of no consequence to whom the declaration of the ground of doubt originally belonged. Dr. Hickok having accepted the premises, must take the necessary conclusions.

Dr. Hickok now says further, that his reviewer "deems that until realities are found, they neither act nor are". Oh! no:

the reviewer did not deem that until realities are found by the processes of the *Rational Psychology*, they neither act nor are; but the *Psychology* itself doubting their reality, and in search of them, must not be allowed to assume their existence before it finds them.

Dr. Hickok now avers further, that while the *Psychology* seeks after the reason as yet unknown and perhaps impossible, "it does not suppose reason not to be, and not to be active in search of itself". He insists that it is only a philosophic and logical finding that he is in search of. Very well; the reviewer then very properly inquired whether he had logically found it. But Dr. Hickok's logical finding required an actual finding. In the *Rational Psychology* itself he most fully affirms it on page 462, in these words: "But thus far the all-comprehending reason is only a void conception. So it *may* be, so, if at all, it *must* be; but that so it *is*, we have yet to find". He then proposes to take "facts", and find it. But *now*, admitting a "logical right to doubt" whether mind or matter exists, and that at the present stage of the argument we know not that reason is, or can be, he demands that the skeptic shall allow him to assume that reason is, "and is active in search of itself"! If this may be assumed, why search any longer? May not the skeptic very properly reply, My good friend, what are you, your book, and your argument, save matter and mind, whose existence you maintain my logical right to doubt? Many such things have I seemed to see and hear and consider; and among them a seeming Plato, and Edwards, and Shakspeare; still you admit my logical right to doubt. What can you bring me more? After all, I know not that I have seen, or heard, or considered anything. When I have considered your rational argument, I know not whether it is rational, or whether there is, or can be, any reason. On your own grounds, I find myself compelled to adopt the beautiful language of Fichte: "All reality is converted into a marvellous dream, without a life to dream of, and without a mind to dream; into a dream made up only of a dream itself".

Dr. Hickok, however, proceeds. And now behold the method of the *Rational Psychology*.

The unfound and perhaps impossible reason tells *à priori* all that sense and understanding can be made to do toward attaining a knowledge of outward things. So they *must* be, and so they must operate if at all. Reason sees by an "un-made and eternal principle" that "conditions all power", and that itself is "conditioned by no power"; that the Creator cannot make them at all, if not after this idea. And now consciousness, whose falsity has been demonstrated, is to verify these ideas by *facts*; and that while the very question is whether we can know any facts. Reason now comes in again and gives "Ontological Demonstrations" of the "valid being" both of the "Phenomenal" and the "Notional"; for though no man ever *perceived* "a rose", understanding has a *notion* that separate qualities given in consciousness, are "connected" together in a real outward rose; and this notion is to be verified by an Ontological Demonstration. This done, sense and understanding are now complete.

So far these ideas and demonstrations have been given by the unfound and perhaps impossible reason. Until reason is verified, they all go for nothing. Now comes the harder task of the reason to find and demonstrate herself. She must tell *à priori* what she must be, and what she must do, if ever found; and then this idea must be verified by facts. To this must be added the appropriate Ontological Demonstration of reason and its objects; and our Rational Psychology is complete. Behold the method!

Before we proceed to the details, we must notice more particularly Dr. Hickok's allegation of "mistake and perversion" in the reviewer, to which we have already alluded. In the *American Theological Review*, July, 1862, he says of the alleged contradiction between consciousness and reason:

"These declarations, and all others in connection with them, are the skeptic's mode of argumentation, and for the truth and validity of which, the author is not otherwise responsible than that they should give a fair representation of the skeptical process. They are not his method, his 'argument, nor his conclusions'. But the reviewer assumes them to be the

veritable logic of the author of the *Psychology*, and in various ways refutes and turns to absurdity and ridicule the processes of the *Psychology* itself, by making it responsible for what belongs solely to another."

We have already noticed that it is of no consequence to whom the declarations in question originally belonged. The *Psychology* admits them to be so far valid as to give the skeptic a "logical right" to doubt whether mind or matter exists. They therefore do not "belong solely to another". But the *Psychology*, instead of giving them as belonging solely to another, on the contrary, affirms them originally, and in its own behalf, makes them its argument, and at last, while by an explanation of terms it supposes it removes the contradiction, it sustains both the alleged witness of consciousness and the demonstration of reason; and so is fully responsible to whatever "refutation" or reduction to absurdity or ridicule has followed from its being held to this responsibility.

The facts are these. The *Psychology*, after arguing some time against a particular theory of perception, adduces thus another *argument* — *its own* — *in its own behalf*, and merely brings in the *admission* of the skeptic to confirm its own declarations:

"But a more incorrigible skepticism results from this theory, when comprehensively examined and intrepidly prosecuted to its legitimate conclusions. It is the testimony in the convictions of universal consciousness, that we perceive the external objects themselves. Every man is convinced that it is the outer object, and not some representative of it which he perceives. The knowledge that the object is out of myself, and other than myself, and thus a reality, and not subjective merely, is the testimony of common-sense everywhere. All minds, that of philosophers as well as common people, are shut up to the testimony of consciousness for a direct and immediate perception of the outward object. *The skeptic himself admits*, yea, insists upon this, and founds upon it the necessary conclusions of his skepticism."

Then follows the alleged demonstration of reason to the contrary, which the *Psychology* also urges in its own behalf, and makes it its argument. The whole is repeated in a form, if possible, still stronger on page 381.

Dr. Hickok, however, sees at length that "there must be

some false element somewhere in this alleged conclusion of inevitable contradictions", and supposes that he furnishes data by which "we may detect the fallacy" (p. 382.) He maintains the formula of contradiction entire, and resolves "the whole basis of the skepticism" into "the old sophism of *figura dictionis*" a "false play upon the phraseology". The witness of consciousness is maintained, and the skeptic justified in using it; but the "outward object", to which consciousness testifies, is declared to be the *quality* of the outward thing, and not the "thing itself". The demonstration of reason is fully maintained, but it is interpreted as denying the perception of the *thing itself*, and not of its *quality*. "The *object for the sense* in perception is phenomenon as quality solely; the *object for the reason* is the thing itself as causality for the qualities." With this explanation of the terms, Dr. Hickok makes the declarations of consciousness and reason the *conclusions* of his psychological investigations, and professes to find "exact harmony". So far from repudiating the declarations in question as belonging "solely to the skeptic", he expressly justifies the skeptic, by name, in his use of the alleged testimony of consciousness, thus (p. 382):

"So far our psychological conclusions confirm the *first* fact assumed by the skeptic as his preparation of the ground for his deduction of universal Pyrrhonism, namely, that the universal conviction of consciousness is, that we perceive the object immediately." "But the fact further is, that this distinct and definite *quality* is all that sense can reach, and all that consciousness can testify to as immediate in its own light" (p. 382).

Consciousness and the skeptic then are both sustained in the first declaration. Dr. Hickok also sustains the demonstration of reason. But is not this *quality* itself as much an *outward* object as the *thing* which is causality for the quality? The testimony of consciousness was for "an immediate perception of an *outward* object" — an "object *out of myself*, and not *subjective merely*". The demonstration of reason was, that the mind can be conscious of nothing without, but *only of its own sensations*. "It is not possible to affirm beyond the immediateness of the organic *sensation*"; "all that can

directly be known is, that the mind has such sensations" (p. 42). Dr. Hickok does not attempt to impugn the demonstration of reason, or the witness of consciousness, but, with his explanation of the terms, sustains both, by his psychological conclusions. Where, then, is the "exact harmony"? On his assumed principle that the mind can be conscious only of what is in itself, there can be no harmony. Even with his explanations, the same contradiction remains; and, in his scheme, must remain, unless an outward quality of a material thing can be at the same time a mere sensation. And this we find, on examination, to be the process of educing "exact harmony". It consists simply in Dr. Hickok's deceiving himself by the substitution of a purely mental object for an object wholly outward, and not mental at all; thus (p. 196): "The sense *perceives*, and perception is the apprehension of the phenomenal only. Internal phenomena as mental exercises, and external phenomena as material qualities, are apprehended". Here *external* qualities and phenomena are distinguished from *internal*, and made objects of immediate perception. But *external* qualities are qualities pertaining to external things. They are in the same place called "*material* qualities", meaning, qualities of matter, not mere mental affections (see p. 383). "*The qualities of the rose, color, fragrance, smoothness, weight, taste, etc., as given in any and all organs of sense, are immediately perceived.*" But these, surely, must be something outward, unless we are to talk of colored, fragrant, or heavy sensations.

But on turning to the *à priori* "*Elements of all possible anticipation in the sense*", and reading for eighty-two pages, to the completion of the "*Ontological Demonstration of the valid being of the phenomenal*", we find nothing given in sense, save sensations, which are made the subjects of mere intellectual operations. "The intellectual agency"—"has first to be supplied with a sensation"—"which must be induced by some *content*"—"and the apprehending of this involves a discriminating it from *non-sensation*". "The distinction here is between *content* and a *void*, *sensation* and *non-sensation*". [And surely this must be all; a *material quality* cannot be

transported from the outside thing, and made to take up its abode in the mind — in a sensation — without making both mind and sensation material. A “content” is simply “sensation” distinguished from “non-sensation”. We wish this to be borne in mind as Dr. Hickok’s own account of the matter here.] “This is the first element in the operation of distinction, namely, *Reality*.” Yes, distinguishing a real sensation from non-sensation. “That it is a real *appearance* is determined from non-appearance.” Yes, the real appearance of a sensation. Dr. Hickok argues at length that it is a “*peculiar appearance—more than what it is not*”, and has in it that which is in no other reality” (p. 124), and that when the “intellectual work” of “observation” is performed, “the completed result as precise appearance in consciousness is *Quality*”. “All *sensation*, as distinguished in a complete observation, *becomes quality*, and may be of different kinds, as colors, weight, sounds, etc.”

A marvellous transformation truly! that as by a mere mental process we distinguish and observe a sensation, the *sensation* — “*becomes — quality*”! quality of an outer material thing. What mystic muttering of robed priest; what *Hocus Pocus* of conjurer ever wrought a more marvellous transformation! But Dr. Hickok continues: “*All quality is educed from sensation*, the sensation being taken up by the intellectual agency, and in its distinguishing operation found thereby to be a *reality*, particularized from all others, and peculiar in its phenomenal being”.

A material quality *educed* by a mental operation from a mere sensation! Was the extraction of sunbeams from cucumbers half so wonderful! But Dr. Hickok repeats it again and again. “Heat and cold, sweet and bitter, fragrant and fetid smells”, are by sense perceived as phenomenal “within our subjective sphere”, and so are “outer qualities” — “perceived objects” — “pertaining to a world of reality” [meaning a real outer world], p. 202. Can it be possible! Not unless the sensation is itself the outer “fetid smell” which causes the sensation, making subject and object identical.

These are not casual inadvertences, but the deliberate and

constant processes of the work. On page 382 Dr. Hickok gives a summary of his doctrine of perception, which he has before spread out over so many pages. If any one will turn to that summary—which we are not allowed space enough to give—he will find that nothing is given or reached in that doctrine of perception, save sensations and intellectual operations upon them. Yet out of these is made to come the perception of outward objects!

It ought to be noticed, however, that while, in the *Rational Psychology*, a “content” in the sense is simply a “sensation” as distinguished from a “non-sensation” (p. 122), the *Empirical Psychology* of Dr. Hickok makes it something far different. If we ask the *Empirical Psychology*, What is a *content* in the sense? it answers thus (p. 83):

“A ray of light has gone into the eye; that ray is no longer a ray of light, and that eye is no longer an empty organ. So with the undulation that has gone into the ear; it is a wave of air no more, and it is an empty ear no longer. The *mutual modification* has become a *third somewhat*,”—and this is—“a *content in the sense*: it is not matter, it is not object, it is not anything as yet perceived.”

A *content* in the sense is, therefore, “a *third somewhat*”, a *mutual modification*”, as of a ray of light and eye, or wave of air and ear!

What then is a sensation? The *Empirical Psychology* gives the answer thus (p. 84): “The identification of the reciprocal modifications of both the recipient organ and of that which has been received, is precisely what is meant by sensation”. A precise definition! A “*sensation*” is an “*identification of reciprocal modifications*”, as of ray of light and eye, or of wave of air and ear.

But what is the Identification of reciprocal Modifications? Dr. Hickok does not tell us. But he does tell us (*Empirical Psychology*, p. 87), that “sensation” may be “in a blind and unconscious state”. An unconscious sensation! An unconscious Identification of reciprocal Modifications! And this in an *Empirical Psychology*, which is nothing else than “the science of mind from *consciousness*”! How are these uncon-

scious sensations consciously given? and given as "Facts of mind", as they here purport to be?

But admitting the whole of this explanation, even then, unless a ray of light, or a wave of air, is a quality of the outward object perceived by the eye or ear, or unless the eye or the ear is itself a quality of the outward object perceived by it, then no element of a quality of the things perceived has entered into this Modification whose Identification "is precisely what is meant by sensation". On his own principles—in both *Psychologies*—Dr. Hickok can never know an outward world, save one which he himself creates, by mental Identifications of Modifications which have no element of a material quality in them at all. If it be otherwise, then, by the transferring of real material qualities to the mind, so that they can be distinguished as "reality", every man who perceives a block is mentally transformed into a block,—and, by turns, becomes himself every animal and every material thing which he ever perceives. One should therefore be careful what he sees or handles.

What now is Dr. Hickok's "Demonstration against Universal Pyrrhonism", by which "we are able to utterly overthrow universal skepticism, being made competent through the conclusions of *Rational Psychology*" (p. 384)? It is simply the transcendental reason confounding internal sensations with "material qualities" of external things; and contradicting herself as she before contradicted the necessary convictions of universal consciousness.

Nor is this impotence of sense to reach an outer world at all relieved by the account which the *Psychology* gives of the faculty of Understanding: "The Understanding is faculty for connecting, not for intuitively beholding". "*It must be the connection of such phenomena only as are given in the sense.*" "*It connects only what is first given in the sense*" (p. 221).

Well, what is given in the sense? Sensations only, according to the *Psychology*. The operations upon these are purely mental. Nothing is reached save mental objects mentally connected. The understanding connects them in a mental "notion". The mind judges that there must be something

without; then draws an image of that outward something, and judges that its image resembles the object. But, to say nothing of the validity of the other judgments, it is manifest that a judgment of resemblance cannot be formed without first knowing the object resembled. That is, on the plan of the *Psychology*, we can never know an outward object, unless we know it before we know it. The *Psychology*, therefore, instead of giving the "Idea of All Intelligence", gives an Idea on which all knowledge is impossible.

Dr. Hickok complains that his reviewer, by emphasizing "The Idea of *all* Intelligence", "assumes that the *Psychology* undertakes to explain all that mind can do", and that by this "the *Psychology* comes to be very irreverently and ludicrously presumptuous".

Oh! no; not "all that mind can do", but all that mind can possibly be made to do towards an immediate perception of outward things. And surely this is very presumptuous; whether ludicrously so, we do not undertake to say. For before one can tell this, *à priori*, he must know all possible qualities of matter, all possible senses, and all that any sense can be made to do towards giving a knowledge of outward things. He must know whether such knowledge requires contact; and if so, how contact can be between mind and matter, and how contact gives knowledge; or if no contact, then he must know how knowledge can be given without contact, and all possible modes by which intercommunication can be made between matter and mind. Unless his knowledge of these things is so perfect—comprehending what mind is, and all possible ways in which it may acquire knowledge through sense—in fine, unless this *à priori* knowledge is so complete that the Creator cannot devise a way to the transcendental reason unknown—then a Rational Psychology is, by its own conditions, impossible.

Moreover, Dr. Hickok's Idea of perception involves mental processes of distinguishing, defining, and judging. Such processes involve the necessity of *memory* to hold sensations and processes until the result comes out in judgments. The *Rational Psychology* is therefore under the necessity of telling,

à priori, whether, and how, minds may be made to remember anything; and of proving the validity of memory and of its objects. In fine, how much short of "explaining all that mind can do" does the *Psychology* "undertake"? Dr. Hickok himself says (p. 26): "*Rational Psychology*"—"gives the Mind, through all its functions of intellectual agency, in the conditioning laws which control all its operations". And now he complains that he is held bound to explain how sensations can take place, and how they give knowledge, and whether and how minds may remember! just as though these were not "functions of intellectual agency"!

But Dr. Hickok now says (*American Theological Review*, p. 395), that the assumption of organs of sense, and of sensations [why are these assumed?] and then of the "operations of *distinction* and *limitation*"—"is all the *Psychology* needs or proposes", in showing whatever is "conditional for all perception". "So far and no further can distinct and definite perception be attained."

Was this all? To distinguish and limit sensations without undertaking to tell how an outward object is thereby perceived? Then the *Psychology* did not "need or propose" to do the very thing for which it was undertaken; and it has, moreover, settled the matter, that the Lord cannot make a mind that shall be able to do anything more towards perceiving an outward object, than to distinguish and limit its own sensations.

Moreover, if it had been all that the *Psychology* proposed or needed,—to suppose organs of sense, and these somehow affected, and sensations given, and then to show how a mental operation *distinguishes* the sensation from all others, and *defines* its limits and quantity,—if this were all, then all this is given in the very terms of the question; the *Psychology* is needless, and is but treading in a circle. When it is asked, *Can an intellect be made which shall be able, by sense, to know an outward object?*—organs of sense, sensations,—and sensations which the mind may distinguish as *real, particular, peculiar*,—are all involved in the terms of the inquiry. To know a thing by sense, means—not to know it by a void or

unconscious sensory, or by a "non-sensation",—but by sensation ; which of course must be distinct, peculiar and definite. Dr. Hickok, in his long and laborious process, simply gives back what was given in the terms of the inquiry. This is all that Kant accomplished in his famous Categories. Kant labored hard, and supposed he had derived them from *à priori* principles of *knowing* ; but the whole twelve were already given in the very conception of a *thing*. They were not derived from principles of *knowing* ; they were conditions of the existence, or of the conception, of a *thing* ; and would have been the same whether there had been any intellect to know it or not. They aided not in the least to show how *knowledge* may be attained. In like manner, Dr. Hickok proves, from an *à priori* investigation of all possible *intelligence*, as he supposes, that a thing for the sense can never be known save under the conditions of *time* and *space*. His pupil and advocate in the *Princeton Review* (p. 378) thinks it one of the wonderful intuitions of reason, "that matter, wherever it exists, must occupy *space*" ; and argues that this knowledge could not have come from experience. Oh ! no ; it is *given* in the very conception of a material *thing*, or of *matter*. We mean by matter, something extended and solid, filling space. Dr. Hickok's supposition of "substance in its causality", with "no adhering or cohering qualities", and so, independent of time and space, is a contradiction in terms, and simply absurd. It is of matter that is not material ; that has the quality of existing nowhere and never. Nor does it relieve him to say that it is *force* ; for such force must exist either somewhere and at some time, or nowhere and never ; and so must be the "Nothing" which President Edwards said "the sleeping rocks do dream of".

We come now to the Reason. So far, reason has been employed in making these conclusions concerning sense and understanding. But reason itself is not yet found, and is admitted to be perhaps impossible. The unfound and perhaps impossible reason now comes to the harder task of finding herself. If she fails here, all that is gone before goes for

nothing ; and we know not whether understanding, or reason, or sense, or worlds, or anything exists.

Let us observe the process. The unfound reason sees, *à priori*, that if reason is, or ever can be, she must be able to comprehend the universe of nature. Such comprehension, Dr. Hickok tells us, must include, how nature can *begin*, and how it must *end*. But, he declares, a compass for such comprehension can be given only in the Absolute [the transcendental name for God]. The reason therefore sees that its first work is to find the Absolute as an "*à priori* position for the reason". As we yet know no outward facts or worlds, we cannot attempt to know God from the things that are made. Moreover, Dr. Hickok shows at length, that we cannot begin with the things that are made, and come to the knowledge of God ; the argument, from design, and cause, and adaptation to ends, being, in his opinion, wholly unavailing. The *Psychology*, therefore, calls upon us to bid world and sense farewell. "We are thus forced, in this part of our work, to dispense with all use of the understanding, and can see, that if the supernatural can in any manner be attained, it must be in the use of the reason only."—"We make abstraction, then, utterly of all that is phenomenal ; and therefore dispense with all the functions of sense."—"The phenomenal is gone" (p. 401).

What now ? "Let there be the reason—conception of an everywhere present *force*."—"Retain what is most simple"—"the force of *gravity*."—"We shall have in this substance, with its causal laws of attraction, repulsion, inertia, impenetrability, motion by impulse, etc. ; and thus, as it were, the framework or elementary rudiments of a nature of things."—"We have in this all that is necessary for an *à priori* representation of a nature of things in itself" (p. 403). Dr. Hickok also professes to see that light, heat, polarity, electricity, magnetism,—in fine, all the cosmical arrangements of just such a world as ours must necessarily result from such a force of gravity. No wisdom is needed to plan the world ; none can be used. Force necessarily works out just such a world, and no power can hinder it, or make the cosmical arrangements of the world otherwise, if once there is a sufficient antagonistic

force. No God, therefore, had any part in *devising* the cosmical arrangements of the universe. Heat, light, electricity, polarity, the movements of the heavens,—none of these can declare a wise and designing God as their Maker. Only suppose *force*, and no knowledge, or will, or consciousness is needed; and so far the *Psychology* supposes none. It sees that force and antagonism being given, so the worlds *must* be; and that by an “eternal and unmade principle”, which “conditions all power, and is itself conditioned by no power” (p. 71). In his *Rational Cosmology* he declares at the very close (p. 384): “The principle of the generation of the material universe involved the agency of these two forces, and needed none other.” —“Nature needed nothing more for its own existence; nature uses nothing more for its onward development; nature yields nothing more to human solicitation or extortion.”

The only thing now necessary, is to account for the force. Here Dr. Hickok supposes a spirit,—the Absolute,—who simply puts his acts in counter-agency, and takes the necessary results. Dr. Hickok,—or the transcendental reason in Dr. Hickok,—professes to see, that not only just such a world must grow from such a dynamic force; but also that it is the nature of spirit to supply such force and to create matter by putting its acts into counter-agency: and that this is so inseparably the nature of spirit, that the only reason why man cannot create matter and worlds is, that he cannot put the pure acts of his pure spirit into counter-agency, *with nothing between* (*Rational Cosmology*, p. 99). His friend in the *Princeton Review* (July, p. 382) professes to see the same; and adds, that “Matter may thus be the product of spirit, and cognizable by it”; and that thus Dr. Hickok’s scheme “removes the gulf in other systems impassable between the Creator and the creature, between the knowing mind and the material objects of its knowledge”.

That is,—save on Dr. Hickok’s scheme of knowing how God may create matter, viz., by putting his acts into counter-action; and that thus matter is, not what men suppose matter to be, but mere *force*,—it is impossible for man to pass the gulf which lies between him and the knowledge of his Creator!—or to

know that there is such a thing as a material object! If we cannot tell how to create a world, or if a world can be made in any other manner than by the activity of a spirit in counter-agency with itself, then man can neither know a world or God! And spirit can know matter because matter is a product of spirit! The product of *whose* spirit? Can man know all that the spirit of God can produce or create? By the same rule the learned Professor should be able to tell us what man's spirit is in its essence.

But now can Dr. Hickok, or any other man, conceive what it is for a spirit to put his spiritual acts in forceful counter-agency with each other? Is it the activity of intelligence or thought pressing physically against another similar activity? And does this create matter? Is it the essence of the spirit pressing physically against spiritual essence? What are these "acts"? Are they entities distinct from the spirit itself in action? If so, then Dr. Hickok should tell us how to create a spiritual act, and throw it off as a distinct entity, and to put it into that "*push and pull*" with another act, which constitutes "*counter-action, complex action, and reâction*" (*Cosmology*, p. 93), and so creates matter. What is it for these acts to come into counter-action? How does Dr. Hickok know, that so they necessarily "create" an impenetrable substance? Nothing is hazarded in affirming that Dr. Hickok has no conception of any possible meaning in what he affirms. No talk of "Dynamics" or "Mathematics" reaches the case of creating matter by spiritual acts in counter-agency. Man can no more explain how God can create matter, than he can explain how he can create souls. The attempt to do either is wholly irrational.

Spirit is introduced into the scheme; but it is ascertained by no known properties or acts of spirit. No function is allowed to the supposed spirit save that of putting his acts into counter-agency. If will or choice be supposed, he has but one choice and one function of will — whether to put his acts in counter-agency. But neither choice, nor volition, nor wisdom, nor knowledge, nor consciousness is needed; for by the supposition, if the acts come into counter-agency by *chance*, or by

necessity, or while the spirit is *unconscious*, then just such a world is produced. Dr. Hickok's creation, therefore, admits no wisdom or design in arranging the cosmical universe. It demands no thought, or will, or consciousness in creating the world. It can fully account for creation, and for all the cosmical arrangements of the universe, by an antagonistic force; and no supposed spirit needs any further capacity than to supply that force; whether by chance, necessity, or by choice, or without thought, or while unconscious, can make no manner of difference. The *Psychology*, therefore, by its own conditions, comes to the simple Absolute of Schelling, who preceded Dr. Hickok in this scheme of world-making. Schelling, in his earlier scheme, needed only a blind, unconscious Absolute striving necessarily and unconsciously after a necessary self-development, and he could tell, *à priori*, how this must produce not only matter and worlds, but thought and reason too: for he professed to see that stones, brains, thought, minerals, and reason are all the same in substance, and necessarily produced by two forces in counter-action; the unity of which forces constitutes the Absolute,—the only, but the unthinking and unconscious God!

Moreover, on Dr. Hickok's scheme, what are the acts of a spirit which come into the supposed counter-action? They can be nothing save the spirit himself in action, forcefully impinging against himself. The Creator himself, in counter-agency with himself, is, on this scheme, himself the world he makes, and so we end in Pantheism. The *Rational Psychology*, as well as the *Rational Cosmology*, must, in this matter, logically and necessarily range itself with the German rationalistic philosophy, with no logical capacity to reach anything at last, save an Ideal world and a Pantheistic God. Let it be distinctly understood, that we speak only of the necessary *logical* results, and of the *logical capacity* of the scheme. Dr. Hickok himself is not a Pantheist; he is opposing Pantheism; but in doing this, he has fallen upon a method, and adopted principles, which can logically lead to no results save Idealism and Pantheism.

Dr. Hickok's friend in the *Princeton Review* supposes that

he saves the scheme from Pantheism by making creation limited, thus :

"But not every spirit, — not the finite can create. They are already limited. Only the Absolute Spirit can make his act react upon itself, and thus produce a force which is truly his creation. And now that our idea of creation involves exactly this process, is clearly seen. For either creation is limited, or it is not. If we take the latter ground, we are both absurd and unchristian ; for this is Pantheism, and we thus identify the Creator and the creature" (p. 382).

This is a new view of Pantheism, viz., that it consists in making creation unlimited ; so that if Dr. Hickok's supposition of "an everywhere present force" were to be followed by that force "everywhere" in counter-agency, it would make a creation as extensive as the Creator, and so be Pantheism ; while a world made by the same process is distinct from the Creator, and not "unchristian", if the counter-agency be limited at a point !

Dr. Hickok's friend continues : "But if we affirm the former position, what is this but declaring that the activity of the Creator restrained itself at the point where creation began, and that this self-imposed restraint is exactly what we mean by creation ?" A very exact definition of the act of creation ! But is it so ? Is there then no world save the "activity of the Creator"—"restraining *itself*", and putting *itself* under "self-imposed restraint"—at a "point" ? If he restrained himself equally everywhere, it would, on this scheme, make world everywhere, and so make it identical with himself ; and this supposition would be quite unchristian and Pantheistic. Limiting the counter-agency to a point makes a wide difference !

Dr. Hickok's plan is somewhat differently expressed, thus :

"The Creator must be conceived as — 'he who ever is, and yet never exists' (*Cosmology*, p. 97). 'He puts his simple activity in counter-agency. He makes act meet, and hold act—and in this originates an antagonistic force, a *new thing*, a something standing out for objective manifestation.' — 'This force fixes itself in position ; holds itself at rest. Its very existence is a *vis inertia*, or a force actively holding itself still'" (*Cosmology*, p. 101).

According to the *Psychology*, there is no other matter than

this. This constitutes the "very existence" of matter. The "*simple activity*" of the Creator in a state of counter-agency, can be none other than the Creator himself in a state of counteraction. This constitutes "the very existence of the force", which is all the matter and all the world there is!

The reviewer had supposed that God could not be limited to the necessity of creating a world only by putting his acts into counter-agency, and of taking the necessary results; but that he had some choice, and could exercise some wisdom in plans of endless possible variety. Thereupon Professor Lewis charges him with directly holding that "the principles of morality are changeable", and that "if God should command us to hate one another, then malevolence would be right instead of love, deceit would be holy instead of truth". The reviewer, however, had said nothing of the kind, nor any thing touching or involving the principles of morality. His remarks were expressly limited to the "Cosmical arrangements" of the universe. The charge of Professor Lewis was wholly gratuitous, without the slightest foundation of any kind. Dr. Hickok, however, undertakes to vindicate and aggravate the charge, as necessarily involved in the reviewer's principle. He insists that if God has any power of choosing otherwise in making a world, than to put his acts in counter-agency, and take the necessary results; or if it is possible for God to exercise any choice or wisdom, or to vary the plan in forming the cosmical arrangements of the universe, then this "involves the power of contrary choice with a vengeance. Not merely does it involve the doctrine of power to the opposite when the strongest motive in the greatest happiness is applied, but power to the opposite in God, when the claim of principle in his own glory and dignity is applied" (*American Theological Review*, p. 403).

How, from the mere physical principles determining the results of spiritual acts in forceful counter-agency, one can draw such conclusions concerning the field of Will and Morals, is not very apparent. But it is apparent how absolutely, in Dr. Hickok's scheme, the Creator is debarred from all exercise of choice and wisdom, save on the sole question whether to put

his acts in counter-agency. On this scheme the Heavens declare the glory, not of God, but of acts in counter-action. Day unto day uttereth no speech, and night unto night showeth forth no knowledge, of God, but only of the "eternal and unmade principle" that "conditioned" all his power. How abundantly the cropping out of a Pantheistic substratum appears all over this scheme!*

So far the *Psychology* has told only how the world could *begin*. Now reason comes to tell *à priori* of the world's career, and how it must *end*.

"A race of beings⁸ compounded of the material, sentient, and moral", may be created, "and thus that which is personal becomes incarnate—the free subjected to the colliding action of the necessitated" (p. 457).

The "compounding" of the material with the sentient and moral, was an incomprehensible mystery to philosophers in all past time. With all the aids of experience, none could solve that mystery. But Dr. Hickok comprehends the possibility of it *à priori*! He derives nothing from experience; he has made abstraction utterly of sense. Why will not Dr. Hickok explain the manner and the *à priori* possibility of such a compound? Dr. Hickok proceeds:

* But Dr. Hickok supposes that an *à priori* philosophy can do the same for "animal and vegetable forces", as for worlds. In his *Cosmology* he carries out this idea, and professes to explain what *life* is, and how vegetables and animals are made. Life is "*a simple, spiritual activity*", which has no "*where*" nor "*when*", p. 235. "All unconscious of its wants, and of the adaptations in material forces for its supply and relief, yet will the activity go out spontaneously to its appropriate material forces". "The spiritual activity combines with such material activities as it finds fitted to its wants". "Matter and spirit are in this truly blended, and the life force is no longer merely spiritual activity, and the matter is no longer mere gross mechanism, but this third thing, as a mere substance, is indifferently either life embodied or matter vitalized" (p. 237). "The whole body must be built up as a self-realizing product of the spirit" (p. 238). In plants the spirit builds on the outside. "The first and great peculiarity of the animal organism must be, *that the vital force be transferred altogether from the surface to the inside*" (p. 246). "The antagonist and diremptive forces make the material world, and the assimilative forces make the vital world, and the vital in the material builds up its own body *superficially as the plant*"—"also builds up a body about itself *from the inside, as the animal*" (p. 252). And this professes to be *Rational Cosmology*!

"Sin may enter"—"somewhere below the Creator, and from finite personality, inasmuch as no colliding want can reach the Absolute, and sin enter through him".

Is this the reason why God can do no wrong; not because he is holy, but because no "colliding want" can reach him?

"What he may do, he will do to exclude sin, both in the use of sentient nature as a penalty, and, when sin has entered, as a tabernacle for divinity to set forth a propitiation" (p. 458).

Wonderful! Nothing can be a faculty of reason that shall not be able to tell *à priori* that when man has sinned, God "*will make use of sentient nature, as a tabernacle for Divinity to set forth a propitiation*"! Wonderful! The transcendental reason has no Bible for all this! The phenomenal is gone! Reason, if reason ever is or can be, must be able to tell *à priori* of Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement!—mysteries which, from the beginning of the world, have been hid in God. Why should man, with such a faculty of reason, ever need a Bible? Are there any deeper mysteries than these, that should render revelation necessary?

One thing more the reason is required to tell *à priori*, under penalty of never being acknowledged as reason; that is, that the world shall end with a chorus of glory and honor to Him that sitteth on the throne, and to the Lamb (p. 459).

And now, having found the *à priori* idea of reason, we are to proceed and find the reason itself:

"So far, the all-comprehending reason is only a void conception. So it *may* be; so, if at all, it *must* be; but that so it *is*, we have yet to find. Our remaining task is, that we take any facts", etc. — "First, in the physical system."

Facts! In the physical system! We know not yet that there are any. We are to find the reason for the very purpose of learning whether it is possible to know any facts, or any thing physical. But now, alas, reason cannot be found unless we can first find the facts! And facts cannot be found until after the finding of the reason! Here our transcendental car, in which we were soaring into regions beyond all matter,

and before all worlds, suddenly collapses, and Rational Psychology comes to an end.

As well here as anywhere; for before we could find the reason, we were to find, *as a fact*, the ending of the world with a chorus of glory and honor. But this could not be found as a fact till the period comes. The finding of the reason then—even had our transcendental car met with no destructive accident—must have been adjourned till the end of the world. While the world stands, it is, on the principles of the *Rational Psychology*, impossible for man to know anything. And this is the philosophy, so much better adapted than the Bible, to meet the growing skepticism of the age. Dr. Hickok says (*American Theological Review*, p. 409):

“But why go this roundabout with the skeptic through the difficult paths of philosophy? Why not go at once to the highest of all testimony in divine Revelation? We answer, well—best of all; if so be the skeptic will take heaven’s testimony, and be wise by what is written. But in most cases, in all matured cases, the skeptic has shut the Bible as a book of infallible teaching. The man who doubts an Objective world, or a personal God who made and governs it, is not in a state where it is to be expected that he shall read the Bible profitably and believingly. If he should, he would still need the rational teaching, as above, if not for his own sake, at least for many remaining skeptics who will not otherwise follow biblical teaching as he did.”

Alas! will this “rational teaching” persuade those “who will not otherwise follow biblical teaching”? For ourselves, we greatly prefer to approach any man that lives, with “the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God”. The Gospel is still “the power of God unto salvation”. If any will not believe Moses and the prophets, and the Son of God, we have no confidence that they can be reached by any philosophy. But *this* philosophy! We fancy we hear the spirit of skepticism crying out, as did the evil spirit to the exorcists of old: “Jesus I know, and Paul I know, but who are ye?”

ART. III.—ON THE RELIGION OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS.

By J. A. VAN HEUVEL, Ogdensburgh, N. Y.

THE American Continent, when discovered, was inhabited through its whole extent, excepting Mexico and Peru, by rude and barbarous nations in the earliest state of society. Being dissimilar in many respects to the people of the old world, having a different complexion and peculiar manners, curiosity as to their customs was strongly excited in those who arrived among them, and many accounts of them appeared. But these, while they described their mode of life, dress, domestic usages, wars, and whatever else was open to their notice, paid but little attention to their religious ideas, which, in general, they are studious to conceal. Missionaries even, sent among them, more intent on imbuing them with a correct faith than inquiring into their belief, and which, looking upon them as possessing scarce any more understanding than the beasts of the forest around them, they considered little deserving of notice, have given very imperfect views of their religion. From this remark is to be excepted Lafitan, who was a missionary in Canada more than a century ago, and possessed a great store of learning, which enabled him to compose his very erudite work, *Mœurs des Sauvages de l'Amérique comparées aux ceux de l'Antiquité* (Manners of the American Indians, compared with those of Ancient Times), and who refers to this very defect in the relations of them that had been given: "I have seen with regret that in most of the accounts written of the Indians, they are described as men without any sense of religion, any knowledge of God, any object of worship. This is a fault even of the missionaries, who wrote with too much haste of things they did not sufficiently understand. They

contradict themselves in their writings; for, while they assert that the American Indians have no worship or Divinity which they adore, they, at the same time, relate circumstances which denote that they have both a Divinity and a worship."

Later travellers and missionaries, possessing more erudition than the earlier, except the writer just mentioned, have paid greater attention to the religion of the American Aborigines, and, in incidental notices, have corrected erroneous impressions regarding it in several respects. But the materials furnished by them have not been made use of by any writer to present a general view of it. This we propose to do, believing the information that we have acquired of them in this respect from all that has been published will be interesting to all, and especially to theological inquirers.

First we propose to establish, on the firmest ground, their belief in the Supreme Being, the Creator and Governor of the world.

And first we present the account given by Lafitan, who says: "All the Indian nations of America, whether nomade or sedentary, have strong and energetic expressions, which denote one God, whom they term the Great Spirit, sometimes Master and Author of Life".*

Lorkiel, who was also a missionary among the Northern Indians, says the prevailing opinion of all these nations is, that there is one God, or, as they call him, one Great Spirit, who has created the heavens and the earth, and made every other creature.†

The Hurons, says Lafitan, term the Supreme Being Areskoné, and the Iroquois, Agreskoné. These names they also apply to the sun. But they have other names for the Supreme Being, which they apply to him alone.

The Lenni Lenape or Delawares, who were spread through Pennsylvania, their historian, Heckewelder, who was a missionary among them, says, instruct their children that they are indebted to a great, good, and benevolent Spirit, who has not

* *Mœurs des Sauvages de l'Amerique*, vol. i, p. 114.

† *History of Missions*, pp. 35, 36.

only given them life, but has ordained them for certain great purposes.*

The Knisteneaux, says Mackenzie, believe in the existence of the Great Master of Life.†

Winslow, of the New England Indians, says: "They owned one Supreme Being, who was the Creator of the Heavens and the Earth".‡

Harriot, in his Account of the people of Virginia, observes—they believed in many gods of different degrees, but in one Supreme Being, who was from eternity, and made the world.§

Harmon, in his Journal, observes: "All the different tribes of Indians, east of the Rocky Mountains, believe in the existence of one Supreme Being, the Creator and Governor of the world, whom they call Kitchi-Manito, or the Great Spirit. They consider him the author of all good".

Many other quotations might be made in regard to the Indian nations of North America, but we add only further the explicit testimony of Henry R. Schoolcraft, Esq., the most eminent antiquarian in the United States, and whose authority must be considered decisive, as he resided twenty years among them: "All the tribes in the United States acknowledge themselves in the hands of the Good Spirit, feel a conviction that all things come from him, that he loves them, and that, although he allows them to suffer, he will again supply them".||

Passing now to the Mexicans, who were a demi-civilized nation, Clavigero says: "They worshipped a Supreme absolute and independent Being, to whom they paid fear and adoration. They believed him to be invisible, and named him only by the common appellation of God, in their language Teoth".¶ Humboldt remarks: "The principal divinity of the Toltecs (who were in Mexico before the Aztecs, the ancestors of the present Mexicans), was called Tlalocautli. He was at once

* Vol. i., *American Phil. Transactions*, Phila.

† *Travels in Canada*, vol. i, pp. 155, etc.

‡ *Purchas*, vol. iv, book x, ch. 5.

§ *Origines Sacrae*, vol. ii, p. 596.

| *History of the Indian Tribes of the United States*, vol. ii, p. 77

¶ *History of Mexico*, vol. i, pp. 241, 242.

the god of waters, of mountains, and of tempests. In the eyes of the mountaineers, it is only on a lofty summit, perpetually enveloped in clouds, that the mysterious preparation of thunder takes place. There the abode of the Great Spirit Teoth is fixed—of that invisible Being who is self-existent and contains all things in himself”.*

In South-America, we find the same universal belief of a Supreme Being.

First of the Peruvians, Acosta says: “The Peruvians generally hold and acknowledge a Supreme Sovereign, author of all things, whom they call Viracocha, and give him names of great excellence. It is him whom they adore as the greatest of every thing, and whom they honor by looking up to heaven”.†

“The Araucanians of Chili,” says Molina, “acknowledge a Supreme Being, called Pillan, a word derived from Pulli or Pilli, the Soul, and signifies the Supreme Essence”.‡

The Caribees are an important nation in South America. They are the most numerous and powerful one on the river Orinoco, and are spread through all the European provinces on the Atlantic, between it and the Amazon. In Cayenne, they are called Galibis, by a change of two of the consonants in their name. A number of years since, I passed some time in one of these provinces (British Guiana), and obtained some facts regarding them, from which and information I since collected of them from travellers early and modern, I have written a particular history of this nation, which is now awaiting publication, from which I take the following particulars:

They term the Supreme Being *Tamouzi*, Annula *Tamouzi-Cabo*—Ancient of Heaven. They sometimes say *Tamouzi-Baba*, Ancient Father—expressions which call to mind the appellation Ancient of Days given to the Deity in the Old Testament. They are of a grave and serious character, and frequently sit absorbed in deep reflection. On these occasions when spoken to by a person, they make no reply, and after-

* *Equinoctial Researches*.

† *Nat. and Civil History of America*, vol. v, chap. 5.

‡ *History of Chili*, vol. ii.

wards, as an explanation, say, they were thinking on Tamouzi.

All physical calamities, hurricanes, earthquakes, pestilence, famine, etc., they attribute to Hyorocan, the Evil Spirit. But when thunder is heard, they say it is not the word of Hyorocan, but the Great God who made the sun, moon, earth, and all mankind.

Of the Galibes a traveller in Cayenne relates that one of their chiefs said to him that there were certain days on which they assembled to speak about the Good Being.*

Of the Brazilians, Southey, in his *History of Brazil*, says, Toupan is their name for father, for the Supreme Being, and for thunder. De Lery observes, those who first made voyages to Brazil relate, that when they spoke to them of God, they said to one another it is Toupan, and the same word means thunder. . . . They show the inward veneration they have of him when it thunders, which they call the Voice of the Supreme Essence.† In their connection of thunder with the Deity, as well as that of the Caribees, we are reminded of several places in the Old Testament, containing the same idea, among others these: Psalm xviii, 13, "The Lord also thundered in the heavens, and the most Highest gave his voice;" and Exodus xxi, 18, 19: "And all the people saw the thunderings and lightnings, etc. . . . and when they saw it, they removed and stood afar off. And they said unto Moses, Speak thou with us and we will hear, and let not God speak with us, lest we die."

Although it has been made evident that the aboriginal nations of America generally, if not universally, believe in a Supreme Being, the Creator of the heavens and the earth, yet there are writers and even missionaries, who, while they admit they have this belief, say that they pay no worship to him, considering him to be so far above the world that he takes no concern in human affairs, and of such great benevolence that he never inflicts punishment on men, and hence that there is no necessity to propitiate him by prayers. This

* Aublet.

† Purchas: *Collection of Voyages*.

opinion has hence been always generally entertained of the American Indians. Their public acts of religion have been supposed to consist solely as idolaters in the adoration of the sun and moon, and of inferior spirits; and, it is said, they never made addresses or supplications to the Supreme Being.

But this idea will be shown to be fully unfounded in regard to all the aboriginal nations of America, from Canada to Patagonia.

Charlevoix, though he says of the Indians of Canada, that they pay no adoration to the Deity, yet observes there are traces, though almost effaced, of a religious worship which they appear to have formerly rendered to the Supreme Being.*

Champlain, who discovered the river St. Lawrence, says of some of the Indians upon it, that they pray in their minds to God.†

Later travellers and missionaries among the Indians have furnished the most abundant testimony that they address prayers and invocations to their Great Spirit.

The Delawares or Lenni Lenape of Pennsylvania, says their historian, are accustomed to ascend a high mountain and pray to the Great Spirit.

"The Knisteneaux," says Harmon, "address prayers to the Creator and Governor of the world, whom they call Kitchi Manitoes."‡

When the Iroquois go to war, they invoke the assistance of the Great Spirit in a war-song, which is given by Heckewelder, of which the following is the conclusion: "O thou Great Spirit above! . . . give me strength and courage to meet my enemy; suffer me to return again to my children, to my wife, and to my relations. Take pity on me, and preserve my life, and I will make to thee a sacrifice". Accordingly, after a successful war, they never fail to offer a sacrifice to the Great Spirit.

The following is the war-song of the Wyandots, from the same author: "Now I am going on an errand of pleasure.

* *Travels in Canada.*

† *Purchas.*

‡ *Harmon's Journal.*

O God! take pity on me, and throw good fortune in my way. Grant that I may be successful."

Attention will now be given to the South American Nations.

The Indians on the Orinoco, says Gumilla, who was a Spanish missionary on this river, "when in affliction, raise their eyes to heaven, and say, according to their several languages, Ayaddi, Acayi, Ayo, Paya! etc., expressions which they use to implore the favor of Heaven."*

The Indians on the Upper Orinoco, says Humboldt, worship a Good Spirit, who regulates the times and seasons, and the harvest.†

The Galibis in Cayenne, says a traveller, are accustomed to ascend a mountain, and pray with fervor to Tamouzi or God.‡ Early every morning the Caribees of British Guiana, while yet lying in their hammocks, offer silent prayers, or pray in their minds to Tamouzi.§

"The Brazilians," says Henderson, "acknowledge the existence of a Great Spirit, to whom they sing hymns of praise."

The Patagonians pray to their Chief Spirit, whom they call the Lord of the dead and the Creator of all things.||

In Adair's *History of the Southern Indians of the United States*, Creeks, Cherokees, Chickasaws, etc., written in the last century, is the following account: "The Indians deem the curing of the sick or wounded a religious duty, and it is chiefly performed by their supposed prophets or magi, because they believe they are inspired with a great portion of divine fire. On these occasions they sing *Yo-Yo* in a low bass key for two or three minutes very rapidly, in like manner *He-He*, and *Wa-Wa*. They then transpose and accent the words with great vehemence. These three words put together make *Yohewa*, which is very like the Hebrew *Jehovah*."

We have discovered a number of other instances not noticed

* *History of the Orinoco*, chap. 26.

† *Travels in South America*, vol. iv, p. 278.

‡ Barrere.

§ MS. notes of the author.

|| Bradford: *American Antiquities*, p. 344.

before by any writer, in which, without any conjecture or doubt, the name of the Supreme Being, Jehovah, is used by the American Indians in their invocations to the Great Spirit. Previous to presenting these, some introductory remarks will be proper.

Dr. Wiseman, in his lectures *On the Connection between Science and Revealed Religion*, observes: "The ineffable name of the Jews, which we pronounce Jehovah, is to be found variously distorted in the mythology of many heathen nations". It was sometimes written Jao. Amongst the Jews, says Diodorus Siculus, was Moses, who called God by the name of Jao. From this divine name, says Calmet, the Greeks had then Iy Iy in their invocations to the gods, or, as it is pronounced in English, J-e.*

Higgins, in his *Origin of the Celtic Druids*, observes: "Through all the heathen nations everywhere, I could trace the worship of the God Jehovah or Jene. . . . The name was pronounced among the Celtic Druids under the letters, Jy, Je, or Jah, and the island Jy or Ji or the Sacred Isle".

The name Jehovah was sometimes pronounced by the Jews Hoo. In a work published in New York some years since, entitled *Joseph and Benjamin*, by Rev. J. C. F. Frey, a converted Hebrew, are the following remarks: "Hoo is one of the names of God, a contraction of Jehovah, and so used in Psalm cii, 27, 'but thou art the same'; original, *Weathta Hoo*, that is, thou art Jehovah; and in Isaiah, xlvi, 12, *Ani Hoo*, I am Jehovah. Our people frequently use Hoo for the name of God".

The Turks frequently use the name Hu or Hou, which has almost always the same signification as Jehovah, that is, "He who is". They place his name in the beginning of their rescripts, passports, and letters patent; pronounced often in their prayers, crying out Hon, Hou, Hou, with all their strength.†

Their ordinary name for God is "Allah", but in marching to battle, their war-cry, by which they invoke his assistance, is Allah Hu, the last syllable being dwelt on longer, which gives it a very wild and peculiar effect.‡

* Robinson's Calmet. † Robinson's Calmet. ‡ Notes to *Childe Harold* of Byron.

Col. C. H. Smith, in his *Natural History of the Human Species*, observes: "The verification of the many epithets of *Hu*, and the spinning dance, according to Taliessin, was well known to the Druids".

De la Mottraye, describing the funerals of the modern Jews in Asia, says, if the deceased were a married man, his wife, with many other friends, says to him, Why didst thou die, He, He, He, He, etc. Hadst thou not a faithful wife who loved thee, Hu, Hu, Hu, etc.*

We shall now produce a number of instances in which the word He or Hoo is used by the American Indians in their invocations to the Great Spirit or Supreme Being.

The war assembly of the Iroquois is thus described by Lafitau. The chief, addressing his Divinity, says: "I invoke thee to be favorable to my undertaking, and have pity on me and my family; also all spirits, good and bad, to preserve me and my party, that we may, after a successful expedition, return to our country". All answer *Ho, Ho*, which is repeated after every invocation and prayer which he makes. He then begins the war-song and dance, striking one of the posts with his war-club, to which all answer with their *He, He*.†

When the Northern Indians, says the Bishop of Meaux, set out on their expeditions, as soon as all the warriors are embarked, the canoes first go a little way and arrange themselves together upon a line; then the chief rises, and holding a *chichikoné* or rattle in his hand, thunders out his war-song, and his soldiers answer him with a treble *He*, drawn from the bottom of their souls.‡

The American Indians, it is well known, on setting out on their march, utter a loud Hoo. This has been commonly thought an unmeaning exclamation; but it is clearly an invocation to the Great Spirit. The writer, from whom the last quotation is taken, makes also the following remarks: "The Indians have their god of war; but this being is no other than the Great Spirit, and who is particularly invoked in their war-songs. Before a battle, and in the midst of an engagement,

* *Travels in Asia*.

† Vol. iii, p. 198.

‡ *Origin of the North American Indians*, by John McIntosh, M.D., Quebec.

his name is the *war-cry*. Upon the march also they frequently repeat it by way of encouragement to each other, and to implore his assistance. L'Abbé Perrin says, that before an Indian engagement the warriors raise a most hideous yell, with which they address the God of battle, looking at the same time upwards, as if in the greatest solicitude to behold his mightiness in the heavens".

"The Dog-ribbed Indians", says Hearne (*Account of a Journey to the North Sea*), "accompany the music either of a drum or rattle, with the frequent repetition of the words Hee, Hee, Hee, Ho, Ho, Ho, etc., which, dwelling longer on one word, and shorter on another, and raising and lowering the voice, produces something like a tune".

Mr. Catlin, in his travels west of the Mississippi, relates that at a feast given by the Sioux to the Indian Agent, the chief, after he had directed his pipe to the four quarters of the globe, and then to the sun, exclaimed Hoo, Hoo.

A person who had been at Montreal said to me, when the Indians from the interior come to it and remain some time, when they break up their camp and commence their journey home, they exclaim Hoo, which must be considered a prayer to the Great Spirit for his protection on their way.

Champlain gives the following account of the Algonquins, on the river St. Lawrence. At a feast, after a war, given by them and two other tribes, the Algonquins caused all the women to sit in ranks, and they stood behind them singing. Their songs ended, they cried with one voice, Ho, Ho, Ho. Their sagamo or chief sat before the women, between two staves, on which were hung their enemies' heads, and exhorted them to the like significations of joy, who then cried altogether, Ho, Ho, Ho.* This ceremony appears to be a thanksgiving, offered after a victory, to the Great Spirit.

In South America we find the words He, He, used among the Brazilians in their ceremony for infusing the spirit of courage related by De Lery. "Six hundred persons were assembled, who divided themselves into three parties. The men went into one house, the women into another, and the children

* Purchas.

into a third. We were commanded to remain with the women. Presently the men began crying Hee, Hee, Hee, which was answered by the women in the same words. They sung or howled thus for a quarter of an hour, shaking their breasts and foaming at their mouths, some falling down in a swoon. The children followed in the same manner. Then the men formed themselves into three rings, in each of which were three or four caraiibes (their priests), who blew upon those around the smoke of tobacco, saying, Receive ye all the Spirit of Courage.”*

The Brazilians, says the same writer, are in great dread of the Evil Spirit, who they believe inflicts blows on them, “and are heard exclaiming Hei, Hei, Aignan (the Evil Spirit) is hurting me”, which appears to be addressed to some superior power for assistance. It may be remarked that Hei, Hei, are the very Latin words used as an exclamation, and in the same double form, with the meaning as given in the dictionary, “Ah, Alas, denoting sorrow, fear, etc.”, which had perhaps originally the same signification as, when in distress, we say, God help me.

An endeavor will now be made to explain how the word Jehovah came among the American Indians in the form of Hoo or He, He.

The Scriptures inform us that all mankind sprung from one stock; that after the deluge Noah and his sons, Shem, Ham, and Japhet, were collected on the plain of Shinar, and in their attempt to build the tower of Babel, “whose top should reach to the heavens”, were confounded in their speech, and dispersed over the world. In this dispersion the portion which proceeded to the East, in course of time, passing through Asia, may have crossed over to the American Continent. The descendants of Noah, on the plain of Shinar, before the confusion of tongues, spoke one language. This may have been the Hebrew, and on their dispersion, though the families in which they were divided spoke different languages, might carry with them some of the words of the common tongue; and it might be considered almost certain they would retain the name of God or Jehovah. The Hebrew word for father—Aba—was thus car-

* Purchas.

ried with them on their migrations. It is found in the languages of three Asiatic nations. In that of the Turks, it is *Baba*; in that of the Calmuca, *Babai*; in the Malayan tongue, *Bapa*.* It is also found in two American languages. The word of the Caribees of South America, for father, is *Baba*.† With the Omaguas, on the river Amazon, it is the same, *Baba*.‡ The initial letter B in these words, is no part of the root of the word, but a prefix. In Asiatic and American languages, a consonant is sometimes put before a word beginning with a vowel.

The American Indians have no statues or images of the Supreme Being, though they have idols of their inferior Good Spirits. This is not only true of the uncivilized tribes, but even of the Mexicans. "He was left unrepresented by any image, because they believed him to be invisible."

Neither among the American nations, barbarous or civilized, is there a temple dedicated to the Most High, except a single one in Peru. "There was in Peru", says Acosta, "a sumptuous temple called Pachacamac, which is the name they give to the Supreme Sovereign and Creator of all things". Garcilasso states that it was not built by the Peruvians, and when asked the reason, they replied that they had never seen him, wherefore they built no temples for his worship, nor offered him sacrifices, and that they regarded him as "the unknown God".§

Of the temple Pachacamac, Von Tschudi, in his work, *Travels in Peru*, gives the following account: "Lurin was situated five leagues from the capital. The village stands about five thousand paces from the margin of the sea-shore. Previous to the Spanish conquest, the valley of Lurin was one of the most populous parts of the coast of Peru. The whole of the valley was then called Pachacamac, because near the sea-shore and northward of the river there was a temple sacred to the Creator of the earth. Pachacamac was the great deity of the Yungas, who did not worship the Sun until their subju-

* Klaproth: *Asia Polyglotta*.

† MS. *History of the Caribees*.

‡ *Vater's Mithridates*.

§ Bradford, *American Antiquities*, cites Garcilasso, vol. i, p. 61.

gation by the Incas, who destroyed the temple which the Yungas had worshipped". To this he gives the following notes : The word Pachacamac signifies, "he who made the world out of nothing". It is compounded of *Pacha*, the earth, and *Camac*, the participle present of *Caman*, to produce something out of nothing.

This is a most remarkable relation, from its applying to the Supreme Being the same description as given in the Bible, *he who made the world out of nothing*, and it is a most interesting inquiry who were the people by whom this temple was built.

It is the opinion of Dr. Hyde, in his very erudite work, *De Religione Veterum Persarum*, that Ophir, to which Solomon's fleet sailed, was on the coast of Peru, and it may be that this part of it was the place to which it came. Other writers have entertained a different opinion ; but there are some reasons to consider the hypothesis of Dr. Hyde not altogether improbable.

In 2 Chronicles, chapter viii, 18, we read : "And Hiram (King of Tyre) sent him (Solomon) by the hands of his servants ships, and servants that had knowledge of the sea ; and they went with the servants of Solomon to Ophir, and took thence four hundred and fifty talents of gold". In 2 Chronicles, chapter ix, 21, it is said : "Once every three years came the ships of Tarshish bringing gold, and silver, ivory, and apes, and peacocks".

Ophir and Tarshish are then the same. Where was it ? As mariners were furnished by Hiram, who had knowledge of the sea, and the voyage was made once only in every three years, it must be some distant country. Dr. Robertson supposes Ophir was on the eastern coast of Africa. Heeren, in his *Commerce, etc., of the Ancients*, is of the same opinion. But this supposition will not agree with mariners being furnished Solomon, "who had the knowledge of the sea", that is, experienced navigators, for ordinary seamen would have answered. The fleet sailed from Ezur Geber, at the head of the Red Sea, and it might have steered along the western shore of that sea, and then along the coterminous coast of Africa, having the land always in sight, that is, coasting along. Josephus thinks Ophir was in the East Indies, as all the articles brought in Solomon's fleet may be found there. Acosta and some

other writers are of this opinion. It is objected to Dr. Hyde's hypothesis, that ivory could not be obtained in Peru, as there are no elephants there; nor could peacocks. But both may have been obtained by the fleet in trading along the coasts of India, stopping at different places in going to or returning from Peru.

Solomon's fleet made frequent voyages to Ophir or Tarshish, for we read, "once in *every* three years came the ships of Tarshish, bringing gold and silver". The Phœnicians furnished by Hiram were only the mariners. The rest of the ships' company were Jews. "Servants of Solomon", it is said, "went with the fleet". They were, without doubt, those employed in the business of the expedition, trading at the places at which the fleet stopped, and it may be considered very probable that some would be left in Peru, if it was Ophir, to collect gold and silver, and procure provisions for every return voyage of the fleet. Hence, an establishment of Jews would be made on the coast of Peru, and if so, they would not fail to preserve their religion and its rites, and might erect a temple to the God of Israel.

This is but a conjecture, but it seems the only explanation that can be made of the extraordinary fact on which we have remarked. The Temple Pachacamac was the only temple dedicated to the Supreme Being in all Peru. There were numerous religious edifices in it, but they were all designed for the worship of the Sun. It was, besides, not built by the Peruvians. It must therefore have been built by a foreign nation. And who could this nation be? Is there any along the whole borders of the Pacific, or in the islands of the Hindus, Chinese, Japanese, Polynesians, etc., whose religion was connected with gross idolatrous rites, who could have erected a temple free from all idolatry, dedicated to the Supreme Being? By whom, but by the Jews, could such a temple have been erected; and who else could have applied to the Supreme Being the designation of him in the Holy Scriptures, "He who made the world out of nothing"!

In a future article will be presented the results of investigations upon the belief of the Indians in inferior good spirits, including an examination of their system of idolatry.

ART. IV.—THE HERETICAL GNOSIS.—By R. BAXMANN.

Translated from the *Deutsche Zeitschrift*, by Rev. ERSKINE N. WHITE, Richmond, Staten Island.

To one of our Church historians, whose life, alas! was but too brief for the interests of learning, there is a remark attributed to the effect, that in his studies he had not exhausted the subject of the first three centuries of Christianity; and, moreover, that in regard to these, he had never permitted himself to say a single decisive word concerning any of the questions at issue between the conflicting theories of Neander and Baur.

Of these two theories, one inclines to trace out the internal, personal life of Christianity, while the other would narrow down its historical form to the limits of an assumed development. Their opposition is of such a nature, that it reaches beyond the first three centuries, presenting itself, for example, most distinctly, in their diverse conceptions of Augustine; in regard to which point, however, the view of Neander unquestionably seems to us more speculative than that of Baur,* favorable as is the latter towards Pelagianism. The disagreement between these two leaders, naturally enough, reappears among their disciples, and the contest burns most hotly in the department of New Testament criticism. In order, for example, to leave as little and as late testimony as possible for the Gospel of John, the Gnostics, many of whom seemed to the disciples of Neander to bear weighty testimony to the lately-discovered *Philosophoumena* of Pseudo-Origen, have been very differently interpreted by the Tübingen school, so that the fourth Gospel might appear to have been promulgated in the stream of completed Gnosticism. Those, on the one side,

* Theologisches Lit.-Blatt, 1860. Nr. 15.

in pretended possession of the "strictest method" would, as a matter of course, from the character of their "method", reproach those on the other, with a vague and cloudy idea of historical development, because they were unwilling to give up the idea that the paths of life are often wonderfully intricate. We cannot here decide the question which of the two methods is preferable, but it is certain that each of the two masters learned something from the other, and so may also their respective schools. Perhaps, then, at some future day, the fundamental difference, which unquestionably still exists, may be removed.

This fundamental difference has been pretty clearly defined in a controversy between Gelzer and Baur.* Gelzer supposed that the momentous quarrel in regard to boundary, between church and school, life and speculation, must be adjusted,—not in the way of a forced reaction, but in the spirit of a thorough and liberal reorganization, which should as truly include within its scope the spiritual strength of the school, as the energetic life of the church. Dr. Baur, on the other hand, expressed his decided disbelief in the possibility of any such reorganization, on the ground that the entire form of the church of our day is opposed to such an end, resting as it does, like a mountain, upon the free development of our culture. We may thank Neander and those who were, and are, of his opinion, that faith in the possibility of ending these complications has not yet perished. This faith is strengthened and animated, by looking back upon the history of the church; for, as in the second and third centuries, the church came out victorious from the hazardous conflict with heathen religions and with philosophy clothed in the form of Christianity, so now, she may still place confidence in the powers of the world to come. Moreover, in the eyes of Neander, his opposition to the New-Tübingen school was founded in just the same principle which arrayed the early orthodox church-teachers against the false Gnosis; and accordingly, he would defend the simple, straightforward belief in Christianity against a spiritual *aristocratism*, which ever tries to sublimate the simple sub-

* Prot. Monatsblätter, 1861, p. 6.

stance of faith into the sphere of abstract conceptions, i. e. to explain it away. Hence Neander's interest and zeal in the contest waged against what he considered the false Gnosis, revived in a Hegelian form, and with the ancient aspects of which his earliest and favorite studies had made him, long before, so well acquainted (Berlin, 1818). Of course he was only confirmed in this view by the fact that Baur himself (in 1835) began his "Christian Gnosis" with the old Gnostics, and traced it down to Jacob Böhme, nay, even to Schleiermacher, Schelling, and Hegel; just as if the new dogmatic theology and philosophy admitted those heretics into their family line. The close connection between the substance of the studies, and the peculiar principles, of these two distinguished investigators of the Gnosis, explains the interest which attaches itself to these researches as related to current philosophical and ecclesiastical questions. It must suffice, however, for the simple historian, to trace the gradual manner in which the questions, that in the early centuries were obscured by the fermentation of their elements, have, since Neander's time, settled into clearer forms, and to note what points are still to be brought into view so that the whole picture may be finally completed.

The two most recent publications of students of Gnosticism give us an opportunity of claiming a new interest for this subject.* Möller approximates to the views of Neander, and Lipsius more nearly to the position of Baur. Möller† declines to dig at the historic roots of Gnosticism, and rather wishes to exhibit it as it actually was in the primitive church. Still he presents, at tolerable length, the systems of the Stoics, of the New Pythagoreans, of the Eclectic Platonic school (particularly of Plutarch), and of Numenius, the founder of the New Platonic school, and asks for a verdict from those intimately acquainted with the subject. On the other hand, Lipsius, acknowledging only in the preface, the fundamental character of

* Lic. E. W. Möller, *History of the Cosmology of the Grecian Church to the Time of Origen*; and Dr. Rich. A. Lipsius, *Gnosticism, its Essence, Origin, and Development*. Leipzig, 1860. (Extracted from *Ersch and Gruber's Universal Encyclopedia*.)

† Loco citato, p. 284.)

the special investigations of Möller, still considers that he has fallen into error, from having taken the ripest form of the Gnosis (as expressed in the *Philosophoumena*), as a criterion for its beginnings. As for himself, he says, that from the first, he regarded with invincible distrust, the sources from which Möller drew so abundantly, and hopes that in this preliminary essay (for an article written for an *Encyclopedia* can be nothing more), he has struck upon the right path, even though he has turned aside from the beaten highway. He has endeavored, especially, to search out the historical origin and the internal development of the Gnostic system, with particular reference to its connection with the religious history of the Orient as its source. Corrections and suggestions, he adds, are most acceptable to one engaged in so obscure a department of investigation.

It was of course to be expected that such a preliminary essay would express an opinion in regard to the old historians of heresy—stating, for example, whether it is true, as Semler asserts, that Tertullian simply copied from Irenæus; also, who was the author of the *Philosophoumena* (whether Hippolytus, Cains or some one else), and why he should be considered less reliable than Epiphanius, a much later witness. It was also to have been expected, that the later investigators, from the time of Massuet, would be characterized in the method at one time undertaken by Rossel. Upon these points Lipsius has either not permitted himself to touch at all, or at most has done so merely incidentally; while he laments the actual character of our authorities, and the fact that the origin of the Gnosis should unfortunately be so imperfectly known, a lamentation which he will not permit in us.* We hope that in the completed work, to which, though he will not pledge himself, he is plainly competent, he will pay attention to such points, and also guard against the errors which Lipsius is in danger of encountering, and which we proceed to notice. It is to be hoped that these suggestions may not, on the one hand, be declared to be worthy of all consideration, and, on the other, be assailed with bitter words, in the manner in which he has seen fit to

* *Gnosticismus*, p. 81, 66, 132.

treat our essay upon the *Philosophoumena* and the *Perates*.* A like treatment, however, fell to the lot of Neander and Jacobi. We shall then consider these three points, viz. the *idea*, the *external origin*, and the *internal progress* of the heretical Gnosis.

Here, as ever, there are peculiar difficulties connected with an attempt to deduce the idea and essence of the sect under consideration, from the party name, that is, from the term Gnosticism. The same historical current may flow on through succeeding centuries under very different names; indeed, the same party often has, at one time, several, and perhaps entirely distinct, appellations; while, on the other hand, not unfrequently, many different shades of opinion, though sharply distinguished from one another, are included under one name. How far then a settled name can be considered of value in this respect, generally depends upon common consent or upon tradition. For this reason, Möller has pronounced it difficult to bring the diverging tendencies of the Gnosis into a single point of view.† The general, fundamental idea of Gnosticism is adequately expressed, neither in the doctrine of emanations nor in that of dualism, nor, least of all, in the philosophical form on which it rests. First of all, the idea of the *δημιουργός*, inasmuch as it is common to Plato, Philo, the apologists, and Numenius, leads to the centre of the Gnostic conception of the world. While most often astrologically conceived, still it is essentially physical and connected with the necessary transitoriness of the world's life. The evolution of the Cosmos is considered as history, within the epochs of which the necessary elements of the process of the Spirit are represented. Though the historical significance of Christ is often weakened by this view, still the influence of the fundamental idea of Christianity, acting directly upon this universal historical conception, is very plain. But while the Christian apologists, in spite of their leaning in theory towards the philosophical *δν*, held to the personality of God, and consequently explained the transition from God to the world, in an ethical way, as an act of free-will (e. g. Athenagoras himself, who thinks that

* Niedner's Zeit. für hist. Theol. 1860, p. 218, ff. † Kosmologir, p. 442, etsq.

the divine artist is conditioned by the *ἔλθῃ*, as a *μὴ ὄν*, that is, as a pure possibility),* the Gnostics viewed this as only the process of the Absolute, which, through the evolution of the world, harmonizes itself with itself. Although the Christian consciousness necessarily took offence at this idea so fantastically wrought out, yet it contained a justifiable protest against that stiff, lifeless apprehension of the idea of God, which manifests its constraining influence in the apologists, though in contradiction with the peculiar conception, and the germs of a living view, contained in the doctrine of the *Logos*. It was, therefore, of the greatest significance, that the Gnostic doctrine of a *Demiurge*, standing over against the highest God, was most distinctly and confidently renounced by the church teachers of that day, even by such as Tertullian, who placed the kingdom of God and the world in the sharpest contrast. They did not forget that this threatened to destroy the heart of all religious life.

It undoubtedly seemed insufficient to the Gnostics to explain the *πολυθρύλλητον ζήτημα, πόθεν ἡ κακία*; by the free determination of the created life. Redemption also suggested to them no idea of a mediator, but, like their cosmology, follows the law of natural necessity. The false separation of the natural and the spiritual life, which is reflected in the docetic character of their Christology, forbids that any moral explication should be achieved. High as the *Pneumatici* are supposed to be exalted above the rest of mankind, as those in whom the chief end of the world is accomplished, still they really did stand on the same level with the *Psychici*, yea, even with the lower formations of the *Ilyic* principle. How different from the ideas of Irenæus, Clement and Origen.

● To all these propositions in regard to the essence of the heretical Gnosis, we give full assent, for they rest upon the fundamental distinction between religion and speculation; and the religious consciousness, in its simplicity, can contain infinitely more than dialectic speculation can express. Moreover, it is clear, wherein lies the heretical idea, as well upon the

* *Ibid.* p. 149, etsq.

subjective, as upon the objective side—we need refer simply to Schleiermacher's statement of the essence of heresy. Finally every speculation, whether old or new, is to be rejected if it seeks to resolve theology into cosmology, and ethics into physics or logic. Lipsius's statement of the idea in question, agrees with the above, almost entirely, notwithstanding the fact that he, like Hegel (the man of the "*strictest method*"), proposes to Christendom the task of accomplishing that old longing of philosophy, which sees in the world only a flower ever developing out of one seminal principle. It was no light thing to break the ban of the school; but in the midst of a prolonged statement, the word escaped which divulged the author's long-delayed explanation with Baur and Hilgenfeld.

To solve the "*old tormenting enigma of life*", is, according to Lipsius, the work of the Gnosis. It is its nature to produce that crisis in the church, when Christianity, for the first time, is conceived, not only as a *sacred* principle, but also as a *secular*—not only as the absolutely satisfactory reestablishment of a morally religious connection between God and man, but also as the final key to the comprehension of the world-wide enigma,—the metaphysical connection between the mortal and the immortal spirit. Thus speaks Lipsius, at first, like Baur and Hilgenfeld; and it is equally congruous with this to consider the Gnosis both as having an internal Christian significance, and also as an essential part of the progressive development of the philosophical speculation of antiquity. But Lipsius happily escapes the threatened danger of obliterating the distinction between religion and philosophy, and consequently between the catholic and the heretical Gnosis, inasmuch as, like Niedner, who unquestionably has touched the nerve of the matter,* he makes the connection between πίστις and γνῶσις to be the test. Thus the ψευδώνυμος γνῶσις favors heresy, not by the fancied importation of strange elements, of something brought over from the heathen dualism or polytheism, but by the tendency of the *Gnosis, as such*, just so far as it lays claim to being the absolute measure of Christian truth,

* P. 61, 138.

and rejects *πίστις* as a superfluous foundation. In place of the sacred history of redemption, the Gnostics put forward a cosmical, or merely phenomenal *process*: and in place of a historically established atonement, the universal, philosophical idea of spirit as in itself identical with divinity, and only needing to grasp the knowledge of such identity, in order to attain to the highest perfection.

The Gnostics ideally subtilize the historical element of redemption, Christ's person and work being for them merely the reflex of a universal, speculative idea; while to Catholics the reality of the redeeming work itself seems to be threatened when the historical side is rejected. This statement of the contrast has our full approbation. But Lipsius ought surely (for, as respects church orthodoxy, he finds it easy enough to reach its heights*) to have had sufficient regard for a believing theology to remember that its opposition to the false views of the Hegelians of the left side, is frequently expressed in the very terms he chooses to describe the old Gnosis. A careful essay upon Baur, in the *Neue Evang. Kirchenzeitung* (1861, No. 4), lately presented in a similar manner the contradiction between Schleiermacher's ecclesiastical stand-point, and Baur's distinct idealism after the mode of Fichte. The key for the explanation of the enigma, which, according to the conception of Baur, still remains unsolved, would then have been within the reach of Lipsius. He might have found it in 1818 in possession of Neander, who, in his preface, writes: "There is a wondrous inner light in man which reflects its beams as with magic illusion upon the outer world, and if it does not light and warm, yet, so to speak, it conjures up dazzling pictures. That this light may not dazzle man, but warm and light him, was especially the blessing of the practical spirit of the true, simple Christianity which led him to the saving knowledge of his moral nature". The epoch, then, made by Neander in his work on the investigation of the Gnosis (in which he conceives it as a structure complete in itself, and springing from a single moulding power), has not had the least

* P. 172.

light thrown upon it by Lipsius, though, according to him, Neander ends with the beclouded, insufficient explanation that Gnosticism is the intrusion of heathen philosophy — i. e. *syncretism*. Before Lipsius assigned Jacobi's definition of the Gnosis, as an eclectic religious philosophy, to the category of vague statements that say everything or nothing, he should have bethought himself, that even Niedner terms it a thoroughly religious philosophy of history; or, at least, he should have looked once more at the commencement of Jacobi's article in *Herzog's Encyclopedia*, for there also he would have found the famous "key" in the statement, that the Christian revelation sets forth the "*fact* rather than a *finished conception* of redemption".

Lipsius also concedes that his own peculiar criterion assigns but a very uncertain distinction as the point of the beginning and ending of Gnosticism.* Syncretism is with him also an essential characteristic, and, like Jacobi, he even denies that Gnosticism is a comparative philosophy of religion. At the beginning, it is true, he recognises, with Baur, the point of contact between the Gnosis and the Hegelian philosophy (the aim of both being absolute knowledge; and the idea of the progress of the spirit from unconscious and simply objective existence, to subjective consciousness, entering into both in connection with the manifestation of the *Christ*); but then he also denies this parallel, saying that the Gnostic systems are more or less *dualistic*, the ground of such dualism, however, lying not in the contradiction between spirit and matter, but in the internal essence of a Gnosis that builds itself up merely as an esoteric doctrine.

So he comes to the point which Weisse (*Studien und Kritiken*, 1837) made against Baur, essentially agreeing with Neander and Matter — that the Gnosis is, in general, to be considered not as *philosophy*, but as *theosophy*, or, more exactly, as *mysticism* and *mythology*; that it does not, as a philosophy of religion, choose logical and metaphysical speculation as its mode of expression, but the poetic imagination and religious

* P. 72.

intuitions ; and, moreover, that it more nearly accords with the views of Jacob Böhme than with those of Schleiermacher and Hegel. His concluding idea represents the Gnosis as the first comprehensive attempt at a philosophy of Christianity. but as an attempt which, in view of the unparalleled range of its speculative ideas, runs out into mysticism, theosophy, and mythology ; for, though ingeniously developed by the Gnostics, this range of thought far transcended the scope of their acquirements, and speedily degenerated into a thoroughly unphilosophical mode of representation. In regard to this definition, we must not forget that the heresy of the Gnosis consists in pretending, in contempt of the received faith, that redemption is to be brought about simply by philosophy, and that, too, a philosophy included within the limits of the cosmical domain. We may say, in addition, that the range of the Gnostic conceptions does not seem to us so unparalleled, nor is the construction of philosophical ideas in a poetical manner (a method customary from the time of Plato to that of Schelling and Hegel), so thoroughly unphilosophical as it is pronounced by Lipsius.

We turn to the second point — *the external origin and the historical progress of Gnosticism.*

Although Möller has chosen to represent the original sources and concurrent factors in a way, not, strictly speaking, genetic, he seems to us to have done a good work in bringing forward the philosophical systems above mentioned. So, too, Lipsius* marks very correctly the turning-point at which the philosophical speculation must necessarily be merged in a Christian speculation. That blending together of the Hellenistic and the Oriental culture, which had been progressing since the victorious march of Alexander the Great, and especially that confused commingling of most diverse systems of worship,—facts in which we are accustomed to see nothing but the surest characteristics of decay, denote much more clearly the necessary breaking down, in the religious

* P. 25.

sphere, of individual narrowness, by which the way was prepared for the universal religion of humanity. Just as the Roman religion was transformed under the influence of the Grecian paganism, so into the Grecian idea of divinity there passed over Phœnician, Phrygian, Persian, Egyptian, Jewish, and East Indian elements. Thus gradually was reared a western-oriental Pantheon, in which, to the superficial glance, the strangest and most grotesque figures seemed to be mingled one with another; but philosophy discerned in the divine myths the one uniting bond, and in the confused chaos of divine forms, recognised the one multinominal Being. There was an internal necessity that as Christianity was philosophical, so also philosophy should be Christian. We must, however, deal cautiously with this last proposition. The task of advancing from the ethical and practical position to the philosophical was not then, nor is it ever presented to every member of a community; and when this task is to be accomplished, the fact of a moral regeneration, as the one necessary foundation, still remains unchangeably established as a demand made alike on all Christians. On the other hand, it is not to be conceded that, in the Gnosis, philosophy is already Christian. Philosophy even now finds no such short way to the attainment of the end, that "*Christ may be all in all*"; and in bringing the historical fact of regeneration into the sphere of philosophy, it is essential to insist earnestly, that Christianity is to be considered as a new creation, by the side of which the old untrue and false religions can no longer stand. Where, as in the case of the Gnosis, and of the present *Thai-Phing* rebellion in China, the Christian element is merely *highest* (*primum inter paria*), there the system still exists in a heathen form. Where the warm and living breath of a pure spirit is breathed forth, and a more healthful view of the peculiar, central principle of Christian truth is taken, such as that for which Möller praises Irenæus, there is the true knowledge, and that, too, in a form so much the more beautiful, if, as in the case of Irenæus, it is coupled with a modesty that willingly awards to the Hellenistic philosophy the merit of superiority in the external form of representation. At the same time, we must not forget the

testimony which Bernhardy* gathered from the Latin and Grecian fathers, that they, more than once, showed themselves fully able to keep pace with their heathen neighbors, the contemporaneous Hellenistic philosophers. In regard to talent and greatness of character, he agrees with Hase that "*la supériorité est évidemment du côté des pères de l'église*".

In Möller's representation of the Hellenistic philosophy, we have not regretted the absence of Philo as much as the want of a consideration of the suggestions, both positive and negative, which were afforded to the educated Christian teachers by the Sceptics, Epicureans, and Peripatetics. Moreover, he should have grouped together the extra-Christian philosophy as drawn from the express testimony of the apologists (e. g. in regard to different forms of worship and theories), so that these spiritual elements, which lie nearer to the Christian than to these diverse systems, might become more and more apparent.

The second source to be noted is, in the words of Lipsius, the *Oriental philosophy*. So Mosheim termed that commingling of religions—with the "prophetic spirit of a Columbus", said Herder, ridiculing the expression; which expression, however, Rossel took in earnest. It was a rather unmeaning phrase in Mosheim; and, moreover, Lipsius complains, even now, of the obscurity of the department. With quite as much reason might we give warning about the confidence with which he lays down certain results, as if they were determined. The veiled forms of that western-Oriental Pantheon, for the most part like the Nile, conceal their source, and if one stream is discovered, there often still remains another yet further back.

Thus Lipsius considers Syria alone as the original home of Gnosticism. He will recognise nothing as from Egypt, although, like C. Köstlin, he transfers to it the *Pistis Sophia*. According to him, the tradition in regard to the sorcerer Simon, as the arch-heretic of Gnosticism, could not have arisen if the patristic tradition had pointed to so remote (?) a land as *Egypt*, as the peculiar home of the Gnosis, instead of to

* *History of Grecian Lit.*, 3d ed. i, 642.

Western Syria, within whose bounds, as is well known, was reckoned not only Samaria but the whole of Palestine. *Gnosis* and *Cabbala* are two different branches from the same root, and the origin of these theories is to be sought, just as little in Judaism alone as in the Parsic influence, but rather in the contact of Judaism with the heathenism of Asia Minor. In Syria and Mesopotamia is to be found the native soil of syncretism. The diversified forms of the commingled religions of Judaized heathenism and of Judaized and heathenized Christianity, Mendaism, the Elcesaites, Messelianism, Andianism, Drusism, the Jezidees, etc., were there at home; and even in the case of the Essenes themselves, we might very naturally refer back, in the same way, to a native relationship, what we are accustomed to put to the account of the Alexandrian and New-Platonic influence. Moreover, the influence of Zoroaster, though undeniable upon some systems, has been greatly overrated; and later investigations into the religious doctrines of Western Asia have proved that much is there indigenous that has usually been assigned to the account of Parsism. Thus Lipsius. In opposition to Lassen, he maintains that the points of contact asserted by him to exist between Buddhism and Gnosticism prove only an internal affinity of ideas; though it may not be improbable that, through the medium of Parsism, which was early brought into contact with East Indian influences, individual Buddhist conceptions may have spread more and more towards Western Asia and Egypt. Still, as previous to Manichæism, no sure proof of such influence can be discerned (excepting the acquaintance of Bardesanes with the Indian doctrines and usages), it might be still more difficult to separate with certainty, by internal criticism, elements so similar.

Perhaps Lipsius, from his pursuit of Syrian studies, has imbibed too great a predilection for Syria. Moreover, in connection with Bunsen, he has defended the three Syrian epistles of Ignatius as genuine (as was noticed by Weisse in this journal in 1859), although not to the satisfaction of Uhlhorn. According to Lipsius, the Grecian Ignatius, meant to attack the docetism of *Saturninus* and the *Ascensio Isaïæ*; and hence

it was interpolated about A.D. 130-140.* In his article for *Ersch und Gruber's Encyclopedia*, as well as in the above defence of the Syrian Epistles of Ignatius, Lipsius traces Gnosticism back to the New Testament. The false teachers of the epistle to the Colossians may be *Christian Essenes*, while those of the pastoral epistles may indicate a further development of the same Essenic Judaized Christianity towards a distinct Gnosticism. In regard to the doctrines of these heretics, glimpses may be seen in the later Clementine Homilies. Thus Lipsius would elevate the Judaism of Palestine to the rank of a forerunner of the Gnosis. His antipathy to Egypt makes him deny, in spite of Neander, Gieseler, and Baur, a similar influence to the Jewish-Alexandrian religious philosophy. He supposes that similar elements tend everywhere to call forth similar phenomena, and that, too, without any necessary external connection or dependence.

It is difficult to combat such a view without entering into some of the details, which go to prove that the channels that originate in Egypt, are not to be considered as so entirely dry. It may be that *Cerinthus* belonged in Asia;† but still the Alexandrian-Judaic philosophy is not so Hellenistic as Lipsius supposes. It is rather Oriental-Grecian. Moreover, there is more room for supposing, that there already existed, before the time of Basilides, a true parent stem, upon which, independently of Syrian influences, the Gnostic ideas that existed in the atmosphere of the age could form themselves into definite systems, and that this parent stem was, as may be inferred from the *Philosophoumena*, the product of Egyptian wisdom,—than there is for imagining that with the removal of Basilides to Alexandria, Gnosticism was first transplanted into Egypt. This question depends essentially upon the credibility of the earliest narrators, and, upon this point, Möller's view stands frequently in direct opposition to that of Lipsius. The latter, like Hilgenfeld, takes the strictly *dualistic* form, in which, according to Irenæus, the Basilidian system appeared,

* Niedner's *Zeitsch. für hist. Theol.* 1856, p. 56-62.

† Lipsius, p. 110. Möller, p. 373.

for the earlier, and the view presented in the *Philosophoumena*, which he terms *Grecianized*, for the later. Möller*, on the other hand, expresses himself as agreeing with Uhlhorn, Baur, and Jacobi, and as opposed to Hilgenfeld — perhaps opposed even to Irenæus, who frequently remodels the earlier systems after the Valentinian Gnosis, the one best known to him. So in regard to the Ophitic system, whose birth-place may very likely be, as Lipsius says, in Phrygia, Möller† finds its original form in the *Philosophoumena*, and sees in Irenæus's account Valentinian notions. According to Möller, Irenæus also first introduces *Emanationism*, the Valentinian doctrine of the *æons*, into the doctrine of *Pseudo-Simon*; while the *Philosophoumena* more clearly educes the system from the ἀπόφασις μεγάλη.‡ *Docetism* seems to Möller to be a form substantially independent of the Valentinian ideas, and therefore one which may serve to unfold the true original essence of the Ophitic Gnosis, which in Irenæus, is perverted into Valentinianism.§ Möller would, therefore, retort the accusation of Lipsius, that, like Irenæus, he has used the completed system as the criterion of the beginnings of the Gnosis.

But, once more, granting that the original form of the *Ophitic* Gnosis may have been preserved in its purity by Irenæus, as Lipsius maintains, still, after all, Lipsius has only internal grounds upon which to decide unquestionably (?) for the Syrian or Western Asiatic origin of the entire Gnosticism. Mosheim, as is well known, assumed a Judaic-Gnostic sect of “snake-brothers”, and transferred it to Egypt. Why may there not have been in Egypt as much knowledge of the Syrio-Chaldaic, as was needed by the Babylonish and Palestinian Christians, in order to understand the seven star-spirits, which shared in the government of the people of Israel? In addition to this, the names are for the most part taken from the Old Testament, which was intelligibly understood in Egypt, or they permit of being explained in Greek or Egyptian.¶

* l. c. p. 844, 852, 865. † l. c. p. 257. ‡ p. 288, 308. § p. 823.

¶ Ἰαλδαβαῶν (יְלְדָא-בְדוּחַי — the Chaos-born), Ἰαῶ (יְדוּחַי), Ἀδωναῖος (אֲדוֹנַי), Σαβαῶν (צַבְאוֹן), Ἐλωαῖος (אֱלֹהַיִם), Ὠραῖος, and Ἀστραφαῖος (Adstapæus, Artaphæus, Astanphæus, according to other readings). The two last admit of various

Hellenistic elements are frequent in Irenæus, e. g. βυθός, έννοια, νοῦς, ένδύμησις and προυνεικος, which latter word is somewhat differently understood by Möller* from Neander. So also in the case of the Ophites of Irenæus, there was a Hellenistic or Egyptian element, to say nothing of the *Perates* and the *Pistis Sophia*, to which Irenæus himself ascribes a predominating Hellenistic coloring. At the same time, the Oriental element is not to be denied. This, however, Lipsius charges me with doing, and that too, though in regard to this very point it fell to my lot to maintain, with special reference to the *Perates*, the entire equilibrium of both elements, thus opposing Kurtz, who, in the first edition of his larger *Hand-Book*, had characterized *Valentinus* as Hellenistic and the *Ophites* as Oriental.

Lipsius himself indicates how many relics of Oriental ideas are to be found in *Valentinus*. Like Volkmar, he derives *Syzygies-Tetrad*, not from the Pythagorean "*Tetraktys*", but from עֲצָבָה, into which the person of the Colorbasus of the Gnostics may be resolved, just as "*Barbelo*" in Syrian corresponds to έν τετραδι θεός. So, too, the Valentinian Ἀχαμῶθ is to be considered as just such a relic of the Syrian *Chakhimutho*, the *mother*, the *producer*, though it has been improperly

meanings. Ὠραῖος suggests אָרָא, on account too of the prayer which (Orig. c. Cels. vi, 31) was addressed to him. Thus Lipsius, following the old example. Perhaps the Grecian interpretation is of value; for in Parsism and in the Phœnician system of Sanchuniathon, which Philo Byblius (Eusebius Præp. Ev. i, 10) has preserved, ὦρα plays the part of "*beauty*", and the LXX even use ὦραῖον for the tree, which bore the destiny of Eve. So also "*ora*" signifies in Egyptian "*serpent*" οὐραῖος-βασιλίσκος (Creuzer, *Symb. und Myth.* ii, 256); and thus we may more easily comprehend the prayer to the serpent-god, who boldly scaled the wall of fire reared around Paradise, and assumed the dominion of the first gate: "Set me free, thou who seest the signs of thy power destroyed in the type of the tree of life, in the type which represents the sinless one" (Christ as the anti-type of the brazen serpent, on the cross as the anti-type of the tree of life). The last uncertain and traditionary name may have also a Grecian interpretation, if we may read ἀστραπαῖος or ἀστεροπαῖος. Ἀσταπαῖος, according to Stephanus Byz., means a people in Egypt, others say, in Spain. Lipsius conjectures a Hithpaël form from עֲתָפָה. Might not the original source of the "*Nil Astapus*" mentioned by Pliny (Hist. Nat. 5, 10), "quod illarum gentium lingua significat aquam e tenebris fluentem", throw some light upon the subject?

* P. 270, 411.

Grecised into *Σοφία*, as if it came from חֲכָמָה. We doubt whether we can defend as confidently this interchange. Hahn, to whom Lipsius appeals, has still connected with it a "*forsitan*,"* and, in fact, the meaning "*bringing forth*" has arisen simply euphemistically, like the expression יָרָה (Gen. iv, 1). In view of the usual latitude in transferring names to Greek letters, it can hardly be maintained that Ἀχαμῶθ stands less nearly related to *Chakhimutho* (i. e. σοφία) than to "*Chakhmuth*". As Lipsius himself concedes, in the case of the *Perates*, that they derived the Babylonish *Thalatth* (*Molédeth*, i. e. *Mother of Life*), according to the Grecian analogy, from the *Sea*,† so also in the case of this figure, which is identified with *Chronos*, he should have consented to adopt the analogous expression, according to which, the "*Sea*" would denote the *tears* of *Chronos*, instead of calling this explanation an attempt to render the clear intelligible by means of the dark. To my satisfaction, Möller has made use of very nearly the same expression.‡ While I would by no means dispute the parallels drawn by Schneidewin and Duncker, still I do not see how the matter becomes any clearer through this reference to the account of Berosus in respect to the "*Omôrôka*" (in the Arm. "*Eus. Markaia*."), or through the parallel that Lipsius draws with the *Mokh-Cosmogony* of Sanchuniathon.§

* *Bardesanes Gnosticus*, p. 65.

† P. 129.

‡ P. 229.

§ Should "*Omôrôka*" be interpreted, with Movers, אִמַּרְקָא, "*Mother of Heaven's Arch*"? or with P. Bötticher, אִמַּרְקָא, "*Mother of Earth*"? or with Dietrich, "Substance (אִמַּר) of the Egg"? See Diestel, *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* 1861, p. 785.

Plainly enough, the age of Sanchuniathon is not here to be taken into account; whether he is placed, as by Creuzer, in the 13th century B.C., or as, by Renan, in the era of the Seleucidæ, it makes no difference. Philo Byblius, the contemporary of the Gnostics (according to Bernhardt, A.D. 117-137), clearly proves the existence of the syncretistic representations which, according to Movers, are of Egyptian origin. Even if Lipsius, like Bunsen, should read מַן, instead of מֶר, and interpret it as "mud" or "corruption" of the aqueous mixture, still the analogy to the Peratian "*primitive mud*" is very doubtful. Renan rejects that change of reading, with the remark that מַן signifies the "corruption" which resulted from the liquefying of the substance, and scarcely the primitive material in which all lay commingled. Spiegel agrees with him (*Herzog's Real-Encyc.* xiii, p. 417). Ewald explains מֶר from the Arabian as equivalent to *material*. Bunsen knows

The confused passage from the *Pératian* book, "*The inhabitants of the confines of Aether*" (δι' προάσπειροι ἐως αἰθέρος), runs thus, according to my translation, which Lipsius approves: "I am the awakening voice in the æon of the night; henceforth I begin to disclose the power that springs from chaos. The power of the arch* in the abyss, which brings up the vile mud from the unchangeable and wide-gaping; the whole force of convulsive movement, water-colored, always mobile; which supports what remains, steadies what vibrates, loosens what departs, lightens what is burdened, and purifies what grows; the true Administratrix over the course of the atmosphere, which cleanses the filth from the twelve (ten?) eyes of the law, and breaks the seal for the force that rules over the invisible, roaring waters—this power is called '*Sea*'. Only ignorance called it *Chronos*, bound in chains, while he wove together the twisted work of the dense, cloudy, obscure, black Tartarus."

Here the obligations of Egypt, even beyond the Pyramids,

of no Egyptian word that corresponds to this reading. As to whether it can be referred to the name of Isis, *Μωθθ*, *Μούθ*, which, according to Plutarch, signifies "Mother", see Creuzer, *Symb. und Myth.* ii, 239, 333, 347.

* I retain the reading *θόλου* which the Codex gives, instead of accenting *θολοί* like the Göttingen edition and Lipsius—1. Because among so many substantive adjectives a substantive is needed. 2. The representation of Tartarus is thus more clear. 3. Afterwards there follows an administratrix of the first arched and æthærial elevation—Euno. For the explanation, in succeeding passages, of the names taken from the Grecian Mythology, there seems to me still to be much to be accomplished—also with reference to the correct reading. That *Ino* may not occur twice, *Io* should stand the first time in its place. Instead of *Νεβρόη*, I suggest *Νεβρώδ*. If *Εβνώ* cannot be explained as from *εἰνή*, *Ἐννώ* may pass for Bellona or the Cappadocian Artemis, Anaitis (Creuzer, ii, 356, 466). *Μίονυ* is certainly, as in Sanchuniathon, the spirit administering justice, in connection with *Σύδνα*. *Σουριήλ* also is, among the Sabians, the bull-headed one. Petosiris and Ostanes are, like Berosus, names of authors (cf. Plinius, ed. Franz, x, pp. 337, 339). *Καρφά* we may find explained in the *Avesta Chordad*, "the Lord, together with Amerdâd, of water and of trees". *Soklan*, clearly identical with *Σακλάν* (Epiph. Hæc. xxvi, 10), can be explained by שֶׁקֶל, one who measures the grain, perhaps *destiny*. *Βένα* (Demeter) seems to be very difficult; Steph. Byz. traces it to Thracian regions; *Bendis* receives sheaves as a gift. Or may we with any probability found it (as in the Cabbala) upon בִּינָה, or upon בְּרֵךְ, the constructing principle? *Μύγδων* is the Phrygian king (Il. iii, 186). *Μήν* (Lunus) had his religious worship preëminently in anterior Asia (Creuzer, ii, 393).

to the Nile-mud will be readily recalled.* So, too, the serpent has a special significance in Egypt, as indeed in all three of the divisions of the world around the Mediterranean. To the data brought forward† by these two latest students of the Gnosis might perhaps be added the German notion about serpents, as having a goblin character, or as friendly house-spirits.‡

In this German conception may also be found a harmonizing of that contrariety of ideas, which is the ground upon which Lipsius considers Baur right, when he assigns the two opposite conceptions of the serpent, either as the seducing principle, or as the King of the heavens, to two different parties; those holding the former view being *Sethians*, those holding the latter, *Cainites*. "The common appellation of '*Ophites*' is derived entirely from their opponents", says Lipsius, "yet it is not found in the account of Irenæus. They termed themselves γνωστικοί. The name *Naassenes*, which is used entirely without meaning, to denote the party which we only know through Irenæus, is appropriate simply to those Gnostics, if there was such a party, who, as represented in *Epiphanius Hær. xxxvii*, 5, adored the serpent as a divine being". Möller expresses himself, like me, in opposition to Baur's distinction, of course, however, without denying the diversity of the Ophitic parties. The names of sects are often formed like *lucus a non lucendo*, and the name *Ophites* seems to have just as real a meaning for those who see in the serpent the evil soul of the world, as for those who see in it the good. Then, according to Irenæus, it is supported by good authority that the Sethites considered the serpent both as a servant of the *Sophia*, and as appearing in a disgusting form. On the other hand, too, the Cainites may have considered the serpent not only as producing good, but also evil. At least, so far as regards Christ, according to *Epiph. Hær. xxxviii*, 3, they were at variance among themselves, as to whether Judas surrendered him, ἀγαθὸν ὄντα κατὰ τὴν ἐπουράνιον γνώσιν, or, ἐπειδὴ ἡβούλετο καταλύειν τὰ καλῶς

* Creuzer, ii, 30.

† Möller, p. 279. Lipsius, p. 126.

‡ Grimm, *Deutsche Myth.* p. 648.

δεδιδαγμένα — an internal difference among the Cainite sect, evidently just as fundamental as that between the Cainites and the Sethites. As for the rest, Möller calls attention to the fact, that Irenæus has already indicated, by the fact of his classing them together, the affinity of the Cainites and the Sethites, and that he is also said to have written in opposition to the Ophites;* and even Lipsius classes together, as different shadings of the same party, Nicolaitans and γυνωστικοί, sects separated by Epiphanius.

In regard to the third point, *the internal development of the Gnostic sects*, we must be brief. Upon this point, Möller confines himself entirely to a comparison of kindred systems. Under the collective name of Ophites,† come first the doctrines of the Naassenes, Perates, Sethites, and of Justin. Afterwards, the work ἀπόφασις μεγάλη, ascribed to Simon Magus, and the doctrine of Monoimus, the Arabian, are represented. The relation of the Docetæ to the foregoing is defined, showing that these latter are a development of the Ophitic and Simonian Gnosis, and that their name ought not to be derived from their holding Christ to be in any degree only a phantasm of a man, but from the fact that every sect sees in Christ what is akin to its own views, and regards him as the true Christ; it being reserved for those who sprang from the highest regions to know him in his complete fulness. This seems to me to be almost a quibble of the *Philosophoumena*, such as has been practised in the case of δοκος, (a *beam* in the eye). Next, the construction of the system, thus far somewhat regular, is interrupted by giving the views of Carpocrates and Epiphanius.‡ Basilides, Saturnilus, Marcion Apelles, and the Valentinians

* l. c. p. 256.

† Besides numerous misplaced accents, we find in Möller the following misprints: p. 258, for vergänglich, read unvergänglich; p. 262, præmonens for præmemorans; p. 285, Phil. vi, 19, for v; p. 336, vi, 38, for vi, 3, 8. Instead of Ialdabaoth, which Möller, in concurrence with the Göttingen edition, receives from Irenæus (Phil. v, 7) ἡλσαδδᾶμος (ܝܠܫܕܕܐܡܘܣ) seemed to me, as to Lipsius (p. 126), from a comparison of Phil. v, 26, to be more desirable.

‡ By a comparison with Irenæus, it seemed to me to follow in opposition to Bunsen, that ἐπιφανής is to read as — *clarus*, as Lipsius (p. 146) has remarked in opposition to the Göttingen edition.

follow, and the Clementine Homilies, as an appendix, conclude the whole.

Lipsius, who keeps constantly before him the end which he is striving to reach, proceeds in a different manner, although the magic word *development* will not always have a free course. The end to be attained is a historical classification of the heresies. He considers their development as a *curve*, which departs for a while from the true highway, but which finally comes back again to orthodoxy. He praises Hilgenfeld, as having accomplished the task of presenting the stadia or epochs of the Gnostic movement in their historical consecutiveness, instead of merely placing, like Baur and Niedner, the different classes of the Gnosis side by side, perhaps according to their locality or leading idea. In agreement with Neander, he places the Judaizing Gnostics (the Gnostic book, *Baruch* and *Cerinthus*) in the *first stadium*; while later, the opposition to Judaism increases in *Saturninus* and the *Ophites*, as described by Irenæus, until the *Cainites*, in their anti-Judaic tendency, proceed to the deification of all the godless characters of the Old Testament. The *second stadium* brings us to the highest development of the Gnosis. No longer merely the Old Testament religious history, but also the Hellenistic speculation comes into notice, and tends to bring into contempt the ordinary Christian *πίστις* and to develop the metaphysical opposition of the *Psychici* and the *Pneumatici*. Instead of the cosmogonic powers everywhere manifest in the old Gnosis, there appear, under varied forms, mythical personifications of speculative ideas. Thus was it in the case of *Basilides*, of the *Valentinians*, of the Grecian form of the Basilidean system, and of the Grecianised *Ophites*, as seen in the *Philosophoumena* (*Naassenes*, *Perates*, *Sethites*). Among them all, the fundamental dogma of the *Perates** comes nearest to the catholic doctrine.

Midway between God and matter stands the *Son*, or the

* Lipsius (p. 154) considers the change made by the Göttingen edition as correct. Möller (p. 22) characterizes the principles of the *Perates* in a way similar to mine.

Logos, who as λόγος ἐνδιάθετος is the essence of all divine ideas, they being formed silently and mysteriously in him, and who as λόγος προφορικός is the principle of all divine manifestations in the world. Before entering upon the third stadium, we will simply call attention to the fact, that the Perates still stand far removed from the Catholic doctrine, inasmuch as they mistake a rude commingling of all possible religions, for a divine revelation, and expressly make *matter*, instead of the Holy Spirit, to be the *third* principle. In doing this, even had they a better Christology, they plainly enough shut themselves out of the defined pale of Christianity. Neither, so far we can follow its internal history, can we admit that on all points the Gnosis returns at last so nearly to the faith of the Church.

But this return of the Gnosis, Lipsius (certainly with very ill-defined lines of demarkation and in varied dissolving forms) defines as the *third and last stadium*. The opposition between the *Pneumatici* and the *Psychici* already appears modified in the *Valentinian Docetism* (Phil. viii, 8), and still more in the *Pistis Sophia*, which, although from the Syrio-Chaldaic root, as Lipsius has not failed to remark, is still the richest and most luxuriant fruit of the Hellenistic Gnosis. But the specifically Christian and ethical element, which opposes a speculation that would refine away everything positive, is most plainly apparent in Marcion, whose system sprang directly from the old simple Syrian systems, and, as the Protestantism of the ancient Church, supplied a real religious need which was overlooked in the Catholic Church. Among the scholars of Marcion, *Apelles*, especially, modified the anti-Judaism of his teacher. With him, the principal point is not the Gnosis *as such*, but the belief in the historical facts of *redemption*. Here he speaks as distinctly as orthodox teachers of the Church. It would perhaps be found impossible to prove a specific difference between him, on the one side, and the Clementine Homilies, and the Alexandrian Clement upon the other, in regard to the fundamental doctrine which alone comes here into question. Thus did the Gnosis merge itself in the Catholic doctrine. On the other side, the two repre-

sentatives of the Syrian church, *Tatian* and *Bardesanes*, prove that there, at least, all sorts of Gnostic opinions were published without being considered as directly heretical.

Our criticism must confine itself to the following points. In the first place, the Clementine Homilies cannot be considered as orthodox. Baur and Niedner take them as elements in the development of Gnosticism, while Neander and Möller consider them, at least, as an appendix thereto. According to some, their influence in Syria in favor of Mohammed cannot have been unimportant. Then, too, Manichæism appears to many as the *climax*, nay, even as the highest consummation of Gnosticism. Not even in the case of the scholars of Marcion does the "*curve*" become directly merged in the orthodox road. Though in the neighborhood of the way of salvation, it still wanders hither and thither. So even with Marcion the key-stone was not yet set. Lipsius knows also very well, that the *Paulicians*, the *Bogomiles*, and the *Catharists* received many Gnostic elements from the Marcionites and the Manichæes; but he ascribes to the sects of the middle ages practical, ecclesiastical, reforming tendencies, and does not consider them as Gnostic.

We may very properly, in accordance with the usual method, confine the history of Gnosticism proper to the early centuries; but yet just the same characteristics are manifested to-day by the *Thai-Phing* rebels in China, who, after the manner of the Syzygies, talk of the wife of the heavenly Father, of the wife and of the sister of Jesus. Nor were practical tendencies wanting in the systems of the old Gnostics. Their false fundamental doctrine, supplanting the *πίστις* by the *γνώσις*, manifests itself even in our day, when a proud knowledge struggles against the demand for a new birth through the word of truth. Orthodoxy, and we may emphasize either the first or the last half of the word, does not find its measure in the doctrines of Clement of Alexandria, nor in the theology of any age, but only in the everlasting Word of Truth.

ART. V.—PLACE OF MAN IN A NATURAL SYSTEM OF ZOOLOGY.

By Professor C. DEWEY, Rochester, N. Y.

LINNÆUS, *SYSTEMA NATURÆ*. 8 vols. 8vo. 1766. — CUVIER'S *ANIMAL KINGDOM*.

THE arrangement of terrestrial objects, in a system of Natural History, was first attempted in the last century. Numerous as were on this subject the volumes of Pliny, who obtained his facts from all accessible authors, to the number, as he states, of more than two thousand volumes, and accurate as were his descriptions of animals (which he asserts were derived from the writings of Aristotle)—so as to be designated by a distinguished writer as a veritable Encyclopædia of ancient knowledge, no system of classification is found in them. Still there were obvious distinctions. Plants were not held to be animals, or minerals to be plants, or the reverse; these three kingdoms of nature were too well distinguished. Aristotle, as Professor Agassiz has stated, had divided animals into two great sections, *Enaima* (blooded) and *Anaima* (bloodless), an admitted broad distinction, but not used as the basis of any classification. Such was the state of natural science for nearly two thousand years from the age of Aristotle.*

But the time had come for a great change and necessary improvement, which will be briefly described.

In 1735 Linnæus gave to the world his *Systema Naturæ*, in a tabular form of only fourteen folio pages, the mere elements of systematic arrangement. This was enlarged in the twelfth edition, 1766, to three volumes octavo, containing the last im-

* What zoölogical position Aristotle assigned to man, is not very certain; but that he treated of subjects under psychology and ethics, which could have no reference to any creatures but man, is well known.

provements of the author in his study of the three kingdoms of nature. In the zoölogical part, the highest division of animals, to the tenth edition, 1761, was Class 1, Quadrupedia, under which were, Order 1, Primates; Order 2, Bruta; Order 3, Feræ, etc. Did Linnæus place man with quadrupeds then? Yes; the immortal Linnæus declared in 1746, says Agassiz, that he *could find no character by which man could be distinguished from a monkey*. Yet Professor Agassiz* shows that Aristotle, nearly twenty centuries before, maintained the "marked differences between man and quadrupeds", and that monkeys have "four hands", the characteristic distinction even in Cuvier of the monkey tribe. Afterward Linnæus substituted Mammalia for Quadrupedia, and divided Primates into 1, Homo, man; 2. Simia, monkey; 3. Lemur; 4. Vespertilio, bat, etc. Thus man was placed at the head of the first Order of the highest Class of animals, and was described as a mere animal. Even Linnæus then admitted, though he had before denied it, some difference between a man and a monkey, while Aristotle held that the monkey partakes "of the nature of both man and the quadrupeds". These views of great naturalists, though almost ludicrous, are yet valuable as illustrating the perversions of human reason. Such were held to be *philosophic* views.

This zoölogical system of Linnæus continued authoritative till that of Cuvier appeared in 1812, which was a great and needed improvement arising from the important discoveries by which science had been enriched in the preceding fifty years. The arrangement was more simple, as well as more dependent upon structure, and excepting one particular, it was more accordant with facts. Being so well known, it is only necessary to state that the first *Order* of the highest *Class*, or *Mammalia*, in the first *Branch* of animals or Vertebrates, is *Bimana* (two-handed), Man. Next to this, Order 2, *Quadrumana*, is the tribe of monkeys. Cuvier's system is an admirable one, if man is a mere animal and has no endowments or powers except what are shared by him with the brutes, as he

* Essay on Classification, p. 65.

is arranged and characterized in this system. His characters, as given in the system, are a *two-handed mammiferous vertebrate* animal. How noble and majestic a being is man! The monkey is a *four-handed mammiferous vertebrate* animal.

The same general arrangement was continued in all the systems published to 1836. Zoölogists seem to have been bound by the authority of Cuvier as by a magic spell, even when cultivated and philosophic men protested against the principle as absurd, on the admitted distinction of the "two-fold constitution" of man, the "material and the spiritual", and especially of the union of moral powers with an animal organism. We do not hold that man is either all animal, or entirely distinct from the animal creation. For this the following statement may be sufficient.

In a system of *truthful* zoölogy, that is, founded on the truth and the whole truth, man could not be ranked as a *merely spiritual* being, as this would not comport with the facts of his constitution, and would omit one half of his nature, the inferior characters of man indeed, but essential to his manhood. It would be no less absurd, in such a system, to introduce only the characters of his material or animal constitution, excluding wholly what belongs to his *spiritual* nature, for this is even more essential to his manhood. The facts require man to be ranked according to his "two-fold constitution", as neither merely spiritual, nor merely animal, but both united.

Still, after the middle of the nineteenth century, and in the advanced state of philosophy on all subjects, it is gravely maintained that man is to be zoölogically held as a mere animal; and the great body of zoölogists, and some Christian zoölogists too, admit the correctness of the principle. Two exceptions there are, of noble men and of high scientific attainments; and to them we turn with grateful pleasure, in order to present their systems for the high gratification of many consistent thinkers. This will satisfy some, who have held the system of Cuvier to be above any radical change.

In 1836, Ehrenberg, whose name is honored in science over the world, published his zoölogical system. Its great divisions

were only two cycles. The translation by Agassiz is here chiefly followed :

1st Cycle. Nations. Mankind, one distinct class, characterized by the equable development of all systems of organs.

2d Cycle. Animals, characterized by the prominence of single systems.

Two great divisions in the second Cycle, viz.

A. Mycloneura, having nervous marrow, as in all the Vertebrates ; and

B. Glangioneura, nervous ganglia, as in all other animals, or Invertebrates.

Though the systems of Cuvier and Ehrenberg are based on structure, or are anatomical, they involve different elements, in that the former holds man to be an animal, the latter separates him from the other, and disposes of him in an independent Cycle. This is the distinction which this difference of structure demands, and for which it is right to contend. Any details in the sub-divisions of the second Cycle, even if imperfect, affect not the principle on which the Cycles are held to be distinct.

For twenty years after Ehrenberg's Cycles appeared, all the systems followed in the trail of the master-spirit, Cuvier. In 1856 the *General Natural History of the Organic Kingdoms* of L. Geoffroy St. Hilaire, was published at Paris. This distinguished savan and zoölogist died at Paris a few months since. His work is little known in our country. It divides *organized* bodies into three kingdoms, one of which had never before been proposed under that designation. They have the following names and characters :

1. *Vegetable*. Possessing only the characters common to all being, organized and living ; its life all *vegetative*, that is, nutritive and reproductive ; life is single or simple. The plant *lives*.

2. *Animal*. Possessing the general characters of the first, with the addition of *sensibility and mobility* ; life vegetative and animal, twofold. The animal *lives and feels*.

3. *Human*. Man alone has the general characters of the second, with the addition of *intelligence*, or to vegetative and animal life is added *moral* life ; his life is triple. Man *lives, feels, and thinks*.

"*Vegetability, animality, humanity* ; three terms which,

in this point of view, succeed each other in a hierarchical order, manifestly as simple as logical: a series where not only no term could be transposed, but to which no term could be added."

Under the *feeling* of animals, St. Hilaire must include sensations, emotions, instincts, knowledge and passions, etc., peculiar to their animal life only; and under the intelligence and thinking of man, that knowledge and moral power which belong only to the moral life, of which man alone is the possessor. Under the word conscience, the French comprehend both consciousness and the sense of right and wrong.

Such is the general arrangement of all organized bodies of earth, according to St. Hilaire. It is the system of common sense as well as of philosophic wisdom. The differences of the three kingdoms are obvious, readily apprehended, and consistent with the facts in nature; and though they have often been pointed out, they have not before been made the foundation of zoölogical classification. These differences may receive more attention under another aspect.

An objection may be made, possibly, to this simple and beautiful system, by the questions—What is life? how is it defined? and the kinds, how known? It has not been defined, though it is well known. Because, if our notion of it is simple, definition is impossible; if compound, its elements are unknown, so that the impossibility still exists. Is there no gravitation, or electricity, or sweetness, etc., because no definition has been given? We know life, as in a thousand cases, by what it does, and its kinds by their effects. In such instances we are obliged to speak of the cause, power, thing, by its operations. The kinds are equally clear. *Vegetative* life is known in the operations of nutrition and reproduction, and in their action, it results in a *vegetable*. *Animal* life results in an *animal*, and is shown in the operations of *sensation and voluntary motion*, which are entirely different from those of vegetative life. *Moral* life is exhibited in that high intelligence and power of reasoning, and that sense of right and wrong, or of moral obligation, which ever imply knowledge

and endowments unknown in the mere animals, and give us the true idea of man.

This system leads the mind at once to the creative power which constituted, in this lucid manner, these three kingdoms, vegetable, animal, and human, each endowed with its own peculiar life, to be exhibited in all the multitude of properties, qualities, forms, and activities of either and all of these kingdoms.

On this system the change of a vegetable to an animal, or the converse, and the transformation of an animal into a human being, or its converse, is an impossibility; for this would require the definite act of the Creator, adding a new life or taking away one already existing. Much of the controversy on the permanence of species must cease on this system.

Besides the crowning excellence of its truthfulness, this system meets a want and gratifies a desire which a host of thinking minds have felt, namely, that organized beings here occupy their appropriate, because natural, position. A brute of the highest kind is incomparably below a man in its endowments, being destitute of *moral* life.

This classification commends itself to the great body of men, and especially to the best educated minds. Everywhere the feeling exists which recognises a brotherhood in the human family, within whose pale the mere animal, even the highest brute of whatever name, never comes, and never can enter. This impression is commonly deepened and strengthened by education.

It can be opposed only by zoölogists, and those who approve the prevailing system. Their reasons are various. Some, because the common classification has been commended, and satisfies the general purpose. Others, because they would exclude all but merely material (physical) elements from the system, as if mental and moral powers and activities belong not to the natural history of our race, and this part of our nature is to be ignored; and especially if these powers or agencies direct the attention to the existence of an infinite personal agent, and God over all. The powers and works of man may show us his nature, capacity, and character; but the works, called na-

ture, must not lead us to see and acknowledge their great Author. In forming the system we are to exclude even that which shows us the thought of the Author in the brightest light; so afraid are we of the knowledge of Him in whom we "live and move and have our being". Such has been the influence, till the times of Ehrenberg and St. Hilaire. The spell is broken by philosophy itself. The system of the latter in particular will lead to important results. In the *vegetable*, *animal*, and *human* kingdoms, the student ascends from the lowest to the highest, and rises from the study of the objects to the divine plan of the Infinite Author. Man stands forth in his moral life, immeasurably superior to all mere animal life around him, over which he rules. His place is shown by nature itself.

The triumph of the truth may not yet be complete. Great is the sorrow of many that even Professor Agassiz still sustains the classification of Cuvier. Of his particular reasons there is not time to speak at present, though they seem far from formidable or convincing.

Let us turn to the earliest philosophy on record, and see the rank assigned by Moses to the race of man. Of course we seek for his opinion as a philosopher, for if we reject his inspiration, we view him only in this light, "learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians". True, we find in Genesis no scientific arrangement of the creatures there mentioned, but we do see a distinction between man and mere animals, which places man incomparably above them. The philosophy of Moses expresses the rank of man thus: "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him"; and made him lord of the whole creation. Thus "man became a living soul", "in the image of God", an intelligent, moral, and responsible being, susceptible of obligation and duty, with a material body and an immortal soul. Of man, and of man only, did our philosopher thus speak; and in all the writings of Moses this distinction is maintained; not a phrase or implication modifies this distinction, either by the elevation of animals to an equality with man, or by the depression of man to a level with the brutes. Considered only as a naturalist, the

teachings of Moses on the rank of man are explicit and incontrovertible. Let it be observed, too, that through the whole course of human history, this distinction has been obvious: animals have not shown any new or ennobling proportions, while man has ever been held to be the same moral and responsible lord of creation.

Thus Moses disposes of man in zoölogy, to all who do not hear in him the voice of inspiration; and the same rank must be assigned to man by all of us who rejoice in the statement of Moses as the words of the infinitely true and good. We bow and worship as we read: "And God said: Let us make man in our image, after our likeness". We see the divine plan and its execution.

ART. VI.—THE NATIONAL CRISIS.*

By Rev. GEORGE L. PRENTISS, D.D.

THE fine saying of the poet Schiller, *Die Welt-geschichte ist das Welt-gericht*, is receiving impressive illustration in our day. Rarely have events been fraught with such solemn, judicial import. There has been nothing like it since the great wars of the French Revolution. For a generation after that epoch of storm and battle, the course of events was so quiet as to lead many to believe that the reign of universal peace was just at hand. Under the impulse of this cheering belief, vast schemes for the improvement of society were inaugurated. The schoolmaster everywhere went abroad. The maxim of Lord Bacon, *Knowledge is Power*, struck men's minds with the force of a new revelation. It became in the practical sphere what the Inductive Method, so highly praised and so

* The following Article was delivered as an address before the Phi Beta Kappa Society in Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H., July 30, 1862. I have consented to its publication here at the request of the Editor, yet with a good deal of reluctance; for the form of a popular address seems to me hardly suited to the grave and dispassionate character of a Theological Review. Some passages relating to British sympathy with America are omitted, that subject having been already so fully discussed in the July Number of this REVIEW. G. L. P.

poorly exemplified by the same illustrious thinker, had already become in the sphere of natural philosophy. Public opinion was enthroned as the ruling power in the world. The principle of free association was applied to the working out of ethical and political reforms as never before. It was applied, also, with still more zeal and confidence to the work of diffusing Christian truth among all nations. Literature, art, poetry, and science, inspired by the popular idea, willingly joined their forces to those of philanthropy, politics, and religion. And while all this was going on in the moral world, the beneficent Genius of Invention was busy in taming the wildest agencies of nature and harnessing them "in order serviceable" to the triumphal car of Progress. The steam-boat, the railroad, the steam-press, and the magnetic telegraph were summoned into being, and incorporated with our modern civilisation. Is it strange that Christian society, animated by such generous intentions, and thus armed of a sudden with powers almost miraculous for realizing them, should have fancied itself on the very verge of that Promised Land toward which it had been wandering through so many wearisome centuries? Is it a wonder that the man of faith and the man of science vied with each other in depicting the glories of the new era? We, whose entrance into intellectual life was in those days, are not likely to forget what a fair bow of promise seemed to rest upon the future. If there was less of that unbounded hope which intoxicated youthful minds at the close of the last century, there was also far less of the overweening conceit which brought upon that generation such fearful disasters. Never before, within the same period, were such varied and strenuous exertions put forth to diffuse useful knowledge, to elevate and educate the masses, to ameliorate the condition of the indigent, neglected, and unfortunate classes, to reform the vicious, to train up children in right paths, to popularize the highest truths of science and religion, to emancipate and dignify labor, to multiply the conveniences and comforts of life, to do away with slavery, war, intemperance, and the other giant evils which had so long preyed upon human happiness—in a word, to render the world the abode of indus-

trious freedom, peace, domestic joy, and virtuous intelligence. If you will take the trouble to read over addresses delivered thirty or forty years ago on occasions like the present, you will find them replete with sentiments illustrative of what I have been saying.

The impression, however, that the world was drawing near to the reign of general peace and brotherhood was far from universal. Some of the best and ablest thinkers maintained quite the contrary theory. They contended that the old providential laws were still in full operation; that the old passions of human nature, however for a time they might appear to sleep, were in reality as strong and explosive as ever; that instead of allaying them, the very advancement of society was fitted rather to give them new stimulus, and to arm them with more destructive weapons; that in a word, the signs of the times foretokened anything but millennial days. Experience has certainly justified this rather than the other view. We can now see plainly enough, that the age which at Waterloo seemed to be bidding adieu to the sword, was itself pregnant with the elements of titanic strife. The revolutionary storms which swept over Europe in 1848, revealed this to every observing eye, and subsequent events have only rendered it still clearer. The Eastern war, the Indian revolt, the wars in China, the Italian struggle, and now our own civil war, have demonstrated, one after the other, that the occupation of the peace society is for the present gone, and that a long time must elapse before spears will be turned into pruning-hooks. So far from learning war no more, never did the nations study it with greater diligence, never were preparations for it made on a more colossal scale than now. Europe is one huge camp, and reverberates with the tramp of a million of armed men.

History is, indeed, a wonderful teacher and judge. Those great crises, especially, which notch the centuries, speak with a voice which is as the voice of many waters, and as the voice of mighty thunderings. What a touchstone they are of good and evil! How plainly they tell us what was right and what was wrong in the past! How they vindicate the majesty of truth! How they uncloak false theories and put to silence

the ignorance of foolish men! They are the Apocalypse of Providence. What was said of the Sibyl, might be applied to them:

Not hers
To win the sense by words of rhetoric,
Lip-blossoms, breathing perishable sweets;
But by the power of the informing Word
Roll sounding onward through a thousand years,
Her deep, prophetic bodements.

Our country is now passing through one of these momentous crises of history. It fell upon us like a thunderbolt from a clear sky. For some eighteen months it has absorbed the attention and tasked the chief energies of the nation. We have thought and talked about little else. Nor has it affected us alone. It has startled all Europe and the furthest Orient. The whole civilised world has watched its course with eager and profound solicitude. Those who differ heaven-wide as to its real character, confess it to be one of the most remarkable and portentous in the records of the race. On this point the same opinion has prevailed at Charleston and Richmond as at New York and Boston; at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg as at Washington. Nobody seems disposed to underrate its importance. It is everywhere felt to be not merely an American question, but for the time being, at least, the paramount question of the world. The Eastern question, the Roman question, the Italian question, and all other questions, appear insignificant in comparison with the awful drama which Almighty Providence is now enacting in these United States. Here, if anywhere in the realm of time and space—I think we may say it without presumption—here, if anywhere, is the spot upon which the eyes of all who regard with interest the fortunes of the human race, whether among mortals or the immortals, are most intently fixed. You will not deem it strange, therefore, that I propose to speak to you of this portentous crisis, and to elicit, if possible, a portion of its meaning. I confess I should feel guilty of a kind of disloyalty, were I to occupy your attention with any other topic.

But two forms of speech seem to me pertinent now. The first is prayer to God. The second is, wise, faithful, patri-

otic speech to each other. We cannot, certainly, invoke too frequently or too fervently the favor of that Infinite Power which rules the world, and before which all the nations of the earth are as nothing; nor can we speak to each other with too much earnestness of the solemn work in which we are engaged. But aside from these two things, why should a loyal American citizen stop to utter or to hear words, be they never so eloquent? What are the tongues of men and of angels at such an hour as this, if they are not flaming with patriotic ardor; if they do not help on the work of saving the nation? The mission of the scholar to-day, is to offer all his knowledge, and all his eloquence, and all his talents, and his own life also, if need be, upon the altar of that country to which he owes so much.

I make no apology, then, for my subject, for it is the only one on which I can speak to you. But I shall aim to treat it in a temper not unbefitting this occasion. I shall try to do so in a spirit harmonizing with its high and weighty character. The feelings of Moses, when the angel of the Lord appeared unto him in a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush, and he said, *I will now turn aside, and see this great sight, why the bush is not burnt*, would not, perhaps, misbecome us to-day, as, standing on this literary Horeb, we look forth upon our imperial Republic, and marvel that it is still unconsumed amidst the fiery trials which have so long encompassed it. Could that unseen voice, which issued from the midst of the burning bush, interpret to us the strange and fearful scene upon which we are gazing, it would, I doubt not, say to us as it said to Moses: *Put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground*. He who considers this terrible scene without a feeling of religious awe, is not wrong in his temper merely; he is utterly wrong in his method; his understanding is off the track. For it is not a whit more certain that we are in the midst of a tremendous strait, than it is certain that we have been brought into it by the hand of God. We have not fallen into it, nor run into it, nor been driven into it by chance, or by any mere human impulse. The storm that has swept over the nation and set all the waves and the sea roaring, was raised by no enchanter's wand. It has been slowly gathering for more

than a third of a century ; and it has at length burst upon us so furiously in strict accordance with the moral laws and order of the world. There is divine reason in it. There is divine justice in it. And we may be quite sure there is a divine purpose in it. It is little better than moral idiocy to attempt to explain this trouble upon any lower principles.

The hand of God, it is true, is always in the world, and nothing comes to pass independently of him. But how much more distinctly and powerfully his ruling hand is manifested at some times than at others ! There are periods when everything seems to go on according to mere natural law. The visible course of affairs is like clock-work. It requires no little effort to believe that behind these quiet, customary appearances Almighty Wisdom is concealed, and that through them all it is executing its steadfast decrees. Such are the times of peace and outward prosperity. Then come periods when the old order of things is brought to an end. New and extraordinary forces suddenly spring into action. Other men and other principles gain the ascendancy. New measures are adopted. A social, a religious, a political revolution is inaugurated. There is a fierce struggle between hostile opinions and systems ; between the past and the future. There is civil convulsion. There is the battle of the warrior, with confused noise and garments rolled in blood. Such are the times of transition, of war and public calamity. The whole order of the world seems then to be changing. A new cycle of events begins. A fresh chapter is opened in history. Humanity takes a step never taken before toward the fulfilment of its grand destiny. The hand on the dial-plate of time is moved forward, and no mortal power is strong enough ever to put it back again. The introduction of Christianity, the inundation and conquest of the Roman Empire by the barbaric hordes of the North, the Protestant Reformation, the civil wars of England, the American and French Revolutions, afford some of the most memorable instances of these great crises and turning-points in the march of society. At such times that stupendous agency, which we call Providence, comes out into the foreground, as it were, and rivets the astonished gaze of all

thoughtful and devout beholders. Then the eye that is armed with faith can almost see it, as it moves to and fro and directs the course of events, like a skilful general leading his forces to victory. Then the ear, that is armed with faith, can almost hear it as, uttering its voice above the tumult and roar of battle, it instructs the warring elements how to fight. And what at the moment may appear obscure and contradictory, how plain it is when we come to read it in the light of the finished series of events! The working out of a great Providential issue is, in this respect, not unlike a child's puzzle. The result is predetermined, and each several piece has an appointed place in securing it. The wrong position of a single piece would defeat the whole plan; and yet, to one who had never before watched the game, many a piece would seem more helpful in a wrong than in the right position. But the practised little eye, that sees the end from the beginning, knows better. So particular movements of the Divine hand, in compassing a certain object, appear to us at times strange and disastrous; but they are not so in reality. The strategy of Providence is almost always unexpected, because it is so far-reaching and comprehensive; but it never fails. Every step leads in the best, if not always in the shortest way to final success. When the last step is taken; when the last piece is in its place—the divine puzzle is solved, and we feel assured that it could not have been worked out so well in any other way. Great and marvellous are thy judgments, Lord God Almighty.

Reason and religion, then, alike impel us to acknowledge reverently the hand of God in this crisis. Nothing else can raise us to the height of its great meaning, or arm us with the strength and courage to go through it in triumph. Nothing else can save us from being utterly maddened by the crimes, horrors, and suffering, which mark its course. If he does not believe it has a divine side; that it is under the direction of Eternal Providence, and intended to work out His omnipotent and all-wise decrees, I do not see how any thoughtful man can look upon it without shame and despair. If God is not in it, then is it assuredly the devil's work, and "chaos is come again."

But it is not enough to contemplate this national tragedy with an awestruck eye, or to believe that it is pervaded by a divine purpose. It exceedingly concerns us to find out what that divine purpose really is. Thrice is he armed who hath his quarrel just; and thrice again is he armed who comprehends the justice of his quarrel. It is no *Deus ex machina* who has ordained this conflict; but the ever-living God of nature and of history. He still governs the world as he has always governed it, by righteous and beneficent laws. As he upholdeth, so doth he rule all things by the word of his power. Events march in the train and keep step to the music of that divine *Logos*, which was, and is, and is to come. In order to act the right part in them, and in order to understand them when they have come to pass, our own intelligence must be in vital sympathy with that of their invisible Author and Arbitrator. The divine purpose which is forcing its way into existence, and preparing for itself a local habitation and a name on earth, must be reproduced in our own consciousness, and embodied in our own life. This is the only way for men to become co-workers with the Most High in executing his sovereign behests. This is the ancient method by which, from age to age, mighty nations and all the elect spirits of the race have comprehended their Heaven-appointed mission—fulfilled their several tasks, and rendered themselves forever illustrious in human annals. This is the secret of that sacred enthusiasm, which transformed Eastern shepherds and nomads of the desert into venerable patriarchs, seers, warriors, and kings; which changed fishermen into apostles and evangelists, and which is able still to bless the world with heroes, saints, and martyrs. It is the presence of some divine idea in the soul, actuating the whole being and illuminating the path of life. Let a man grasp, in honest conviction, a real thought of God, and spend his days in striving to realize it; and he is on the highway to glory, honor, and immortality. Let a whole people grasp, in honest conviction, some sacred cause, some principle of immutable justice, and consecrate itself to the work of vindicating that cause and enthroning that principle, and we have the grandest spectacle ever witnessed on earth.

One design of public trials is, no doubt, to render such con-

secration purer and more entire. There is no sweeter or nobler use of adversity than this. It is astonishing what rapid strides a people can make in understanding the principles of its own existence, its history, and its providential task under the pressure of overwhelming calamity. How immeasurably more vivid and profound is our national consciousness than it was before the bombardment of Fort Sumter! You remember how the report of that flagitious act was borne to us on the wings of the lightning; and how, like lightning, it struck our hearts. But it did more than that; it penetrated the lowest depths of the popular mind like the trump of God, and raised again to newness of life old ancestral ideas and patriotic instincts, which had too long lain buried in oblivion. Years seemed to intervene between the day before and the day after we heard that appalling news. And we have lived very fast ever since. If you measure time by events, we have lived almost half a century since then. If you measure time by the intensity and depth of experience which is acquired in it, the nation has passed since then from incredulous youth to full and earnest manhood. It has felt the weight of tremendous cares and responsibilities; it has been at its wits' end and staggered like a drunken man; it has been rocked as by an earthquake, has poured out its blood like water, and walked month after month along the edge of a bottomless pit that yawned to swallow it up. It has been putting forth superhuman exertions to save its own life, its honor, and all its dearest treasures. Surely it ought to have learnt thus a great deal of wisdom; surely it ought to understand both itself and others a great deal better than it did eighteen months ago.

And beyond all question, such has been the effect of its fearful experience. This crisis, like the word of God, has been quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow; and has been a discernor of the thoughts and intents of the nation's heart. It has revealed to us perils of whose existence we had not dreamed, but which, concealed a little longer, would have wrecked us past hope. It has taught us great lessons of political truth and duty,—

lessons concerning the divine institution, authority, beneficence, and rightful claims of government, which, if we mark, learn, and inwardly digest them, will not be forgotten for a thousand years. It has shown us that the principles for which our fathers fought and toiled, for which they lived and died—the principles which lie at the foundation, uphold and animate the whole majestic structure, and form the cap-stone of our Christian Republic, are as *sacred* as they are glorious; that they are guarded by a jealous deity, whose feet are indeed shod with wool, but his path is as the path of a flaming sword, turning every way; and that no people can trample these principles under foot without incurring his vengeance. How many huge fallacies, by which we have been led to fancy we could enjoy the inestimable rights and privileges without fulfilling the self-sacrificing duties of constitutional liberty, has this crisis scattered to the winds! How it has, at once, revealed and chastised our national vices and follies, our vain-glorious conceit, our political corruption and venality, our shallow views of public duty, the madness of blind party-feeling, and the bitter consequences of converting the service and offices of the country into a barbarous system of partisan reward and spoils! How plainly we now see that mere material prosperity and aggrandisement are no true signs of national well-being; that the most magnificent industrial interest, if allied to injustice and despotic lust of power, may in an instant lose its sceptre and become like a millstone about the neck of its subjects to drown them in the depths of anarchy and woe.

It is easy to perceive how in these and similar ways, this rebellion, by its very magnitude and wickedness, has been to us an incomparable moral and political discipline. It has wrought upon the understanding, conscience, and whole spirit of the nation with an almost miraculous power. It has precipitated a work of popular education, to which there are few, if any, parallels in history. As we compare the temper and posture of the national mind in reference to some of the weightiest problems of the nation's life with what it was only eighteen months ago, we are lost in wonder. It is like comparing the

intelligence and courage of consummate manhood, with the petty views and weakness of youth. Momentous questions which then perplexed the brains of statesmen, as they had long been the subject of fierce debate throughout the land, have been finally answered, and their answers wrought into the inmost experience, sense, and character of the nation. They are adjudged and settled for all time. It is scarcely more probable that they will be reopened than that we shall revive the question, decided by our fathers a century ago, of colonial allegiance to the crown of Great Britain.

Secession is one of these adjudicated questions. This crisis has compelled the American people to answer it, and they have done so by stamping it with the seal of their abhorrence as deadly heresy and rebellion. They have marked it with an anathema such as the Christian Church has put upon an open denial of God. It is like atheism, and subverts the first principles of our political worship as a free, order-loving, and covenant-keeping people. It makes the Constitution, as atheism makes the Bible, a deceitful dead letter, instead of an organic law of life. It makes the government, which our fathers built up for us with such infinite pains, a mockery and a delusion, placing in its hand a broken reed instead of the mighty sceptre of righteous and sovereign authority. It ruthlessly puts asunder that Union and Liberty which Almighty Providence, on the day when they so happily joined hands in the presence of the jubilant nation, surely intended should be one and inseparable, then and for ever. It is a principle of social disintegration and universal anarchy. Denying that we are, or ever were, the people of these United States, it aims to destroy our historic life, to blot out our name and nation, and render us a by-word in the earth. Secession, in fine, is national suicide. It is a monstrous political crime, which must be put down and punished at all hazards and at any cost. Such is the irrevocable judgment which the American people have passed upon this baleful doctrine.

And in passing this sentence, I need hardly say, they have settled the question of *coercion* also. They have decided that it is both their right and bounden duty to maintain their na-

tional existence and authority by force of arms. They were very slow in coming to this conclusion; it cost them prodigious struggles of mind; they would have given everything short of their country's life and honor to avoid the issue. Where does history afford another instance of a puissant and high-spirited nation drawing the sword and wielding it in its own self-defence with such unspeakable reluctance? But the nation has deliberately taken this step, and in doing so has determined that this Union, since it could no longer be preserved by the ballot, must be preserved by the bullet; that those who, against reason, against law, and against solemn oaths, attempt to destroy it, shall be compelled to desist and return to their allegiance by rifled cannon and the sword of justice. And it has already sealed this decision with the blood of myriads of its noblest sons. Henceforth let all the world understand that American Democracy is not the rule of popular opinion or of moral and political suasion only,—not mere organised influence, but that it is *government* in the highest sense of the term; and that the enforcement of the laws, at whatever cost, is a fundamental article of its creed—just as fundamental as liberty itself.

But there is another and still more momentous question which this rebellion, if it has not already answered, is rapidly forcing to a settlement. It is one of the most formidable questions that ever taxed a nation's intelligence or puzzled a nation's will. It relates to the most extraordinary political and social phenomenon of modern times. For more than a century it has been the subject of earnest thought and discussion; for a third of a century it has called forth more debate, has aroused more vehement passions, and led to sharper diversities of opinion, than any other subject. It has created a literature of its own; and if all the articles, speeches, addresses, sermons, reviews, pamphlets, and books which have been written upon it were collected, they would form a large library; and they would furnish too, I may add, as striking specimens of human eloquence, and of both the power and weakness of human wisdom, as can be found in our mother-tongue. There is no other chapter in history exactly like this, and certainly few others so profoundly interesting to the

student of human nature. *African slavery in the bosom of this free, democratic, Christian Republic*—whence and what is it? right or wrong? a blessing to be spread and perpetuated; a curse to be got rid of, or a *tertium quid*, capable of being turned into a blessing or a curse, according to the use that is made of it? Is it a sectional or a national institution, the creature of mere local and municipal law, or of the Constitution itself? Ought the Christian Church to condemn or to defend it, or to say nothing about it? Have negroes rights which the government and white men are bound to respect, or does their rightful state lie outside the sphere of law, the Constitution, and the public conscience? Behold a sample of the points involved in the problem of American slavery!

I need not stop to review the history of this terrible question. You know it as well as I do. You know how the differences of opinion about it became more and more sharply defined, more antagonistic and irreconcilable both in church and state, until they reached their climax and practical conclusion in the rupture, one after another, of large religious denominations, in the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and the consequent struggle in Kansas, in the Dred Scott decision, and the Presidential election of 1860. By this time the South had become almost unanimous in regarding slavery as a divine institution; and as such they, naturally enough, claimed the right to extend it far and near. Few vestiges remained of the anti-slavery sentiments which formerly prevailed among them, and had been cherished by their most illustrious statesmen of earlier days. It was one of the most sudden and complete revolutions of public opinion on record. To explain fully how it was brought about, would lead me astray from my subject. The prodigious growth of the cotton interest was a leading cause, but by no means the only one. Along with this conspired potent influences, moral, social, and speculative, which were in part the natural effect of slavery itself, and in part wrought upon the Southern mind from abroad, and especially from the North. The result was, a public opinion in favor of the institution so unanimous and despotic, that the slightest

whisper of opposition imperilled a man's reputation, if not his life. The decree of King Nebuchadnezzar, that whoso would not fall down and worship the golden image which he had set up in the plain of Dura, in the province of Babylon, should be cast into the midst of a burning fiery furnace, was scarcely more inexorable than the public sentiment at the South, which demanded homage to the Dagon of slavery.

In the Free States, meanwhile, hostility to the system had grown deeper and more intense; but it was still far from unanimous. A large and influential portion of the Northern people, and leaders of opinion, either kept silent on the subject or spoke with doubtful and bated breath; others boldly avowed their entire sympathy with the Southern doctrine; denounced all who opposed it, and predicted the day when that doctrine would be dominant throughout the nation. Most of this latter class were wont to spell "negro" with two gs, and could not restrain their wonder that such a black and miserable creature of God should excite anybody's thought or pity. Certain ethnological theories of the day, and such contemptuous views as Mr. Carlyle, in one of his Latter-Day Pamphlets, allowed himself to express respecting Sambo and the uses to which he should be put in the world, gave great aid and comfort to this class at the North, as they had done to the new doctrine at the South. Then there were inveterate party prejudices, dislike of politics in the pulpit, and I know not what other influences, which continued to excite bitter divisions in Northern sentiment. Some who really hated slavery, hated abolitionism a great deal more; while many hated abolitionism with such total energy of mind and heart that no faculty was left for hating slavery. The state of things was curious in the extreme. It was a psychological study. Thousands of candid and sensible men look back to their feelings on the subject two years ago with unfeigned astonishment; and thousands more are likely to do so before another two years shall have passed away. The *odium theologicum* in the palmiest days of bigotry and superstition was scarcely more suspicious or more intolerant than the sentiment aroused in many a Northern good man's bosom by the mildest denunciation of slavery as a wicked and cruel system.

Such is a rude but not, I think, an unfair picture of the state of popular opinion in reference to slavery two years ago. Though far in advance of what it had been before in our day, it was yet conflicting and deeply complicated with the violent passions and prejudices of party.

But the summer of 1860 seems to lie far back in a former age. The nation, as I have said, is several decennia older than it was then. It has been taking lessons of a Higher Teacher. It has passed through "great searchings of heart." Its moral vision has been touched with a marvellous eye-salve, and whereas it was once blind, now it sees—sees with the clearness of intuition—sees with amazement that it never saw before—sees as it were in the very light of eternal justice. An earthquake has broken asunder the gates of brass wherein the public conscience long seemed to lie imprisoned, and that conscience has come forth, disenthralled, to bear witness to the truth, and to judge righteous judgment. Slavery appears to the nation now what his sin—his intemperance, his gambling, his lust—appears to the man whose feet have at last been taken from the horrible pit and the miry clay and planted upon a rock. We have found out that each one of its sable victims is like a grain of gunpowder; and that four millions of them combined together in the political and social system render that system one vast magazine of mischief, sure sooner or later to explode and scatter ruin over the world. The logic of words had done its work; and thousands of wise and good men remained still unconvinced. The logic of events and of Providence has now been heard thundering through the land; and the people are beginning to cry out, *Amen—so let it be!*

Of course there are individual exceptions. Some still assert that abolitionism, political ambition, the doctrine of State-rights, or something else, and not slavery, is the prime cause of this rebellion. But such theories are fast dying out; few real thinkers advocate them any more. The plain common-sense of the American people agrees with the philosophy of history, with the best reflection and with the most authoritative testimony of Southern leaders themselves (of such men as Dr. Thornwell and Vice-President Stephens, e. g.) in regarding

Slavery as the proper root and ground of our national troubles. A strong disunion sentiment, it is true, had long existed at the South, and the desire to break up the Union has often used slavery for a *pretext*, as General Jackson, with rare sagacity, predicted it would. No doubt wild dreams of a Southern republic, of conquest in Mexico, Central America, Cuba, and elsewhere, coupled with bitter disappointment at the loss of political power at home and a growing dislike of "Yankees and Northern mudsills", have been controlling motives in precipitating treason. But back of all these other motives—animating, envenoming and arming them all—has lain the slave-power itself. Out of this dark and evil ground was born the dire spirit of Secession. Had no such institution existed, I do not deny that centrifugal tendencies might have shown themselves in the Southern States, but it is not conceivable that they could ever have been combined into such a diabolical scheme of perjury, treason, and rebellion as that which is now struggling to destroy the government and life of the nation.

I have no time to go into an analysis of the social system of the South; but the day, I believe, is not distant when the general voice of Christian society will admit it to have been false to the core; and that its permanent existence as a ruling power would have been fatal to the moral interests of this nation and of mankind. It will be admitted that the elements of a worse and more dangerous oligarchy can hardly be imagined. Quite aside from the fate of the enslaved race, the condition of the large majority of the white race also is rendered by it hopelessly degraded. What sad revelations the progress of the war has given us on this point! How well they illustrate the maxim of Lord Bacon respecting the true greatness of kingdoms and states: "Let states that aim at greatness, take heed how their nobility and gentlemen do multiply too fast; for that maketh the common subject grow to be a peasant and base swain, driven out of heart, and, in effect, but a gentleman's laborer. Even as you see in coppice woods, if you leave straddles too thick, you shall never have clean underwood, but shrubs and bushes. So in countries, if the gentlemen be too many, *the commons will be base.*" It is un-

deniable that slavery has been the main cause of that remarkable stratum of Southern society—the *poor whites*—who have already afforded their political masters so much food for powder, and who, forming as they do in large sections of the South, an immense numerical majority of the population, are to be rewarded by and by—those of them who survive—with the privilege of not voting at the elections and of taking no part in the government of the new Confederacy. I speak of the oligarchical despotism of the South—not of the Southern people themselves. I know perfectly well that so far as individual character is concerned, the South has produced and is still able to produce as fine and noble specimens of human nature—as brave, as generous, and as Christian men and women as the North. But its slaveholding social system is essentially at war with the first principles of our democratic republic; at war with its liberty and equality, with its popular suffrage, with its common schools, with its free thought, free speech, and free press, with its constitutional order and justice, with its industrial dignity and freedom, with its fair humanities, and its ancestral Christian spirit. Such a system cannot live and rule on this continent without subverting, sooner or later, the institutions of our fathers and changing our whole civilisation. It has already developed some of the subtlest vices of Oriental caste combined with the political organization, skill, energy, and reckless ambition, which belong to the revolutionary despotisms of the West. Give to this power national existence and independence, half a million of bayonets, a great fleet of iron-clad ships and floating batteries, railroads leading everywhere, two thirds of our sea-coast and the Gulf of Mexico, more than seventy out of our eighty-four principal rivers, the larger portion of our present territory, with unbounded prospects beyond to tempt its cupidity, and what is likely to be the result of it all before the beginning of another century? Is anybody so ignorant of history or so simple-minded as to believe that such a power as this and such a power as the American Union could quietly coëxist in the same hemisphere?

I cannot resist the conviction, then, that in the decree of

Providence this rebellion is the death-sentence of slavery, and that the American people will see to it that the sentence is carried into execution. And this not solely because the institution is so unjust and cruel to the black man, but still more because it is so utterly demoralizing to the white man. If we were at liberty to leave out of account the claims of the negro himself; if we could demonstrate, as so many have tried to do, that his welfare is best promoted by the state of bondage, even then would the paramount interests of the dominant race require the overthrow of slavery as a system abhorrent to the whole genius and *morale* of our Anglo-Saxon type of civilisation. But are we at liberty to leave out of account the claims of the black man himself? "I frankly confess to you, gentlemen (said the other day a distinguished politician of the old national democracy, to a highly intelligent company whom he was addressing), I frankly confess to you, that, for myself, I take no interest in the negro; but, gentlemen, I am at a loss to conceive how any man can review the history of this rebellion without a clear conviction that *Almighty Providence* does!"

Precisely when and how the "*monstrum horrendum*" will be finally disposed of I do not pretend to say; but certainly the mortal process seems to be going on. There is already a most destructive "friction and abrasion" about the extremities; and in due time, doubtless, the very seat of life will be reached. Let us not be impatient; let us not be in too great a hurry. There is a right way and a best way of doing whatever ought to be done. Because a murderer is sentenced to be hung, nobody would be therefore justified in strangling him on the spot. The forms of law must be observed. Whether slavery is finally abolished in one year or in a score of years, appears to me comparatively unimportant, provided its abolishment is deliberately initiated and rendered ultimately certain. The subject is beset with the greatest practical difficulties, and those who agree as to the main principles ought not to quarrel about the details of time and manner. The country is under a heavy debt of gratitude to the President for the admirable spirit which he has shown in dealing with this question. His

recent address to the Border State men is one of the most dignified and impressive appeals which ever issued from the lips of power. I shall not stop to discuss the President's plan, or any of the other schemes of emancipation which have been proposed. Whatever plan is adopted, it is plain enough that its successful execution will require the utmost wisdom, firmness, and resources of the nation, aided by the special favor of God. In the progress of events a violent and summary policy may become necessary. We know not what a month or a week may bring forth. The American people are in no mood to be trifled with ; and the mill of the gods, although it always grinds sure, does not *always* grind slow. Sometimes when a great people, inspired of Heaven, put their shoulder to the wheel which turns it, its movement becomes quick and terrible like an avalanche ; then in a moment, in the twinkling of the eye, as it were, the work is done. For one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and sometimes he crowds the work of a thousand years into one day.

I have left myself but little time to touch upon other points of vital importance. It has been my aim to show that this crisis is full of Providential lessons and results. Events have a two-fold office ; they are designed at once to form and to reveal the nation's character. They force it to a thorough self-knowledge and self-development. They compel it to face its past errors, and learn the bitter but salutary truth that

" We still have judgment here ; that we but teach
Bloody instructions, which, being taught, return
To plague the inventor ; this even-handed justice
Commends the ingredients of the poisoned chalice
To our own lips."

They summon its deepest principles, its intelligence, its latent, reserved strength, its moral and physical resources, its ancestral spirit, and its whole manhood into strenuous action. This rebellion has taught us as much that is new about ourselves and our institutions, as about the geography of our country. What mist and clouds of false opinion it has scattered to the four winds ! With how much more benignant and star-like virtue than ever before, do those divine ideas of

freedom, humanity, justice, and religion, in whose radiance the infant nation was perpetually bathed, and which have been indeed

“ — a master-light of all our seeing,”

shine down upon us in this dismal midnight of our troubles! When before were ever the time-honored traditions of our history; the sweet memories of our pilgrim father and mothers; the names of the immortal patriots, heroes, and statesmen, which fill the earlier and the later annals of the Republic; the good old cause for which they lived and died, the great Constitution, the beneficent government, the glorious Union which they formed by their wisdom and consecrated by their prayers and sacrifices,—when were they ever so precious and sacred as now — now that parricidal traitors would despoil us of them all?

But we have learnt much that is new about other nations as well as about ourselves. One of the most startling effects of this crisis has been the sudden revelation of foreign sentiment in reference both to our Union and to the cause of constitutional and popular government, which it represents. Those best acquainted with the secret currents of European opinion, were still unprepared for what we have witnessed; more especially for what we have witnessed in Great Britain. To the most of our people the course of England was anticipated without misgiving. They expected to be almost inundated by a stream of hearty Christian sympathy from that old fountain whence their forefathers had drawn the living waters of freedom. They were already covenanting with themselves how they would one day pay the grateful debt and teach their children to pay it over and over again after them. All this may have been unreasonable, and even foolish; but certainly it was most natural. Never was there a deadlier disappointment. England appeared to wait until she thought she saw which way the scale was going to turn; and since then her sympathy has been like the blast of a wintry east-wind. There have been, it is true, noble exceptions. The names of such men as John Bright, Mill, Arthur, Hughes, Foster and others, will

long be held in honor among us, for they have spoken generous and truthful words in our behalf, when such words were of more value than the precious onyx or the sapphire. A few presses, too, have been earnest and faithful advocates of our cause; and no doubt there have been many secret good wishes and prayers for our success. But the simple fact remains, that the general feeling of Great Britain, as expressed in the varied organs of her public opinion, and by her public men, has been overwhelmingly against us and our cause. How shall we explain it? It may be readily explained by assuming that our cause is bad, and that we are in the wrong. Then England's course would be highly to her credit. But assuming our cause to be what we honestly believe it to be, the cause of order, justice, and human freedom, how then shall we account for the fact that the freest, most law-abiding and politically-enlightened, most anti-slavery, and most Christian people of the old world—our own kith and kin too,—have turned their backs upon us in this dread hour of our agony, and lavished their moral support upon the most flagitious conspiracy and rebellion the world ever saw,—a rebellion whose openly-avowed aim is to found a government with perpetual and ever-extending slavery as its corner-stone! No ordinary motives, no ephemeral influences and pretexts, however plausible, can explain this phenomenon. It has deeper roots. It is the product of causes that lie back of the common consciousness, that have their source in the will rather than the understanding. No man of sense will pretend, of course, that there may not have been honest misapprehensions in England respecting our feeling and intentions toward her. Infinite pains had been taken by the emissaries of secession to foment such misapprehensions:—as, for example, that Mr. Seward was her enemy and was bent upon the annexation of Canada, that we wanted to get into a war with her, and the like. But did not the course of our Government in the Trent affair afford an unanswerable reply to such calumnies? No doubt, too, the Morrill Tariff, and still more the loss of cotton, have been exceedingly trying to her. But these things were no justifiable ground of offence. We had a perfect right to frame our own tariff. It was no fault of

ours that England's supplies of slave-grown cotton were suddenly cut off. It was the fault of the traitors who precipitated the country into civil war. If England had not been predisposed to take sides against us, she might still have insisted upon our giving up Mason and Slidell; but would she have done it in just the way she did? Could she have so misunderstood the principles of our Constitution, the motives of our government, or the spirit of our people in reference to this struggle; could she have so misinterpreted the most notorious facts, and boldly continued to assert that slavery had nothing to do with the real motives and merits of the struggle, if a secret bias of the will had not perverted her judgment? But I need hardly speak of a secret bias. No fact of contemporary history is better established than the fact that this Republic is the object of profound antipathy among the ruling classes of Great Britain, and that they would rejoice in its destruction. With individual exceptions, of course, they are our enemies, and not our friends. Our troubles have taught us this. In ordinary times nations are apt to play the hypocrite towards each other. Their amity is apt to be the mere offspring of fear or self-interest. Their alliances are often unnatural and forced. There is, in truth, a deplorable want of real honesty and Christian principle in the whole sphere of international polity and relationships. But such a crisis as the present compels nations to uncloak their real sentiments and proclivities. It has done so in the case of Great Britain, in a way to excite our grief and amazement. As one after another of her most eminent statesmen, the leaders of her renowned aristocracy, her eloquent divines and able writers—men whose names were familiar as household words in all our homes—pronounced judgment against us, often in terms of unwonted arrogance and contumely; it has seemed almost incredible that we were listening to voices from the land of Milton and of Hampden—the land consecrated of old to liberty, law, and hatred of slavery. But it was even so. And it is a fact which seems to me portend anything but good to the cause of peace and humanity.

Great Britain and America ought to march in the van of

Christian civilisation, hand joined to hand. It is a thousand pities they should not do so. England could form no alliance on earth so natural, so fruitful, so beneficent, or so invincible as this. It would be a grand alliance with the future, and with the course of history. "The possible destiny", said Coleridge, thirty years ago, "the possible destiny of the United States of America, as a nation, of a hundred millions of free-men, stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, living under the laws of Alfred, and speaking the language of Shakespeare and Milton, is an august conception. *Why should we not wish to see it realized?* America would then be England viewed through a solar microscope—Great Britain in a state of glorious magnification." If the spirit which breathes in these generous words of one of her greatest and wisest sons, had possessed the heart of England's statesmen, she would have seized the precious, irrevocable opportunity, and bound this great Republic to her with hooks of steel.

She has chosen another course. I do not complain of it. But I think the causes of her doing so merit our careful study, for they are likely to influence both her and us in the future. "In the eyes of an Englishman", says the profound critic of our own Democracy, who knew England well, and loved her in spite of her faults, "a cause is just if it be the interest of England that it should succeed. A man or a government that is useful to England, has every kind of merit, and one that does England harm, every sort of fault". These are severe words, and I should not have ventured to utter them in my own name; but have they not found a signal illustration in the present case?

There is, indeed, something prodigious in the mental and moral constitution of most Englishmen, when they sit in judgment upon other nations. What a marvellously happy faculty they possess of forgetting unpleasant things in their own history! How often they remind one of what the rat said to the mouse, when a cat was introduced into the premises:

"Said the other, This cat if she murder a rat,
Must needs be a very great sinner :
But to feed upon *mice* can't be counted a vice ;
I *myself* like a mouse for my dinner."

After hearing all the various rebukes, counsels, and curtain-lectures addressed to us from the mother-country during the past eighteen months, would anybody venture to dream that the British Government had ever been anything else but the gentle, impartial, and divinely appointed "guardian of civilisation"? Would anybody believe that it ever had made, or ever could make, the smallest objection to the "secession" of old Ireland, the Ionian Isles, or the ancient nationalities of India? Truly there was never such a huge piece of contradiction; for, without a question, England is still a great and wonderful country, full of glorious institutions, robust virtues, prolific talents, unbounded industry, enterprise, pluck, and cleverness; above all, of true-hearted and large-hearted Christian men and women. Nobody can deny this. But in her weak points there is no nation more ludicrously infirm, however unconscious she herself may be of the fact; while her bad points are exceedingly bad. If one wishes to understand the dark side of British character in our day, let him read over the articles of the *London Times* on the American struggle, remembering that this is the paper from which English noblemen, bishops, scholars, merchants, and politicians derive their chief information and by which they are most largely influenced in forming their opinions concerning the affairs of the world. Where else shall we find a match for this most able, but godless sheet, in unblushing mendacity, scoffing, arrogance, and duplicity! Its course toward our afflicted country has been that of Shimei, who came forth and cast stones at King David, when he fled before the rebellion of his unnatural son, who cursed the king also as a bloody man and a man of Belial. It is hard not to say, with the sons of Zeruah, *why should this dead dog curse my lord, the king?* Why should our revered and sorrow-stricken country be reviled and mocked at by this uncircumcised Briton? But I seem to hear that country's injured majesty chiding such thoughts, in the words of King David to Abishai and all his servants: "Behold my son, which came forth of my bowels, seeketh my life; how much more now may this Benjaminite do it? Let him alone, and let him curse, for the Lord hath bidden him".

I have spoken of England and her feelings toward us. On the Continent we have more friends and are far better understood. Insular narrowness and aristocratic pride have not stood in the way of a candid study of our institutions. There the great work of De Tocqueville made its mark upon the political intelligence of the age, and its influence is still felt. The remarkable books of our generous and whole-souled advocate, De Gasparin, strikingly show this. The passion for popular freedom and popular rights, yet glows in many noble breasts. Neither the divisions and reactionary principles in Germany, nor the iron despotism in France, nor the all-absorbing thought of national unity in Italy, have extinguished it. Still the political condition of the Continent is not auspicious for our cause. So far as the governments and ruling classes are concerned, they regard us, for the most part, with doubt and disfavor. The reaction is everywhere potential. The Sphynx-like man, who reigns in the Tuileries, is everywhere held in secret terror, and sits as an incubus upon the heart of Europe. The sympathy with popular, republican, Christian institutions like ours, is at its minimum; the sympathy with ultra-conservative principles and absolutism in Church and State is at its maximum. The revolutions of 1848 have borne little fruit but this as yet. Let any one who desires light on this subject, read with care the recently published memoir and letters of De Tocqueville. It is one of the saddest books of the day. It gives a most vivid picture of the demoralization of political sentiment and character in Europe. Let me cite a few passages. Here is one written in 1856:

"I still consider liberty as the first of blessings. I still see that it is one of the most fertile sources of manly virtues and great actions. No tranquillity and no material comfort can in my mind make up for its loss. And yet I see that most of the men of my time — the most honest among them, for I care little about the others — think only of accommodating themselves to the new system, and what most of all disturbs and alarms me, turn a taste for slavery into a virtue."

Again he writes:

"Is it really true that there ever have been parliamentary assemblages in France? That the nation took a passionate interest in all that was

spoken in them? Were not these men, these constitutions, these forms of government, shadows without substance? Did the passions, the hopes, the fears, the sympathies and antipathies, which once so strongly moved us, really exist in our own time, or are they mere recollections of what we have read in history? In truth, I am tempted to believe it; for what has really existed leaves some trace, and I see none of all we imagined that we saw and felt."

Speaking of the réaction in France, he says:

"With a few exceptions, we have come out of this revolution like laborers who leave the field hanging their heads, worn out by the day's work, thinking of nothing but to get home, get their supper, and get to bed."

If Europe does not intervene in our troubles, then, it will be from no restraint of principle, but from the conviction that intervention would be likely to cost too much. Nothing will ward it off, nothing has warded it off, but a salutary dread of the possible consequences. The monitory voice of that little "Yankee cheese-box", which appeared so unexpectedly off Fortress Monroe on that memorable Sunday morning of last March, has been far more eloquent in our behalf than any despatch of Mr. Seward. We shall be demented if, after the lessons of the past year, we rely upon anything else than our own strong arm and the favor of Heaven. Peace is our fundamental policy; but henceforth we must be one of the first military and naval powers of the earth. The systematic and persistent attempt, both in England and on the continent, to represent the American people as little better than a great mob, and the government as terrorized by their clamor, means, being interpreted, hostility to our free, democratic institutions; and it is all-important for us so to understand it. Even the aged Lord Brougham, in his recent lamentable tirade, plainly avows this sentiment. He warns against the fierce, warlike passions of democracy in contrast with the peaceable spirit of monarchy, and does not shrink from a virtual comparison of the American people agonizing for national life and their national government, to the multitude who clamored for the crucifixion of our Saviour. The feeling of most of the governments and ruling classes of Europe toward *the people* in the democratic sense of that term (a feeling oc-

casioned in part, I admit, by errors and excesses of the democratic spirit) is very much that of the Pharisees of old; *Execrabilis ista turba, quæ non novit legem.*

But it is time that I hasten to a conclusion. I have touched upon only a few salient points of my subject. And while, as you perceive, I have spoken my mind freely in reference to the rebellion and its motives, as also in reference to foreign sympathy with it, I have said but little in censure of our own faults and errors in the past or the present. This is not because I think there has been no ground of blame, nothing wrong among us. Far enough from it. But it would be difficult to speak the whole truth without allusions not altogether in place on such an occasion as this. It is no hour for bitter reflection and recrimination. Few are altogether guiltless. Almost all have made mistakes, greater or less. I have small respect for the man who busies himself now with nursing old hates and prejudices, raking up old quarrels, proclaiming his own innocence, or even denouncing old sinners. He had better wait till the war is over,—perhaps he had better wait till the day of judgment. *That* will be a fearful day, no doubt, to not a few who have helped on this treason and held their heads high in the land; but will it not be a serious day to us all, when our duty to our country shall be the matter of inquisition? Who of us has done for her all he might and ought to have done? Who of us will not need mercy? So far, too, as the leading conspirators and criminals are concerned, whether north or south of Mason and Dixon's line, they may safely be left to the future. History will take care that justice is done them. We have seen but the early dawn of American literary genius. We shall have our Thucydides and our Tacitus yet. Perhaps we shall have our Dante yet; and when he constructs his poetical hell, he will leave ample space, and that in the lowest circles, for these unnatural children of the Republic; ample space, too, let us hope, for the corrupt contractors and politicians and office-hunters who have traded in the woes and blood of their country! And on the other hand, he will place high in his poetical Paradise, and crown with aramanthine wreaths, those who shall have done most and made the greatest sacrifices for their country's salvation.

In the mean while, let the main question be,—Who is on the Lord's side? Who, forgetting the past, is willing to put his hand to the plough, and help put down this rebellion, without further delay? Who is willing to give his days and nights, his labor, influence, money, son, brother, and his own life to the work until it be accomplished? It is high time to put these questions everywhere and to everybody—and those who hold back and shirk them, harping still upon old grievances, deserve the malediction pronounced against Meroz; *Curse ye Meroz*, said the angel of the Lord, *curse ye bitterly the inhabitants thereof; because they came not to the help of the Lord, to the help of the Lord against the mighty.*

Of the history and conduct of the war thus far I have but few words to say, and these shall be a plea for confidence. Grave mistakes have unquestionably been made. How could it have been otherwise? The President and his advisers are fallible men. Congress is far from being an infallible body. Our best generals are all imperfect. On the other hand, the task to be performed, both civil and military, has been almost superhuman, with scarcely a ray of experience to guide the government on their dim and perilous way, with treachery on every side, and the popular voice itself often clamoring for different and sometimes for impossible things. We have wanted our President to be at once a Washington and a Jackson, and our generals to be all Napoleons. We have wanted to have everything done with consummate wisdom and skill. It was a natural feeling in view of the interests involved; but was it reasonable? Certainly, there has been a great deal to try and vex the nation's patience; but it is always so in momentous exigencies; and does not this very trial of patience work experience, and experience hope? It is a thousand times pleasanter to praise than to blame; and though blame is often indispensable and most salutary, yet it is so only in the degree that it is intelligent and just. On the whole, is there another man among all the twenty millions of loyal citizens whom you would prefer to put at the head of the nation in place of the honest, sagacious, and just man—the plain Western man of the people—whom Providence has put there?

Admitting that Congress has said and done some unwise things, has it not also passed some of the most important and fruitful measures recorded in the history of our national legislation? Have we not ample reason for thanksgiving that the crisis has given us so many officers in both arms of the service who have understood their work, and performed it with eminent skill and valor; men whose names will be for ever honored in the memory of the Republic? And as to the army and navy themselves, what words can do justice to their heroic deeds and their still more heroic sufferings and patience? We used to look up to the heights of patriotic zeal and self-devotion, where our Revolutionary sires once walked, with awe-struck eye, and fancied them inaccessible in our pleasure and money-loving age. But these youthful scions of the good old stock have trodden those glorious heights, and are treading them to-day; so too are myriads of the sons of Erin and of the land of Luther along with them. Of more than six thousand sick and wounded New England soldiers who have passed through New York, two only, I was told the other day, had been heard to utter complaint and dissatisfaction with the war; the rest were eager to recover, that they might return to the field of conflict. Such is the spirit of our young warriors for the Union; and I believe it is, in truth, the inmost spirit of the nation.

Let us give way, then, to no querulous, doubtful, or gloomy temper. Let us not only not despair of the Republic, but cherish unbounded faith in its heaven-appointed destiny. Hope is our American and Christian birth-right. We belong to the future; and if the past was not a mockery, that future has in store for us unspeakable blessings. But we must prove ourselves worthy of them before they will be ours. The nation has already done a mighty work, military, naval, financial, and political; but it is able to do a yet mightier work. We have had great successes already; we shall have greater still in the future. The recent sharp disappointment at not celebrating the Fourth of July in Richmond and all other disappointments will be swallowed up in the ultimate triumph. It is indeed a dreadful contest; like that waged in heaven,

when, smitten by the sword of Michael, the great archangel, Satan "first knew pain"; a contest

" — such as, to set forth
Great things by small, if, nature's concord broke,
Among the constellations war were sprung,
Two planets, rushing from aspect malign
Of fiercest opposition, in mid sky
Should combat, and their jarring spheres confound."

Yes, it is *war* of the direst sort; as such let it be carried on until this rebellion also be hurled headlong,

"With hideous ruin and combustion, down
To bottomless perdition."

Let the country throw its whole mind, soul, and strength into the contest; but let it do so with the moral dignity, order, and temperance which become a great Christian people. Let it go forward with impassioned energy and determination, but at the same time calm, self-possessed, and revengeless. We are fast making history and forming character for coming ages; let us keep a righteous and stainless record that shall be a heritage of honor to our children's children. The world is looking on, and with but few friendly eyes. God and angels, too, we may be sure, are spectators of our conduct. "The breaking up of the American Union", writes De Tocqueville, "will be a solemn moment in the history of the world". "I cannot desire, as many persons do, its dismemberment. Such an event would inflict a great wound on the whole human race." I, for one, cannot believe that such a wound is to be inflicted. There is only one other calamity that, it seems to me, would exceed this—the expulsion from among us of the Christian religion. So far as we ourselves are concerned, if this rebellion should triumph, that instant the value of human existence on this continent would fall as the public securities fall when a hurricane of bankruptcy and panic sweeps over the land. It would then be as woeful a thing to live as it is pleasant now; and as bitter in dying to leave children behind you as it is sweet now; for every nerve and fibre of loyal American life is bound up with the life of

the Union. The national government, viewed in the most formal way, is yet like the shell of the tortoise, which shelters, guards and conserves the whole organism within. What would become of the living creature were this protective covering crushed and torn off? and what would become of the vital organism of American society, with its thousand tender and sacred offices, if, no longer sheltered and shielded by the Constitution and the laws, it were exposed to the assaults of those fierce, anarchic elements which are now desolating and consuming the life of the South?

And while the Union is all in all, the very ark of the covenant, to us and our children, it is everything to the race. It is freighted with better hopes for freedom and humanity than any other nation in existence. If it is wrecked and lost, there will be a cry of anguish through the earth. What other nation can take the place or do the work of this? What other nation by its fundamental principles and its entire history represents, as this does, the immutable rights and dignity of human nature? What other nation occupies such a matchless position on the globe for serving the cause of God and man? If still united, we shall cross the threshold of 1900 a hundred millions strong; and if we fight this battle successfully, what battles for truth and justice and freedom and all good things shall we not *then* be able to fight?

The issue is in the hands of God, and it becomes us reverently to await his decree. But we have the strongest reasons for awaiting it in hope. Would he have guided the nation from the beginning with such a friendly and outstretched arm, if he had meant to kill us? Surely we cannot abandon the faith of our fathers, that he is the Master-Builder of this Union and has ordained for it an incomparable destiny, so long as the moon endureth.

Yes, I believe it will yet live not only to correct its own errors and to learn wisdom by the things which it has suffered, but also to teach the world new lessons in liberty, in government, in philanthropy, in science and art, in the dignity and skill and exhaustless resources of industrial freedom, and in the beneficent power of Christian faith. I believe it will yet be-

come, like Mount Zion, the joy of the whole earth, realizing, as the light of its example becomes more pure and bright, the vision of the poet :

" I saw the expectant nations stand
To catch the coming flame in turn ;
I saw, from ready hand to hand,
The clear, though struggling, glory burn.

" And each, as she received the flame,
Lighted her altar with its ray ;
Then, smiling to the next who came,
Speeded it on its sparkling way."

Let us, then, steer right onward in our dread task, humbly entrusting our cause still to that divine Champion of humanity, who guides the march of history. It is a true Apocalyptic contest, full of mysterious seals and vials of tribulation ; but it is in the hands of Him who in righteousness doth judge and make war. Let us not doubt that in due time he will bring forth judgment unto victory. "Then", to conclude in the glowing words of Milton, "then amidst the hymns and hallelujahs of saints, some one may be heard offering at high strains in new and lofty measures, to sing and celebrate His divine mercies and marvellous judgments in this land throughout all ages ; whereby this great and warlike nation, instructed and inured to the fervent and continual practice of truth and righteousness, and casting far from her the rags of her old vices, may press on hard to that high and happy emulation, to be found the soberest, wisest, and most Christian people at that day, when Thou, the eternal and shortly-expected King, shalt open the clouds to judge the several kingdoms of the world, and distributing national honors and rewards to religious and just commonwealths, shalt put an end to all earthly tyrannies, proclaiming thy universal and mild monarchy through heaven and earth".

Theological and Literary Intelligence.

THE *Christian Remembrancer*, in an article on the Western Church, gives some curious facts in relation to the Papacy :

"Full of years and honor, Pius VII departed this life August 21, 1823, having lived eighty-two years, and held the Pontificate twenty-three ; a year shorter than his predecessor, longer than any other pontiff but one. Those who sat more than twenty-one years are only

	Years.	Months.	Days.
Pius VI,	24	6	14
Hadrian I,	23	10	17
Pius VII,	23	5	6
Alexander III,	21	0	4

It is well known that an ancient tradition forbids the hope of any of Saint Peter's successors *peruenire ad annos Petri*, i. e. to reign twenty-five years."

"While we are on this subject, we may mention the very singular rule, or, rather coincidence, which has been imagined to determine in the earlier half of a century, the length of the reigning Pontiff's life. Add his number to the number of his predecessor, and that to ten, and the result is the fatal year. Pius VII succeeded Pius VI, six and seven are thirteen ; add ten, which makes twenty-three ; Pius VII died in 1823. Leo XII succeeded Pius VII, twelve and seven are nineteen ; add ten, and you will have twenty-nine ; Leo XII died in 1829. Pius VIII succeeded Leo XII, eight and twelve are twenty ; add ten, thirty. Pius VII. died in 1830."

"It is worth while, before we turn from the See of Rome, to look at the characters given to the Popes whose reigns we have been considering, in the famous prophecy of Archbishop Malachi, because, whether his or not, we cannot but believe it to be more than a coincidence that the prediction and fact should so tally. It was first printed in 1596, by Arnold Wyon, in his *Lignum Vitæ* ; but the reader may most easily see it in *Moreri's Dictionary*, or M. Henrion's *Histoire des Papes*. (Paris, 1832.)

PIUS VII. *Aquila rapax.*

Is not this a wonderful motto, when we remember how the French eagle swooped on the aged Pontiff, and ravened him out of his possessions ?

LEO XII. *Canis et Coluber.*

PIUS VIII. *Vir religiosus.*

GREGORY XVI. *De Bulneis Etruria.*

He was of the order of the Camaldulites ; and the baths of Camaldole in Tuscany, their mother house, are famous.

PIUS IX. *Cruz de Cruce.*

The arms of Sardinia are a cross argent ; a heavy cross indeed to the reigning Pontiff. (We believe that this is the first time this explanation has been given—the prophecy not having been republished since the crowning aggression of Sardinia.)

The remaining eleven Pontiffs—for according to this prophecy there will be only eleven more—are thus characterized :

- | | |
|------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Lumen in cœlo. | 6. Pastor et nauta. |
| 2. Ignis ardens. | 7. Flos florum. |
| 3. Religio depopulata. | 8. De Medietate lunæ. |
| 4. Fides intrepida. | 9. De labore solis. |
| 5. Pastor angelicus. | 10. Gloria Olivæ. |

11. In persecutione extremâ sacræ Romanæ Ecclesiæ sedebit Pater Romanus, qui pascet oves in multis tribulationibus ; quibus transactis, civitas septecollis diruetur, et Judex tremendus judicabit populum.

In connection with this last prediction we may remark that Imperial Rome began and ended in Augustus—the ten tribes in Oseha or Hoshea.”

The *Notes and Queries*, May 8, 1862, p. 359, says that the application of *De Balneis Hetruriæ* to Gregory XVI is on the basis of the collection of Etrurian Antiquities, made by this pontiff. It also says that on the death of Gregory XVI, “the election of his successor was at once rightly prognosticated from the terms of the same prophecy.”

The Belgian historian, Baron Kervyn de Lettenhove, has discovered in a library at Paris an autobiography of the Emperor Charles the Fifth, a work whose existence was mentioned by writers of the sixteenth century. At intervals for many years, efforts have been made to find this manuscript, and in 1859 a diligent search was made in Belgium, at Venice, and other places. But in May of the present year the Baron de Lettenhove, while comparing some manuscripts in the libraries of Paris, found a Portuguese version of the Emperor's autobiography. In a letter to his son Philip, preceding the biography, the Emperor states that he began the book in 1550, while making a tour on the Rhine ; that it was continued at Augsburg, and completed at Innspruck ; that he wrote it, not from vanity, but to show his faults. It is said that the autobiography will soon be published. The contents of the book are of great importance, as it recounts how long the Pope urged him to arrest the progress of the Reformation, and that when he determined to remain in Germany, it was with the fixed resolution to crush the Protestant princes.

Two thousand rupees have been placed in the hands of a London firm by a Hindu merchant at Bombay, as prizes for the best essays on the *Vedas*, or sacred writings of the Brahmins. The subject of the essays is to be a “Review of the Vedas, with special reference to the light which they cast on the Social and Religious State of the Ancient Indians, and on their Belief and Practices, as better than those of the Hindus of Later Times.” The following are the conditions :

“1. The essays are to be in the English language ; and it is recommended that they shall not exceed three hundred or four hundred pages octavo, pica type. 2. The author of the best essay will receive a prize of twelve hundred rupees. It is expected that he will either arrange for its publication on his own account, within six months of his gaining the prize, or give up his manuscript with its copyright to the donor of the prize, for its disposal. 3. The author of the second best essay to receive a prize of five hundred rupees, and the author of the third best essay a prize of three hundred rupees. 4. All passages from the Vedas and other works to be referred to in notes, mentioning the place in which they occur. A list of original treatises and papers by European and Indian authors, bearing on the subject of the essays, and the works on which they are founded, to be given in an appendix. 5. The adjudication of the prizes to be left to the following gentlemen : The Rev. John Wilson, D.D. ; Martin Haug, Ph. D., Professor of Sanskrit, in the

Puna College; Dr. Bhow Daji, Fellow of the University of Bombay; the Rev. Dhanjibhai Nouroji and Rao Sahab Wishwanath Narayn Mandalik, Bombay. 6. Each competitive essay, with a motto and sealed note containing the name of the author, to be placed in the hands of Dr. Wilson on or before the 1st of August, 1863. The competition is open to all classes of people, without any distinction. 7. If the writer of the first best essay will give a Sanskrit version of it, he will receive three hundred rupees additional."

The Poetry of Affghanistan has been introduced to the British public in a book of *Selections from the Poetry of the Affghans*, translated by H. G. Raverty, a captain in the English army in India. Among these poets was one Khushhal, a warrior as well as a bard and a writer on ethics, jurisprudence, philosophy, falconry and biography. His ideas about women form an oriental lyric, which will serve as a companion-piece to *La Donna è Mobile*:

"All woman-kind are of intellect deficient;
And the voluntary causes of all life's ills.

Thou mayst be straight and even with them;
But they are crooked and wayward with thee.

Do them a thousand benefits and services;
Yet, at a single word, their hearts sulky grow.

They become poison unto thee, and kill thee—
They, whom thou deemest a healing balm.

They have no fidelity in their composition:
They are, naturally, unto perfidiousness prone.

Say no more about them, O Khushhal!
It would be better had they never existed!"

A great discovery has been made in Constantinople of the library of the famous Hungarian King, Mathias Corvinus, who reigned 1458 to 1490. It consisted of 50,000 volumes; but was diminished by his successor, until after the fatal battle of Mohacs, Buda, where it was deposited, fell into the hands of the Turks. Since then, nothing has been known of its fate. The Hungarian Academy sent a commission to inquire after it, and they report, that on May twenty-first, they found what remains of it in the private library of the old Seraglio. What treasures may not be found in this collection so wonderfully preserved!

SWITZERLAND.

A MONUMENT TO CALVIN.—A movement is now in progress in Europe to raise a monument to John Calvin, at Geneva, Switzerland. The proposal was made last September, in the meetings of the Evangelical Alliance, and met with unanimous assent. Since then, a committee composed of pastors and laymen have been engaged in arranging the means to carry out this plan. After mature reflection, the committee have adopted the plan of erecting a large building which shall bear this inscription over the door: "HALL OF THE REFORMATION—Erected to the Memory of the Reformer of Geneva, John Calvin, by the Evangelical Christians of all Nations, in accordance with the wish expressed in the Conference of 1861. On the 24th of May, 1864, three centuries will have elapsed since the death of Calvin. This third

centennial anniversary will be selected to inaugurate the movement, in presence of Christians from all parts of the globe who are able to attend this pious festival.

NORWAY.

In seven recent years there appeared in Norway a total of 1,027 volumes; or an average of 146 per year. In philology, 87; in metaphysics, 23; in teaching, 65; in theology, 18; in law, 63; in history, 123; in military science, 28; in belles lettres, 187; in politics, etc., 46; in medicine, 26; in natural philosophy, 39; in agriculture, 48; in technology, 12; nautical and commercial, 83; in mathematics, 28; miscellaneous, 6. Of these 870 were original works, 139 were translations, and the remainder (18) reprints of old books. 791 were printed at Christiania, the University-town; while only 100 were printed at Bergen, the chief town for commerce.

R U S S I A.

E. DE MURALT has edited at St. Petersburg, the *Chronicles* of Georgius Monachus, called *Hamartolus*, which extend from the creation to A.D. 842, with supplements by other hands to A.D. 1143. This is the first full edition—an octavo volume, pp. lii, 1016. Comments of Leo the Grammarian, and of Cedrenus, are added. The work is chiefly valuable for the history of the Image Controversy; it is also full on the Paulicians and Bogomiles.

The Russian Government is said to have the intention of founding a Roman Catholic university in Russia, the seat of which would be at Cherson. For the first formation of this university, professors are to be sought in Germany, and the Russian Minister at Munich is said to have applied with that view to the court of Bavaria.

H O L L A N D.

Two new works have appeared on Spinoza. One is a *Supplement* to his works, edited by J. Van Vloten, containing matter hitherto unpublished. It is printed in the same form as Bruder's Leipsic edition, and costs about \$2½. The other is an essay by Antonius von der Linde on the *Theory of Spinoza* and its first effects in Holland.

Prof. Roorda has published a *Javanese Lexicon*, and Prof. Pynappel a *Malay*: both at Amsterdam.

Dr. J. J. Van Oosterzee, of Rotterdam, has completed in 3 vols. (1855–1861) his work on the *Christology of the Old and New Testaments*, which German critics say is “a work of the first order”. The first volume gives the Old Testament Christology; the second that of the New Testament; the third sums up the whole Scriptural view of Christ's person. Dr. Oosterzee is also the author of a *Life of Christ*, in reply to Strauss; and of some of the best portions of Lange's Bible-Work.

Alberdingk Thym has published at Amsterdam a work on *Willibrod, the Apostle of the Netherlands*, first bishop of Utrecht, A.D. 696–739. Dr. Van Hengel's *Interpretatio Epistolæ Pauli ad Romanos* appears in a revised edition, 2 vols. pp. 623, 865. The 4th edition of Hofstede de Groot's *Institutio Theologia Naturalis*, is published at Utrecht.

The *History of Mohammedan Rule in Spain from the Downfall of the Gothic Monarchy* has been made the subject of an elaborate work published at Leyden by a distinguished Orientalist, M. R. Dozy, in 4 vols. The present instalment of the history reaches to the year 1110, or to the conquest of Andalusia by the Almoravides, illustrated by the exploits of the Cid and other Christian champions.

SPAIN.

A Society of Friends of the Orient proposes to publish a collection of original Arabic works, illustrative of the history and literature of the Spanish Arabs, in translations. It will appear in *livraisons* of 16 pages 4to each, every fortnight, for 2 reals.

The 28d and 24th vols. of the *Coleccion de Documentos ineditos*, edited by Miraflores and Salva, contains the Correspondence between the Duke of Alba and Philip II and others upon the conquest of Portugal in 1580-1.

Another relic of the Spanish reformers has been recently discovered, *The Christian Alphabet, or True Way to acquire the Light of the Holy Scripture*, by John Valdez, published in Italian, 1546, and now translated into English by B. B. Wiffen (Bosworth & Harrison, London). It consists of a Dialogue between the author and his friend Giulia Gonzaga, wife of the Duke Colonna. It was found about ten years since in the collection of a Brighton bookseller. Valdez was driven from Spain and found refuge in Naples. His theology is akin to that of the German mystics. Nicholas Ferrar published, in 1638, a translation of his *One Hundred and Ten Considerations*, much esteemed as a devotional book.

ITALY.

The publication of manuscript treasures from the old Ambrosian library of Milan, has been begun under the title *Monumenta Sacra et Profana ex Codicibus præsertim Bibliotheca Ambrosiana, etc.* The first fasciculus of vol. 1, contains Latin fragments of the Gospel of Luke, of the Parva Genesis (Lesser Genesis, hitherto unknown, allied to the Æthiopic Book of Jubilees), and of the Assumption of Moses. In Syriac, there are prolegomena to the version of Paul of Tela (A.D. 617-618, soon after the Harkleian); and the text of Baruch, Jeremiah and Lamentations. The work is edited by Dr. Antony Maria Ceriani. This library was founded by Charles Fred. Borromeo (not the Saint), who died 1631. It is said to contain 14,000 to 15,000 manuscripts.

Prof. Gaymonat has brought out at Florence a *History of the Waldenses* and their doctrines in one volume; Desanctis is publishing *La Religione dei Avi*.

The Farnese Gardens in Rome, the property of the King of Naples, have been purchased by the French Emperor for 250,000 francs. They occupy the whole of the *Roma quadrata* of Romulus. The Emperor is having excavations made to discover if possible the ruins of the old palace of the Cæsars. The French government has also purchased the Campana Museum for 4,364,000 francs; Russia had previously purchased from it works of the value of 650,000 francs; and England to the amount of £5,000. It is the richest collection in the world of vases, bronzes (over 3,000), etc. It

also contains numerous pictures, e. g. 400 before Raffaella. Among the pictures is one by Raffaella at the age of twelve.

The Milan Academy of Sciences has issued proposals for the purchase of all of Volta's manuscripts, instruments, etc.

Pius IX, by Letters Apostolic, Jan. 6, 1862, established a Propaganda to have in charge all questions relating to the affairs of the Oriental Churches. Among the members named are Franchi, Ferrari, Theiner, Bitra, etc. The Letters are given in full in the *Annales de Phil. Chrét.*, Feb. 1862.

Besides the works of Passaglia, other eminent Italian clergy have published works advocating substantially the same views; Liverani, *Il Papato, l'Impero e il Regno d'Italia*; the Canon Reali, *Liberty of Conscience in relation to the Temporal Power of the Popes*; Abbé Perfetti, *The New Relations of the Papacy*. The latter recommends a kind of itinerant papacy; that the Pope shall pass from place to place, subject to no potentate, and imparting blessings to the faithful. Cardinal Mathieu, archbishop of Besançon, has replied to Passaglia.

A translation of M. de la Rive's *Memoir of Count Cavour* has just been published by Longman & Co., London. The translator, Mr. Romilly, is said to have been a personal friend of Cavour from a very early period of his life. The book contains a number of anecdotes of the youth and private life of Cavour, and concludes with an affecting account of his illness and death, by his niece, the Countess Alfieri. Marquis Ainard de Cavour, nephew of the Italian statesman, publicly protests against any further publication of his late uncle's private correspondence.

F R A N C E .

The French Academy has again given one of its prizes to a Protestant work, De Pressensé's *History of the Church*, the two last volumes. The prize conferred was the Montyon literary prize, which was also given, *ex æquo*, to Cochin's excellent treatise on Slavery. Among the previous Protestant names thus honored, are Chs. Weiss, Bartholomess, Waddington, Sayous, and Rosseeuw Saint-Hilaire.

The Protestants of France have presented to the MM. Haag the sum of 10,000 francs as a testimonial of honor for their invaluable work, *La France Protestante*. As an evidence of the completeness of the work, under the letter D, Haag has 385 articles, of which the *Biographie Universelle* of Michaud has only 62. It contains the minutes of the Protestant Synods, and edicts, treaties, placards, etc., bearing on the history of the Reform.

Among the new periodicals are the *Annales de Bibliophile*, ed. L. Lacour, 7 francs per an.; *L'Amateur d'Autographes*, ed. by Charavay; *La Réforme Littéraire*, etc.

In the French translation of Motley's *History of the Netherlands*, which bears Guizot's name, there are numerous suppressions. The Belgic version is said to be more complete and exact. Among the omissions in Guizot is the last paragraph of the third volume, containing Motley's final estimate of the character of William the Silent.

A pamphlet published at Paris, *La Bulgarie Chrétienne*, advocates the full separation of Bulgaria from the Greek patriarchate, on the ground that this was originally forced upon them in the thirteenth century, although they themselves desired to be annexed to Rome. Several applications to the Pope, it is said, were strangely overlooked, until the civil power had actually attached them to Constantinople.

The first article in the *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, 1862, by the editor, Bonnetty, is on the Knowledge the Romans might have had of Biblical Traditions, from their Intercourse with the Jews, presenting a series of documents and facts bearing on the point, ranging from B.C. 168 to 59; the discussion is to be continued. F. Robiou gives an analysis of German works of Brugsch, Scheucher, and others, on Oriental Monuments and Inscriptions. Jules Oppert has a learned and valuable account on the Honover, the Word-Creator of Zoroaster, including a sketch of his life and opinions. His translation of extracts from the Zend, especially those bearing on the Word, differs materially from Anquetil's version. M. Bonnetty, in the March number, reviews the recent decisions of Rome in relation to traditionalism and ontologism, of which we shall elsewhere give a more full account. De Charency's review of Nott and Gliddon is continued.

An international college is the latest French idea. M. Rendu, the originator, proposes to have colleges at Oxford, Paris, Rome or Florence, and Bonn, pursuing the same course of studies. The student, when eleven years old, should be sent to Rome or Florence, and pass two years there, studying all his lessons in Italian, which he is expected to know something about when he leaves home. In his thirteenth year he is sent to Bonn, where his studies are pursued in German, and thence he proceeds to England or France to finish his education.

The prize presented to M. Thiers for his *History of the Consulate and the Empire*, has been given by him to the Academy to found a "Thiers Prize," which shall be awarded every three years from the accumulated interest—about three thousand francs. The subject of the work for which the prize is to be given is left to the choice of the Academy.

The students of Paris are at length to be accommodated with comfort in the Imperial Library. The new reading-room will seat, it is said, a larger number of readers than that at the British Museum. The library contains 1,800,000 volumes, and the shelves on which they are arranged measure seventeen miles in length.

M. Duloirier has been appointed by the Emperor Napoleon to fill a chair in the University of Paris, as Professor of the Armenian Language and Literature, in the place of M. Vayan de Florival, deceased.

Mg. Albert de Broglie has been appointed by the French Academy to fill the seat of the late Abbé Lacordaire; he received twenty-two out of the twenty-nine votes.

An excitement has been aroused by the suspension by the Minister of Public Instruction of M. Ernest Renan's course of lectures at the College of France, on Oriental languages. The most notable sentence in the obnoxious lecture is this: "Amid the enormous fermentation in which the Jewish nation was plunged under the last Asmoneans, the most extraordinary moral event of which history makes mention occurred in Galilee. A man, incomparable, and so great that, though here everything must be judged in a point of view of positive science, *I would not contradict those who, struck by the exceptional character of his work, call him God*, effected a reform in Judaism—a reform so profound, so individual, as to be a creation in every part. Having arrived at the highest religious degree that ever man before him had reached, having arrived at standing before God in the relation of a son with his father, being devoted to his work with a total forgetfulness of himself and an abnegation which has never been so highly practised; and lastly, being the victim to his idea, and rendered divine by his death, Jesus founded the eternal religion of humanity, the religion of the mind, freed from all priesthood," etc.

Prof. Rosseeuw St. Hilaire, of the Sorbonne, whose article on the Coun-

cil of Trent is translated in this number of our REVIEW, has been giving lectures to crowded audiences, on the History of the Jews. He concluded his course with an eloquent vindication of the Supernatural in the Jewish history (against Salvador and Franck), and with a warm appeal to the young men on the harmony between true liberty and vital Christianity.

GERMANY.

Theologische Studien und Kritiken. Heft 2. 1862. Auberlen, The Eschatology of Christ in Matt. xxiv, xxv. Gümlich, The Enigmas of the Raising of Lazarus—concluded. Ullmann, additional particulars about a hymn of Frederick III, etc. Köster, Illustrations of Scripture from the Classics. Hundeshagen, a review of Henke's Calixt. Riehm on Bleeck's Introduction to the Old Testament. Auberlen makes Matthew xxiv, 29 refer to the second coming of Christ; what precedes refers to the Roman destruction of Jerusalem.—The third *Heft* contains an admirable tribute by Ullmann to the memory of the late Professor Umbreit, and also an account by Riehm of Umbreit's various literary productions; Hauck on Galatians iii, 15–22; Bäumlein on Gal. v, 23; Linder on various passages of the New Testament; Scheide on the Epistle to Diognetus; General von Rudloff on Traducianism and Creatianism, etc. Hauck takes mediator (Gal. iii, 20) in the sense of "representative", adding another to the 250 interpretations of the passage.—The fourth *Heft* has an admirable article on Zwingle, by Hundeshagen; Kleinert on Isaiah liii; Köster on Rom. viii, 18–28; Knödel, Analecta from Clement of Rome's first epistle; Sengler on the Trinity, etc.

Zeitschrift f. wissenschaftliche Theologie. Heft 1. 1862. The editor of this representative of the Tübingen school contributes an article on the Question about the Gospels, reviewing Ewald and others; contending against the hypothesis that Mark was the primitive Gospel, and claiming that Jesus was strongly influenced by the Essenes. Volkmar concludes his dissertation on the General Epistles and the Book of Enoch. Egli has a learned contribution to the criticism of the Septuagint. G. Frank notices several works on Luther's Relation to the Augsburg Confession, etc.—*Heft 2*: C. A. Wilkens gives a long and excellent account of the Spanish nun, "the teacher of the Church, the glory of the Spanish nation", Saint Theresa à Jesu, born 1515, died 1582, founder of the Carmelites, one of the most remarkable of the mystics and saints of the Roman Catholic Church. She was canonized in 1621. "Her letters alone make her the first prose writer of Spain", said a distinguished Spanish critic, Capmany. Her "visions" are among the most remarkable phenomena in religious history. Wilkens translates three of her most noted hymns, "To the Crucified", "The Eternal Beauty", and "The Pierced Heart". Bossuet says that her writings contain "a celestial doctrine". Among her noted works are, *The Road to Perfection*, *Thoughts on the Love of God*—an explication of the Song of Songs, *Meditations on the Communion*, etc.

The *Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, of Berlin, has given a full synopsis of Pastor Fisch's articles on the United States, from the *Revue Chrétienne*. It uniformly speaks favorably of this country.

The first article in the *Zeitschrift für die historische Theologie* (Niedner's), 1862, is a very full and valuable sketch of Polish Literature, by E. D. Schnaase, on the basis of works in the public and private libraries of Dantzic. The bibliography is more fully collected than before. It includes

sketches of the religious works, catechisms, hymn-books, etc. Hochhuth continues his learned sketches of the History of Protestant Sects in Hesse, by accounts of the mystical and fanatical Weigelians (Homagius, Zimmermann, and others) and the Rosicrucians.—In the second *Hefst* is a clear and excellent analysis of the religious and theological opinions of Bernard of Clairvaux, by G. L. Plitt, well arranged, and presenting his opinions in part in contrast with those of his great rival, Abelard. Adolf Bogen gives a full account, under the title, Rome and Hanover, of the Attempts at Union between Lutherans and Roman Catholics in the 17th century, including the writings and doings of Spinola, Molanus, Bossuet, and Leibnitz. It is the best monograph on the subject.—The third *Hefst* is chiefly taken up with the life of Henry Nicholas, prepared with great care by Dr. Rippold, from new materials. Nicholas was the founder of the so-called Family of Love, and died in 1555. Dr. Ebrard, in the second article, shows that we probably have not the complete text of Jerome's work, *De Viris Illustribus*—by citations, as he supposes, from it, in the works of the Irish monk, Columban. Prof. Sack, of Berlin, gives the documents about the noted proceedings of the Wöllner ministry against the rationalists, in the Edict issued 1788. Dr. Burkhardt, librarian at Weimar, criticises the Jena edition of Luther's works, 1558-70. He shows incidentally the impulse given to the book trade by Luther and other reformers. In 1518, 85 German books were printed; in 1514, 47; 1515, 46; 1516, 55; 1517, 87; 1518, 71; 1519, 111; 1520, 208; 1523, 498. Of Luther's works, new and reprints, appeared in 1518, 20; 1519, 50; 1520, 133; 1521, 40; 1522, 180; 1523, 180.

The first article in the *Lutheran Journal* (*Zeitschrift*), 1862, is by Prelate Mehring, on the Revision of the Idea of Inspiration, defending the doctrine against objections, with particular reference to Rothe's essay on the subject in the *Studien und Kritiken*, 1860. Dr. Rudelbach has an interesting and valuable account of the literary labors of the revered Bishop Mynster, of Denmark, born 1777, died 1858—a man of almost encyclopedic attainments, the author of several historical and exegetical works held in high esteem. Under the title, *Martyrs of the Reform in Italy*, Dr. Boehmer, of Halle, reprints two very rare tracts (not known by McCre); one in Latin, by Negro, giving an account of the executions of Fanini of Faenza, and of Dominico of Bassano; the other in German, is a history of Montalcino, executed in Rome in 1558.—The second *Hefst*, 1862, contains Meisner on the Children of Eden; Floerke on the Millennium, in reply to various criticisms of his work on that topic; Pescheck, the historian of Bohemia, on the Anti-Reformation in Carinthia—valuable materials; Stroebel against Stahl. It also announces the decease, March 3d, of Dr. Rudelbach, of Copenhagen, one of the editors, and a pillar of orthodoxy in Denmark.

In the *Theologische Zeitschrift*, Dr. Kliefoth, one of the editors, contributes a learned essay on the Symbolism of Numbers in the Scriptures, taking strong ground against Bähr's interpretation of the number 7, as signifying the union of God and the world. Bähr has been generally followed in this by German theologians. Kliefoth contends, that there must be a variety of interpretations in the different passages; and that, when a number is used symbolically, it is not to be numerically reckoned—this in application to the prophecies. The other editor, Dieckhoff, reviews Kahnis's *Dogmatics* very severely on the canon and inspiration.

In the recent conflicts in Baden, which led to the exclusion of Ullmann and Bähr, and resulted in the triumph of Schenkel and the more rationalising party, Prof. Rothe came out for the first time in public affairs, much to the grief of many of his friends, in hostility to the Evangelical party. He

defends his position in an essay in the *Allgemeine Kirchliche Zeitschrift* (edited by Schenkel). His general theory of the Church, long since avowed, is, that it is to be finally resolved into the State. He is a decided supernaturalist, but also an equally decided opponent of the formulas of the old orthodoxy. One main object, he holds, of theologians and the Church should be, in the present state of affairs, to bring the opponents of Christianity to feel the full power of a living Christianity, of a Christianity rooted and grounded in Christ, and not based on past confessions of faith, made for the 16th century.

GREAT BRITAIN.

The works of Dr. Edward Williams, who died 1813, first President of Rotherham College, editor of Edwards,—are to be republished in 4 volumes. They are among the ablest written by English Dissenters. Among them are *Antipædobaptism Examined*; *Essay on God's Equity and Sovereignty*, including an examination of the Arminians, Whitby and Fletcher, *Defence of Modern Calvinism*, etc.

The British and Foreign Evangelical Review for July has the following articles: 1. The Poetical Element in Scripture: 2. The Theological System of Emmons—from *THE AMERICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW*: 3. Montalembert's Monks of the West: 4. Power in the Pulpit—from the *Christian Review*: 5. Dorner on the Sinless Perfection of Jesus—a very able article: 6. The Greek Testament of Webster and Wilkinson, in the main commended: 7. Rougemont on the Primitive People—a full account of a valuable work, too little known: 8. Bucklé's Philosophy of Mind, convicting him of clear inconsistencies: 9. Foreign Theological Reviews: 10. Critical Notices. It says of the articles of Dr. Hickok and Prof. Lewis, that they "have said nothing to lessen the repugnance which we feel to the language of Pantheism, even though called Bible Pantheism. Till the discussion adjusts itself to the doctrine of sin, which it has not yet done, it is still away from the main point of harmony with Christianity."

The Journal of Sacred Literature, July, has articles on the Religion of Ancient Rome; the Te Deum; Sacred Trees; Benedict of Nursia; Epistle of Jude; Luke's Gospel; Clement of Alexandria—from Pressensé; Superstition; Antediluvian World; Record of Creation; and a translation from the Spanish of Luis of Granada of Considerations on the State of Man: besides Correspondence, Notices, etc.

The British Quarterly Review, July, has articles on The Science of Language—reviewing Max Müller; Handel; Ritual Uniformity a Protestant Innovation; Peaks and Passes; France and Italy; The English School of Painting; Döllinger on the Church; the Turkish Empire; the Exhibition of 1862. In the Epilogue on Affairs the editor still laments the war going on in this country. He thinks that we have sadly degenerated from the Puritan type, and that, while the present temper of the nation continues "no domestic, no foreign relation can be safe". The war, he says, to "all right-minded men is a spectacle, which is simply painful."

The Christian Remembrancer, July, has a very sharp criticism of Rev. J. Mudry's French translations of English works—exposing his blunders in the rendering of works of Bishops Wilson, Bull, and others. An article on the Literature of the Lord's Prayer is devoted to the patristic interpretations to the time of Gregory of Nyssa. The other articles are—Walter (not Sir) Scott on Unclean Spirits; Replies to *Essays and Reviews*;

George Herbert; The Sarum Missal; Publications of the Surtees Society; Future of the Scottish Liturgy.

Leighton's Library. A writer in the *Notes and Queries*, who signs himself Eirionnach, and says that he is preparing a new edition of Archbishop Leighton's works, gives an interesting account of a visit to Leighton's library at Dunblane, which he left for the use of the clergy in the diocese, 1684. A catalogue made in 1691 shows that many of the books are lost; and the whole collection is in a state of confusion and dilapidation. Among the works were mss. of Leighton, containing excerpts, sermons, homilies, etc. A catalogue was printed in 1708, and again in 1843. The present salary of the librarian is 5*l.* a year. Most of the works were patristic and mediæval; though there have been some modern additions. A copy of the *De Imitatione* is filled with his pencil-marks and notes. The catalogue consists of 1539 articles.

The *Memorials and Sermons* of the Rev. Joseph Sortain, of Brighton, have been published. Mr. Thackeray says that "he is the most accomplished orator I ever heard in my life". He was a Nonconformist. The *Eclectic* gives an account of his life and discourses.

George Finley, LL.D., concludes his valuable series of works on Greek history by a *History of the Greek Revolution*, in two volumes, coming down to 1843. He corrects many mistakes in Tricoupi's history.

Richard Owen's *Paleontology, or, a Systematic Summary of Extinct Animals and their Geological Relations*, second edition, gives the results of all modern research in this department of science, and finds nothing to confirm the development hypothesis of the naturalists.

A Defence of Faith. Part I. *Forms of Unbelief*, by Sanderson Robins, discusses the Alexandrian and Scholastic philosophies, English Deism, Pantheism, Rationalism, and German Philosophy. Rev. T. M. Birks, in the Bible and Modern Thought, published by the Tract Society, presents popular religious arguments against the *Essays and Reviews*, and works of similar tendency. Chs. P. Chretien's Sermon on *The Letter and Spirit*, examines the subject of Inspiration in a careful and scholarly method.

English critics are indebted to M. Philarète Chasles, Librarian of the Mazarine Library, for the solution of a Shakspeare problem, that resisted all the "homely wits"; that is, the true interpretation of the enigmatic inscription to his Sonnets, 1609. M. Chasles divides the inscription, supposing the first part, written by Shakspeare, to end with *wiseth*: and the last to have been added by the editor, Mr. Thorpe. *Notes and Queries*.

Mr. J. E. B. Mayor is about to bring out a new edition of Roger Ascham's *Scholemaster*. He has previously edited two volumes on *Cambridge in the Seventeenth Century*, containing two Biographies of Nicholas Ferrar, and one of Matthew Robinson, full of curious matter.

The April number of the *Quarterly Review* (London) has a long discussion on the Training of the Clergy, occasioned by the decrease in numbers and influence of the ministry of the Church of England. It insists upon a more thorough course of study, especially in Greek and Hebrew, and upon the necessity of an acquaintance with German theology.

The April number of the *London Review*, the representative of Methodism, has a sharp dissection, by Rev. W. B. Pope, of Bishop Colenso's recent work on the Epistle to the Romans. His theory is, that all mankind are justified and regenerated from their birth—even the heathen. He denies the atonement and advocates restorationism.

Mr. Elliot Stock, of Paternoster Row, London, is issuing a series of "Historical Papers" on the early annals of Non-conformity. Their object is to lay before the public some of the less known facts in the history of the

"Separatists" before the departure of the Pilgrim Fathers in 1620, which recent discoveries have brought to light.

Mr. Miall, the editor of the *Non-Conformist*, has been presented with £5,000 by his friends, who wished to testify their appreciation of his twenty-one years' services in editing that paper.

Dr. William Smith, of England, has printed a preliminary list of names in letter A for Mr. Murray's projected *New Biographia Britannica*. Twenty-one pages, with an average of a hundred names to the page, count up to more than two thousand English worthies whose names begin with A.

A Testimonial Fund for Isaac Taylor is proposed, for his eminent services to Literature. Upon the Committee are Dean Milman, Prof. Mansel, Dr. Whewell, Sir D. Brewster, Lord Lindsay, and many others. Something should be done for it in this country.

The *Literary Gazette*, established in 1817, has ceased to be. *The Parthenon* takes its place, edited by Mr. Goodwin, the author of the discussion on the Mosaic Cosmogony in the *Essays and Reviews*. The *Saturday Review* has a circulation of 15,000; several of its staff have left and joined the *London Review*. Archdeacon Denison has begun the publication of a monthly called *The Church and State Review*.

Among the new theological works announced are Robert Cox, *Literature of the Sabbath Question from the First Century to the Eighteenth*, two vols.; Rev. B. W. Savile, *Revelation and Science in respect to Bunson's Biblical Researches*; Rev. Henry Martyn, *Five Sermons* (never before published); Archdeacon Sanford, *Mission of Church of Rome* (Bampton Lectures for 1861); Dr. Kennedy, *Hymnologia Sacra*, 1500 of the best English hymns.

Pre-Historic Man; Researches into the Origin of Civilisation in the Old and the New World, by Daniel Wilson, D.D., Professor in University College, Toronto; *Lectures on the Epistle to the Philippians*, by Charles John Vaughan, D.D., Chaplain in ordinary to the Queen; Rev. J. M. Neale, four volumes on *The History of the Catholic Church from the Day of Pentecost to the Present Time*; fifth edition, carefully revised, of Mr. Elliot's *Horæ Apocalypticæ*; or, a *Critical and Historical Commentary on the Apocalypse*, in four volumes.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The *Princeton Review* for July is "persuaded that the peace and purity of the church would suffer by any attempt to reunite "the Old and New-School Assemblies". It expresses no opinion as to the interchange of delegates. The *Danville Review* for June is cordial about the interchange of delegates, and decided against projects for organic union. It says: "We are fully persuaded that the differences, in nearly all respects, between the two denominations, are too great for them to constitute one denomination sufficiently harmonious to work together with great efficacy or great comfort". Dr. Breckinridge adds: "New School Presbyterianism is a type to itself—and occupies a posture of its own, as really as any other denomination—and that while it may fairly be doubted even by us, whether more harm than good would not result from absorbing that type and destroying that posture; it is not perhaps possible that this should happen at all; and positively certain it cannot happen by an organic union with Old School Presbyterianism, without convulsing, if not revolutionizing that".

Rev. B. F. Morris is preparing a work on the *Christian Life and Character of the Civil Institutions of the United States*.—Benson J. Lossing announces a *Pictorial History of the Great Rebellion* (Childs, publisher, Philadelphia).—Samuel Walker, of Boston, publishes W. A. Crafts, *The Southern Rebellion, from the Commencement of Buchanan's Administration*.—Robert Tomes, *The War with the South*. Nos. 5, 6. New York.—E. A. Duyckink, *The War for the Union, Civil, Naval, and Military*. Nos. 1-4.

Southern papers advertise a *Diary of the War for Separation*; being a daily chronicle of the leading events and history of the present revolution, from the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln.

A novel enterprise has been undertaken by a New York firm, in the republication of old American newspapers, extending as far back as 1728, and coming down to 1818. They are *fac-similes* of the originals, and will be instructive and curious additions to the public and private libraries of the country.

In the last decade the newspaper and periodical literature of the country has doubled in numbers and circulation. The figures are as follows:

NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS.

Year.	Number.	Circulation.
1850,.....	2,526	426,409,978
1860,.....	4,051	927,951,548

The first volume of the *History of Methodism in Canada*, by the Rev. G. F. Playter, has been issued from the Wesleyan Book-Room at Toronto.

The May number of the *Christian Examiner*, in an able article on Herbert Spencer's Philosophy, says: "What was essential in Polytheism is retained by the monotheistic Trinitarianism, and no profound Monotheism can long be free from some form of Trinitarianism".

The Harvard College Libraries now contain about 150,000 volumes and 60,000 pamphlets. The increase last year was 4,566 volumes and 5,821 pamphlets; 1,837 of the books and 5,666 of the pamphlets, with 93 maps, were donations.

The Boston Public Library has 100,000 volumes; Boston Athenæum, 85,000; Boston Mercantile Association, 20,000; Boston Library, 15,000; State House Library, 14,600; Massachusetts Historical Society, 14,048; American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 8,600; American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions, 6,649; Suffolk Law Library, 6,400; Congregational Library Association, 6,000; Mechanics' Apprentices' Library, 5,000; Natural History Society, 5,000; Massachusetts Hospital Library, 3,700; New England Historical and Genealogical Society, 4,200; Young Men's Christian Association, 2,844; Young Men's Christian Union, 2,188; the "Prince's" Library, 1,600; Library at Mission-House, 2,118; Charitable Mechanics' Association, 1,000; Republican Institute, 1,600; Medical Society, 600; College of Pharmacy, 800; Musical Fund Society, 200; Franklin Typographical Society, 1,100. Total of twenty-five public libraries, 307,242 volumes. — A circular has been issued by a committee appointed by the directors of the General Theological Library at Boston, to set forth the wants and designs of that institution. The number of volumes is about 1,200; about 100 are added each week. It is the purpose of the founders and friends of the library to make a complete collection of works on theology.

At a recent sale of rare American books in London, the prices brought

were higher than ever before for a similar collection. The following are the most noticeable items: A volume of American Almanacs, 1727 to 1736, £7 7s.; Audubon's Birds, about a quarter of the work, £23; Biblia Latina, 1462, the first Bible with a date, £180; Coverdale's Bible, 1535, the first English Bible, made up with *fac-simile* leaves, £140; Cicero's *Cato Major*, printed by Benjamin Franklin, £6 16s. 6d.; the *Knickerbocker Magazine*, 52 vols., £18 17s. 6d.; Series of Las Casas's Relations of Transactions with the Indians, 1552, £5 2s. 6d.; *Massachusetts Centinel*, a newspaper printed at Boston, a series from 1786 to 1829, £11 0s. 6d.; Morton's *New England's Memorial*, 1669, £10 10s.; *The Secret Works of a Cruel People made Manifest*, 1659, a curious tract relating to New England, £8; Smith's Virginia, 1627, £16 5s.; the *Massachusetts Spy*, 1788-1820, £10; Thevet's *New-found World*, 1568, £5 5s.; Torquemada, *Monarchia Indiana*, 8 vols., large paper, £18; Vaughan's Travels in America, 1784, a small manuscript volume of brief but interesting notes, £6; Audubon's Birds, a portion of the work, 294 plates, £30 10s.

Rev. Albert Barnes publishes a letter in denial of rumors that he had changed his views in regard to the Trinity, the Atonement, and other "doctrines of grace". He says: "I know nothing of the origin of the statement, but I will only say that it is utterly false, each and every part of it, in the direct statement and in all that is implied in it. I have made no change in regard to the views which I have so often and so abundantly expressed in my writings. By advancing years, and by my studies, I am more and more confirmed in the views which I have always held, and which I have so often expressed—to which I expressed my attachment at my ordination to the ministry, and which I have endeavored for so many years to defend in the pulpit and through the press—on the doctrine of the Trinity, the doctrine of the Atonement, and the great cardinal doctrines of Christianity as 'embraced by Christians generally'. The doctrine and the mode of government of the Presbyterian Church, with which I have been so long connected, I love more and more the longer I live; and in the belief of those doctrines, in which I was trained, and which I have publicly held and endeavored to maintain for nearly forty years of my life, I expect to die."

Literary and Critical Notices of Books.

BIBLICAL LITERATURE.

Novum Testamentum Græce ad Fidem Codicis Vaticanani recensuit PHILIPPUS BUTTMANN. Berolini in Aedibus Rud. Lud. Deckeri. 1862. Royal 8vo, pp. 524. Imported for \$1.50; the quarto edition for \$4.50. This beautiful edition of the Greek New Testament is printed from new steel types, reproducing, as far as possible, the form of the Greek letters as found in the inscriptions of the Augustan age, the manuscripts of Pompeii, and the oldest uncials, adding, of course, accents, punctuation, etc. The type is admirably clear, and it is a new pleasure to have the Greek in this ancient and more accurate form. The Greek letters now in general use were derived from the cursive manuscripts of the century immediately preceding the invention of printing. This new type was prepared at the urgent instance of Lachmann, who made use of it in the notes to his edition of *Lucretius*. It is here tried, by way of experiment, in an edition of the New Testament. This edition has also the recommendation of being a reproduction of the text of the Vatican Codex B, changed only so far as there were manifest slips and errors. At the end of the volume is a careful comparison of the variations in the different collations or editions of this Codex, including that of Mai, 1857, as amended by Vercellone, 1859, and revised by Kuenen and Cobet, 1860, and criticised by Alexander Buttmann (a brother of the editor of the above) in the *Studien und Kritiken*, Heft 1, 1862. The other editions used are those of Birch, 1798, Bentley, 1799, Bartoloccius, Tischendorf, Lachmann, and Muraltus.

In the last number, 1862, of the *Studien und Kritiken*, Buttmann gives a detailed account of this edition, of great interest to the critics of the text of the New Testament, particularly in its remarks on the Vatican codex. He gives striking examples of the defects of Mai's edition, even of wilful changes in the codex to accommodate it to the *textus receptus*. He states the main object of his work to be, the reproduction of the Vatican codex in a legible form, altering only in cases of manifest error, and noting all such carefully. The codex itself, he declares to be "extremely careful and free from error" in comparison with other codices. One instance of this care is noticed by both the Buttmans. The preposition *ovv* in composition is always assimilated in the later mss.; in the Vatican codex it is sometimes assimilated, and sometimes not; but always assimilated when it forms, in the compound word, one conception: e. g. Luke i, 61; 1 Cor. ii, 13; on the other hand, not so in John iv, 9; Luke xxiii, 48, 51.—Those parts of the text, not found in the Vatican ms. (viz. the latter half of Hebrews, and, the rest of the New Testament), are supplied by Buttmann from Lachmann

The passages of the *textus receptus*, which are wanting in the Vatican, and conceded to be interpolation, are given in brackets. A long list of 21 pages presents all the cases in which the codex is altered on account of manifest slips of the pen; and all the instances of variations of reading in the different editions, or professed citations of the codex.

A Commentary, Grammatical and Exegetical, on the Book of Job; with a Translation. By the Rev. A. B. DAVIDSON, M.A., Hebrew Tutor, New College, Edinburgh. Vol. I. London: Williams & Norgate. 1862. 8vo, Pp. lv—202. This work is the production of a young and vigorous writer in the department of Hebrew learning and Old Testament exegesis. He has been known as yet only as the author of an interesting and ingenious essay on Hebrew accentuation, which was published about a year since. In the present volume he strikes out boldly and grapples with the hardest portion of the Hebrew Scriptures. He proposes to furnish a grammatical and exegetical commentary on the book of Job, together with a new translation of the text. Indeed, he appears to regard himself as a sort of pioneer on a soil hitherto untrodden by English feet. He has fashioned his work without any English model. In interpreting the Old Testament on a basis of grammar and history, hardly any English-speaking mortal has preceded him. "With the exception", he says, "of the valuable commentary on Genesis of Mr. Wright, and the works of Mr. Ginsburg, a German writing in English, strict grammatical treatment of any portion of the Hebrew Scriptures appears a thing as yet unattempted in our language". Is not the English language spoken in America? and is it possible that Mr. Davidson forgets Prof. Conant's book, which is inserted in his own list of works on Job, and is one of the five characterised by him as "first-rate"? The notes of Prof. Conant may well serve as a model to a commentator writing in any language. Clear, terse, adhering closely to the point in hand, they fully deserve the epithet which Mr. Davidson bestows upon them. Prof. Conant was, it is true, hampered by the special object he had in view; since his notes were designed simply to illustrate and defend his revised translation. But notwithstanding this, they are extremely valuable to the student, and have been commended, we are told, by so high an authority as Prof. Roediger, as the very best. Or to carry the case further with Mr. Davidson, we might refer to the commentaries of Prof. Stuart, as furnishing examples of a grammatical treatment of the Old Testament Scriptures. Prof. Stuart published commentaries on Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Daniel. That he was chargeable with grave faults may not be denied. He borrowed much from others; he sometimes misunderstood his sources; he committed errors in details; his style was diffuse and declamatory. But when all this is said, it still remains true that Prof. Stuart possessed a clear, strong, exegetical sense; he knew what was sound and just, and could be relied on as to his main results. His method, the spirit and direction of his exegesis were right, and his works have justly had a wide influence on Biblical study both in this country and in England. He, if any one, deserves the name of pioneer in the grammatical treatment, in our own tongue, of the Hebrew Scriptures.

Let not the reader imagine, from these remarks, that there is any purpose to depreciate the work of Mr. Davidson. On the contrary, we regard it as a work of great merit and displaying rare ability. It is written out of a full and exact knowledge of the materials. The philological remarks are thorough and judicious. Above all, the author sets himself with zeal to bring out clearly the religious thinking and teaching of this portion of

the Bible. He has made a very interesting book, which will delight many who cannot follow him in linguistic details. There are, however, some blemishes of form and method. The style, though rich and glowing, is tinged with a certain grandiloquent vagueness, and is obviously formed on German rather than on pure English models. For example, when the author would refer to Bildad as the representative of human experience—the well-read man, who knows what the fathers thought and the books say—he describes him as “the exponent of accumulated human thought and the necessary utterance of the consciousness of humanity”. In another particular also, Mr. Davidson may be classed with some of the later orthodox Germans. He is, if we may be allowed the expression, *a little too pious*. There is an apparent striving after religious effect, as if the sacred work of scriptural annotation demanded a peculiar dialect. The interpreter of the Bible ought to be pervaded to the very centre of his being with a religious spirit. But religious earnestness is not the quality he requires; it is the higher attainment of holy calmness that is demanded of him. He should possess a certain transparency and simplicity of soul, which can show forth the precise thought of the text, without distortion or exaggeration. Mr. Davidson is too anxious to find in the expressions of Job the language of a representative religious experience, and is under a constant temptation to infuse into the text more than the sacred writer intended to convey. The germ is expanded into the fully-developed doctrine; the dim anticipation is confounded with the clear and confident hope.

Mr. Davidson advocates a theory of the structure of the book of Job, which has hitherto been most fully and successfully defended by Schlottmann. According to this theory, the poem is not philosophical or didactic, but dramatic. Its design is to paint passion, not to discuss truth. Job represents the good man; and it is the object of the book to describe his trial and his triumph. “We call it a drama because it has an action and a progress. A cloud of glory hangs over the commencement of Job’s life, dark storms settle on the middle, but these drift away or remain to be illuminated with a transcendent and new glory at its close. . . . Thus it is wrong to consider the book as intended to teach any particular truth; it teaches nearly all truth. It is a life-history, a life-drama; all that is necessary for life and godliness come to light in it.” Thus, according to our author, the book is devoted to an *exhibition* of the trial of Job; which trial is carried on, under the permission of God, for the purpose of proving the reality of Job’s (and so of man’s) religion. The trial is exhibited in three specific temptations; the first two are briefly described in the prologue, while the third or final trial is fully detailed in the poem. This last trial does not consist in any new suffering or bereavement; it lies in the interpretation put by Job and his friends on his previous sufferings. “We must take care”, says our author, “not to misunderstand the relation of the poem to the introductory part or prologue. Both come from the hand of the author, both are necessary to a full account of Job’s temptations. The introduction contains two, the poem the third or final. The poem, however, is not independent or chief; it is merely the detailed and prolonged exhibition of the state of Job’s heart. . . . We must not confound the dialectic problem of the poem or great part of it—that is, the problem in debate between Job and his friends—with the great problem of Job’s (and so humanity’s) case; the problem in debate between God and Satan. The question between Job and his friends was, What is the explanation of Job’s sufferings? which, of course, rises often and necessarily into the higher, What is the explanation of suffering? The question between God

and Satan was, Is Job's virtue unselfish? which rose into the other, Will Job's virtue stand the test of severe affliction? and that into the highest of all, Is human religion a reality? Thus the minor or inner problem between Job and his friends is not in any way the problem of the book of Job, but a question whose discussion contributes, not by its solution as such one way or other, but by the effect which its discussion (and solution or failure of solution) has on Job's mind and religious feeling, to the solution of the problem of the book."

This is ingenious and well put; but is it wholly true? Is it not fatal to this theory of the problem of the book, that the epilogue contains no reference to it? The sons of God are not convened, nor does the question raised by Satan receive a definite answer. It is the case between Job and his friends that is adjudicated; or rather, the debate is cut short by Jehovah himself with the assertion of his own majesty. He is sovereign, and the key of this problem, as of all things dark and hidden, is to be found in his inscrutable will. And so in the verdict which God pronounces, Job is rewarded because of his words, and his friends are rebuked because they have failed to understand and to justify the divine dealings: "Ye have not spoken of me that which is right, as my servant Job". It is not so much a vindication of Job's character as a decision of the controversy. Job, notwithstanding his waywardness and presumption, has come nearer to the truth than those with whom he has disputed. And, again, on the theory that the debate is merely a description of Job's third trial, the discourse of Elihu seems impertinent and foreign to the plan. Elihu presents new views of God and his providence, obviously designed to refute the position hitherto maintained. Thus, in opposition to Job's seeming denial of the divine rectitude, Elihu asserts the goodness of God as shown in the very creation and preservation of the world. All God's dealings are perfect; and the good man must lay his suffering to the account of his own sinful nature, and his perplexity to the account of his ignorance. Elihu also maintains, that the main end of suffering is disciplinary; that it is sent as chastisement for sin, and hence is really a proof of God's goodness. Elihu is obviously brought forward to partake in the debate, and to contribute something to the decision of the problem under discussion. In short, it is impossible to escape the conviction that the elucidation of truth is the grand object of the author of Job. Like our own great poet, he seeks "to justify the ways of God to men". Doubtless, there is a certain dramatic cast to the book; passion is painted as well as truth debated. In the passionate outbursts of Job's discourse, we find often, not the calm progress of argumentation, but the delineation of a soul under the hidings of God's face. But we cannot believe that the writer designed to describe even the drama of a religious experience. The mind of the sacred poet was stirred with the great question, Why do the righteous suffer? Everything revolves about this. He takes up all the various lines of thought by which the Christian philosopher in the light of the Gospel has sought a clue to the enigma. Thus, at the outset, the author touches on the thought, that suffering may be demonstrative, designed to express the power of religion in the heart of the good man. Job appears in the prologue as a martyr; he is called to endure as a witness to the truth. But this thread is presently dropped, and we see it no more throughout the entire book. Farther on, he lays hold of the view, that suffering may be chastisement, and at various points in the discussion refers it to the sovereign pleasure of God. These threads are not woven into a logical web, but curiously intertwined as it were by the hand of an artist.

But we must cut short this discussion, and notice briefly Mr. Davidson's

view in regard to the date of the composition of the book. He opposes decidedly those who would bring this down as far as the Babylonian exile. He appeals to the noted parallelism between Jeremiah xx, 14-18, and Job iii; since the freshness and vigor of the passage in Job, contrasted with the dullness of that in Jeremiah, leaves no room to doubt which is the original. He refers also to similar imitations in other prophets, especially in Amos. He finds likewise an affinity between the language of Job and Proverbs, although the conception of the divine wisdom is developed more perfectly in the latter than in the former. The doctrine of a future retribution, as contained in Job, is less advanced than that of the book of Ecclesiastes, which Mr. Davidson attributes to Solomon. Job, therefore, must have been written before the time of Solomon. How long before, he cares little to answer. To the possibility of a much earlier date, he is willing to give free scope.

We had designed to speak of the merits of the new translation, but our limits forbid.

H. H.

An Introduction to the Old Testament, Critical, Historical, and Theological, containing a Discussion of the most Important Questions belonging to the several Books. By SAMUEL DAVIDSON, D.D., of the University of Halle, and LL.D. Vol. I. London: Williams & Norgate. 1862. Pp. xii—536. The position of Dr. Davidson is well known to the theological public. He has been for a long time a teacher and writer in the department of Sacred Literature. Within the last few years, his views on certain points of Old Testament criticism seem to have undergone a change. This, however, was not generally known, or excited little attention, until the publication of a new edition of Horne's *Introduction*. Dr. Davidson undertook to revise the portion relating to the Old Testament. On the appearance of the book, it was found that in many particulars he indorsed the results of the later rationalising criticism of Germany. As was to be expected, this occasioned much uneasiness and excited considerable outcry. Dr. Davidson was ejected from his place as teacher, and a new volume of the *Introduction*, more in harmony with the prevailing views, was substituted for the one tainted with such germs of rationalism. During the last few years it has been understood that he was engaged in renewed study of the Hebrew Scriptures, and in the composition of a work which should set forth and defend his matured views. The volume named above is the first part of this work, which is to be completed in three volumes. The present volume begins with the Pentateuch, and ends with the books of Samuel. It is not a mere manual or hand-book for the student, but it contains a full discussion of the points in debate respecting the date, authorship and authenticity of the several books of the Old Testament. The work, therefore, will furnish what has hitherto been wanting in our language — a tolerably full exhibition of the questions involved in the historical criticism of the Hebrew Scriptures.

On the whole, we are glad that Dr. Davidson has put forth such a work. The necessities of the time seem to demand that the theological student should understand something of the scope and bearing of the points at issue concerning the books of the old covenant. He will find them fairly stated, and in certain aspects also fairly debated, in this volume. Dr. Davidson is a man of wide reading, of great sincerity, and, we believe, also of true Christian principle and feeling. While we cannot admit his conclusions, we would cheerfully acknowledge the candid and honest tone with which the discussion is conducted.

H. H.

JOHN ALBERT BENDEL'S *Gnomon of the New Testament*. A new Translation. By O. T. LEWIS and M. R. VINCENT, Professors in Troy University.

Vol. II, 8vo. Perkinpine & Higgins, Philadelphia. 1862. In noticing the first volume of this new translation (p. 400 of this Review, 1861), we gave some account of Bengel's life and of the various editions of this most concise and suggestive of commentaries. The American translation is undoubtedly the best that has appeared, and must find its way into all good theological libraries. Some portions of the original are omitted (referring to obsolete matters); but their place is more than made good by substantial additions, selected with care, from later commentators. The volume is highly creditable to American scholarship, and to the enterprise of the excellent book-sellers, who venture on such a publication in these critical times. Bengel is coming to new honor more than a century after his decease. Some peculiarities in his exegetical method, and general theory of religion, are just beginning to be fully appreciated. He is more historical than speculative, relies much more upon facts than upon theories or logic. An able article on his peculiar *Significancy as a Theologian* was published in the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1861, and translated in the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, April, 1862. It would be well worth appending to this valuable edition of his chief work.

Lange's Bible-Work. J. J. VAN OOSTERZEE, D.D.: *Theological and Homiletical Commentary on the Gospel of St. Luke.* Translated by SOPHIA TAYLOR. Vol. I. Edinburgh: Clark. New York: Scribner. 8vo. 1862. Pp. 445. Among the volumes which make up Lange's useful Bible-Work, this commentary of Dr. Van Oosterzee, of Rotterdam, is one of the very best, for its clearness, conciseness, and pertinency. It is both learned and popular. The exposition combines strict interpretation and evangelical sentiment, with a constant protest against rationalistic perversions. The threefold plan of the commentary, presenting the exegetical, the doctrinal, and the homiletical elements of each passage, makes it an excellent work for ministers. If this series could be republished in this country in a cheaper form, it would undoubtedly have a wide circulation. As the Clarks bring it out, it is three or four times the price of the original. The next volume of the series, in the translation, will conclude the exposition of Matthew, and embrace that of the Gospel of Mark. — As a specimen of Oosterzee's Homiletical Hints, we take a few from his interpretation of Christ's Temptation in the Wilderness. "From the Jordan of glorification to the wilderness of temptation. This is God's way of dealing with the Christian as well as with his Master: and this way is, 1. the old, yet always new; 2. the hard, yet kind; 3. the dark, yet easy; 4. the solitary, and yet the blessed way.—Temptation follows the Christian even in solitude.—The forbidden way of 'taking thought' for food.—The dangerous mountain-tops of spiritual life.—Satan never lies more boldly than when he promises.—The highest elevations border on the deepest precipices.—Even the devil is a theologian", etc.

Theologisch-homiletisches Bibelwerk, von J. P. LANGE. VIII Theil. *Der Brief Pauli an die Galater*, von OTTO SCHMOLLER. Bielefeld. 1862. Royal 8vo, pp. 119. XIII Theil. *Der Brief des Jacobus*, von Dr. J. P. LANGE und Dr. J. J. VAN OOSTERZEE. Pp. 117. 50 cents each—about one fourth of the price of the Edinburgh translation.—These two new volumes of the German edition have the general characteristics of the previous parts—condensed exposition, evangelical spirit, and adaptedness to homiletic use. Schmoller interprets justification as a declarative act; and argues forcibly against the Roman Catholic view. The "works of the law", by which we cannot be justified, he says, include the moral as well as the ceremonial law.

He also contends against the position, that faith justifies because God sees in the germ the ripened fruit of sanctification. If this were so, he argues, then the ground of our justification, so far as God is concerned, would lie in something else than what forms the trust and hope of the believer, viz. Christ as the ground of justification. The new life is a life of faith in Christ (ii, 21).—In the commentary on the Epistle of James, Dr. Lange wrote the Introduction, the translation, and the exegetical notes; Dr. Van Oosterzee, the doctrinal inferences, and the homiletic hints.—Two more parts of this commentary (on Ephesians, Philippians, and Thessalonians) are promised for 1862. The remaining volumes on Romans, the Epistles of John, and the Revelation will be published next year.

Handschriftliche Funde von FRANZ DELITZSCH. 1s Heft. Lpz. 1861. Prof. Delitzsch found in Mayhingen the Reuchlin codex of the Apocalypse, the only one used by Erasmus in his first edition (1516) of the New Testament. His second edition, 1519, from which Luther translated, was but slightly changed. In the three subsequent editions, 1522, 1527, 1535, he made some use, though not sufficient, of the Complutensian Polyglott. The above Reuchlin Codex contained the text, intermixed with a commentary, and Erasmus, in some passages, took the comment for the text, and even changed the text to accord with the Vulgate version. The last five verses of the Apocalypse were wanting in the ms., and Erasmus made up the Greek as well as he could, with a perverse disinclination to the use of the Greek article. The above work of Delitzsch shows also the carelessness with which even the Reuchlin Codex was used; the codex itself, in fact, was not collated, but only a copy of the same, made by an inexact scribe. He thus gave a basis to the *textus receptus* which had its ill effects upon the modern versions. For the criticism of the text of the New Testament, this collation of Delitzsch gives valuable aid. An interesting sketch of this whole matter, communicated by Herzog to the *Revue Chrétienne* (Supplement, Feb. 1862), is translated in the *Journal of Sacred Literature* for April.

El Libro de los Salmos. Nueva York: 1862. Pp. 165. The Spanish translation of the Psalms, by De Valera, Amsterdam, 1602, is the basis of this new edition, published by the American Bible Society, and revised by competent scholars. It is beautifully printed. The book of Proverbs is now going through the press.

HISTORY OF THE CHURCH AND OF DOCTRINES.

Roberti Grosseteste Episcopi quondam Lincolnensis Epistola. Edited by HENRY RICHARD LUARD, M.A. Royal 8vo. Pp. cxxxi, 467. London: 1861. Since 1857 the English government, under the direction of the Master of the Rolls, has been publishing, mostly from manuscripts never before edited, a series of important works illustrative of the mediæval history of Great Britain and Ireland. These works, most of which no private publisher could afford to issue, are elegantly printed in the clearest type upon the best of paper, and may be had in this country for about three dollars a volume. Of the nearly thirty volumes which have already appeared, may be named such works as the *Opus Tertium* and *Opus Minus* of Roger Bacon, the *Fasciculi Zizaniorum* of Thomas Netter, Pecock's *Repressor*, the writings of Giraldus Cambrensis, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, according to the several original authorities, the Chronicle of the Monastery of Abing-

don, and, though last not least, the letters of the famous Bishop of Lincoln, one of the ablest men of the thirteenth century, who did much toward paving the way for Wycliffe.

Earnestly commending this entire series of invaluable works to the attention of librarians and scholars, we are now moved to make special mention of the exceedingly interesting volume which has come latest to hand. It is a most welcome addition to the materials requisite for a thorough study of the mediæval Papacy in its relations to the English Church. First we have, from the pen of the editor, an extended and carefully written biography of Grosseteste, then an account of the manuscripts used in preparing the volume, then a table of the letters in their supposed chronological order, and finally the letters themselves (in Latin), one hundred and thirty-one in all, only about one half of which have ever before been published. Even of those previously published (by Edward Brown in 1690), only the one which is given by Matthew Paris, Grosseteste's contemporary, has been much noticed; and it is on this that the fame of the great Bishop has chiefly rested. No wonder the story of his life has so nearly become "a mythic embodying of the principle of opposition to the see of St. Peter". This volume will go far toward restoring Grosseteste to the solid domain of history, and overruling the judgment of Hallam, who depreciates his learning, and speaks of him as "a man of *considerable* merit"; who "has had his share of applause".

Robert Grosseteste (Greathead) was born of humble parents about the year 1175, studied at Oxford, and probably for a time at Paris; after holding several inferior offices, was elected Bishop of Lincoln in 1235, and died in 1253, greatly to the relief and joy of the reigning Pontiff.

In spite of all which Hallam says to the contrary, his learning was certainly extensive for the age in which he lived. Besides a knowledge of Greek and Hebrew, at that time very rare in England, he made such attainments in other branches, such as medicine and husbandry, as to win the applause even of Roger Bacon, the most universal genius of the century. His writings on a great variety of subjects, if collected, would fill three goodly folios. He appears to have been familiar with the writings of Augustine, Jerome, and Gregory, and frequently indulges in quotations from the ancient classics.

As a bishop, he sturdily resisted the usurpations of the Papacy, then at the height of its power, especially in England, whose king, Henry III, was deeply indebted to the Pope for the recovered allegiance of his kingdom. On the other hand, he was equally strenuous in withstanding the encroachments of the Crown. In short, he was a clear-headed, incorruptible, resolute bishop, maintaining his proper spiritual prerogatives against all invaders.

He also lifted his voice loudly against the moral corruptions then so rife amongst both clergy and people. The mendicant orders found in him a friend and a patron, because they made themselves felt as reformers.

His activity was also conditioned by the growing infidelity of Europe, against which he set himself with great energy. His reverence for Scripture as the ultimate appeal in all controversies was unbounded. He speaks of the authority of Scripture as "*irrefragabilis*".

Doubless he deserves to be hailed as one of "the harbingers of the Reformation". His direct and positive influence upon Wycliffe and Huss is beyond dispute. Not that he anticipated the peculiar doctrines of the Reformation, or dreamed of a separation from the see of Rome; but with all his might he opposed the papal abuses of jurisdiction, inveighed against

the immoralities and ignorance of the clergy, and encouraged the study of the Scriptures as the oracles of God. His traditional renown, great as it is, is therefore no greater than he deserves.

R. D. H.

A Text-Book of the History of Doctrines, by Dr. K. R. HAGENBACH. *Buch's Translation, revised with large Additions from the Fourth German Edition, and other sources.* By HENRY B. SMITH, D.D., Professor in the Union Theological Seminary of the City of New York. Sheldon and Company. New York: 1861-2. Two vols. 8vo. Pp. 478-558. Clergymen in the harness, with but little money to spare for books, and but little time for anything beyond the weekly demands of the pulpit, frequently ask our opinion in regard to the *minimum* of apparatus required in the study of Church History. Three works seem to us indispensable. These are Gieseler, in five volumes (when complete), the first four of which bring the history down to 1648 A.D.; Neander, also in five volumes, which nearly reach the Reformation; and Hagenbach, whose *History of Doctrines* covers the whole ground. Few American scholars are more to be envied than the two to whom we are indebted for these three masterly works. Some years ago Professor Torrey, of Burlington, took in hand what was then considered the gigantic task of translating Neander. In the year following the appearance of the fifth volume of Neander, Professor Smith began to put forth his revised edition of the Edinburgh translation of Gieseler, and has recently given us the fourth volume, only a small portion of which had appeared in an English dress. Ministers and theological students, compelled by their poverty to choose between these two great German masters in Church History, had better possess themselves of Gieseler, whose foot-notes are in themselves almost a patristic and scholastic library. And yet we cannot advise any one to think of dispensing with Neander, whose work complements rather than rivals that of Gieseler. Rather than endure such mental and spiritual privation, it would be better to make the old coat do service for another year.

Still less can we advise any preacher of the Gospel doctrines to try to get along without Hagenbach. To be sure, a man might be very useful in the ministry who had no book but the Bible, if he so studied it as to saturate his whole being with its contents. But since theology must inevitably be studied as a science, and the doctrines all have their history, that history should be familiar to every preacher. If we are ever to distinguish between the one constant substance of Christian doctrine, and its many shifting forms; if we are ever to have a true Catholic tolerance, as far removed from bigotry on the one side, as from latitudinarianism on the other, it must be through such studies as are inspired and guided by some good History of Doctrines like this of Hagenbach. Errors of speculation, when they can be shown to have struck their flag again and again, are thereby stripped of half their power either to seduce or terrify.

Of all the many Histories of Doctrine which have appeared in Germany, this of Hagenbach best meets the wants of the theological student. If not quite equal to some others in original acuteness and grasp of intellect, it surpasses them in fulness and compression of materials. The doctrinal stand-point of the author likewise recommends him to the favor of our American theologians.

In regard to the service rendered by Professor Smith, in preparing the edition issued by Sheldon & Co., we cannot permit the circumstance that he is our friend and colleague, to withhold us from the expression of our opinion. The translation has been carefully revised throughout; its inaccuracies corrected, its obscurities cleared. Much additional matter has

also been inserted; the Edinburgh translation having been made from the second German edition, while this is from the fourth. Many sharp and suggestive paragraphs are likewise added from Baur, Neander, and others. And what is of special importance, whole sections have been inserted, giving the development of doctrines in England, Scotland, France, and America. This is done without disturbing Hagenbach's ground-plan, or perplexing his references; as, for example, section 225 is devoted to the "Cartesian Philosophy", while the sections following, added by Professor Smith, are numbered section 225 *a*, and section 225 *b*. We are greatly mistaken if Dr. Hagenbach himself is not as much instructed by the new sections pertaining to English and American theology, as any author well could be by any editor. As for ourselves, we have nothing in our theological literature to meet the want met by these new sections. The learning displayed is as exact as it is ample.

R. D. H.

Hymns of the Eastern Church. Translated, with Notes and an Introduction, by the Rev. J. M. NEALE, D.D., Warden of Sackville College. London. 1862. Pp. 164. Our students of Church History have long been familiar with the Latin Hymnology. The *Thesaurus Hymnologicus* of Daniel appeared more than twenty years ago, followed by Mone's Collection nearly ten years ago. Translations have also abounded. As Dr. Neale says in his preface: "There is scarcely a first or second-rate hymn of the Roman Breviary which has not been translated; of many we have six or eight versions". But of the Greek Hymnology, which fills eighteen quarto volumes, English readers are now receiving their first instalment in this little volume. It contains about sixty hymns, the translating of which has occupied a portion of Dr. Neale's leisure time for the last twelve years. Besides the hymns, we have brief biographical sketches of their several authors, with a short Introduction, explaining the genius of Greek ecclesiastical poetry in general. The translator reckons three epochs of this poetry: 1. That of *formation*, while it was gradually throwing off the bondage of classical metres, and inventing and perfecting its various styles, down to about 726 A.D. 2. That of *perfection*, nearly coincident with the Iconoclastic Controversy, from 726 to 820 A.D. 3. That of *decadence*, from 820 to 1400 A.D.

The first to throw aside the classical metres, and "strike out the new path of harmonious prose", was Anatolius, of Constantinople, who died 458 A.D. From him we have an *Evening Hymn*, not used in public worship, but said to be a great favorite in the Greek Isles, which reminds us of Bishop Ken's "Glory to thee, my God, this night". This is it:

"The day is past and over :
All thanks, O Lord ! to thee.
I pray thee now, that sinless
The hours of dark may be.
O Jesu ! keep me in thy sight,
And save me through the coming night !

"The joys of day are over ;
I lift my heart to thee ;
And ask thee that offenceless
The hours of dark may be.
O Jesu ! make their darkness light,
And save me through the coming night !

"The toils of day are over ;
 I raise the hymn to thee ;
 And ask that free from peril,
 The hours of dark may be.
 O Jesu ! keep me in thy sight,
 And guard me through the coming night !

"Lighten mine eyes, O Saviour !
 Or sleep in death shall I ;
 And he my wakeful tempter,
 Triumphant shall cry :
 'He could not make their darkness light,
 Nor guard them through the hours of night' !

"Be thou my soul's preserver,
 O God ! for thou dost know
 How many are the perils
 Through which I have to go.
 Lover of men ! O hear my call,
 And guard and save me from them all !"

The greatest of the Greek ecclesiastical poets, according to Dr. Neale, was John of Damascus (d. between 754 and 787 A.D.), the famous theologian. Thirteen pieces from his pen are given. One of these, a hymn for All Saints, has a brave ring.

"Those eternal bowers
 Man hath never trod,
 Those unfading flowers
 Round the throne of God :
 Who may hope to gain them
 After weary fight ?
 Who at length attain them,
 Clad in robes of white ?

"He who gladly barter
 All on earthly ground ;
 He who, like the martyrs,
 Says, 'I *will* be crowned'.
 He whose one oblation
 Is a life of love ;
 Clinging to the nation
 Of the blest above.

"Shame upon you, legions
 Of the heavenly King,
 Denizens of regions
 Past imagining !
 What ! with pipe and tabor
 Fool away the light,
 When he bids you labor—
 When he tells you—'Fight !'

"While I do my duty,
 Struggling through the tide,
 Whisper thou of beauty
 On the other side!
 Tell who will the story
 Of our *new* distress;
 Oh! the future glory,
 Oh! the loveliness!"

The translator of these poems is the Dr. Neale who has distinguished himself by his laborious and learned History of the Eastern Church. No man in England is more competent to give us a much larger collection of hymns from the same source, which would be sure of a hearty welcome.

R. D. H.

DORNER, Dr. J. A. *History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*. Division First. Vol. II. Translated by Rev. W. D. SIMON. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Scribner, 1862. 8vo, pp. 544. This volume completes the history of the discussions of the first four centuries upon the Person of Christ, and incidentally the Trinity. It also completes the translation of the first volume of Dorner's work, ending with the Council of Constantinople, A.D. 381. We need not repeat what we have so frequently said about the very great value of this elaborate treatise, so ample in learning, acute in criticism, and philosophical in exposition. The chief points embraced in this second volume are, Monarchianism, Ebionism in new forms, Sabellianism, Arianism, and Appollinarism. Some of our younger divines, who are inclined to deny the proper human soul in Christ, would do well to master the discussion of the latter heresy. The translation is made with conscientious care, though some of the shades of philosophical and theological terms might be more definitely rendered. The table of contents is much abridged from the full analysis, which is so helpful a part of the original. We hope soon to welcome the conclusion of this most important work, which ought to be studied by our theological students and ministers.

Catechesis Religionis Christiana, seu Catechismus Heidelbergensis. Editit LUDOVICUS H. STEINER, A.M. Baltimore: Typis Joannis D. Toy. 1862. 8vo, pp. 48.—*Theologisches Handbuch zur Auslegung des Heidelberger Catechismus*. Von KARL SUDHOFF. Frankfurt am Main. 1862. 8vo, pp. 514. The first of the above volumes contains a careful collation of various Latin editions of the venerable Heidelberg Catechism, prepared by Rev. L. H. Steiner, of Frederick City, Md., with reference to the tercentennial anniversary (1863) of the preparation of the work, which is to be commemorated by the German Reformed Church of this country, by an edition in German, Latin, and English. It is well printed from a collation of a Cambridge edition, 1585; Geneva, 1609; and the Oxford Sylloge Confessionum, 1804.—The second work is an excellent and full theological commentary to the Catechism, derived from leading Reformed divines, and explicating all the articles in order; also prepared with respect to the same celebration. It is made up of three parts: systematic, pp. 1-140; analytic, 143-472; historical, 473-514. The latter portion gives all that is needful to illustrate the history and literature of the document. Among all the catechisms of the Continent, the Heidelberg bears away the palm. Sudhoff incidentally corrects many Lutheran misstatements of the Calvinistic system of theology.—In the last number of the *Studien und Kritiken* (Heft iv,

1862), Dr. Ullmann gives a short account of the preparations made to celebrate this centennial in this country. In Germany and Switzerland such men as Hundeshagen, Lange, Ebrard, Krummacher, Hagenbach, and Riggenbach, will bear a part.

Immanuel; or, the Mystery of the Incarnation of the Son of God. Unfolded by JAMES USHER, Archbishop of Armagh. London: Nisbet & Co. 1862. 8vo, pp. 38. We welcome the reprint of this admirable discourse. In a concise way it presents the outlines of its grand theme in a thorough manner, guarding against erroneous views. It is a subject which needs to be devoutly and philosophically studied. Dr. Usher strongly holds to the "mystical union", yet without mysticism, and without resolving the atonement into a mere life-theory.

Matthes, Allgemeine Kirchliche Chronik, 1861, the eighth annual issue of this convenient, useful, and cheap chronicle of religious events. It contains some account of controversies as well as of ecclesiastical matters, generally in an impartial spirit. Slight space [and still more meagre pains are given to this country. Why does not Professor Schem continue his Year-Book? Matthes says of our war, which is all that he reports anything about, that our "civil and moral condition does not show any good aspect, though we are so boastful of our freedom and piety. It is more and more apparent that corruption, lack of bravery, and other republican virtues, everywhere prevail, and that our much bepraised religious and ecclesiastical zeal run out into mere boasting". On both sides there is, indeed, "much preaching"; but the Southerners preach up "slavery", and the Northerners "the observance of the Sabbath"; "tailors and barbers rush into chaplaincies"; and as soon as there "is a hot fight, almost all run away". And this is the sum of our religious history, A.D. 1861!

Presbyterian Historical Almanac for 1862. By JOS. M. WILSON. Vol. IV. Philadelphia. 1862. This Almanac steadily improves in value. The portraits of Moderators are now quite respectable. An undue proportion of space is given to the Old School Presbyterian Church. Why, for example, should the names and numbers of the students belonging to the Seminaries of the Old School be given, and not those of the New School? The Southern churches, which have notoriously formed another Assembly, are still included in the minutes of the Old School. The statistical tables, giving the amount of contributions, credit the Old School with over \$3,000,000, and the New School with less than \$300,000. This undoubtedly shows that the New School has not yet got into the way of keeping its accounts regularly; but it also shows how little such statistics can be depended upon for giving the real facts of the case. The sum of Presbyterianism in America and Great Britain is 10,592 ministers, 12,232 churches, 1,018,051 communicants, \$8,804,065 contributions.

Baptism, the Covenant and the Family. By REV. PHILIPPE WOLFF, late of Geneva, Switzerland. Translated freely from the French by the Author, with some additions. Boston: Crosby & Nichols. 1862. Pp. 345. The excellent author of this volume writes with great zeal and zest against the Baptists and their arguments. He has manifestly often met them face to face in sharp debate, and some of his reasonings must have kept them on the alert. His review of the patristic testimony, Tertullian, for example, shows that they can have but a slight hold in that quarter for many of their present views. His argument for the intimate connection of infant baptism

with the divine economy, and the family relation, and the welfare of the Church and of society, is strongly put. While he exaggerates some points, yet the general aim of his book is commendable, and its main points clearly stated, and defended with vigor and acuteness.

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

Irish History and Character. By GOLDWIN SMITH. London and Oxford: 1861. Pp. 197. For its size, this is by far the best book we know on Ireland and the Irish. It is a book of real insight and sagacity, comprehensive and suggestive, full of pregnant hints, exceedingly generous in its tone, considering its English parentage, and well fitted to render important practical service in the solution of the perplexing problem of Irish destiny. Its author, the accomplished and able Professor of Modern History at Oxford, has done himself great credit by this attempt to "cultivate the charities of history", and to "take fair account of misfortunes as well as of crimes".

That Ireland has suffered sorely for centuries by reason of her political connection with England, is a fact so patent as to require no proof and allow no contradiction. The remedy clamored for by Irish patriotism, as everybody knows, is independence. The remedy earnestly recommended by Professor Smith, is wiser and more kindly legislation on the part of England. Political independence is out of the question. Ireland is too near a neighbor ever to be surrendered either to herself or to any other power. The security of Liverpool and London is to be maintained at Galway and Dublin. English statesmen may think we ought to give up the mouths of the Mississippi, but they have no idea of ever giving up the Shannon and Liffey. Furthermore, Ireland has not within herself the physical resources for an independent and vigorous state. The singular moistness of her climate, begotten of the Gulf Stream, limits her agricultural capabilities, and renders her properly a grazing, instead of a grain-producing, country. This climatic peculiarity has also had not a little influence in relaxing the energies of the people.

But the great trouble with Ireland is in her blood. Unfortunately for her, she has been too purely Keltic. While France, equally Keltic in the original basis of her population, has been materially modified by other elements, and shaped in her development by alien impulses, Ireland has always been too exclusively Irish. It was her misfortune not to have been subdued and occupied by the Romans; not to have been overrun by the Anglo-Saxons; not to have endured a more thorough Norman conquest. The best part of Ireland now is Ulster, where Scotch blood has brought in Scotch energy and thrift. The millions of Irish emigrants to America, "have left their country for their country's good", making room for other elements—Scotch and English, now at last elaborating an amalgamation which has been too long delayed.

It was likewise an unspeakable misfortune that Ireland, through the gross blundering of English churchmen, failed of being detached, in the sixteenth century from the Papal See. Hence her bitter hatred of England, and those entangling alliances with France and other Papal nationalities, which have involved her in so many and such grievous calamities.

The unwise legislation of England has been inspired by a profound and intense distrust and dislike of the Irish character. This little work of Goldwin Smith is one of the most hopeful tokens of the hour, that these feelings

of such long standing are at last to give way before more charitable judgments. If such counsels as this book offers, are duly regarded, Ireland will henceforward be more pitied for her calamities than blamed for her offences, and the day is not distant when her people will rejoice that they are still, in spite of all their revolutionary spasms, a part of the British Empire.

R. D. H.

History of Friedrich the Second, called Frederick the Great. By THOMAS CARLYLE. In four volumes. Vol. III. New-York : Harper & Brothers. 1862. Pp. viii, 596. After an interval of several years, Mr. Carlyle publishes the third volume of his characteristic work; and readers may well be content to wait, if they can reap such profit from the delay. The incidents of the four years immediately following Friedrich's accession to the throne are here given in life-like description and coloring. Even Carlyle himself has never sketched real life with more of point and vigor. He ferrets out the motives of men, and the intricacies of diplomacy and war with rare insight. Many previous errors are corrected; many things set in a new light. No student of history or literature can neglect this volume. The life of Friedrich is viewed as the centre of European history in those momentous years, 1740-1744; all the nations are marshalled on the stage. And there is also many a brilliant side-piece of incident and character. Voltaire, for example, is criticised, as if the author enjoyed his own descriptions. Another volume it is said—though we hardly see how it is possible—will complete the work. We have space for only one characteristic passage: "My friend, it was not Beelzebub, nor Mephistopheles, nor Autolicus-Apollo, that built this world and us; it was Another. And you will get your crown well rapped, M. le Maréchal, for so forgetting that fact! France is an extremely pretty creature; but this making of France the supreme Governor and God's Vicegerent of nations is, was, and remains one of the maddest notions. France at its ideal *best*, and with a demi-god for King over it, were by no means fit for such function; nay of many Nations, is eminently the unfittest for it. And France at its *worst*, or nearly so, with a Louis the Fifteenth over it by way of demi-god—O Belleisle, what kind of France is this; shining in your grandiose imagination, in such contrast to the stingy fact: like a creature consisting of two enormous wings, five hundred yards in potential extent, and no body bigger than that of a common cock, weighing three pounds avoirdupois. Cock with his own gizzard much out of sorts, too!"

The Constitutional History of England since the Accession of George III, 1760-1860. By THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, C. B. In two volumes. Vol. I. Boston : Crosby & Nichols. 1862. Pp. 484. It is enough, and it is not too much, to say of this work, that it is a worthy continuation of the labors of Hallam. At this time, when men's thoughts are irresistibly led to a review of all theories about government and law, liberty and progress, it is well to have so careful and competent a guide through the changes and development of the English constitution. The author writes in sympathy with the progress of liberal opinions: he believes in the growth and final triumph of liberty under law. The different chapters of this volume review the legislative history of England upon distinct topics: viz. the Influence of the Crown; Prerogatives of the Crown during the Minority or Incapacity of the Sovereign; Revenues of the Crown; the House of Lords; the House of Commons; Relations of Parliament to the Crown, the Law and the People. All these subjects are discussed with ample knowledge and candid criticism. Some of the facts, as to the intrigues and venality of men and

parties, and the intemperance of debate, afford matter for curious reflection. The second volume, already advanced, will comprise a history of party, of the press, of political agitation, of the church, of civil and religious freedom. The work is issued in the best style.

Memoirs, Letters, and Remains of ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE. Two vols. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1862. Alexis de Tocqueville died on the sixteenth of April, 1859, at the age of fifty-four. These volumes tell us all that we shall at present know of the private life and opinions of the author of *Democracy in America*. No foreign writer has shown himself so capable of understanding the genius of our institutions, or the character of our people. The most interesting portion of these two volumes is that containing the letters: they are so free, unreserved, and sagacious. We give a brief abstract from one or two. To M. Beaumont, under date of December 21, 1856, he writes: "You should read too, as we have done, the third and fourth volumes of Macaulay. It is more amusing than any novel, and almost as superficial. When I say superficial, I mean that it wants the sagacity which penetrates through the passions of the time and the country, down to the general character of an epoch, and to its place in human progress. As to mere facts, it is far from superficial—the author has studied them well."

To Mrs. Grote he writes January 31, 1857: "What you say of the simple character of the English is true. Their perception is just, somewhat narrow, but clear; they see only what they look at; they do well only one thing at a time. This accounts to me for one of their remarkable peculiarities."

Of the English government in India, he writes to Lady Theresa Lewis, September 24, 1857: "Nothing under the sun is so wonderful as the conquest, and still more the government, of India by the English. Nothing so fixes the eyes of mankind on the little island of which the Greeks never heard even the name. Do you believe, madame, that a nation, after having filled this vast place in the imagination of the whole human race, can safely withdraw from it? I do not. I believe that England obeys an instinct, not only heroic, but wise, when, already possessing India, she resolves at any price whatever to keep it. I add, that I am convinced that she will keep it, though perhaps on less favorable conditions." The man who wrote these things was not only an observer, but a philosophical statesman.

PHILOSOPHY.

Modern Philosophy. By F. D. MAURICE. London. 1862. This fourth volume of Mr. Maurice's disquisitions on the history of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, traverses the period from the fourteenth century to the French Revolution, with glimpses into the nineteenth century. It is written in a peculiar method, being rather the reflections of the author upon the various systems, than a full unfolding of the systems themselves. Every student of the history of opinions will here find much to quicken his intellect and direct his researches. Mr. Maurice has the faculty of finding "good in everything", extracting nutriment for the mind from the greatest variety of sources. He moves in an independent way among the thinkers of all times. The least satisfactory part of the work is that which has to do with the German speculations, where the author often seems satisfied with second-hand and vague views. One commendable feature in the general tone of the volume is, the relation to Christianity under which the systems are exhibited. By the truth as it is in Christ they must stand or fall.

First Principles of Ethics. By J. T. CHAMPLIN, President of Waterville College. Boston: Crosby & Nichols. Pp. 204. All who have read President Champlin's work on Intellectual Philosophy will be prepared to find in this treatise a clear and concise statement of principles, and an orderly arrangement of topics. The work is devoted to the theory of ethics, in vindication of the position, that right is conformity in conduct to the reason and nature of things. "Action" is the whole subject of moral government and of moral science. "Virtue is externally, doing right, and internally, intending right." While we doubt whether this theory includes the whole of moral science, or is the best statement of its real principle, yet the author has unfolded it in its different aspects and relations more fully than previous writers, and with ingenuity and cogency. Ethics has, and must have, its teleology as well as its *principium*. The author's very general statements about Edwards's theory seem to us to indicate, that he has not fully mastered its real import and bearings.

Æsthetics; or, the Science of Beauty. By JOHN BASCOM, Professor in Williams College. Boston: Crosby & Nichols. Pp. 266. In these interesting Lectures, Beauty is considered as a simple idea, revealed in the expression, and having unity and truth for its necessary conditions. The work is written with intelligence and spirit, and with a thorough appreciation of the value and need of this neglected department of philosophical inquiry. The principles of architecture, sculpture, painting, and poetry (why not of music also?) are presented in the five concluding Lectures in an attractive manner. Without pretending to the form of a scientific system, the main points involved in the science are stated and elucidated. It supplies, too, a desideratum in our general literature; for Æsthetics, in a complete system of education and culture, cannot be wisely neglected. We commend the work to the attention of teachers and scholars; they will be well repaid for its careful perusal.

A System of Logic. By P. McGRACOR, A.M. New York: Harpers. 1862. Pp. 469. Logic is here viewed in a broad way, as including "the various means of acquiring and retaining knowledge, and avoiding error". The work makes no pretensions to dealing with the science of logic in a strict acceptation; it is rather a popular and practical treatise on mental culture. As such it gives to the student many hints and directions of much value. While the author's usage of terms is not always sharp, yet his book will be of service to those who wish to know the general principles of logic, without entering into the technicalities of more thorough discussions.

POLITICAL AND MORAL QUESTIONS.

America before Europe. Principles and Interests. By Count AGÉNOR DE GASPARIN. Translated from advance sheets by MARY L. BOOTH. Third edition. New York: Scribner. 1862. Pp. 409. In our last number (pp. 579-581) a valued contributor gave an account of the French edition of this able and remarkable book, which, in its English version, as we are glad to see, has been so warmly welcomed in this country. The translator has executed her task with fidelity, though too often retaining the traces of French idioms. The work traverses the ground of our present complications with a firm and manly hand, with comprehensive insight, in eloquent style, and inspired by the highest moral and religious convictions. No foreign, we

might even say, no American writer has done us such ample justice. This is a phenomenon in politics and in literature. The special discussions on Belligerents, Neutrality, Blockades, and the Trent affair are among the very best that have appeared; the concession by England of belligerent rights to the rebels at the breaking out of the rebellion is shown to be without any precedent. The attitude of England is thoroughly and impartially examined. The duty of Europe is plainly set forth. In fact, the strength and value of the book are very much found in the relation which is here assigned to this country in respect to Europe, in the world-wide consequences which the author sees to be involved in our present struggle. Of the issue of this conflict between freedom and slavery, De Gasparin is a sanguine prophet, because he is a believer in God, freedom, and immortality. We again commend the book most cordially. It ought to be read by every American citizen. As a specimen of its spirit, we subjoin an extract, bearing on the policy of England:

"Suppose for a moment that England, without even giving way to her abolition sympathies, had taken the side of the right, her conduct would have no longer encountered either difficulties or embarrassments. Here is justice, and there injustice; here is a President regularly elected, and there are men in insurrection against the free Constitution of their country, their flag and their oaths. Well, we are on the side of justice, which is also that of liberty. Without intervening, without meddling with that which does not concern us, we will maintain our natural relations with the Government of the United States; and as to the Southerners, we owe them nothing; we are determined to see in them only what they are, rebels against the law, rebels in favor of slavery."

"There are two nations in England. Whoever does not begin by admitting this, must renounce all hope of understanding the history of this strange country."

"When unprincipled England grieves us, let us turn with confidence toward liberal and Christian England! Thank God! the latter is constantly gaining ground. If a few antiquated spirits still repeat the *civis sum Romanus* of British pride, if the cry of war against America has been repeated for a moment by the crowd, if the disposition rudely to break down all resistance is manifested here and there, a better disposition is also making its appearance, another people is rising."

La Question de l'Indépendance et de l'Unité de l'Italie, vis-à-vis du Clergé par Ernest Philalete (P. PASSAGLIA). Paris, 1862. Father Passaglia in this new pamphlet vigorously prosecutes his labors in behalf of Italian unity and independence, and in opposition to the temporal sovereignty of the Papacy. He carries to its legitimate results the line of argument in his three previous works, of which we gave an account in the April number of this REVIEW. In the first chapter he states the question, and expounds the true nature of the independence of the papacy in harmony with the rights of the nation. Chapter second defends the right of the Italian people to unity and independence, and that it ought to prevail over dynastic and papal rights. Chapter third, with some special pleading, "demonstrates that liberal principles of government are of Catholic origin". Chapter fourth contains an exhortation to the Catholic clergy.

God Timing all National Changes in the Interests of his Christ. By WILLIAM R. WILLIAMS. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1862. Pp. 56. This able and eloquent discourse gives a vivid picture of the elements of our present struggle, in relation to the progress of the kingdom of Christ. No better sermon has been published on this absorbing theme.

The Civil War in America. An Address at Glasgow, by A. F. STODDARD, Esq. Glasgow, 1862. Pp. 81. Mr. Stoddard deserves the thanks of all Americans for his well-timed, useful, and patriotic vindication of our national cause.

The Present Attempt to dissolve the American Union, a British Aristocratic Plot. By B. New York, 1862. Pp. 42. Sidney E. Morse, Esq., in an article that forms the basis of this pamphlet, shows that at least some of the English viewed the emancipation of their colonial slaves in its possible bearings upon the future of this country. Though this was a speculation, rather than a "plot", yet the result undoubtedly fell in with the wish of the ruling class in Great Britain. They rejoice in our anticipated downfall, and would do nothing to avert it. The editor of the pamphlet adds several curious facts bearing on the same theme.

Bird's-Eye Views of Slavery in Missouri. By EDWIN LEIGH, M.D. St. Louis: Keith & Woods, 1862. In six maps the position and relations of slavery in Missouri are here presented to the eye in an ingenious and striking way. Dotted squares (in addition to figures) represent, in map 1, the population; in 2, the slaves; in 3, the slaveholders; in 4, the proportion of slaves to population; in 5, to farms; in 6, the tobacco crop. Dr. Leigh is a thorough student, and his work is very useful. He proposes to make similar diagrams of Virginia, Missouri, and, on a larger scale, of geography in general.

The Living House, or God's Method of Social Unity. A Baccalaureate Sermon, August 8, 1862. By MARK HOPKINS, D.D., President of Williams College. This admirable sermon is based upon 1 Peter ii, 4, 5, "To whom coming as unto a living stone", etc. It discusses three grand methods of social unity. The first is by the balance of mutual interests and selfishnesses. The second is by power or pressure from without. The third is by *vital affinity*—and this is God's method. This divine method is then unfolded with great force and beauty. A few sentences from the closing appeal to the young men, will show the spirit of the discourse, and what its distinguished author thinks of the great contest now going on:

"You inherit a government more conformed to the methods of God than any other. There is in it more of freedom in all directions; we trust there is also more of vitality, of unity, and of power to expel what would be destructive of its life. But this is yet to be tested, and the result will depend on the present generation of young men. If our national life shall come out triumphant in its struggle with that internal and cancerous malady to which it has at times seemed to succumb, it will be the most glorious triumph of free principles the world has ever seen. Will it thus come out? We think so. The government has a power, and the nation a life and a conscious unity, that we did not know of till the present struggle. Let but the demon of slavery be cast out, and though it leave the nation rent, and torn, and prostrate, we shall yet rise to a strength and greatness unknown before. There is no strength like that of unity from vitality and freedom. There is no beauty like it. Go forth, then, and do what you can in giving to the nation this strength and beauty. Be true to God's methods; be true to the interests of freedom and the rights of man."

The Golden Hour. By MONCURE D. CONWAY. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1862. Pp. 160. An earnest, popular, and eloquent plea for saving the nation by the abolition of slavery, as the only method. Mr. Conway writes

like a man of profound convictions, and at the same time in a style adapted to the masses of the people. His influence must be felt in his new position as editor of *The Commonwealth* in Boston.

POPULAR SCIENCE.

Annual of Scientific Discovery, a Year-Book of Facts in Science and Art, for 1862. Edited by DAVID A. WELLS, A.M. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. This is a very valuable book, containing, within a small compass, an account of the principal discoveries and improvements in the Arts and Sciences for the last year. At a time when invention is stimulated almost to an extreme, and art so strenuously asserts its domain over nature; when commerce and war are changed in their course and methods by new instruments and more powerful weapons, one cannot even read the newspaper with intelligence, unless he has in some degree kept pace with discovery and invention. It is interesting to observe, notwithstanding the extraordinary encouragement afforded to the military arts, that the arts of peace are making still greater advances. Among the curious facts recorded in this little volume, we notice this statement from the engineer of the Niagara Suspension Bridge: "The cables of the Niagara Bridge are free from vibration, and, consequently, will last as long as the nature of good wrought-iron will permit, when subjected to a moderate tension not exceeding one fifth of its ultimate strength. *This durability I am unwilling to estimate at less than several hundred years*". The travelling public will be satisfied with this.

The New Gymnastics for Men, Women, and Children. By DIO LEWIS, M.D. With three hundred Illustrations. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1862. Pp. 274. It is certainly surprising what a variety of postures the human body can be brought into by means of a scientific physical training. This New Gymnastics, by an accomplished teacher of the art, gives ocular evidence, and sufficient directions, for all possible attitudes. The subject itself is one of prime importance for all our boys and girls. Some such system is imperatively needed in public and private schools. And this new work seems to be well adapted to its object; and it has the advantage of having been thoroughly tested. A great variety of exercises is given for classes and individuals. It is all based on scientific principles. Many teachers will find this to be the manual they have been in quest of. A translation of Kloss's *Dumb-Bell Instructor*, and of Schreiber's *Pangymnastikon*, adds to the value of the work. The theory is, to develop all parts of the system fully and symmetrically, and incidentally to correct distortions and maladjustments.

Health: its Friends and its Foes. By E. D. MUSSEY, M.D., LL.D. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1862. Pp. 368. Those who do not accept the theories upon vegetable diet of the venerable and excellent author of this treatise, may still derive many valuable lessons as to health, and the treatment of disease, from the results of his laborious and successful career. He is emphatically a Christian physician, and an ornament to his profession. Our young men, and young women too, would do well to lay to heart the wise counsels contained in this instructive volume, giving the results of some threescore years' experience as a physician. The author is now over eighty years of age. If his long life is to be ascribed in any good degree to his dietetic system, he presents a strong practical argument in its favor.

The Children's Picture Book of the Sagacity of Animals. Illustrated with sixty engravings, by Harrison Weir. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1862. Pp. 276. This is the fifth in this series of Picture-Books which the Harpers are preparing for the delight of children. The illustrations are capital.

First Book of Chemistry. By WORTHINGTON HOOKER, M.D. New York: Harpers. 1862. Pp. 231. No better book can be found to initiate children into the wonders of chemistry. It is abundantly illustrated.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

The Poems of ARTHUR HUGH CLOUGH, with a Memoir, by C. E. NORTON. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. Pp. 299. This is a welcome work, not only to the personal friends of Mr. Clough in this country, but to all the friends of a manly and cultivated literature. The Memoir is a graceful tribute to the worth of the author, whose rare promise was hardly fulfilled. The longest poem in this collection—*The Bothis of Tober-na-Vuolich*—was reprinted in this country about twenty years ago. It describes a vacation trip of Oxford students in Scotland, and is written in hexameters. Though not perfectly finished in form, it is simple, natural, and masculine in expression. Many of the minor poems are wrought out with higher care. The high ideal, and the religious elements are indeed wanting; a partial philosophy casts doubts over the utterances of a simple faith. But still the pervading spirit is thoughtful, earnest, and aspiring. These poems give the author, if not the highest, yet an honorable place in modern poetic literature. This volume is an acceptable addition to the "blue and gold" series, for which we owe so many thanks to Ticknor & Fields. Mr. Clough also published a translation of Plutarch's Lives, which has a high rank for fidelity. He was a contributor to the *North American Review* and to *Putnam's Magazine*.

Country Living and Country Thinking. By GAIL HAMILTON. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1862. Pp. 461. In vivacious style and excellent humor these entertaining sketches introduce the reader to many old, and some new experiences in country life, and throw a charm around all. Occasional pruning might recommend some of the descriptions to a fastidious taste, but no reader can fail to be interested in these familiar scenes, which, as described, have a new freshness. Nor is there wanting an occasional deeper vein of thought and feeling. It is superfluous to praise the style in which Ticknor & Fields get up their books.

The Patience of Hope. With an Introduction by JOHN G. WHITTIER. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1862. Pp. 171. A work heartily commended by Mr. Whittier and by the author of the *Hours Subseciva*, must have matter congenial to many Christian minds. The author is a woman of rare powers of thought and expression, as well as of deep religious trust. She brings flowers and fruit from the garden of the Lord; and her lessons in the *Patience of Hope* are doubly welcome in these trying times. The extracts from her poems, given in the preface, are not too highly praised by Dr. Brown, when he says that they "remind us of Herbert, and Vaughan, and Keble". We are glad to see that the publishers announce another work—*A Present Heaven*—by the same writer.

The Koran: commonly called the Alcoran of Mohammed. Translated by GEORGE SALE. To which is prefixed a Life of Mohammed. Boston: T. O. H. P. Burnham. 1862. Pp. 472. This convenient and cheap edition of the *Koran* has already, we understand, had unusual success; no less than fifteen hundred copies having been sold. As a part of the religious history of the world, it must always be a work of great interest to scholars. And the version of Sale will hold its place, in spite of its imperfections, in English literature. Rev. J. M. Rodwell, of Caius College, Cambridge, has recently published a new translation, reàrranging the Suras, or chapters. Two new translations have been published in Holland; one by Tollens, 1859; the other by Keyser, 1860. Noaldeke, in Germany, brought out a new edition, 1860. A new edition of Kasirmirski's French version has appeared in Paris this year.

The Adventures of Philip on his Way through the World. By W. M. THACKERAY. New York: Harpers. 1862. Pp. 267. With Illustrations and a likeness of the Author. The author of *Vanity Fair* is still most at home in the pictures of human society and life. His shrewd observations and genial satire both amuse and instruct the reader. This new story, though somewhat prolix, has a better sustained interest, and a better drawn plot than some of his recent tales. It will, of course, be read by all who love quiet humor and the romance of real life.

Abel Drake's Wife. A Novel. By JOHN SAUNDERS. New York: Harpers. 1862. One of the most interesting, original, and simple novels of the year. Characters and scenes are sharply and naturally delineated.

The Last of the Mortimers. A Story in Two Voices. New York: Harpers. 1862. 12mo, pp. 378. The author of *Margaret Maitland* has lost none of her power. Her descriptions are as real, and her characters as natural as ever. This story is one of the most attractive and charming that she has produced.

The Struggles of Brown, Jones, and Robinson. By One of the Firm. By ANTHONY TROLLOPE. 8vo. New York: Harpers. Pp. 136. 25 cents. The theory and practice of modern trade advertisements are here unfolded to the infinite amusement of buyers and sellers, who, of course, include pretty much all of civilized mankind.

Religio Medici, A Letter to a Friend, Christian Burials, Urn Burials, and other Papers. By Sir THOMAS BROWNE, Kt., M.D. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1862. Pp. 440. Second Edition. With a Portrait. Every lover of healthy English and Christian literature is under obligation to Mr. Fields for this beautiful and finished edition, with a carefully revised text, of the best works by the sagacious, quaint, and witty author of the *Religio Medici*, of which Coleridge said, that "the style throughout is delicious". It is a volume to have near at hand, among one's chosen books. Good sense, wise reflections, quick turns, and subtle shades of thought, unaffected piety, and sound morality, give character to these rare writings. The book is got up in the best taste.

Leisure Hours in Town. By the author of *Recreations of a Country Parson*. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1862. Pp. 437. And here is another dainty Riverside book, to go along with Dr. Browne, also adorned with the likeness of the author, whose face we are glad to see. It looks broader and

stronger than we expected, but it is genial for all that. Mr. Boyd writes quite as well in town as he did in the country. His leisure moments store his garner for us. Quiet, natural humor, capital descriptions, keen yet kindly insight, mark his essays. Retiring members of presbyteries, on this side of the water, will relish his conclusion. Dr. Candlish is well handled on the organ question. College Life at Glasgow will be read with some of the zest with which it is written. But we cannot note all the "Concernings" and good things.

Beauties selected from the Writings of THOMAS DE QUINCEY. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1862. Pp. 432. The title is less than the book. More than a third of the volume is taken up with De Quincey's autobiography, gathered from various parts of his writings. It is intensely, even painfully interesting. It teaches us to read the secrets of that shrewd, meditative, half-mystic face, with the longing, restless eyes, that greets us as we open the volume. The selections are well made under the captions, Dreams, Narratives, Essays, Critiques and Reminiscences, and Detached Gems. Specimens are given from twenty volumes of the wonderful imaginations, brilliant descriptions, varied learning, bitter irony, and versatile powers of this man of genius. A perpetual by-play of allusions and reminiscences keeps the reader on the alert. Few describe real scenes and persons more vividly, and no man of our times has made phantasies seem so real as the author of the *Opium-Eater*.

Atheos: or, the Tragedies of Unbelief. New York: 1862. Infidelity is here assailed by describing the lives of noted unbelievers, taken as representatives of different classes in society. The subject are, 1. The Child Bard. 2. The Infidel Revolutionist. 3. The Infidel Politician. 4. The Infidel Reformer. 5. The Infidel Tribunal. 6. The Infidel Philosopher. 7. Appendix. The Infidel's Death-bed. The design is a good one, and well carried out. Shelley, Paine, Hume, and others, furnish the materials.

Preparatory Latin Prose-Book: containing all the Prose necessary for entering College. By J. H. HANSON, A.M. Fifth Edition. Boston: Crosby & Nichols. 1862. 8vo, pp. 775. A most excellent and useful book, prepared with scholarly care, and ample for the proposed object. Its price is only one dollar and fifty cents; specimen copies are furnished for one dollar. It is well printed, in a clear type. The vocabularies spare the student the cost of extra dictionaries. References to Andrews and Stoddard's, and to Kühner's Grammar are given at the foot of each page. It contains judicious selections from the works of Cicero, Cæsar, and Sallust, with good notes, and the quantity of the words marked for one hundred and twenty-five pages. Synonyms are given from Döderlein. Besides the Vocabulary, there is also a Geographical and Historical Index. So convenient a manual must make its way without much trouble.

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